The WEU associate members and the new European security architecture

RECOMMENDATION 665

on the WEU associate members and the new European security architecture

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

(submitted by Mr Martínez Casañ, Rapporteur, and Mr Adamczyk, co-Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

II. Associate member status: creation and development

(a) From Maastricht to Ostend

(b) From Amsterdam to Helsinki

III. The present position - participation by associate members

(a) Involvement in WEU's political structures

(b) Participation in the work of the Assembly

(c) Involvement in armaments cooperation

(d) Associate members' contribution to WEU's operational development

IV. Prospects - the aftermath of the Cologne and Helsinki Decisions

V. Conclusions

on the WEU associate members and the new European security architecture

The Assembly,

1. Aware of the crucial importance of the WEU associate member countries to peace and security in Europe;
2. Taking account of the central role of the associate members in all WEU institutions since the creation of associate member status;
3. Welcoming the stated readiness of the six countries concerned to continue to contribute to European defence through its new institutions;
4. Noting with concern, however, that neither the Cologne nor the Helsinki European Councils gave a clear response to the matter of an appropriate form of participation for associate members in the new Common European Security and Defence Policy;
5. Recalling Decision 23 adopted at the special session of the Assembly in Lisbon;
6. Noting with concern that the level of participation of the associate members in the ESDP may not match up to that currently offered them in WEU, given that the Helsinki European Council reaffirmed that such participation will be "without prejudice to the Union's decision-making autonomy";
7. Noting with concern therefore that the associate members may be consulted only in the event of NATO assets being used or where their own national forces are involved in peace operations, while their current participation in WEU is analogous to that of the full members;
8. Noting with concern that contrary to the spirit of Amsterdam, the European Council no longer plans to absorb WEU acquis in its entirety, including associate member participation, and envisages taking only WEU's operational aspects into the ESDP;
9. Expressing its disquiet that, to the extent that all WEU structures are not to be taken into the European Union in the immediate future and that the associate members are not represented in the ESDP interim bodies, their ability to play a continuing part in European defence may be compromised,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Endeavour to secure for the associate members participation rights in the new security and defence architecture that are at least equivalent to those they at present enjoy in WEU;
2. Encourage a global agreement with the group of six countries concerned such that their rights and obligations are laid down in a clear and uniform way;
3. Ensure that when certain WEU structures are transferred to the EU, associate member participation remains at present levels;
4. Support the Assembly's intention to offer the associate members participation rights that are at least equivalent to the present arrangements once it is transformed into an interim security and defence assembly, in accordance with the decision taken in Lisbon;
5. Support the transfer of an equivalent of the present parliamentary dimension of WEU to the European security and defence framework in accordance with Assembly Decision 23 adopted in Lisbon;
6. Secure participation for the associate members in the work of the interim bodies set up in the ESDP framework.

(submitted by Mr Martínez Casañ, Rapporteur, and Mr Adamczyk, co-Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Since the decision of the WEU Bremen Ministerial (11 May 1999) which endorsed the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to associate member status, the group of WEU associate members, a highly active element of European defence as it has been organised in WEU for the past decade, consists of non-EU European NATO member countries. It should be noted that associate member status, which initially concerned Turkey, Norway and Iceland, was provided for under a declaration on the part of WEU member states annexed to the Maastricht Treaty of 10 December 1991.
2. The WEU Assembly has an obvious interest in its six highly valued associates participating both in peacekeeping missions and in the decision-making process within the structures of the new European defence architecture. It would be inconceivable indeed for the new Common European Security and Defence Policy to mean a reduction in the NATO European Allies' involvement in the building of European defence.
3. The conundrum of how to preserve the WEU associate members' acquired rights when WEU's tasks are transferred to the EU has become more and more complicated since the Saint Malo Declaration of 4 December 1998, on a possible merger between WEU and the EU. In fact the recent European Council summit meetings held in Cologne and Helsinki have left vague such matters as the arrangements for associate member participation and avoided coming down firmly on the issue of how they will have a say in EU decisions and actions.
4. The situation appears the more interesting given that, since 1 March 2000, the European Union has created interim bodies with responsibility for implementing the new security and defence policy. Other matters dealt with up to the present by the WEU Permanent Council, the Military Committee and the Military Staff, will be transferred by stages, but speedily, to the EU interim bodies. However, the form in which our associate members will be able to play their part in those bodies is far from being decided. Moreover, our own Assembly, which, as a result of the decision taken at its special session in Lisbon in March, plans to transform itself into an interim body exercising parliamentary scrutiny over the new European Security and Defence Policy, has no doubt that the associate members should be included fully in its activities with an analogous or even an enhanced status as compared to the one they have at present.
5. This report has been supplemented by the discussions that took place during the colloquy on the status of WEU associate members arranged by the Political Committee in Oslo on 7 February and the debates in the framework of the special session in Lisbon on 21 March. Your Rapporteurs first outline the background to the development of the relationship between WEU and its associate members and then proceed to give an account of the very important contribution the various countries have made to the different WEU bodies and the activities of the Organisation, in order to demonstrate the political absurdity of allowing this valuable acquis to go to waste. Lastly, they conclude that the six WEU associate members, with their earlier excellent record of activity in WEU and their highly promising future potential for contributing to the building of a real European defence should continue to participate under the same conditions as at present in the new European institutions which are currently taking shape within the ESDP framework.

II. Associate member status: creation and development

(a) From Maastricht to Ostend

6. Associate member status in WEU was officially created on 10 December 1991 through a declaration by WEU member states, for those European countries members of NATO which did not belong to the European Union.
7. The WEU member countries then invited the states concerned to become associate members of WEU in such a way that would give them the possibility "of participating fully in the activities of WEU". The declaration of principle adopted in Maastricht was subsequently clarified in some detail in Part III of the Petersberg Declaration "on relations between WEU and the other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance". The WEU Ministers at that juncture recalled the basic principles on which relations between WEU full member states and WEU associate member states should be based:

• settlement of their mutual differences by peaceful means, in accordance with the obligations arising out of the modified Brussels Treaty, the North American Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the commitments entered into under the terms of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, and the other generally recognised principles and rules of international law;
• in their mutual relations, refraining from resorting to the threat or use of force, in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

8. They also emphasised - apparently with the tensions that existed at the time between Greece and Turkey in mind - that the security guarantees and defence commitments in the treaty which binds the member states within Western European Union and the one which binds them within the Atlantic Alliance were mutually reinforcing and could not be invoked by those subscribing to Part III of the Petersberg Declaration in disputes arising between member states of either of the two organisations.
9. European member states of the Atlantic Alliance which have accepted the invitation to become associate members of WEU, although not being parties to the modified Brussels Treaty, may participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council - subject to the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty - of its working groups and of the subsidiary bodies, subject to the following provisions:

• "at the request of a majority of the member states, or of half of the member states including the Presidency, participation may be restricted to full members;
• they will be able to be associated with the Planning Cell through a permanent liaison arrangement;
• they will have the same rights and responsibilities as the full members for functions transferred to WEU from other fora and institutions to which they already belong (in other words the Eurogroups transferred from the Atlantic Alliance to WEU);
• they will have the right to speak but may not block a decision that is the subject of consensus among the member states;
• they may associate themselves with the decisions taken by member states and participate in their implementation unless a majority of the member states, or half of the member states including the Presidency, decide otherwise;
• they will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they commit forces;
• they will accept in full the substance of Section A of Part III of the Petersberg Declaration which will form part of the association document;
• they will be connected to the member states' telecommunications system (WEUCOM) for messages concerning meetings and activities in which they participate;
• they will be asked to make a financial contribution to the organisation's budgets."

10. The status of the associate members is also defined in the "Document on associate membership" approved by the Rome Ministerial Council held on 20 November 1992, with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Iceland, Norway and Turkey, which states that they may associate themselves with the decisions taken by member states and paragraph 3, indent 5 of the same document reiterates that they will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they commit forces.
11. Hence the Rome Declaration lays down the broad outline of the status of associate member which came into force on 6 March 1995. This official status was however to evolve as a result of the Ostend (19 November 1996), Brussels (22 July 1997), Erfurt (18 November 1997), Bremen (11 May 1999) and Luxembourg (23 November 1999) Declarations, the content of which is summarised below.
12. The Ostend Declaration issued on 19 November 1996 represented a landmark in the development of the status of the associate members in that it established genuine armaments cooperation with those countries. In practical terms the ministers acknowledged their right to participate on an equal footing with the other WEU nations in the activities of the Western European Armaments Organisation which they were in the process of setting up.
13. The Brussels and Erfurt Declarations contributed to the enhancement of associate member involvement in WEU activities. In the Brussels Declaration, ministers provided that WEU should examine the possibility of maximum participation in its activities by associate members in accordance with their status in the fields of armaments, space and military studies. The Erfurt Declaration endorsed the steps taken already and tasked the Council to pursue the process.
14. At the Ministerial Council meeting in Bremen on 11 May 1999, the WEU member states adopted a Declaration on the new associate members: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and recalled "the essential importance of the full participation, in accordance with their status and relevant documents, of associate members in all aspects of the preparation, planning and conduct of WEU Petersberg operations". In terms of participation by the associate members the ministers made no distinction between European Union-led operations and those where recourse was had to NATO assets and capabilities.

(b) From Amsterdam to Helsinki

15. The Treaty of Amsterdam, which was signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999 and which revised the arrangements covering the CFSP, was an important step towards the creation of a European Security and Defence Identity. Article 17.1 (ex Article J.7.1) states that "Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the Union, providing the Union with access to operational capability ... It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy ... The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with WEU with a view to the possibility of integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide".
16. Article 17.3 (ex Article J.7.3) further states that "The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications".
17. Although the Treaty nowhere provides explicitly for the participation of the WEU associate members in WEU-led operations under European Union auspices, such participation was regarded as an acquis deriving from the Petersberg Declaration, with associate members participating on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they committed forces, irrespective of whether they were EU-led operations carried out through WEU using European assets or operations with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.
18. The Amsterdam Treaty therefore paves the way for the definition of a common defence policy making it possible to give the European Union a defence capability and responsibilities without creating divisions between EU member states and other European allies.
19. In December 1998, at the Saint Malo Franco-British Summit, the need for the European Union to be in a position to play its full part on the international stage was referred to in a declaration which supported a European defence organisation within the framework of the European Union. The leaders of the two nations also stated that "To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises". A project such as this which envisages the Union acquiring its own operational capability, implies that if pointless duplication is to be avoided, WEU's integration must be envisaged within an intergovernmental pillar of the European Union, the CFSP.
20. The Saint Malo Declaration therefore threw wide the debate on a possible WEU/EU merger, raising questions about the participation of the associate members in the new European security and defence structures that are to replace WEU. This in turn raises the issue of the involvement of the WEU associate members and associate partners - which by definition are not members of the European Union - in any new common defence policy resulting from WEU's integration into a Community pillar.
21. Clearly then, there is a need to consider the conditions for bringing WEU within the European Union, so that such transfer does not involve any diminution of the rights and obligations of countries that do not belong to the European Union but rather makes it possible to consolidate their contribution to building a European Security and Defence Identity.
22. The possibility must in any event be considered of associate members, which are not European Union member states, continuing to be part of the machinery governing decision-making in defence matters. For WEU's transfer to the CFSP not to curtail the associate members' acquired rights in the Organisation there would need to be separation of the CFSP from the Community pillar, since any restriction on their involvement would call into question the process begun within the WEU framework with a view to the establishment of a European collective security system. WEU is in fact helping to create a vast area of peace and security in Europe.
23. The Atlantic Alliance is far from viewing a possible - albeit relative - marginalisation of some of its allies in the new European defence architecture with equanimity. Hence, the American Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, remarked on the subject in an article published in the Financial Times on 7 December 1998 that any institutional change should be consistent with the basic principles of the Atlantic Alliance. She went on to say that there were three pitfalls, which she referred to as the "three Ds", that must be avoided. These were:

• decoupling: the European institutional decision-making process should not become dissociated from the wider one of the Atlantic Alliance;
• duplication of NATO and EU military structures;
• discrimination against NATO members that were not also members of the European Union.

24. This third pitfall is of particular concern to the associate members which fall into this last category. It is essential that ESDI should not take a form which discriminates against them.
25. The Atlantic Alliance made a statement for the first time on the development of the European Union's role in security and defence in a communiqué released at NATO's Washington Summit on 24 April 1999. After applauding the new impetus given to strengthening a Common European Security and Defence Policy by the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Saint Malo Declaration the Allies took stock of the implications of the process for those European members among them who were not also EU members.
26. In this connection the Allies made the following statement: "We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU" (paragraph 9 (d) of the Washington Communiqué).
27. The outcome of the Washington Summit therefore shows that the Allies want rights acquired by associate members in the WEU framework to be preserved and do not want the latter to be excluded from the future European security and defence structures.
28. At the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Bremen on 10 and 11 May 1999, the Ministers warmly welcomed the participation in WEU by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland which they emphasised was "a significant contribution to the security of Europe and an important step towards strengthening WEU in the perspective of a common European policy in security and defence".
29. The ministers recalled the essential importance of the full participation, in accordance with their status and relevant documents, of associate members in all aspects of the preparation, planning and conduct of WEU Petersberg operations (Declaration on the new associate members of WEU: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland attached to the Bremen Declaration).
30. The Bremen Declaration in itself was regarded as very disappointing. The WEU Ministers took no decision on the future status of associate members in defence Europe and it was greatly to be regretted that they made no reference to their full participation. They remained very vague on that score, taking the view that developing European security and defence "would serve the interests of all WEU nations" and thus left it up to the Council to determine specifically what the status of associate member would entail.
31. The WEU Ministers did not follow the Assembly's recommendation (Recommendation 642 on WEU and European defence: beyond Amsterdam, Document 1636, 15 March 1999) to propose to the European Council, that when WEU's powers were transferred to the European Union, the latter guarantee that the WEU associate member and partner countries will continue to enjoy the rights of participation they currently have in that Organisation.
32. There were many who expected the Cologne European Council to take the decisive step, in line with the spirit of Amsterdam and for which Saint Malo appeared to have paved the way, towards merging WEU with the European Union. However, the Cologne European Council was in fact a step backwards in terms of what the Amsterdam Treaty had envisaged, since it did no more than provide for the inclusion of certain of WEU's functions within the European Union. The Cologne Declaration is silent on at least on two important issues: it does not mention the future of WEU as a whole and goes no way at all towards proposing any solution even in outline as regards the future position of the WEU associate countries (associate members and associate partners) in relation to the new European defence architecture.
33. In fact what is abundantly clear from the Cologne Declaration is that the European Council no longer envisages WEU's integration as such into the EU; rather the intention is to create a number of new bodies within the European Union - similar to those that currently exist in WEU - so that the Union can take on its new responsibilities for Petersberg missions. The European Council, which made reference to its determination for the European Union to have the assets and capabilities necessary to take on its foreign policy responsibilities, seemed not to want to take advantage of the cumulative experience embodied in the entire range of existing WEU structures, opting on the contrary for a gradual, piecemeal approach. If the European Council holds to this position, a question mark hangs over a large part of WEU's institutional and operational acquis, including the substantial defence cooperation established with the associate members. It is also to be regretted that the Council's interest is confined to the operational side of WEU, and that it has reservations about taking on board other very important aspects of its architecture, such as Article V, or essential aspects of cooperation (for example over armaments) between countries that form part of the WEU family.
34. In the Cologne Declaration the European Council stated with particular reference to forms of participation on the part of and cooperation with associate members, that it intended to set up:

"... satisfactory arrangements for European NATO members who are not EU member states to ensure their fullest involvement in EU-led operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within WEU;

"... arrangements to ensure that all participants in an EU-led operation will have equal rights in respect of the conduct of that operation, without prejudice to the principle of the EU's decision-making autonomy, notably the right of the Council to discuss and decide matters of principle and policy;".

35. As far as associate member participation is concerned, the European Council is here again concerning itself only with the operational aspects of WEU. At present the associate members not only take part in operations but also in drawing up WEU's defence policy, including operational planning and preparation, and this contribution by the associate members at all levels and to practically all areas of WEU's work is, in your Rapporteurs' view, one of WEU's most important acquis.
36. Moreover, in the particular area of WEU's responsibilities constituted by Petersberg operations, the European Union's intention is not to guarantee to preserve WEU associate members' existing rights of participation in the WEU Council, its subsidiary bodies and the Assembly of WEU in their entirety, but only to "ensure their fullest possible involvement", which will inevitably lead to the loss of part of their present entitlement and, more important still, to a de facto division of Europe into several "classes" of country, leading to a decrease, rather than an increase in the security of our continent.
37. Finally, the European Council has decided that implementation of the EU's new responsibilities for crisis management is to be a CFSP responsibility. At present the CFSP covers only European Union member states and there are no plans for the time being for associate member involvement in decisions on defence taken in the CFSP framework.
38. The European Council meeting in Helsinki on 10 and 11 December 1999, taking as its basis the guidelines it defined in Cologne, decided that the Union should acquire a capacity to conduct military operations through the establishment of new political and military structures, namely:

• a standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) which will deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP, and will exercise, under the authority of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of any military crisis-management operations;
• a Military Committee to give military advice and make recommendations to the PSC;
• a Military Staff responsible for performing early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces;
• machinery for non-military crisis management will also be set up for better coordination and enhancement of the Union's and the member states' non-military crisis response tools.

39. The Council underlined its determination "to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises". In Helsinki the Council therefore laid the foundations for the CESDP.
40. Regarding cooperation with European states which are not European Union members, specifically the WEU associate member and associate partner countries, the Helsinki Council decided that:

"... appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested states to contribute to EU military crisis management;".

41. The Council is therefore paying very little heed to the acquis of WEU and that of its associate members, which will merely contribute to the military management of crises without the right to participate in the decision-making process.
42. In addition, the Finish Presidency Report to the Helsinki European Council on strengthening the CESDP provides for a number of practical measures to be taken before the end of 2000 in order to achieve the aims set out in Cologne. With regard to consultation and cooperation with non-EU countries, the report states the following:

"The Union will ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with NATO and its non-EU members, other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU as well as other prospective partners in EU-led crisis management, with full respect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and the single institutional framework of the Union.

With European NATO members who are not members of the EU and other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU, appropriate structures will be established for dialogue and information on issues related to security and defence policy and crisis management. In the event of a crisis, these structures will serve for consultation in the period leading up to a decision of the Council.

Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the non-EU European NATO members will participate if they so wish, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, on a decision by the Council, be invited to take part in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets."

43. The report also provides that European NATO members who are not EU member states will be invited to contribute to this improvement of European military capabilities. In other words they will be asked to contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of EU-led military operations.

III. The present position - participation by associate members

44. Clearly, the contribution made by the associate members within the WEU bodies is governed by their status, in other words by their rights in and obligations towards the Organisation. Nevertheless it has to be acknowledged that all of those countries - virtually without exception - have been extremely committed, not to say proactive, in their response to the overtures made to them to contribute to building a European defence. It is precisely that impetus which has largely been at the root of the enhancement of their status, reflected in their growing involvement whether at an operational, political or technical level.

(a) Involvement in WEU's political structures

45. According to the Petersberg and Rome Declarations referred to above, associate members are entitled to participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council and its working groups and subsidiary bodies. More specifically they may associate themselves with the decisions taken by member states; they are able to participate in their implementation unless a majority of the member states, or half of the member states including the Presidency, decide otherwise. They have the right to speak but may not block a decision that is the subject of consensus among the member states.
46. From the outset the associate members were supposed to participate in all the working groups of the Council with the exception of the Security Committee and space activities. Today, only Iceland does not attend the Space Group in which the five remaining associate members play an active part.
47. For example, they attend meetings of the Politico-Military Group where they take part in drawing up general guidelines on WEU's operational role and in the follow-up and direction of various operations (MAPE mission in Albania, demining assistance mission in Croatia or the CMX/Crisex 2000 exercise.
48. Since Iceland showed only limited interest, Norway and Turkey were also the only two associate members to participate in the Council working groups which came into existence as a result of the transfer of Eurogroup to WEU, such as the working group on the Transatlantic Forum, Eurocom and Eurolongterm and the Western European Logistics Group (WELG). Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined them after the decision was taken by the Council at WEU's Bremen Ministerial to grant them associate member status. The Petersberg Declaration had earlier provided that the associate members "... will have the same rights and responsibilities as the full members for functions transferred to WEU from other fora and institutions to which they already belong ...".

(b) Participation in the work of the Assembly

49. The associate member countries are represented at WEU Assembly sessions by delegations of representatives and substitutes from their national parliaments, whose number is to equal to that stipulated in Article 26 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, namely: Czech Republic: 7; Hungary: 7; Iceland: 3; Norway: 5; Poland: 12, Turkey: 12.
50. The WEU Assembly grants them prerogatives appropriate to their participation in WEU's activities, without voting rights in plenary sessions.
51. Members of delegations of associate member countries have voting rights within committees, other than the Standing Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, on which they nevertheless sit. They cannot express an opinion on reports which constitute a reply to the annual report of the Council.
52. It should be noted that since they joined the Assembly virtually all associate member delegations have made a significant contribution to its work. They attend debates in committee and plenary session regularly, they contribute to the preparation of reports, where they avail themselves fully of their right to be appointed co-Rapporteurs, and to other events held by the Assembly - for example the Oslo and Antalya colloquies organised respectively at the initiative of the Norwegian and Turkish Delegations.

(c) Involvement in armaments cooperation

53. Turkey and Norway and the three newcomers, for the reasons already explained above, play a full part in the activities of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), the successor to the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) to which they already belonged.
54. The WEU Council decided at its Ostend meeting on 19 November 1996 to set up the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO) as a WEU subsidiary body, at the same time acknowledging the associate member countries' right to be involved in WEAO activities.

(d) Associate members' contribution to WEU's operational development

(i) Involvement in operational structures

55. Associate members participate in the activities of WEU's Military Committee through their Chiefs-of-Defence Staff's attendance at its meetings, where they have voting rights.
56. Some associate members participate in the activities of WEU's Military Staff, which normally involve 11 members: 9 full members and 2 associate members¹. However, for the preparation of Crisex 2000 and current MAPE activities, the Military Staff was augmented by three officers, two from Poland and one from the Czech Republic.
57. The associate members also appoint officers to the Planning Cell and therefore participate in its activities, which would under normal circumstances consist in:

• preparing generic plans for possible operations;
• preparing exercise plans and evaluating the results of exercises;

In the advent of a crisis:

• providing the authorities with opinions on the nature and feasibility of intervention by WEU;
• coordinating the preparation for the deployment of forces under WEU auspices until this function is assumed by the designated joint headquarters;
• exercising surveillance over the situation in zones at risk and monitoring its evolution.

58. Lastly, the associate members are involved in the operation of the Torrejón Satellite Centre and thus kept informed of WEU's space activities as they are also by their participation in the Council's Space Group. Such involvement in operational structures enhances the already significant contribution associate members make to WEU's activities. They also participate in the preparation and conduct of exercises.

(ii) WEU forces

59. Associate member status provides for participation in WEU forces and five associate member countries figure in the database².

(iii) Operational involvement

60. By contributing forces to WEU the associate members take part in WEU-led military operations on an equal footing with full members.
61. By virtue of the fact that they also belong to NATO, they play a full part in the planning, preparation and execution of WEU operations drawing on NATO assets and capabilities.
62. The crisis in Albania provided the first opportunity for military cooperation between WEU full members and associate members. It is worth noting that Turkey sent soldiers as its contribution to Operation Alba, a humanitarian military operation deployed between 15 April and 12 August 1997 to facilitate transport and distribution of humanitarian aid.
63. Although the operation was admittedly not a WEU mission in the strict legal sense since it was undertaken on the basis of a UN Security Council Resolution under the aegis of the OSCE, it should be noted that all contributing members were WEU states. Although not properly speaking a WEU-led operation, it nevertheless involved cooperation between an associate member country, Turkey, and WEU full member states.
64. Associate members were recently afforded the opportunity to take an active part in a WEU operational mission with the creation of the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE), which is currently carrying out a WEU-led operation to re-establish a viable police force in Albania.
65. Thus on 2 May 1997, the Permanent Council decided to set up MAPE to assist the Albanian forces of law and order. The aim of MAPE's mission was to provide the Albanian police with advice on law and order matters and to provide training for instructors, but not take direct responsibility for police operations. All WEU's associate members with the exception of Iceland have seconded officers to MAPE. MAPE is the first real practical example of military cooperation, since almost all member states, excepting Belgium, and almost all the associate members have taken part in the mission. Cooperation in this area has borne fruit and the mission was reinforced and extended for a further year in April 1999.

IV. Prospects - the aftermath of the Cologne and Helsinki Decisions

66. Although the process begun at Saint Malo was universally perceived as a unique opportunity for the European Union at last to acquire a security and defence dimension, which became known as the ESDI, no commitment was given in either the Cologne or the Helsinki Declarations to common defence being incorporated as an obligation into the EU Treaty as the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties had envisaged. This means that at least initially, and for a period of indeterminate duration, there is no question of the European Union taking on a defence responsibility properly speaking nor any responsibility for the implementation of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. By the same token, therefore, there is now no thought of Article V being incorporated into the Treaty on European Union.
67. Indeed, for the time being the European Council is not even thinking of integrating WEU as a whole, merely certain of its functions, into the European Union, which suggests that WEU's present structures are likely to be dismantled and parallel bodies created inside the European Union.
68. Thus it appears that WEU, at least over an initial period that may be a protracted one, wants to incorporate only WEU's operational elements, beginning with those concerned with crisis management, including those deemed useful in that connection like the Planning Cell, the Satellite Centre and so on. The collective defence dimension has been shelved for the time being and armaments cooperation appears to have been deferred to some future date.
69. Neither has the form, permutations or extent of any involvement in the new arrangements on the part of the European members of the Atlantic Alliance been laid down. It goes without saying however that the EU's new responsibilities must not result in confusion or paralysis of certain tried and tested institutions operating at 28. Any loss of security to Europe as a whole would equally be unthinkable.
70. One very important problem, resolution of which will depend on future European Council decisions, therefore remains associate member participation in the new institution. Clearly peace and security in Europe must not be the prerogative of some countries but is something to which all Europeans are entitled, whether or not they are EU members. It is worth remembering that our associate members have played a very important part in WEU's activities and in the European security framework as a whole. They have taken an active part in the all various WEU bodies, making use of their rights in a highly constructive manner. They have helped create bridges between WEU and NATO, taken part in peacekeeping operations organised by our own Organisation or the Atlantic Alliance and made forces, national and international, available to WEU (FAWEU).
71. Clearly the European Union must offer our associate members a position analogous to the one they now enjoy in WEU. The Helsinki European Council envisages that all those countries will be able to enter into an on-going relationship with the Union in the preparatory phase of operations and will be invited to take part in EU-led missions. Any definition of the substance of that relationship and the procedures surrounding it is carefully avoided and the decision is deferred to a later stage. In short, the main area of work is still to be done.
72. According to an interesting analysis published under the auspices of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, the involvement of associate members in the European defence project by the following means might be envisaged³:

(i) a unilateral decision by WEU associate members. European NATO Allies could thus decide on a case-by-case basis to associate themselves with decisions taken in the CFSP framework, without necessarily being involved in their preparation;

(ii) participation in the new European Security and Defence Policy by means of an arrangement between the European Union and NATO. This option would seemingly have the effect of limiting participation by the European Allies in EU-led operations using NATO means and capabilities;

(iii) the last option, associating those countries with the CFSP (for matters pertaining to ESDI) on the basis of the existing arrangements within WEU, seems, in the opinion of the Rapporteurs, to offer the best deal for the associate members and for the furtherance of European Defence. This form of associate membership status within the EU would thus be their best guarantee of retaining their present participation and contribution rights within the new framework.

73. According to reliable, though as yet unofficial sources, the Portuguese Presidency is likely to put forward as a solution a multilateral agreement between the EU and the six NATO allies and other EU applicant countries pursuant to Article 24 of the Treaty on European Union. The security and defence framework thus created would allow for cooperation between the Fifteen and our associates, both in peacetime and in times of crisis, at various levels (the Council, the PSC, the Military Committee and the Military Staff). While respecting the autonomy of EU decision-making machinery, the Union will need to set up appropriate arrangements for dialogue, information and consultation with NATO's European allies and the applicant nations, including provision for consultations during the period leading up to the Council's decision.
74. This proposal by the Presidency, if it goes ahead, appears to suggest that the European Union is moving in the direction of a form of cooperation with the WEU associate countries (associate members and partners) which would substantially meet their concerns and those of the WEU Assembly, at least in terms of their involvement in WEU's operational efforts. It should be noted nevertheless that the Union is careful to reaffirm its own decision-making autonomy which may not be enough to satisfy the wish of the majority of associate members to take part at all levels virtually on an equal footing with EU members.
75. At first sight the last option is the one that the WEU Assembly, which constantly advocates the need to preserve WEU's acquis when its responsibilities are transferred to the European Union, is likely to prefer. This WEU acquis includes inter alia the series of cooperation agreements between it and NATO and the allied countries, irrespective of whether they are EU members. Therefore it seems entirely logical and in keeping with European security interests at large to require that the rights of participation acquired by WEU associate members should be preserved in full. Your Rapporteurs are also agreed that notwithstanding NATO decisions concerning development of an ESDI within the Atlantic Alliance, WEU alone can hold out to NATO countries not members of the European Union - and hence also to the countries of central Europe - the firm prospect of playing a part in the formulation of a genuine European security and defence policy, in other words one agreed by Europeans for Europe, thereby gaining the benefit of a European security area.

V. Conclusions

76. Since it was created in 1991, associate member status has proved its worth through the active participation of the NATO European allies in virtually all aspects of our Organisation and their valuable contribution to peacekeeping missions under the aegis of WEU. At the same time their presence in WEU has undeniably increased its operational effectiveness and added to its political clout.
77. The historic decisions taken by the Cologne and Helsinki European Summits and by the WEU Council in Bremen mean that European defence is now viewed in quite a different light. With the imminent transfer of most WEU functions to the EU and the creation of the interim bodies within the latter institution, a question mark now inevitably hangs over the future of the contribution of the European members of NATO in the entire range of ESDP activities. Several trends seem to be emerging within the European Union itself. Some of these opt for a minimalist solution of involvement on a case-by-case basis in EU-led peacekeeping missions, stating nevertheless that the six countries could then take part in all decisions. Others are in favour of the associate members participating more systematically in the framing and implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy, with a status similar to the one they currently have in the WEU framework.
78. The Assembly and your Rapporteurs more specifically take the view that it would be inconceivable for the new European security architecture to lead to those strategically and politically important countries making a lesser contribution to the new security and defence architecture. We therefore firmly believe that any future form of participation should guarantee our six allies the same opportunities they currently have within the WEU framework and that their ability to contribute should be strengthened, if possible, and not lessened. Moreover it is in that spirit that the provisions adopted at the special session in Lisbon regarding the establishment of a new assembly which would take over the responsibility of democratic scrutiny in the framework of the ESDP were intended. Lastly, regarding the whole area of difficulty surrounding the legal form of any new relationship between the European Union and our associate members, the preferred solution would appear to be an agreement between the EU and that group of six countries as compared with other possible solutions (agreements with individual countries, agreement with NATO) since it acknowledges the fact that the six countries form a distinct group of like countries, as compared with other categories (neutral countries, third countries and so on) while locating them within a uniquely European perspective. In any event, it seems certain that that the active commitment of the associate members to the ESDP will considerably enhance the European Union's capability to carry out peace operations as well as its political stature on our own continent and beyond its boundaries, which has clearly been one of the objectives our Assembly has pursued for a number of years.

¹ Prior to the entry of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The former 11 are now 14.

² See the first part of the 45th annual report of the Council, Assembly Document 1661, September 1999.

³ See "A delicate process of participation", Münevver Cebeci, WEU Institute for Security Studies, November 1999.