---

Summary record of the Conference on "European Security and Defence Policy: the way ahead" held at the Bundestag, Berlin 6-7 February 2007

---

Summary record
of the Conference on "European Security and Defence Policy: the way ahead"
held at the Bundestag, Berlin
6-7 February 2007

---

THE MESSAGE FROM BERLIN
TO THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT
ON THE WAY AHEAD FOR
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

for their consideration ahead of the European Council meeting to be held on 25 March 2007
on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome

Berlin, 7 February 2007

Fifty years ago, six European states signed the Treaty of Rome. We applaud the progress made by these states and those who have joined them in the intervening years, towards a Europe with:

Now, fifty years on, the European Union exists and twenty-seven European countries have thrown their weight behind that initial endeavour.

Today the security of our societies, and the survival of our democratic values themselves are at risk from the emergence of new threats - terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, mass migration and organised crime - that affect not only the security of our continent but also the viability of our democratic principles.

We need to articulate common responses to these new common threats in relation to security and defence. This response must be closely coordinated with our allies in NATO.

We urge the European Heads of State and Government to make every effort to develop a European Security and Defence Policy based on:

Conference on

European Security and Defence Policy:
the Way Ahead

6 - 7 February 2007

Bundestag, Berlin

PROGRAMME

Tuesday 6 February
10.00	Opening of the Conference
	- President of the Bundestag, Dr Norbert Lammert
	- President of the Assembly, Jean-Pierre Masseret
10.30	First Sitting: "ESDP: political developments"
	Chairman: Mr Gerd Höfer (Socialist Group), Vice-President of the WEU Assembly and leader of the German Delegation
	Rapporteur: Charles Goerens (Luxembourg, Liberal Group), former President of the WEU Assembly
	Speakers:
	The ESDP in action : achievements and future prospects
	Claude-France Arnould, Director, Defence Aspects, Secretariat General, EU Council
	The strategic partnership between NATO and the EU after Riga
	Zoltan Nagy, Head of NATO Affairs and Multilateral Affairs Section, NATO HQ
	ESDP: Reality, Ambitions and Illusions
	Otfried Nassauer, Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security
	An outside view of ESDP
	Dr John C. Hulsman, Scholar in Residence, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
	Debate and Conclusions
14.30	Address by Reinhard Silberberg, Secretary of State for European Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, representing the German EU/WEU Presidency
	Second Sitting: "ESDP: operational developments"
	Chairman: Dr Karl A. Lamers,Vice-Chairman of the Bundestag Defence Committee and Vice-Chairman of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
	Rapporteur: Robert Walter (United Kingdom, Federated Group), Chairman of the Defence Committee
	Speakers:
	Operational developments?
	General Henri Bentégeat, Chairman of the EU Military Committee
	ESDP crisis-management operations: a German perspective
	General Johann-Georg Dora, Deputy Chief of Defence, Bundeswehr
	Lessons Identified from Operation ALTHEA
	General Giorgio Spagnol, Director of EU Operations, SHAPE
	Lessons learned from recent ESDP operations
	General Christian Damay, Force Commander, EUFOR DR Congo
	Lessons learned from SETAF operations
	Colonel Gordon B. Davis, Jr, Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff Southern European Task Force (Airborne)
	Debate and Conclusions
16.30	Third Sitting: "ESDP: capabilities and procurement"
	Chairman: Jean-Pierre Masseret, President of the Assembly
	Rapporteur: Mr Edward O'Hara (United Kingdom, Socialist Group), Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee
	Speakers:
	Improving Europe's defence performance
	Dick Zandee, Head of the Policy & Planning Unit, European Defence Agency
	The place of OCCAR in the European defence procurement debate
	Director of the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement (OCCAR-EA), General Nazzareno Cardinali
	Which defence industrial and technological base for Europe?
	Bernard Retat, Honorary Vice-President of Thales, Chairman of the Defence Committee of the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD)
	Consolidation of defence industries in Europe
	Maurizio Tucci, Chief Executive Officer of SELEX Communications Spa, Finmeccanica Group
	Consolidation of European defence sector space industries
	Gilles Maquet, Senior Vice President Institutional Relations, ASTRIUM
	Perspective of a global company on the European defence market
	Rolf Theodor Ocken, Military Advisor to the Board, Rolls-Royce Deutschland
	Central and eastern European countries: economic perspectives and role in the European defence market
	Wolfgang Hummel, Head, Division for Strategic Investment, State of Berlin Government
	Debate and Conclusions
Wednesday 7 February
09.30	Fourth Sitting: "ESDP: the role of parliamentarians"
	Chairman: Jean-Pierre Masseret, President of the Assembly
	Reports by the Leaders of the Political Groups following the Group seminars on 4 and 5 February:
	Robert Walter, Chairman of the Federated Group
	Theodoros Pangalos, Chairman of the Socialist Group
	Mike Hancock, Chairman of the Liberal Group
	Parliamentary control of ESDP - how to strengthen accountability?
	Dr Wolfgang Wagner, Senior Research Fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung)
	What role for national parliaments in ESDP?
	Hubert Haenel, Chairman of the European Affairs Committee, French Senate
12.00	Debate and Conclusions by the President of the Assembly and presentation of the Message from Berlin to be forwarded to Heads of State and Government with a view to the European Council meeting to be held on 25 March 2007 on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty

---

TUESDAY 6 FEBRUARY

Mr Lammert, President of the Bundestag (Translation) - Mr President, your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to welcome you all most warmly to Berlin, on the occasion of this parliamentary seminar being organised by the WEU Assembly here in the hemicycle of the Bundestag.

This is the third conference to have taken place in this building since the reunification of Germany. It is a pleasure for us once again to be able to host this parliamentary meeting here in Berlin.

In six weeks' time, also in Berlin, the European Union will be celebrating the 50^th anniversary of the Rome Treaties. In so doing it will be commemorating the first chapter of one of Europe's biggest common success stories.

At that time, when the Rome Treaties were signed by six founding states in order to provide the basis for the creation of a European Economic Community, probably no-one could have imagined that the 50^th anniversary of those treaties would be celebrated by twenty-seven member states from Eastern and Western Europe, and that this European Union would have long since gone beyond the integration of its economies and the creation of a common market and developed into a common political Union.

This is also a good time, in my view, to recall the fact that following the traumatic experience of two world wars which both started in Europe and in which no other country played a more decisive part than the one which I am representing today, this idea of pooling the economic potential of the European states was by no means the first and certainly not the only attempt to make a fresh start. It had been preceded by an ambitious plan for a European Defence Community, although the idea turned out to be not yet ripe, for as everyone knows it was agreed among the governments but failed to be ratified by the French National Assembly.

From these beginnings of a new Europe in the 1950s came a development which, both in terms of the nations involved and of the level of cooperation achieved these past fifty years, goes far beyond anything which would have been deemed realistic during the post-war years.

It is no mere coincidence that in this colloquy being opened today, we will be looking not only at general issues pertaining to the common development of Europe and possible further progress in the field of political cooperation, but also, precisely, at the challenges facing the European Security and Defence Policy. For we are all aware that there is a link between the political integration of the European Community, on the one hand, and the future prospects for a common European security policy, on the other, or at least that one cannot be organised entirely independently of the other. The fact that the opinions of the governments and parliaments of the member states of this Community and other European countries quite naturally diverge of course has consequences for the extent and intensity of cooperation in the area of ESDP. The growing importance attached in recent years to these issues and to the need for cooperation in this area is evident if only from the fact that the EU member states are now engaged in eleven missions on three continents, entailing not only operations in the field of police and justice but also military operations and observer missions. The European Union has long become a recognised player in the field of international crisis management. And if I am not mistaken, the expectations that other countries have of the European Union and its member states in terms of helping them overcome their problems and conflicts are now beginning to exceed the possibilities of the instruments actually available to us for that purpose.

This growing discrepancy, precisely, is the problem that we, both governments and parliaments, have to come to grips with. We must tackle the question of whether and to what extent we are able and willing to meet that demand for stronger European involvement in the settlement of international conflicts and of the conditions we must create in order to live up to those expectations and indeed to the goals that we have set ourselves. As we all realise, this has a range of implications of a political, economic, technological and of course military nature and raises a whole host of direct and indirect policy issues and questions about our priorities, including as regards our national budgets. Alone in terms of our defence spending and in order to ensure the most effective and targeted use of resources, there are a whole series of − to use a cautious term − `adjustments' that could be made well beyond the current national efforts being made in this respect.

Ladies and gentlemen, on 6 February 1888 − 119 years ago to the day − when conscription in the German Empire was extended to seven years, this building did not yet exist. And there was nothing remotely comparable at the time to the explicit constitutional responsibility that Parliaments now have for scrutinising the conditions in which the national armed forces are deployed.

Now the Constitution of this country gives the Bundestag an unparalleled − and some would also say, exemplary − role in decisions on the deployment of the armed forces, including, and indeed precisely when they are to be sent on external operations. The Bundestag decides whether at all and when, and for how long and under what conditions German soldiers may participate in operations abroad, which increasingly are being conducted in an international cooperative framework and more and more under European responsibility. This shows the extent of our responsibility and of the need for clarification among ourselves so that we are able in the future to take those decisions in a responsible fashion on behalf of our fellow citizens.

To that extent I have very high expectations of this conference. I wish you all an interesting and pleasant stay in Berlin and intensive, constructive and whenever necessary, also controversial debates during this conference. I hope that those discussions will lead to decisions that will provide important guidance for all of us in our national parliaments, but perhaps also for the European governments, when assuming our responsibilities for this immense task.

Many thanks. I am now happy to declare this conference open and to hand the chair to President Masseret.

Mr Masseret, President of the Assembly of WEU (Translation) - Mr President, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen,

I would first like to offer my thanks to you, Mr President of the Bundestag, for receiving us here in Berlin for this colloquy, initiated by our Assembly and devoted to the future of the European Security and Defence Policy.

My thanks go also to all of those who have devoted time and effort to ensure that these two days we are to spend together are a success.

Thanks finally to the people who will do us the honour of speaking during this colloquy. Their analyses and thoughts will be useful to us.

Our meeting is like an echo of the one held in this very place just one week ago at the initiative of the German government also on the ESDP and which brought together European representatives from the EU and NATO. The closeness in time of these two initiatives devoted to the same subject is in itself a useful opportunity to assess and compare their respective analyses.

I was very interested to read the speeches of the German Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Steinmeier, that of Mr Solana - Secretary General of the WEU among other things - and finally the declaration of the Secretary General of NATO, Mr de Hoop Scheffer. Today, it is the turn of the WEU parliamentarians to express their views. My speech will not be descriptive; I will not recount the history of the ESDP again. I simply want to ask the questions that to me seem essential.

The first question: What political role do we want for the EU in organising the world of the 21^st century? This is the decisive question that everything else follows on from.

We are aware of the geopolitical and geostrategic challenges before us. Faced with these challenges, what do we want? We all, I hope, in the times ahead want the EU to be a free and autonomous actor that is both respected and worthy of respect. A political actor taking its responsible place in the community of nations. A political, economic and social group able to defend and promote its approach towards the problems of modern society, its values, its scientific, technological, cultural and democratic potential.

If that is what we want, it is necessarily an ambitious political project that we must build. A political project that our fellow citizens expect, because they understand the future better than most politicians who nervously focus on the fears they attribute to their voters. It is from this clear political project that the Union's foreign policy and defence and security policy will emerge.

If the ESDP is at a standstill today, it is because upstream the political process itself is at a standstill. This situation is appalling. We must stop the constant search for a woolly consensus which, by trying to please everyone and leave no one out, jeopardises the strengths and values the Union still has.

The second subject for consideration: What do we think of the present concrete reality of the ESDP, what are our requirements and what suggestions do we have to give it more substance?

We cannot content ourselves with a self-satisfied pat on the back as our executives are often wont to do on the subject. True, there has been some progress, but there is still a long way to go. Mr Solana, who, in his role, regularly points out what is good in the ESDP, is increasingly emphasising the urgent need to do more, to do better, at the risk of the EU floundering if it does not do so.

In order to have an ESDP, it would be necessary to agree on which missions all the states would support fully, with conviction, thereby justifying the financial outlay to fulfil them. The Petersburg missions to which the ESDP is limited are too weak and their geographic scope too ill-defined to give any substance to the existence of an ESDP at the service of a European political project.

To have an ESDP, all the states would also have to agree to make an equivalent budgetary outlay relative to GDP. This is not the case. Too many of our European partners are free-riding on the ESDP.

We cannot ignore the permanent capability shortfalls in certain areas, which the capability development mechanism has not been able to make good. At the same time, we note that defence spending for the different states is disorganised, badly or not at all coordinated, and often even duplicated. The markets are fragmented.

What is lacking is trust between partners. Only 5% of the sums devoted to preparing our future defence are spent in the framework of European cooperative programmes. This lack of organisation, these contradictions and shortfalls give NATO its strength. Some people may be content with this, but here too, we must open our eyes.

Through the NRF (NATO Response Force), as part of a planning process, it is the United States that sets the technological objectives. This process may very soon lead Europe to technological subservience and to political subservience as a result. We want neither subservience nor confrontation. We want a balanced cooperation that respects the interests of all concerned.

Political responsibility requires us to look beyond the immediate future. For us Europeans, when talking of vital interests, looking ahead is to anticipate all possible scenarios, including one where the American big brother lets go of its little European brother's hand to serve its own interests. This is not something we should live in fear of, but something we should be aware of.

If we want the European Union to have the position it deserves in the international community, European defence must be urgently relaunched. Unless there is a new initiative, the movement is in danger of running out of steam, as a policy of small steps is not enough to further the ESDP process.

Three proposals could meet with unanimous approval. They would promote a better understanding of European construction:

It would cost us nothing, but it would attest to the existence of a shared common destiny.

But there are also a number of more difficult questions, requiring new and complex initiatives. One solution would be to formalise the acquis of the Constitutional Treaty still under discussion.

Apart from the permanent structured cooperation that, four years after the drafting of the relevant provisions, is no longer the subject of consensus, the question of democratic control of the ESDP needs to be settled.

In order to achieve democratic legitimacy, the Union should entrust an interparliamentary forum with the responsibility of monitoring and supporting the activities undertaken within the European institutions and at the intergovernmental level on essential matters of security and defence.

An interparliamentary forum is needed to bring together representatives of national parliaments and the European Parliament to discuss questions of security and defence. This forum is not intended to be a second European chamber, but a vital democratic link with citizens and public opinion. This project, which we in our Assembly wholeheartedly support, would provide us with a way forward.

Neither can we ignore the reality of the European Parliament, elected by universal suffrage, which also wants to have its say in European issues and that does so through a subcommittee of its foreign affairs committee. As a result the duality that exists more and more between the civil and the military can be seen in a certain number of areas such as the ESRP.

But we must go further in matters of military equipment. To do so we must face a difficult question: should we go forward at 27, or should a smaller group of countries be allowed to go further?

This question arises in the light of what exists in other areas. The euro and Schengen, for example. The mechanisms are up and running and yet not all member states have signed up to them.

Why not apply these examples to the area of defence? We could then imagine an enhanced Union in the field of defence, in the spirit of the founding treaty of WEU.

Such an enhanced Union would entail, for those states that were members of it, additional obligations regarding coordination of defence policies so that we might progress towards the goal of a common defence policy.

Such an enhanced Union might entail:

There are many subjects for debate. In the interests of our fellow citizens, we must get to grips with these issues and express ourselves freely in order to find common ground. What is at issue is the European area and, more importantly, the daily lives of our children, our buying power, and our industrial, economic and cultural activities. We are not experts in military technology; we are politically committed men and women who must find solutions in our areas of competence.

Finally, I will touch on EU-NATO relations as seen from the perspective of the ESDP.

I am a French parliamentarian and I would like to remind you of my country's attachment to the transatlantic link. France is a loyal member of NATO in every way. I am not against the transatlantic link, quite the contrary.

The question is that of the Europe's autonomous capacity for independent decision-making within the community of nations, not as rivals but as partners of NATO and the United States. The relaunch of the ESDP must necessarily take into account the EU's special relationship with NATO.

For many European governments, the relationship with the United States in matters of international security remains fundamental. For all that, I do not believe that the EU should deal only with civilian matters and leave the military aspects to NATO.

The EU needs military capabilities to be able to act on its own. We must not set out on a path that would not allow us to exist in our own right and defend our vital interests in the future.

You can see that there is no shortage of subjects. I have tried to tackle them head on, as woolly consensus has no place in political debate. Some people have one opinion, others think differently. The game of democracy consists in finding a peaceful solution to these differences and it is what we are going to try to do during these two days of debate on a subject that is central to the political future of the European Union: the European Security and Defence Policy.

Mr Goerens, Rapporteur (Luxembourg, Liberal Group), former President of the WEU Assembly stressed that although the Constitution had not been ratified, this did not stop Europeans from having a responsibility to act and respond to international crises. The ESDP to date had been successful with a number of police/civilian/military operations (most notably: the police mission in Bosnia, the border control mission in Rafah, the operation in Aceh and the more recent EUFOR RD Congo mission), however those successes had not been visible enough. His view was that our results needed "to be made more visible". The ESDP was not the reason for rejection of the Constitution by the peoples of two countries. Eurobarometer surveys showed that public opinion was in tune and perhaps even ahead of current developments and future expectations of the ESDP were high.

Mrs Arnould, Director, Defence Aspects, Secretariat General, EU Council. ESDP successes included its operations and recent structures such as the European Defence Agency (EDA), the EUMS operations centre and the European Defence College. However, developing capabilities and increasing budgetary efforts both needed to be given more political thought and priority at this point.

Recent operations in Bosnia and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had produced a number of achievements and successes:

Following the Congo Operation, it had become evident that more dialogue and cooperation should be developed with the United Nations and regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) in order to focus on better preparation for operations.

The ESDP needed:

Mr Nagy, Head of NATO Affairs and Multilateral Affairs Section, NATO HQ. stated that NATO-EU relations shaped the security architecture of the 21^st century and the EU was becoming a global political player through ESDP. The United States had also acknowledged this process and agreed that the ESDP provided an opportunity. NATO recently stated a stronger EU would further contribute to common security. What should be done to get the process right? The European Constitution held the key. The ESDP had to be compatible with the Alliance's common security and defence policies.

Why was cooperation between the two organisations still limited? The answer was simply to avoid duplication. Berlin Plus was no longer sufficient. Military and non-military aspects of crisis management had to go hand in hand. NATO and the EU both had capabilities which when combined could bring about progress in regions in crisis.

In Afghanistan, NATO possessed only military not civilian means to do the job. The latter could be provided by the UN and the EU.

The hurdles that needed to be surmounted were:

There was "peaceful cohabitation" rather than a "happy marriage" between the two but being overly ambitious would frighten those who were sceptical. Small steps were the way to building on operational realities:

NATO believed that a strategic partnership between the two organisations was never more important than at present. The ESDP - much like NATO - was a victim of its own success. High expectations however generated capability gaps. Therefore, instead of competing, the two organisations should seek synergies at both HQ and national levels.

Mr Nassauer, Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security described the ESDP as:

The ESDP faced a number of complex problems:

Because the ESDP had known recent successes, there was a tendency for Europe not to be sufficiently self-critical. However a lot remained to be done in the Balkans to achieve stability. EU-NATO relations in fact reflected EU-US relations. A successful ESDP should go beyond Berlin Plus; military tools alone were not enough, the future lay in civilian crisis-management capabilities.

Lastly, the ESDP lacked democratic legitimacy. There was not enough parliamentary control. This aspect needed discussion and developing in further detail.

Dr Hulsman, Scholar in Residence, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) noted that there had been a lack of understanding of the ESDP in the United States. The US, being NATO-centric, had always supported the idea of burden sharing, however perceptions there were changing following Iraq, multilateralism and civil-military management was now being accepted as the future.

Crises would arise where Europe would want to intervene alone (the Balkans were one example). If that allowed the US to take troops out of the Balkans it would be perceived a step forward.

How would future alliances be made, especially when institutions such as the UN and the WTO were not considered to be working very well? The sole response to that question which seemed to emerge was a mixture of ambiguity and agnosticism. But the US was definitely seeking something that worked. What did not work were wide disparities in defence spending (85%-15%) between Europe and the US. Policy must be developed, if the ESDP worked in certain parts of the world it meant the US did not need to be in those regions and that was a net advantage. If the list of current problems did not change the neo-conservatives would ignore Europe, and the growing trend of US under-involvement and isolationism, particularly following Iraq, would continue. The reality was that if problems were not solved by both sides of the Atlantic working together no one would care about the workings of the US-EU relationship. Now was the time to talk about policy and how institutions fitted into that. Unilateralism was not an option.

Mr Hancock (United Kingdom) asked where were the discussions on international policy with the United States when they were asked not to go to Iraq? Why hadn't the US listened? What was Javier Solana's role in WEU? Where was he? Were there solutions for Kosovo and Afghanistan? There was too much on institutions, not enough on parliaments.

Mr Vrettos (Greece) felt that Europe needed to speak with a single voice on global security policy. However, a direct dialogue between Europe and the US had to be established. The US should be at one and the same time a friend and strong ally and a supporter of Europe's security policy.

Lord Russell Johnston (United Kingdom) said that President Masseret was right in hoping that the EU would develop as an influential political entity. The nations of Europe had a common future and faced the same realities. Europe was made up of a number of small and large countries that needed to work closely together to deal with common threats. The national interests of those countries converged. As Mr Goerens said, public opinion was already ahead of the politicians. This had been illustrated by France and the Netherlands's rejection of the European Constitution. On the subject of Kosovo, he believed, like Mr Martti Ahtisaari, that Serbia had lost its moral right to govern Kosovo.

Mr Mercan (Turkey) observed that the EU was not good at security issues. If it were, the problems being discussed at present such as Afghanistan and Iraq would be discussed in a different light. The EU should not focus on its successes but on its mistakes. Security and defence policy should be in line with NATO policy, when it came to things like burden sharing for example. The realities had to be faced. Lives were being lost and there was little control over this. Policy had to be formulated and strategically-oriented approaches devised.

Mr Glockner (Vice-President of Eurodefence, Luxembourg) noted that after operations had been conducted, reconstruction was needed in post conflict or crisis areas. Increased aid should be given as the US was tied down in Iraq.

Mr Menier (Vice-President Eurodefence, France) made the point that the borderlines between security and defence were less and less visible. The Assembly should engage in more debate on these issues not only in committees but in plenary session as well.

Baroness Knight (UK) was convinced of the need for public support and of the need to explain what was meant by terms such as the Rapid Reaction Force. Reaction against whom, or what? An invasion or an earthquake? Each country could have a different foreign policy but there was a need to be clear in what was said and explain matters to the various electorates to win their support.

The Rapporteur concluded that many interesting and encouraging views had been expressed during the first sitting. Should the ESDP develop a medium to long-term vision? Should the EU develop as a single state and could the ESDP be a state policy? European institutional engineering had helped progress despite external pressures. The problems of EU-NATO relations were really problems between Europe and the United States. However, in some ways the EU was clearly at a disadvantage - for example on account of its lack of visibility because of not having a foreign minister.

Mr Silberberg, Secretary of State for European Affairs, representing the German WEU-EU Presidency, remarked that the ESDP was one of the EU's most dynamic policy areas, with 10 operations on three continents in 2006. The German Presidency had set itself three main priorities with a view to further developing and broadening the ESDP: dealing with ongoing crisis-management operations; further developing crisis-management capabilities and deepening the EU's strategic partnerships (including with the UN and NATO). The ESDP was one in a range of instruments (together with political, diplomatic and economic tools) that the EU could use to attain its foreign and security policy objectives. It had an important civilian component which must be developed on an equal footing with the military component: this indeed was the purpose of the 2008 Civilian Headline Goal. At the recent conference on "ESDP: quo vadis?" organised jointly by the German Foreign Affairs Ministry and the EU Institute for Security Studies the question had been raised, in the light of the lessons learned from the EU operation in the Congo, whether the EU had sufficient planning and command capabilities for its future operations. Mr Solana had proposed the creation of a new civilian headquarters in Brussels for the command of all future ESDP civilian operations, such as the possible EU mission in Kosovo. The European Security Strategy provided the framework for the ESDP's strategic development but the Constitutional Treaty was also important and Germany would make every effort at the upcoming Council meeting in June to maintain the substance of that Treaty. All in all the ESDP was a "success story": it was the policy area that had undergone the most rapid and dynamic development and that was the most unequivocally supported by European citizens. Governments and parliaments alike could be proud of what had been achieved.

Chairman: Dr Karl A. LAMERS, Vice-Chairman of the Bundestag Defence Committee and Vice-Chairman of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly

General Bentegeat, Chairman of the EU Military Committee, outlined the operational developments required for ESDP to meet security needs: information superiority, long-term crisis management and cooperation between all the different actors on the ground.

For operational purposes, the EU was adapting its structures, instruments and modes of action in order to develop an overall crisis-management capability. The aim was to ensure security in a country or region through military action and at the same time to stabilise, rebuild and restore the rule of law through civilian means.

As from 1 January 2007, a single body, the SIAC (Single Intelligence Assessment Capacity), formed by the juxtaposition of the "Situation Centre" (SITCEN) and the "Intelligence Division", became responsible for the collection and dissemination of intelligence within the EU. The intelligence it provides is global, complete, cross-checked and confirmed. Structures had also been streamlined in the field of management of EU civilian and military operations.

Civilian and military instruments had to be coordinated at all levels of the chain of command, in Brussels first and foremost. This idea had led to the planned creation of a "civilian chain of command" involving the appointment of a Civilian Operation Commander, supported by a Civilian Operations Headquarters in Brussels, who would have direct authority over the heads of civilian missions on the ground. Strategic planning for both civilian and military operations would be conducted in the Civilian/Military Cell.

It was also important for the European Union to have a "Watch-keeping Centre" within the Operations Centre, responsible for collecting and disseminating information coming out of or going into the theatre of operations. This was only in the planning stage, however, and needed to be consolidated and approved by the Council.

As regards instruments, General Bentegeat welcomed the development of two concepts. The first, the "Crisis Response Team", a civilian concept, was in the process of being established and would provide the Union with a pool of qualified civilian personnel (magistrates, administrators, etc). The second, which was military, was the "BG 1500" concept, operational since 1 January 2007. These land forces nevertheless needed to be supplemented by a naval and air capability. The European Union had two weak points to overcome: strategic transport and logistics. These two factors were crucial for ensuring a rapid response to an emergency situation.

In conclusion, General Bentegeat underlined the overall success of the civilian and military operations conducted by the European Union and the key role played by civilian/military cooperation in strengthening the credibility of the European Union.

General Dora, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr, recalled that Germany's security was inseparably linked with the political development of the European Union. As a member of both the EU and NATO, Germany subscribed to the idea of effective multilateralism. It was involved in a large number of international peacekeeping and security operations in the United Nations framework.

Four of the 16 EU-led operations were purely military missions. Germany's contribution to these was as follows:

During the initial phases of Operation Artemis, the Bundeswehr had contributed strategic air transport and medical evacuation assets;

Germany's commitment to multilateral action was also visible in the implementation of the battlegroup concept. Germany was involved in providing the Union with operational forces on a rotational basis and for a standby period of six months. Since 1 January 2007 Germany had been participating together with Finland and the Netherlands in one of the battlegroups on standby.

Similarly, in the second half of 2008, Germany would be joining with France to form a battlegroup in which Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain would also participate.

Furthermore, Germany would be making substantial contributions as a partner nation in several other battlegroups.

The German, Portuguese and Slovenian Tri-Presidency had underlined the need to enhance the EU's military rapid-response capabilities, drawing on all the services.

In the future the ESDP would be confronted with a growing need for crisis prevention and management. Crises and conflicts were becoming increasingly complex. Operations would therefore require a comprehensive approach combining military and non-military instruments.

ESDP efforts needed to include post-conflict support and ensure coherence between the civilian and military aspects of crisis management. It was also necessary to strive for coherence between Commission and Council policies and among the partners of the international community.

Such effective multilateralism called for efficient cooperation and complementary action between the EU on the one hand, and the United Nations and/or NATO, on the other.

Cooperation with other regional organisations such as the African Union needed to be enhanced.

It was necessary for EU operations to be conducted on the basis of a UN mandate and for the member states to preserve their autonomy as regards the decision on whether or not to participate in such operations.

Regarding areas where progress needed to be made, the Union would have to look into ESDP force-generation procedures and issues of command and control. Mandates for future operations needed to be more robust and cover all phases of operations, including redeployment. A number of questions arose in that regard:

Regarding the military aspects, member states were making efforts to overcome shortfalls in areas such as command and control, reconnaissance, effective engagement, sustainability and protection.

In conclusion, it should be stressed that security could not be guaranteed by any one nation alone. Effective multilateralism and a networked approach combining all available civil and military instruments were therefore essential. The European states needed to work more closely together and with their partners. The ESDP needed to continue to adapt to the changing nature and scope of crisis-management operations.

General Spagnol, Director of EU Operations, SHAPE, set out to explain how the Berlin Plus arrangements worked and the lessons learned from recent EU operations, in particular EUFOR Althea in Bosnia.

Recalling that the Berlin Plus arrangements made provision for giving the EU access to NATO's planning capabilities and for the potential availability of NATO assets and capabilities (communications systems, etc) for EU crisis-management purposes, he listed all the problems that needed to be solved in order to establish practical cooperation between the EU and NATO.

There was an EU Operations Headquarters within SHAPE (EU OHQ) for the planning and command of operations conducted in the Berlin Plus framework. It had been set up for Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at the beginning of 2003. The personnel had stayed on at SHAPE until the end of 2003 to deal with Operation Althea (Bosnia), which led to an EU Staff Group (EUSG) being established in May 2004 at SHAPE. For Operation Althea the EU had access to "NATO common assets and capabilities". In practice, this meant that the whole of SHAPE was used as the EU Operations Headquarters (EU OHQ), the core planning and coordination element of which was the EUSG.

As planned, the Chairman of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) was the point of contact for the Operation Commander (OP CDR), a European general who was also Deputy SACEUR. The Operation Commander (OP CDR) commanded the operation in Bosnia through the NATO (European) Command Headquarters in Naples, as it was this command that was responsible for the Balkans region within NATO.

For this operation NATO provided the EU with command structure elements (HQ at Mons, Naples and Sarajevo with staff officers), communications and information systems and intelligence.

The Berlin Plus arrangements were found to have worked properly. Given the planning times for such an operation, appointment of an Operation Commander (OP CDR) and agreement on the use of NATO intelligence by the EU should take place as soon as possible and national caveats must be known well in advance.

The question of security arrangements for access to confidential NATO documents and equipment was still a problem. Furthermore, Berlin Plus did nothing to solve the question of task-sharing between NATO and the EU in the event of an emerging crisis, although both organisations recognised the need to cooperate within a strategic partnership.

General Spagnol felt that the existing NATO-EU relationship needed to be rethought to ensure better cooperation in the face of current threats and made the following proposals:

A coordinated and comprehensive approach was needed, drawing on the best capabilities of each organisation. There was a need for a comprehensive civilian and military approach to crisis management and the EU had a unique capacity to combine civilian and military instruments, as could be seen in Bosnia (military, police, monitoring, Commission programmes).

NATO and the EU had to revitalise their consultation at every level, working out shared strategic views and encouraging burden-sharing and synergy. In this context, the role of the Deputy SACEUR was pivotal.

General Damay, Force Commander, EUFOR stated that EUFOR RD Congo was the EU's second operation in the DRC, following Operation Artemis in 2003, which had already left its mark as an effective military operation with clearly defined objectives. The aim of EUFOR RD Congo, launched following a decision by the EU Council on 12 June 2006 in application of UN Security Council Resolution 1671, was to provide support to MONUC during the electoral period in the DRC. Germany provided the operational command of the mission from its Operation Headquarters (OHQ) in Potsdam, while the Force Headquarters (FHQ) was in Kinshasa. The mission, which lasted from mid-July to mid-December 2006, involved 2 400 soldiers, divided between an Advance Party in Kinshasa and an On Call Force stationed in Gabon, using the French military structures pre-positioned there. In addition, a French strategic reserve force was kept on standby at its home base in France. 18 of the 21 contributing nations participated in the deployment of the force in the theatre of operations.

The aim of this force during its five month stay was to provide, on a day-to-day basis, a visible and credible presence in order to deter potential troublemakers during the electoral process while providing reassurance to the local population. It was nevertheless obliged to intervene significantly during the violent clashes that broke out on 21 and 22 August in Kinshasa following the announcement of the results of the first round of the elections, in which 23 people were officially reported killed and more than 40 wounded. A Spanish rapid reaction company formed a buffer force together with a MONUC unit, an action that was unanimously recognised as being decisive for safeguarding the electoral process and demonstrating once and for all the impartiality and deterrent capacity of the European force.

The UN mandate expired, as planned, on 30 November 2006, four months after the first round of the presidential election. However, it took until Christmas for most of the units to redeploy to Europe, a process which fortunately went smoothly despite the lack of specific rules of engagement to cover this delicate phase of the operation.

This positive result was only possible because the operation was part of a coherent set of actions taken by the European Union from the beginning of the transition phase in 2003. Those actions included, in addition to intensive diplomatic activity, the creation of the European Development Fund and of a 250-strong observer mission commanded by General Morillon and deployed all over the country during the elections. The ESDP played its part, well before the arrival of EUFOR even, with its EUPOL mission in support of the Congolese police and EUSEC mission for the reconstruction of the DRC armed forces. Thus the military intervention was an extension of the EU's political action and a demonstration of its resolve to obtain results.

Cooperation with the UN was another highlight of this mission. EUFOR was the EU's response to a request from MONUC for reinforcements during the electoral period, particularly in the fields of intelligence, rapid reaction and crowd control. Although the force's capabilities only partially met those expectations, cooperation was nevertheless a success. However, in the light of past experience and with a view to future joint interventions it would be necessary to define more clearly the operational decision-making level within the UN and EU chains of command in accordance with the scale and degree of urgency of the action to be taken.

The chain of command on the European side provided political control of the operation, with the strategic decision-making centre in Brussels, the strategic command (OHQ) in Potsdam, Germany, and a French tactical command (FHQ) in Kinshasa. This proved to be a complex and unwieldy chain of command for a 2 400-strong force deployed on the ground and clearly there was a need to explore various avenues for progress in order to see, in particular, whether it would not be preferable for the OHQ and FHQ command levels to be provided by the same nation, or whether a permanent OHQ which could then work directly with the FHQ(s) on the ground should not be set up in Brussels.

EUFOR RD Congo provided a formidable testing ground for the ESDP. The success of the operation depended on meeting a threefold challenge: supporting the Congolese people in their unshakeable resolve to at last live in peace; creating a light but highly professional European force with state-of-the-art equipment and capable of long-duration autonomous deployment far from its home base in order to enable the EU to meet its political objectives of stabilising the DRC and the Great Lakes Region; and finally, bringing together soldiers from all over Europe under the same banner in order to form a coherent, motivated and united force.

However the success of the operation needed to be placed in perspective: the favourable course of events - the fact that all the security problems had been concentrated in Kinshasa - had made the task of the force easier. From the military standpoint it would seem that the lessons learned from past experience were not all taken into account, starting with those learned from Operation Artemis (the importance of combined civil and military intervention and the need to include the deployment and withdrawal phases in the duration of the mandate). As a result the same problems were encountered as three years previously. It was therefore to be hoped that the next EU operation would take on board the numerous lessons learned from the EUFOR RD Congo operation.

Colonel Davis, SETAF, Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff presented SETAF (Southern European Task Force), whose headquarters are in Vicenza, Italy.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the restructuring of NATO and US forces in Europe, SETAF was tasked to redefine its mission from one of territorial defence and logistics support to projection. Its current mission was to deploy rapidly as the core of a task force or to be combined with a rapid reaction force. It therefore served mainly as a rapid reaction force.

Since 1994, SETAF had been deployed in a dozen or so crises in the Balkans, Africa, and in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Colonel Davis addressed three lessons learned from SETAF operations:

The first concerned training. Civilian leaders expected their militaries to be ready to go when needed. They expected them to know their job, be thoroughly trained for it and have the right equipment ready for use. The troops therefore had to have regular training throughout the year and focused training just before deployment.

SETAF troop training was based on a two-year cycle. It was synchronised with the change of commanders and regular staff rotations. One of the key aspects of training this task force, as with all US Army training in fact, was the use of external observers as experienced instructors for officer training.

For SETAF's subordinate units the training cycle was normally annual. It was designed to maintain a high state of training readiness to deploy on short notice, which required programming the right frequency of high quality training.

The second lesson: the importance of cultural awareness. It was important to develop and refine cultural awareness before and during deployments. This meant familiarising the troops with the language or languages, the history, customs, values and current politics of the peoples of a nation or region. Their approach was to seek out people (military or civilian) with particular experience in the area of operation and integrate them in pre-deployment training or where possible actual deployment.

This approach included collaboration with national embassies and seeking advice and information from allies with expertise. He recalled that this was a major investment in time and effort for every operation.

Finally, the third lesson learned was the importance of being able to work with coalition partners. SETAF normally worked with traditional NATO partners. This could be done in a formal or informal manner. Operations conducted in the Balkans and Afghanistan formally involved NATO. In Africa, however, SETAF was supported by its European allies. This was understandable given Europe's strong historical ties with Africa. For example, in Rwanda, SETAF worked closely with French forces.

Coalition operations meant training leaders and units and employing systems and procedures for interoperability. Ideally it meant compatible equipment and common references and values. At a minimum, it meant complementary capabilities, information sharing systems and mutual trust among the different leaders.

SETAF had benefited from years of association with NATO forces. It had conducted bilateral and multilateral exercises and regularly conducted unit and individual exchanges with other NATO countries.

Finally, Colonel Davis stressed that to truly integrate these lessons required two conditions. Firstly, adequate resources had to be available and this required political will and economic support. Secondly, military organisations had to be learning organisations, which required the development of a mindset that favoured learning, adaptation and change.

Mr Walter, Rapporteur, thanked the Generals and Colonel Davis for giving an interesting military perspective, as well as his parliamentary colleagues for their contributions to the debate. The different speakers had pointed not only to the EU's successes, but also to a number of problems, in particular the issues of caveats, the funding of operations and the effective planning and control of operations, which needed to be tackled in order to provide the ESDP with a way ahead.

Mr Zandee, Head of the Policy & Planning Unit, European Defence Agency described the European Defence Agency's role and working methods. The EDA was not an "armaments agency", it was capability-led. Its work was guided by the future needs of Europe's armed forces, which should determine Research & Technology (R&T) investment choices and make for armaments cooperation across national borders as well as steering the supply side industry.

The US invested a lot more than Europe in the future of its military: 32% of the American defence budget of over 400 billion dollars per year was spent on R&D and equipment procurement, whilst Europe only spent around 18% of its annual budget of 193 billion euros on investing in future capabilities. Of even greater concern, Europe was wasting scarce euros by investing largely on a national basis: only 20% of equipment was procured jointly and around 12% of defence R&T went on cooperative projects.

What money was available in Europe had to be spent more wisely and in closer cooperation.

To steer R&T and future acquisition, the EDA had developed a Long-Term Vision which looked at the most likely developments in the global context, future trends in science and technology and the most likely