



**Assembly of Western European Union
The interim European Security and Defence Assembly**

DOCUMENT A/1783

3 June 2002

FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION

European military capabilities in the context
of the fight against international terrorism

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mr Wilkinson, Rapporteur

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European military capabilities in the context of the fight against international terrorism

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¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 16 May 2002.

² *Members of the Committee:* Mr Schloten (Chairman); MM *Baumel*, McNamara (Vice-Chairmen); MM Acosta Padrón, de Arístegui San Román, Mrs Bakoyianni, Mr Blaauw, Lord *Burlison*, MM Contestabile, Cox (Alternate: *Lord Russell-Johnston*), Dhaille, Díaz de Mera, Dreyfus-Schmidt, Glesener, Goris, Goulet, Gubert, Henry, Irmer, Koulouris (Alternate: *Kontoyiannopoulos*), Lemoine, Medeiros Ferreira, Neumann, Pereira Coelho, *de Puig*, Ranieri, Rigoni, Rivolta, Siebert, Skoularikis, *Timmermans*, Valk (Alternate: Ms *van't Riet*), MM Walter, *Wilkinson*, Zierer, N..., N...

Associate members: MM Bársony, Braun, Chobot, *Docekal*, Ms Fjeldsted, MM Gönül, *Janas*, *Kalkan*, Kelemen, Komorowski, *Lorenz*, Mutman, Necas, Mrs Nybakk, MM *Telek*, Wrzodak (Alternate: *Lusnia*), N...

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

APPENDIX I

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RECOMMENDATION 706¹***on European military capabilities in the context of the fight against international terrorism***

The Assembly,

- (i) Condemning all forms of terrorism and particularly acts of terrorism against civilian populations;
- (ii) Recalling the decision taken by NATO in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on the grounds that they were determined as constituting an armed attack directed from abroad against one of its members;
- (iii) Recalling Recommendation 694 on Europe's security confronted with international terrorism, adopted on 18 October 2001;
- (iv) Aware of the need to combat terrorism using every available means – police, judicial, financial and military – in compliance with each country's constitutional and legal system, with international conventions and under the appropriate supervision of national parliaments;
- (v) Stressing the need to develop and step up coordination between European countries and internationally in order to respond to internal and external terrorist threats;
- (vi) Noting that in certain cases it is essential to be able to complement civil measures with military means in order to combat terrorism effectively and, for that purpose, to make provision for specific civil and military personnel training programmes;
- (vii) Stressing that serious shortfalls continue to exist in the field of European military capabilities for operations abroad, particularly as regards strategic lift and logistics, command, control, communications and intelligence (C4I) systems and precision-guided munitions;
- (viii) Observing that the current volume of national defence budgets precludes any significant improvement in European military capabilities for operations abroad;
- (ix) Recalling that according to the ESDP headline goal, as decided by the EU heads of state and government at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the European Union should be capable as of 2003 of deploying outside the EU's borders an autonomous well-equipped 50 000 to 60 000-strong force sustainable over at least one year;
- (x) Stressing the importance of rapidly implementing the decisions taken by the Laeken European Council (December 2001) with a view to drawing up a European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) to remedy the shortfalls identified in the resources necessary for achieving the headline goal;
- (xi) Highlighting the need to coordinate the use of military assets deployed by European countries which are members of WEU, the EU and NATO, in cooperation with their American and Canadian allies and their Russian and Ukrainian partners,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite the WEU countries:

1. To engage in cooperation and closely coordinate their activities in all the relevant areas of the war on terrorism, namely, intelligence, police and justice, financial planning and the use of military assets, by pursuing a global policy to counter this threat;
2. To establish close cooperation among European countries in the fight against terrorism, taking as their basis the core formed by the European Union member states and drawing up a common list of banned terrorist organisations subject to regular review to take into consideration name changes and mutations of terrorist groups;

¹ Adopted without amendment by the Assembly on 3 June 2002 (1st sitting).

3. To formally include the fight against international terrorism among the objectives of the ESDP, specifying that it be considered as one of the Petersberg missions, for which the European Union now has responsibility;
4. To acquire a military capability that is coordinated at European level and able to play an effective part in the fight against terrorism, giving priority to appropriate intelligence and communication assets – in particular optical and radar observation satellites, reconnaissance aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles and intelligence analysis and interpretation units – as well as to precision-guided munitions;
5. To ensure that defence budgets are sufficient for acquiring the capabilities envisaged by the headline goal, in particular by assigning to the operating budgets of the armed forces the funding necessary to guarantee that well-equipped and trained deployable forces, including reserve forces, are available at all times;
6. To establish cooperation in the naval sector, so as to have an effective airborne naval group on standby at all times, and in the aeronautical sector, in order to provide modern transport and air refuelling capabilities;
7. To ensure that the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) adopted by the EU will rapidly lead to the implementation of European equipment cooperation programmes so as to remedy the shortfalls identified during evaluation of the assets required for the fight against terrorism and for equipping the forces concerned;

FURTHER RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

8. Endorse this set of recommendations and forward them to the appropriate bodies of the European Union (Council, Commission and Parliament) and NATO.

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr Wilkinson, Rapporteur

I. Introduction

1. Terrorism, or the pursuit of political objectives through the coercive effect of illegal acts of violence, arouses intense passion and emotion. It challenges democratic governments directly which, if they are intelligent, aim to defuse the possibility of terrorism by economic and social policies which diminish disparities of wealth and power and bridge divisions of race, creed and culture within nation states.
2. Nevertheless, even enlightened democracies can for reasons of conflicting ideology, religious fanaticism, ethnic tension or great power ambition find themselves the focus of terrorism. The Assembly recognises that in the current international context, this applies to the European members of WEU as well as to the United States of America.
3. Whilst the search for an acceptable political solution to terrorism should always be maintained and complemented by proactive economic, social and judicial policies, democratic states have both a right and a duty to protect themselves and their citizens by all relevant means, including military deployment, for which appropriate capabilities should be maintained and exercised.
4. Nevertheless, in view of the intensely political nature of any terrorist campaign and the sophisticated interplay of civil and military countermeasures, it must be stressed that the direction of any military response by a democratic country should be under effective political control which in turn is subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
5. For many years, and particularly so following the end of the cold war, military commentators have warned of the threat of international terrorism to European security. Surprisingly, in view of the painful experience of many western European countries at the hands of terrorist organisations such as the IRA, ETA, Red Brigades and Red Army Faction (RAF), there was little evidence before the murderous acts of aerial terrorism perpetrated in New York and Washington and the anthrax attacks in the United States afterwards, that countering and defeating the scourge of international terrorism were high military priorities for western governments.
6. Indeed an enjoyment of the “peace dividend” through a reduction of military budgets, the ending of conscription and the closure of military bases and installations characterised west European defence policy in the decade before 11 September 2001. To some extent they still do.
7. Whilst warnings abounded of new multidimensional threats to European society and security from mass migration, drug dependence and trafficking, Islamic fundamentalism, cyber warfare, terrorism and the emergence of states of concern with the capability to develop and deploy weapons of mass destruction, only the rise of al-Qa’ida and the extraordinary precision and destructiveness of its attacks on the United States of America with the consequent death of many European citizens and NATO’s invocation for the first time in its history of the mutual defence provisions of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty brought home in shocking fashion to European governments and peoples the true extent of their vulnerability to international terrorism and the inadequacy of their military preparations to counter it.
8. There has been a tendency among European governments to concentrate more on the EU’s institutional priorities in the development of a European security and defence identity than on the creation of the military capabilities relevant to today’s dramatically altered security environment. This has been partly because the enhancement of military capabilities remains primarily a national responsibility and partly because the political mindset which attended the definition of the Petersberg tasks for the European Union was one which underplayed their purely military component and placed more emphasis upon their humanitarian dimensions, notwithstanding the fact that the troops most capable of dealing effectively with a humanitarian crisis are those whose primary role is war fighting and who have been trained accordingly.
9. Anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan have reinforced old lessons: the importance of swift response and the rapid deployment of effective in-theatre logistics, the need for accurate targeting and

precise delivery of air power at the critical point together with a sufficiency of helicopters, the value of elite troops who can operate for long periods in arduous terrain – special forces, commandos, airborne forces and paratroops, mountain and desert warfare specialists, and troops with the linguistic skills, personality and adaptability to mount coalition operations alongside NATO and non-NATO forces alike. Last but not least, expeditionary warfare like that in Afghanistan requires adequate medical backup including well equipped field hospitals which not all European countries can deploy since defence medical services have been one of the more deplorable areas for economy in recent years – a process which must be reversed in face of the risks of biological or radiological terrorism.

10. In short, Europe has a formidable task if it is effectively to redress its deficiencies in military capabilities against terrorism. The Assembly of Western European Union has a part to play in informing national parliaments and electorates of the disturbing current realities and in contributing to the debate on European military capabilities and the European Security and Defence Policy. It will be upon national governments and parliaments that the European Union must rely if it is to convert its security and defence policy into an effective military instrument against terrorism. It is to be hoped that this report will give the necessary encouragement to this process.

II. Europe's war on terrorism

1. Terrorism in the 21st century

11. The 11 September attacks, which were on an unprecedented scale, ushered in a new era of threats, referred to by some as “hyperterrorism” or the “terrorism of mass destruction”. The two terms, however, do not entirely overlap. To equate hyperterrorism with the terror of mass destruction is too simplistic, although the latter may be a component of the first.

12. Far from breaking the mould of terrorism, the hyperterrorism of which Osama bin Laden's al-Qa'ida network is the first exponent, remains within the tradition of an alternative strategy of “right against might”, with essentially socio-political goals and containing a marked psychological element. Hyperterrorism displays four salient characteristics. It operates at world level and its aspirations are global. It uses as its form of organisation both piecemeal mutual help networks (financial, material, conceptual or methodological) and autonomous dormant cells capable of being activated in the fullness of time. The entire system represents an aggregation of individual initiatives welded together by New Information and Communications Technologies (NICT) and demonstrates an acute sensibility to the vulnerability of modern western societies. Finally, it draws also on the ideal of martyrdom.

13. Hyperterrorism is therefore a new form of globalised conflict with which the international terrorism of yesteryear scarcely equates. It has global strategic ambitions. Osama bin Laden's intention in engineering the 11 September events was clearly to strike at the centre of gravity of American power, essentially economic and trade-based, but the intention was also there of precipitating the famous “clash of civilisations” between the West and the Arab-Muslim world in the expectation of a reckless and disproportionate reaction from the United States. Intentions aside, there is evidence of transnational organisation in terms of funding, logistics, recruitment and training. The United States holds al-Qa'ida responsible for its establishment worldwide. The Americans believe that the network is present in more than 60 countries and locations around the world².

14. The difficulty for the security services in forestalling the threat of hyperterrorism lies in the way it is organised: a loose, decentralised formation made possible by the revolution in information and communications technology. The practical executants of such terrorism are individual terrorists, who are not directly affiliated to a specific organisation, or “sleepers”, fully integrated into their surrounding milieu. The United States has long been aware of a rise in individual terrorism, not exclusively confined to Islamic fundamentalist circles, as the examples of the Unabomber, Theodore John Kaczynski³ and Timothy McVeigh⁴ go to show. The relevant American authorities are concerned

² *Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated 13 February 2002.

³ From his mountain retreat in Montana, the UNABOMBER (University/Airlines Bomber) used parcel bombs to terrorise airline company bosses, academics and researchers throughout the United States between 1978 and 1996. No less than 16 attacks are attributed to him.

that there could in the long term be collusion between violent extreme right wing American elements and Islamic fundamentalism, in a shared hatred of Israel, globalisation and the Federal US Government⁴. It goes without saying that the 11 September coordinated mass attacks were far from being the work of individual, isolated terrorists, but al-Qa'ida has been known to support a panoply of loosely associated micro-terrorist operations, whose very profusion was calculated to distract intelligence services' attention from the preparations being made for the major onslaught.

15. Some terrorists, now recruited in the science departments of the universities of the West, exploit our dependence on technology (information, communications, energy and transport) which are themselves interdependent.

16. Another characteristic of these modern-day terrorists is their willingness to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The threat this represents is a source of considerable concern for the governments and security services in developed countries and indeed has been for some time, particularly since the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo metro perpetrated by the Aoum sect in 1995, while al-Qa'ida is known to have tried to acquire WMD and related technologies.

17. However, in both cases the terrorists' actual capabilities fall short of their stated intentions. A study of the options available to terrorist groups for the acquisition of WMD does not lead to the conclusion that they would be able to procure or develop such weapons on their own without the assistance of a state. In the latter instance we would be dealing with state terrorism, in which case traditional means of deterrence would strongly discourage such "cooperation". Even the most highly developed states were only able to equip themselves with such weapons after decades of major financial investments and a large-scale and highly sophisticated R&D effort in terms of both material and human resources.

2. European capabilities for the war on terrorism

The political acquis of the CFSP

18. The efforts to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy within the EU have not yet come to full fruition, but the very fact of having organised institutional consultations on international crises among the EU member states under the auspices of the High Representative, Javier Solana, is in itself a major step forward. Mr Solana's recent efforts with respect to the Middle East and Macedonia have shown that it is possible to adopt a common European position. With regard to the war on terrorism, that common approach was evident in the solidarity voiced by the European states vis-à-vis the United States and in their appointment of a representative in Kabul.

19. The creation under the SG/HR's responsibility of a situation centre headed by a special adviser, whose task is to draft, for the former's benefit, analyses of the situation in crisis areas, is an important achievement. Indeed, a common assessment of the situation is the first step towards a common response. However, it has to be admitted that in the field of intelligence and the upstream evaluation of the terrorist threat, exchanges among the European states continue to take the form of bilateral meetings or ones involving only those countries which are affected first-hand.

Intelligence

20. Coordination among the European intelligence services in their efforts to combat terrorism in fact takes place through a series of loose arrangements. The TREVI group – on terrorism, radicalism, extremism and international violence – was set up in 1975 as a forum for the relevant EU ministers, with a view to strengthening police cooperation. It has six working groups and is tasked with organising intelligence exchanges and harmonising legislation among the European states. The Berne Club will soon embrace 19 participating states, including the Fifteen. This body organises numerous meetings for small informal groups on specific topics, whose composition is decided on an *ad hoc*

⁴ Timothy McVeigh was responsible for the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 which claimed the lives of 168 people.

⁵ *US extremists, Terror Groups Eyed*, Los Angeles Times, 27 February 2002.

basis. While this provides an opportunity for exchanges among intelligence services, it does not lead to any common assessment for the benefit of a European political authority.

Economic and financial acquis

21. One should not lose sight of the fact that the first steps to be taken in the wake of the 11 September attacks before any military operations were launched were of a financial nature: in late September the assets in the United States of 27 individuals and organisations were frozen and deposits and transactions on American soil of any foreign banks which refused to cooperate were blocked. The blacklist drawn up for that purpose by the US authorities was immediately taken up by the European states. The aim, as explained by President Bush, was to undermine the terrorists' financial basis.

22. Internally, the EU has started framing a European policy on money laundering:

- adoption in June 2001 of a Framework Decision on money laundering and on the identification, tracing, freezing, seizure and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime;
- adoption in October 2001 of a protocol to the Convention on police and judicial cooperation. This agreement lays down the principle that banking secrecy and tax reasons cannot be invoked as an obstacle to requests for international cooperation;
- draft Framework Decision concerning the freezing of assets and elements of proof, which should make it possible to adopt interim safeguard measures, such as seizure, in another member state.

Finally, the EU supports the work being done under G7 auspices by the FATF (Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering) on non-cooperative countries and territories and is involved in the ongoing revision of the 40 FATF recommendations. It was agreed in October 2001 to expand the FATF's remit to cover the funding of terrorism and it recently defined new international standards to combat such funding.

23. But does “this determination truly signal the beginning for the international community of a new era as regards controlling the financial flows linked to terrorism? It would be premature to draw optimistic conclusions, inasmuch as the effectiveness of such measures is contingent upon the political will over the long haul of those who promulgate them (...) however, it hardly needs to be stressed that this is an area in which there are pressing interests to which certain states, including European ones, are not insensitive (...)”⁶. Furthermore, action against the funding of terrorism does not just entail combating money laundering. In the case of al-Qa'ida it is a matter, above all, of preventing the misuse of “clean” money, whether it be bin Laden's assets or the funds collected by so-called charitable organisations.

Judicial acquis

24. Major progress has been achieved in the “justice and home affairs” pillar of the EU over the past few years, and the 11 September events have considerably speeded up the pace of developments. First of all, the creation of a “European police office” – Europol – which has been in operation since 1999 with the aim of “improving the effectiveness and cooperation of the competent authorities in the member states in combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international organised crime”. Each country has set up a “national unit” in charge of liaising with Europol, which manages databases on suspect persons. However, it is not a forum for in-depth exchanges among the different services on the terrorist threat. It is a small body with no operational policing responsibilities (its target is a staff of 350, including 44 officers in charge of liaising with all the relevant national services). However, the member states have decided to change Europol's role and to set up joint investigation teams to deal with terrorism, drug trafficking and trafficking in human beings.

⁶ “Combattre le terrorisme international” (Combating international terrorism), Information Document No. 3460 (2001), French National Assembly, 12 December 2001.

25. The Convention to set up Eurojust, a body composed of national prosecutors, magistrates, or officers with equivalent competence, is under negotiation, as is a European arrest warrant. However, Eurojust has been in operation in a provisional form since March 2001. It is a small organisation with a staff of about fifty, with the task of “facilitating the proper coordination of national prosecuting authorities and of supporting criminal investigations in organised crime cases, notably based on Europol’s analysis”.

26. Finally, the introduction of a European arrest warrant decided at Laeken is a major step forward, because it does away with the political control to which extradition procedures were traditionally subject. Eurojust and the European arrest warrant should play a key role in the fight against terrorism at European level.

3. Military aspects of the war on terrorism

27. More specifically as regards the European Security and Defence Policy, recent events have made it clear that the United States is unwilling, following its experience with NATO in Kosovo, to deal with a coalition which could limit its decision-making autonomy regarding the use of military means. One cannot help but wonder, however, what means of action Europe would have in similar circumstances. What would have been the reaction at European level had the terrorists attacked targets in the United Kingdom or France? Real progress has been achieved recently under the ESDP, with the setting-up of EU institutions and procedures which could have been used in similar circumstances had the political will been there, because the description of the Petersberg missions is sufficiently broad-based: “tasks of combat forces in crisis management (...)”. But even if there had been the political will, the military capabilities of the European states would not have allowed them to conduct operations on the scale of the United States operations in Afghanistan, since they lack the necessary airlift for force projection, as well as the requisite intelligence and surveillance capabilities.

28. Generally speaking, there are various areas in which military means can be used to combat terrorism: intelligence procurement, territorial surveillance and protection of the most sensitive sites, participation in an emergency response to radiological, chemical or biological attacks by terrorists, the deployment of forces to seek out and destroy terrorist command networks and training camps and finally, the protection of troops on external operations.

29. As far as territorial protection is concerned, surveillance patrols and the defence of sensitive sites, possibly using air defence capabilities, will be a national responsibility for a long time to come, but there will need to be coordination and harmonisation among European countries.

30. In the case of radiological, chemical or biological attacks by terrorists, it is important to be able swiftly to apply the relevant public safety procedures. Here too, the responsibility lies at national level, but properly organised cooperation at European level is also essential as the problem can rapidly spill over beyond the national borders. Imagine, for example, the problems posed by an influx of possibly contagious refugees, wishing to cross the Rhine following a biological attack on Strasbourg. In very practical terms, the military would be requisitioned (for transport, maintaining law and order) and the armed forces’ medical services would be called on to supply the requisite detection and decontamination equipment.

31. Finally, the need for armed intervention against terrorist organisations has been shown in the case of the United States operation in Afghanistan. But what could the European states have done if the United States had requested military assistance, or if the al-Qa’ida target had been not in the United States, but in Europe? Future efforts to destroy the training camps belonging to this type of terrorist network will most likely require European intervention in countries that harbour those activities. The creation of a European force projection capability that is flexible enough to adapt to the different types of mission – in keeping with the Helsinki headline goal – is a European response to that threat, but the resulting force must also have the requisite operational capabilities. In the case of Afghanistan, some might have hoped to see European countries engaged alongside the Americans, for example by playing a visible part in the air strikes. In practice, however, since Europe does not have long-range bombers, its only possible contribution for several months would have been the use of its aircraft carriers. We know what the situation in Europe was in practice: a single aircraft carrier without, as yet, a modern air arm.

32. Finally, the threat of terrorist attacks against military units on operations abroad is not a figment of the imagination. Suffice it to recall the attacks on the building in which the French forces were stationed in Beirut and against the US forces in Saudi Arabia. The protection of deployed forces abroad calls for local intelligence work. Within the framework of the Petersberg missions there needs to be European coordination of the different national intelligence services, given the diffuse nature of this type of threat.

III. The campaign against al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom

33. Operation Enduring Freedom, conducted by the United States against the Taliban and the al-Qa'ida terrorist forces and support structures in Afghanistan provides another example, following the Gulf war and the conflicts in the Balkans, for the European states to analyse and take on board in their efforts to set up a military international crisis-management capability.

34. The military intervention in Afghanistan can be divided into two phases. The first lasted from 7 October (beginning of air strikes) to 7 December 2001 (withdrawal of the Taliban forces from Kandahar). Its intensity gradually increased as an ever greater range of means (first airborne, then land-based) were called in "to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime"⁷. It is this first phase which is important for the purposes of our tactical/military analysis, in terms of the equipment used, the mode of operation and the political and diplomatic factors which contributed to achieving the stated aims.

35. The second phase is still under way and has the more "familiar" trappings of a policing mission (although in a much more volatile and dangerous political and social environment than in the Balkans) and anti-guerrilla warfare operation, as illustrated most recently by the fighting in the Shah-e-Kot region in east Afghanistan close to the border with Pakistan. Europe's armed forces have excellent skills and assets for this type of action, but they have considerable limitations as compared with the United States when it comes to the real-time acquisition and exploitation of intelligence.

36. Operation Enduring Freedom provides Europe with an example to emulate, but it has also revealed the shortcomings from which – regardless of their size and the degree of development of their armed forces – the European NATO countries and the WEU and EU member states suffer at all levels – whether it be military, economic, technological or political. As long as those countries are unable to meet the challenges of a modern-day conventional conflict, it will not be possible to set up a credible and effective common European force. In spite of the lessons learned during the Gulf war (1991) about mobility, force and power projection, intelligence and interoperability between European and American forces and equipment, we find ourselves eleven years on facing the same shortcomings, notwithstanding the considerable progress achieved in a few specific areas (for example, common armaments programmes and two military observation satellites) which could be likened to palliative care rather than to any real cure.

1. Hyperpower versus hyperterrorism

37. Operation Enduring Freedom is the first instance of what could be described as a low-intensity conflict using the means and procedures of a high-intensity war. The wars in the Gulf and Kosovo were conflicts between states, in which the adversaries had relatively sophisticated military, economic and industrial infrastructure, which was both an advantage and a drawback. On the one hand it allowed the states concerned to resist, while suffering human and material losses, thereby guaranteeing the survival of the forces in power, but on the other hand it gave the attacking parties a multitude of strategic and tactical options. The dispersal of enemy defences and continuous erosion of enemy infrastructure gave those parties the final advantage, particularly since they were safe from reprisals on their own territory.

38. In Afghanistan there were large numbers of Taliban and al-Qa'ida fighters, with military equipment of disparate ages, origins and destructive power, with no land- or air-based communications network for central coordination and no recourse to the requisite civilian and industrial structures and energy supplies. The United States and the international coalition, on the

⁷ Speech by President Bush, 7 October 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov>

other hand, had not only all the material, technological and human resources of a modern superstate, but also an unwavering political resolve. Furthermore, while Iraq and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia enjoyed a degree of more or less overt political and material support at international level, in Afghanistan, even though not all countries were prepared actively to support the United States in its combat, neither were any of them prepared to find themselves in the category of “enemies” as defined by President Bush when he said, “Either you are with us or with the terrorists”⁸. This psychological preparation, backed up by intensive diplomatic action⁹ and the use of modern communications technologies¹⁰ and the progressive deployment of large-scale military means around Afghanistan, sealed the fate of the Taliban leadership.

39. Enduring Freedom started out as a “normal” operation on 7 October 2001 with air strikes using aircraft and cruise missiles. After a week of systematic destruction of the Taliban military infrastructure and al-Qa’ida training camps, it was decided that control of the skies was sufficient to move into a new phase of tactical combat against the enemy forces, using low-flying AC-130 aircraft (as of 15 October) and UAVs (as of 17 October) to target all enemy forces on the ground, regardless of size or mobility. The successful use of those aircraft was to a large extent due to the real-time acquisition and exploitation of intelligence. This was quite a feat, given that the information gathered on the ground was transmitted to the Central Command facility based in Saudi Arabia, then to Tampa in Florida and from there to the Pentagon. The order to attack or not would then follow the same route back from the Pentagon to Afghanistan. All this was possible thanks to information technology, high bit-rate large-capacity data links and the availability of an extensive network of communications satellites.

40. On 19 October, special forces conducted a ground attack near Kandahar. More than 100 rangers were flown in by helicopter to attack an airfield and Taliban command centre, destroy weapons depots and recover documents concerning Taliban and al-Qa’ida activities. This marked the beginning of a sustained operation on the ground, where armed CIA units¹¹ had been in place since before 7 October to assist the anti-Taliban forces of the Northern Alliance and encourage armed rebellion by Pashtun tribal leaders, both allies and enemies of the Taliban. Dispatching ground forces when Taliban and al-Qa’ida units were still in control of the major towns and communication routes was a risky undertaking that marked a break with the reluctance of the past, particularly during the Kosovo campaign. It was an expression of the firm political resolve which was not only decisive for convincing the anti-Taliban armed opposition forces that the United States meant business and encouraging them to take more effective action, but also for improving intelligence gathering, target identification and the disorganisation of enemy forces which had to contend with both air strikes and pressure on the ground.

41. In November, the Taliban forces opposing the Northern Alliance in the Mazar-i-Sharif area were subjected to intensive bombardments with high-power BLU-82 bombs which explode a metre above the ground and have a radius of destruction of 200 to 600 metres. For the first time, US cargo planes landed in Afghanistan, on a soft airstrip at Golbahar and at Bagram airport. On 9 November, Mazar-i-Sharif was occupied by the forces of the Uzbek General Rashid Dustum, and on 13 November, Herat and Kabul were occupied by the forces of Ismaï l Khan and the Northern Alliance respectively. Air and ground operations moved to Kunduz in the north-east and Kandahar in the south. UAVs, AC-130s, the Navy’s F-18s and B-52s were present everywhere, but what was interesting was their use in close conjunction with each other in an integrated approach that was almost like a new weapons system.

42. Striking examples of that integrated approach were recently given by the Pentagon to the American press agency Associated Press¹²:

⁸ Speech by President Bush, 20 September 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov>

⁹ Supported by offers and promises of technical and economic assistance.

¹⁰ Although the impact was less in the Muslim world where the Qatar TV station al-Jazira replaced CNN.

¹¹ The CIA also has its own surveillance and attack UAVs.

¹² “US Recon Effort Top in Technology”, Associated Press, 11 March 2002.

- in November the US forces heard reports of a possible meeting between Taliban and al-Qa'ida leaders close to an airfield at Kandahar. To check that information they dispatched a UAV – a Predator drone – to fly over the area, while a J-STARS surveillance aircraft was sent to detect vehicle convoys heading towards the presumed meeting venue. The J-STARS did indeed detect a convoy and the Predator was directed to follow the vehicles. The next step was to call in an AC-130 to attack the meeting place, the targets having been identified and sent to the AC-130 through a video link connecting it with the Predator. This optimised the effectiveness of the attack while, at the same time, making it possible to avoid a mosque located close to the target site and which had not been designated as a legitimate target;
- the same month, an American special forces unit and Northern Alliance units riding on horseback noticed a gathering of Taliban forces in a valley. They used their satellite radios to call in air support in order to remove the obstacle. A B-52 was dispatched to the area and conducted an attack guided by a Viper targeting system composed of a laser range-finder, a lap-top computer with a digital map display and a GPS receiver to determine the target coordinates.

This type of approach integrating air and ground-based systems was a permanent feature of the first phase of operations, including during the close combats which took place at Quala Jangi prison at the end of November 2001. The closeness of the combatants (and an error in coordinates) nevertheless caused casualties among the US and Afghan forces pitched against the al-Qa'ida fighters.

43. On 26 November, a large contingent of American marines was transported by helicopter via Pakistan to Kandahar airport. This force, backed up by Cobra combat helicopters and armoured vehicles, had the task of identifying targets and controlling the routes leading out of Kandahar and towards Pakistan and the mountainous areas of Tora Bora. That “landing”, followed by the arrival in northern Afghanistan of units from the 10th Mountain Division, marked the beginning of the second phase of operations, which took the form of conventional anti-guerrilla warfare. On 7 December, the Taliban rulers of Kandahar withdrew, leaving the town to local Pashtun groups. The Marines' camp became an arrival and departure point for the various American and European special forces units taking part in the fighting for the control of Tora Bora and Zawar Kili, which lasted until January 2002. Air forces were actively involved in those operations, dropping bombs and high-power “bunker-busters”¹³.

44. Thus the hyperpower has won the first battle against hyperterrorism. Technology played a key role in the military part of operations, but overall success was due to a combination of factors of which only the United States is currently able to take full advantage. The first factor was the clearly stated political will and the concern to win public support. Apart from small pockets of not very vociferous opposition, that support has not wavered, primarily because of the nature of the attacks perpetrated on 11 September 2001¹⁴. Then came the concern to win international support, but on the terms decided by the United States: in other words, no more wars conducted by “committees”, as was the case during the 1999 operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This diplomatic approach is based on a system of political and economic leverage, with an element of constraint in the form of the abovementioned adage “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists”. The final factor was the existence of clearly defined goals and making the military means available to achieve them.

45. Those means were used to the maximum of their capacity, with various innovations and adaptations to take account of the situation on the ground. Once again the advocates of the “all air-based” approach seem to have been proved right, provided that the right conditions are met:

- elimination of enemy command centres, radars and air defence systems (ground-based systems and aircraft) in order to have complete control of the skies;

¹³ In particular the AGM-86D cruise missile which can “count” the number of floors it penetrates before detonating, fuel-air explosives which suck out air and the 1 500 kg rocket-propelled AGM-130 bomb equipped with a video camera and GPS guidance system.

¹⁴ Acts of terrorism against civilian and military targets (the Pentagon) using civilian means (commercial airliners) and hostages turned into human bombs (the passengers of the hijacked aircraft).

- use of all-weather and all-terrain satellite and airborne observation systems;
- integration of systems using IT and high bit-rate large-capacity data links;
- availability of a sufficient number of different types of aircraft (and in the case of UAVs, not worrying too much about losses) in order to provide continuous coverage of the sky and ground and to carry out the full range of missions (e.g. surveillance, strategic or tactical attack, support, rescue, deployment of ground forces);
- having the requisite choice of munitions, bombs and missiles for the different types of target (e.g. precision attacks, heavy bombardment, human targets or underground installations);
- availability of bases and platforms (such as aircraft carriers) close to the targets, or else of long-range aircraft and a sufficiently large fleet of tanker aircraft.

Those few elements are one of the keys to the success of Operation Enduring Freedom. When combined with the land component, and in this specific case the action on the ground by special forces and the Afghan allies, the enemy's surrender (unconditional or not) became only a matter of time. From that point of view, Operation Enduring Freedom was a success, even though the "war" has not yet been won, as illustrated by the events around Shah-e-Kot and Gardez (Operation Anaconda).

2. European action in Afghanistan: lessons for European defence

46. The European states were unanimous in condemning the attacks of 11 September 2001 and expressing their political solidarity with the United States. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was invoked as of 12 September, for the first time since NATO's creation in 1949, and was subsequently activated by the North Atlantic Council on 2 October, three weeks after the attacks, when the United States had already commenced its deployment around Afghanistan. In application of Article 5, the NATO member states decided on a series of measures¹⁵ aimed at combating hyperterrorism:

- "enhance intelligence sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally and in the appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it;
- provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other states which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism;
- take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory;
- backfill selected Allied assets in NATO's area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against terrorism;
- provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies' aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to operations against terrorism;
- provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO nations for operations against terrorism, including for refuelling, in accordance with national procedures".

47. Two decisions for immediate application were taken: the deployment of Alliance AWACS aircraft in the United States (to free their American counterparts for action in Afghanistan), and the deployment of Standing Naval Forces (STANAVFORMED) to the Eastern Mediterranean. Those decisions were put into practice on 9 October. On 8 October, the Secretary-General announced that the United States and the United Kingdom had started military operations and that other NATO members had undertaken to provide direct military support during the operation¹⁶.

¹⁵ Press statement by the NATO Secretary-General on the North Atlantic Council decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the attacks perpetrated on 11 September against the United States, 4 October 2001, www.nato.int

¹⁶ Statement by the NATO Secretary-General, Lord Robertson, NATO, 8 October 2001, <http://www.nato.int/>

48. The European Union, which does not yet have military forces and operational structures able to prepare and carry out a large-scale military operation¹⁷, gave its political support to Operation Enduring Freedom in the form of declarations by the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and WEU Secretary-General, Javier Solana, by the Belgian Presidency of the EU Council (7 October 2001) and by the Commission President, Romano Prodi. On 8 October, the Council of Ministers (General Affairs) published a statement on action against the Taliban:

“The European Union declares its full solidarity with the US and its wholehearted support for the action that is being taken in self-defence and in conformity with the UN Charter and the UNSCR 1368. The terrorist attacks of 11 September are an assault on our open, democratic, tolerant and multicultural societies and are regarded by the UN Security Council as a threat to international peace and security. The Heads of State or Government of the EU made clear on 21 September that a riposte to those barbaric acts would be legitimate. Member States have confirmed that they stand ready to act each according to their means. The European Union remains in close consultation with the United States”.

49. The political solidarity that NATO and the EU expressed with the United States was important as a mark of Europe’s support for the United States’ action, but did not in practice lead to any coordination at European level, or to active military participation in Operation Enduring Freedom, with the exception of that of the United Kingdom. From the outset it seemed to be a case of everyone for themselves, with a minimum amount of coordination, in contrast to the widescale civil and police cooperation that was launched within weeks of the 11 September attacks. Europe’s problem was a lack of capabilities, and it could not in this case call on the American logistics and intelligence that had been available throughout the operations in former Yugoslavia.

50. Even the United Kingdom’s contribution to the combat operations was a relatively modest one: Tomahawk cruise missiles launched on 7 and 13 October 2001¹⁸ against targets in Kandahar, reconnaissance flights by Canberra PR9 aircraft as of 9 October, refuelling operations and the presence on the ground of special force units: Special Air Service, Special Boat Squadron and Royal Marines. The last two elements – refuelling and special forces – turned out to be very important, and were a demonstration, not only of the UK’s recognised skills in this area, but also of identifying and making maximum use of limited resources according to requirements. Indeed, the United Kingdom has the world’s second largest air refuelling fleet after that of the United States, and the Tristar and VC-10 aircraft which compose it are compatible with the aircraft of the US Navy (F-18 F/A and F-14 F/A, for example) and Marine Corps. That contribution was valuable, in that it considerably increased the autonomy of a large number of US combat aircraft launched from aircraft carriers and the Island of Diego Garcia (e.g. the B-52s), enabling them to stay in the air longer for the purpose of locating and destroying fixed and mobile targets.

51. British special forces participated in intelligence gathering, target identification and surveillance missions, as well as in attacks together with American special forces alongside the Afghan anti-Taliban forces. Their presence on the ground from the early days of the operation showed how serious the UK was about its military commitment to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the United States and demonstrated the high level of interoperability with the methods and procedures of the American special forces¹⁹. Moreover their prestige in the eyes of the American commanders grew as a result of that participation, particularly in view of the fact that while the Europeans are fascinated by the American special forces (e.g. the Rangers, Green Berets and SEALs), in the United States it is the British special forces which serve as a model²⁰.

¹⁷ Particularly since Alliance assets that could have been made available to the EU had already been mobilised for the benefit of NATO and the United States.

¹⁸ “Operation Veritas – British Forces”, <http://www.operations.mod.uk/veritas/forces.htm>

¹⁹ A “public” demonstration of their joint action – very rare, given the secrecy surrounding the British special forces – was shown in November 2001 (via CNN) on worldwide television during the fighting at Quala Jangi prison.

²⁰ “Mountain Division: Why the US can’t match the British at high altitudes”, Jason Vest, *Prospect (US)*, March 2002, www.prospect.org

52. During the various phases of the operation the American and British naval forces were joined by those of other states, in particular France with its *Charles de Gaulle* aircraft carrier and naval group, as well as Germany, Italy (*Garibaldi* aircraft carrier), Canada and Australia. European (other than British), Canadian and Australian special forces were deployed at the end of November and in December at the Marines base at Kandahar – Camp Rhino – and participated in the operations in the region of Tora Bora. More recently, special forces units from Germany, Australia, Canada, Denmark and France (which also contributed Mirage 2000 fighter planes), Norway and the United Kingdom²¹ were actively involved in Operation Anaconda in the Shah-e-Kot region.

53. It was through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan²² that there began to be some coordination of the European involvement and a sharing of tasks among the contingents from the 17 participating European states²³ and New Zealand²⁴. This force, with a planned strength of 5 000 members, was placed under British command until June, when Turkey, in principle, takes over the command. Several times the provisional Afghan government has requested an extension of the ISAF's zone of action – currently confined to the Afghan capital, Kabul – but for the moment the European states have been reluctant, for a number of reasons. In the first place, a dispersal of their forces would make them more vulnerable to attacks from Taliban guerrillas or from other groups in the case of conflicts among the ethnic and tribal factions of Afghanistan, and secondly it would be difficult to supply and equip additional forces and ensure their rotation, and to keep them in place over a long period far from their home base.

54. While the absence of any significant European presence alongside the United States in Operation Enduring Freedom can be criticised, such is not the purpose of this report, particularly since, from the very outset, the planning, preparation and conduct of the operation were in the sole hands of the Americans, with the usual consultation and exchanges of information where this proved to be necessary. Either Europe's contribution would be integrated in those plans, or else Europe would try to take autonomous action using its own resources. Its military shortcomings and their practical consequences are well known and do not need to be repeated here. Afghanistan arrived too soon, or perhaps too late, for "European" defence, which in fact is being driven by a small number of states with global ambitions. The large majority of current and future EU members follow behind without much enthusiasm, perhaps because they have no illusions, or because they – and this is true too of the more powerful states – have stagnating or decreasing defence budgets and have priorities other than acquiring transport aircraft, observation and communication satellites, cruise missiles and other equipment, both old and modern. Afghanistan has demonstrated the gaps in terms of doctrine, equipment and technology between the European states concerned and the United States. It will not be possible to plug those gaps if Europe (in the sense of the present and enlarged EU) persists in trying to do so by developing and acquiring the systems which won the Gulf war eleven years ago.

55. European assets and potential must be geared to those sectors with a high technological added value. A debate on the specialisation of national armed forces and making them professional, and on the better and more rational use of reserve forces, should be launched in all the states concerned with a view, not to bringing about partial reforms at national level, but rather to arriving at a coherent and modern overall model. With a few fairly old refuelling aircraft and a handful of elite soldiers, and by maximising its resources, the United Kingdom was able to make a prestigious contribution to the operation. With that example in mind, some serious thought should be given to the question of why the 15 EU member states, NATO with its 19 member states and WEU at 28 were not more present in the skies and on the ground in Afghanistan from October to December 2001. Forging a European political will in the field of defence will take a great deal more time than that required to set up a

²¹ "Operation Anaconda costs 8 US lives", 4 March 2002, www.cnn.com

²² Provision was made for this force in the Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan signed on 5 December 2001 in Bonn by the various Afghan factions and it was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1386 of 20 December 2001. ISAF is not a UN-led peacekeeping mission.

²³ Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

²⁴ The only non-European country in ISAF.

military headquarters or organise the joint production of transport or combat aircraft. The next major international crisis will not wait for either.

IV. European military capabilities and the war on terrorism

General remarks

56. The scale of the transnational terrorist threat justifies the use of military force, including for preventive purposes. We saw following the 11 September events how the United States, on the grounds of legitimate self-defence, organised its military retaliation against the al-Qa'ida camps and leaders in Afghanistan. Furthermore, all European states took measures to protect their territory and airspace, calling on military means such as patrols, local defence of sensitive sites with batteries of missiles and placing interception aircraft on alert status.

57. Having, at its Helsinki Summit in December 1999, expressed the political will to develop the ESDP, the EU underlined "its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises". This meant in practice the ability to conduct the so-called Petersberg missions which the EU incorporated in the Amsterdam Treaty:

"humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking".

58. The definition of those missions is sufficiently broadly worded for a number of EU member states to take the view that it would have been possible to organise a coordinated European military intervention in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. But no consensus was found on that position and the matter was not put to the EU crisis-management bodies – the Political and Security Committee or the Military Committee.

59. Several EU countries – supported by the WEU Assembly – now take the view that the fight against terrorism should be added to the list of Petersberg tasks that come under the responsibility of the EU.

60. In practical terms, the structures foreseen by the Nice Declaration in December 2000 are now in place in Brussels. The Presidency report to the Laeken Summit (December 2001) states that:

"Through the continuing development of the ESDP, the strengthening of its capabilities, both civil and military, and the creation of the appropriate EU structures, the EU is now able to conduct some crisis-management operations. The Union will be in a position to take on progressively more demanding operations, as the assets and capabilities at its disposal continue to develop. Decisions to make use of this ability will be taken, in the light of the circumstances of each particular situation, a determining factor being the military and civil assets and capabilities at the disposal of the Union at that particular stage".

61. "The EU is now able": in reality, however, such an assertion is no longer enough to frame a credible policy. Military engagement entails practical action of which some states are capable, albeit with various gaps and shortcomings which limit their influence, not with regard to the adversary, but vis-à-vis their American ally. The question is whether the European states would be able, in the EU framework (in enlarged form) or within a multinational coalition of the willing, to successfully prepare and conduct an operation on the scale of Enduring Freedom. Three factors are important for answering that question: diplomatic (political) influence, economic influence and military capabilities.

62. In the area close to the EU's borders – south-eastern Europe and the western Mediterranean, for example – those three factors are to be found together, and provided there is a joint political decision the larger European states are able to mount an operation and ensure its success, including from the point of view of logistics, intelligence and communications. But if we move further afield, one of the three factors will be missing and its absence will need to be offset, either with the help of the United States (diplomatic influence, military transport and intelligence capabilities), or with the help of other regional powers or states close to the conflict zone. Furthermore, given the differences of internal

policy from one European state to another, the greater the risks and the more objectives differ, the harder it will be to agree on a common political position²⁵.

63. The political authorities at national and European level are aware of those problems. Indeed, the stated aim of the reforms under way in the EU and NATO – which sometimes give the impression of a “revolution in politico-military affairs” (analogous to the United States’ RMA) – is to give Europe and its organisations the means to take action to deal with any inter-state or non-inter-state transnational conventional threat, while preserving its autonomy vis-à-vis the United States, so as to better defend Europe’s specific interests. The alternative is “imperial leadership”, which may be acceptable at first, but can in the long run cause misunderstandings and bad relations that are in no one’s interests in the present unstable world.

1. Existing EU capabilities

64. As shown by the Laeken Declaration on the EU’s operational development, major progress was made in 2001 towards giving the EU a genuine capacity to assess a situation and decide on possible autonomous intervention, by setting up a number of structures under the authority of the High Representative for the CFSP, Mr Solana.

65. The Union now has at its disposal a coherent crisis-management structure:

- the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), composed of diplomats and high-ranking civil servants, has the task of supplying assessments of the Union’s interests with respect to international crises and proposing possible policy options;
- the Political and Security Committee (PSC), composed of civil servants with the rank of ambassador, monitors the international situation and, in the event of a crisis, is responsible for the political control and strategic direction of any military operations;
- the Military Committee (EUMC), composed of the chiefs of defence staff, provides the forum for military consultation and cooperation among member states in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management;
- the EU Military Staff (EUMS) is responsible for situation assessments and strategic planning, which includes defining the politico-military framework for any intervention and drawing up possible strategic military options;
- the Situation Centre (SITCEN) is the key element of the effort to achieve synergy between civilian and military assessments. It has the task of summarising information and disseminating it in real time. In times of crisis it is a round-the-clock monitoring unit.

66. In addition to the structures that are already up and running, the EU is endeavouring to set up the military capabilities defined at Helsinki (December 1999) under the headline goal. The aim is to be capable as of 2003 of deploying within 60 days a 50 000 to 60 000-strong force sustainable over at least one year.

67. However, the Petersberg missions do not define the possible zones of intervention, which is why the military experts arbitrarily chose the case of a theatre of operations at a distance of 4 000 km from Europe for their assessment of the necessary capabilities. This, then, is not an official political choice. The Laeken Declaration stipulates in this regard that:

“To enable the European Union to carry out crisis-management operations over the whole range of Petersberg tasks, including operations which are the most demanding in terms of breadth, period of deployment and complexity, substantial progress will have to be made:

(...)

The strengthening of military capabilities in accordance with the European Action Plan to remedy shortcomings identified and the implementation of the exercise policy will be necessary to enable the Union progressively to carry out more complex operations.

²⁵ The hesitation and conflicts of interests surrounding the Kosovo conflict (March-June 1999) are a case in point.

(...)

To achieve these objectives, the Union, and in particular the Ministers responsible, will seek solutions and new forms of cooperation in order to develop the necessary capabilities, in accordance with this report, making optimum use of resources”.

68. In practice, the proposals made by the various countries are globally speaking sufficient, in terms of volume, and at the ministerial-level Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2001 progress was made towards finding the necessary capabilities. However, out of the 144 military assets required, there remain 40 identified shortfalls. The problem now is to make good those remaining shortfalls, which calls for decisions with far-reaching financial implications.

69. For these reasons, the EU member states adopted a European action plan on capabilities at the Laeken summit and since then, 16 working groups have been set up to deal with the following themes:

- attack helicopters;
- support helicopters;
- NBC;
- UAV/STA Units;
- medical role;
- carrier-based airpower;
- suppression of enemy air defences;
- air-to-air refuelling;
- combat search and rescue;
- cruise missiles;
- precision-guided munitions;
- theatre ballistic missile defence;
- deployable communications modules;
- headquarters (OHQ, FHQ, CCHQs)²⁶;
- strategic ISR IMINT collection;
- UAV (HALE, MALE and tactical UAVs);
- outsized transport aircraft;
- roll on roll off and cargo ships;
- general cargo shipping.

2. Intelligence

70. Following the 11 September attacks a number of top-level EU meetings were held, at which decisions were taken on how to organise the fight against terrorism in Europe. On 14 September, just a few days after the attacks, the EU heads of state and government issued the following joint declaration:

- “We shall make the European Security and Defence Policy operational as soon as possible. We will make every effort to strengthen our intelligence efforts against terrorism.
- The European Union will accelerate the implementation of a genuine European judicial area, which will entail, among other things, the creation of a European warrant for arrest and extradition, in accordance with the Tampere conclusions, and the mutual recognition of legal decisions and verdicts.”

71. This declaration of principle highlights two complementary aspects of the intelligence requirements for the fight against terrorism:

²⁶ The HQ shortfall is not a numerical shortfall but a qualitative shortfall based on a lack of concepts, training, readiness and exercising of HQs offered.

- a requirement for *strategic intelligence*: knowledge of networks – how they are organised and where they are located; background and ideology; their targets and hence threat assessment; likely damage; their *modus operandi* and, overall, the consequences for member states' security – description of possible scenarios; how they are funded (financial arrangements, banking scrutiny, role of so-called charitable institutions etc.). In this respect intelligence must be gathered outside the member states' territory. This is the job of the "intelligence" services which must also seek to obtain specific intelligence about countries harbouring terrorist network bases: political regimes, links with terrorists, possible development but also aspects such as infrastructure and military assets, etc.;
- a requirement for *counter-infiltration security* which is mainly a policing aspect. It involves obtaining intelligence about networks that are already operating on the territory of the EU member states or their allies in the fight against terrorism: members of such networks, their habits and addresses, surveillance and shadowing, international police cooperation, etc.

72. To organise the necessary cooperation arrangements the EU's Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted a package of measures on 20 September. The document in which they are set out contains a section entitled "Cooperation between police and intelligence services". It describes the need for cooperation at the level of the EU Police Chiefs Task Force and between intelligence services. It also refers to the need to set up a team of anti-terrorist experts in Europol.

73. Finally, one new development is that the European Union is organising cooperation among the member states' intelligence services. This was a decision taken in the wake of the 11 September attacks at a meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 September, the conclusions of which state:

"The Council would reiterate how important it is for the quality of Europol analyses that the police authorities *and also the intelligence services* of the Member States should quickly pass on any relevant information on terrorism, ... The Council has decided to set up within Europol, for a renewable period of six months, a team of counter-terrorist specialists for which the Member States are invited to appoint liaison officers from police *and intelligence services* specialising in the fight against terrorism, (...)"

74. In the context of anti-terrorist operations in which military forces are deployed to countries harbouring terrorist networks, such as al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan, the task of gathering strategic intelligence includes intelligence on the general situation and specific defence intelligence. The European Union now has a proper intelligence structure under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the Council/CFSP High Representative (SG/HR).

75. The *Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU)* works directly under the SG/HR. Its task is to provide assessments of the Union's interests in regard to the CFSP, to give early warning of crises and produce documents setting out, with reasons, the policy options available. It comprises some 20 or so staff and senior civil servants from the Council and Commission Secretariats. It relies on diplomatic, economic, political and social information, either freely available or obtained through member states' diplomatic missions.

76. For defence intelligence, the *EU Military Staff (EUMS)* is in charge of early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. This entails *evaluating the situation, defining the politico-military framework for possible intervention and drawing up military strategic options*²⁷.

An *Intelligence Division* has therefore been created within the EUMS. It assists with situation assessment, early warning (strategic monitoring) and provides operational support in the event of European engagement. However it does not handle documentary intelligence. The division has a staff of thirty or so (23 officers and 7 junior officers). There is at least one expert from every member state. The experts all work for the Director-General of the EUMS but also have a secure link to their own national intelligence services. They are thus able to receive intelligence contributed by their own country and request intelligence if necessary. This arrangement made it necessary to set up special

²⁷ Annex V of the French Presidency report (Nice, December 2000).

infrastructure and each member state identified which of its own particular agencies would be responsible for providing intelligence. From intelligence received, the division is to provide situation assessments that reflect a common European position. The documents produced are forwarded to the Director-General of the EUMS, the Military Committee and the Situation Centre.

77. The *Situation Centre (SITCEN)* is the key to the synergy between intelligence from civilian and military sources. Answerable to the SG/HR and led by his Special Adviser, it is responsible for supplying him with any intelligence required for situation assessment and monitoring. The SITCEN summarises the information and circulates it. In the event of a crisis being declared it becomes a crisis monitoring cell and therefore operates round the clock. Its staff members are drawn from the PPEWU and the EUMS Intelligence Division.

78. The EU, then, now has structures for analysing strategic intelligence, but it needs to be supplied with the requisite material. Indeed, Europe has few intelligence-gathering capabilities of its own, whether it be satellites, imaging facilities or electronic interception systems.

79. In the field of space imagery, the advantages of which were illustrated by the recent conflicts in Kosovo and Afghanistan, Europe has only the two Helios 1 optical satellites (France, Italy, Spain). The promising projects that are under way – Germany’s SAR-Lupe and Italy’s COSMO-SkyMed – give us reason to hope that we will have two families of radar satellites in four years’ time. France, in cooperation with Belgium and Spain, will be launching the Helios 2 satellite, and is planning a dual-use (civil-military) optical satellite constellation known as Pléiades. Furthermore, the Torrejón Satellite Centre – now an EU agency – will need to be equipped with a proper military imaging division in order to be useful for the war on terrorism and in Afghanistan.

80. As regards conventional military imaging and electronic interception for the purpose of combating terrorism, Europe has a fairly wide range of systems, some of which have been used in Afghanistan: strategic and tactical photographic reconnaissance aircraft, aircraft and ships for electronic surveillance, radar surveillance aircraft (AWACS and Hawkeyes) and so on. France, for example, deployed Mirage IV P strategic aircraft in the Arab Emirates and *Super Etendard* aircraft based on aircraft carriers off the coast of Pakistan for numerous photographic reconnaissance missions in Afghanistan.

81. All these capabilities can be used in the pre-operational phase for the purpose of evaluating the situation and preparing strategic options, as well during the crisis-management phase, when they can be made available to the operation commander.

82. Finally, we have seen that during an operation like Enduring Freedom there is a need to gather intelligence on the ground. Special forces, the “operational branches” of the intelligence services and military units specialised in intelligence procurement all came into play. There are highly reputed special forces in Europe – the British SAS, the commandos and troops of France’s COS – and Germany will have a special division ready by 2003. Its core, formed by the KSK special forces²⁸ set up in 1996, is already operational.

3. Forces deployment and protection

83. We have seen, in this report, that Europe’s military involvement in Operation Enduring Freedom has been on a much smaller scale than in the previous operations in the Gulf and former Yugoslavia. Europe’s contribution in terms of troops – which it took some time to deploy – represents just a small part of the American effort. The difficulties involved in making any significant contribution are a good illustration of the capability shortfalls that were identified in connection with the EU headline goal.

84. First of all, deploying forces in a theatre as far away as Afghanistan, without the possibility of support bases in Pakistan, has once again brought home the need for strategic airlift, although it has to be admitted that the conditions in this case are much tougher than those defined for the purpose of the

²⁸ Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK). Besides support units it consists of 4 commando platoons. The first platoons are specialised in ground infiltration, the second in airborne operations, the third in amphibious operations, the fourth in operations in the mountains or under arctic conditions; www.specwamnet.com

headline goal (a distance of 4 000 km from Europe's periphery). Germany and France chartered numerous Antonov 124 flights from Ukraine: Germany for the purpose of troop transport, France for the deployment of six Mirage 2000 at the Manas base in Kirghizstan. In spite of the arrival of the A 400M, which will probably be operational by 2010 and well adapted to fly to countries bordering on Europe, Europe will remain totally dependent for heavy-lift high-volume aircraft on Russia, Ukraine or the United States.

85. In the fight against terrorism the Americans have shown how effective close air support available at very short notice can be for troops on the ground. This type of cooperation requires not only very sophisticated intelligence-gathering means, such as UAVs or satellites, but also the setting up of an extremely efficient command system in virtually real time. This can only be done using high bit-rate transmission systems which require a network of communication satellites. It must be possible to "decentralise" the terminals for this type of system in the theatre of operations, and teams on the ground have to be provided with target selection equipment fitted with laser and computer technology and a GPS system. As far as such equipment is concerned, there is definitely a very big gap between American and European forces.

86. Europeans also face serious problems when it comes to deploying strike aircraft on the ground. There is no doubt that the problem of placing combat aircraft on military bases in host countries near a theatre of operations with a view to carrying out anti-terrorist missions is a very sensitive one. French aircraft had to wait until 20 February 2002, i.e. four months after the start of operations in Afghanistan, before they could begin their flights from a base in Kirghizstan. It is therefore essential for European countries to be able to deploy at any given time a large European air and sea task force which can call upon strike aircraft with a sufficient combat radius to operate effectively without having to use bases on the ground.

87. The United Kingdom has decided to build two aircraft carriers of over 40 000 tonnes which are to be equipped with catapult takeoff systems and arrestor wires for landing. Today, the only European aircraft carrier in this category is the *Charles de Gaulle*. However, because it was being serviced, which is symptomatic of this type of vessel for one third of its working life, it could not be deployed to the theatre until 18 December 2001, i.e. three months after the 11 September attacks. France's ground attack aircraft, the reconnaissance and combat *Super Etendard*, have carried out many missions in Afghanistan but as they require four in-flight refuelling operations, their flight autonomy is very limited. The scope for action will be improved considerably once they have been replaced by *Rafale* aircraft.

88. Europe will also have to make a huge effort to fit its ground attack aircraft with weapons systems that can deploy precision-guided munitions, missiles and laser-guided bombs and also with GPS systems, for attacks by day or night. 80% of the munitions used by the Americans in Afghanistan are precision-guided – an impressive record which Europe would find it impossible to match given that many of its aircraft are not suitable for using such modern weapons systems.

89. Furthermore, recent operations have demonstrated the effectiveness of slow-flying ground support aircraft such as helicopters and especially the AC 130/Canon, a tactical version of the Hercules C130. No such aircraft is available to European forces. Helicopters such as the Franco-German Tiger therefore need to be developed in a "ground support" version. At present, Europe has only a few helicopters of this type.

90. Finally, to protect forces engaged in the fight against terrorism from threats in the theatre of operations there is a need above all for services based on human and electronic intelligence together with appropriate protective measures. Although the protection of external theatre bases is being studied in NATO as part of Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) warfare, it is not a priority in the fight against terrorism.

91. There also needs to be a review of the role of European reserve forces, above and beyond national measures, so that they can be effectively incorporated in the planning process. The use of reserve forces to provide certain services in the rear (upstream control of the logistics chain, for example) or in the deployment zone (to act as air controllers or perform security tasks) will allow better management and more efficient use of the active forces. The creation of a European system to

identify reservists and their skills, together with appropriate national and European legislation to regulate relations with employers and social status, are reforms which are overdue. The delay in putting them into practice constitutes a handicap for Europe's crisis-management capabilities.

4. Protecting sensitive sites

92. The protection of sites that are potential terrorist targets is a difficult task. It calls for large numbers of security forces and military support is, of course, one possible approach to the problem. Several European countries have included soldiers in the police patrols responsible for territorial surveillance during periods of terrorist threats. Certain sensitive installations, such as nuclear power plants, were even placed under the protection of batteries of anti-aircraft missiles following the 11 September attacks.

93. All these protection measures will for a long time to come be a national responsibility, but there should be coordination and harmonisation at European level, in particular between countries sharing borders.

94. The reaction to an airborne threat – the suddenness and swiftness of which calls for a collective response – will continue to be dealt with at national level, but will be coordinated within NATO using the air defence network. The decision to shoot down a hijacked commercial airliner is the responsibility of the supreme national air defence authorities, but here again the criteria need to be harmonised at European level.

95. In any case one must realise that this form of protection would be very costly in terms of human resources and military assets. It is not possible to have a permanent system of air defences or fighter planes and AWACS flying over major cities. Intelligence is the only effective way to thwart terrorist plans of this nature.

5. Participating in emergency action in the event of a terrorist attack

96. In the weeks that followed the 11 September attacks, the fear of a further terrorist onslaught, this time using weapons of mass destruction and terror, spread across the United States and Europe. The anthrax contamination scare²⁹ (September to November 2001) and subsequent false alerts, particularly in Europe, mobilised the health and civil protection services in many countries.

97. During this period, the American security services received information, which was later proved to be unfounded, according to which a 10 kilotonne nuclear warhead had been or was going to be smuggled into New York by terrorists with links to al-Qa'ida³⁰. According to an estimate published in the *British Medical Journal*³¹, if such a bomb were to explode in New York it would directly kill more than 250 000 people and, just as significant, about 1 000 hospital beds would be destroyed by the blast and 8 700 more would be in areas with radiation exposures high enough to cause radiation sickness. This would result in the death of thousands of people who would be unable to receive treatment. The information was not disclosed at the time, not even to the FBI or the municipal authorities, for fear of a panic reaction which would have brought the city to a standstill.

98. These two examples of terrorist attacks using biological, nuclear or radiological warfare are extreme cases, but to prepare for such a possibility in the future we will need to devote the necessary (financial, material and human) resources to modernising, improving and strengthening the existing civil protection machinery in European countries. In order to cope with the repercussions of terrorist action on such a scale, cooperation between civil and military structures in this field is indispensable. This is not a new requirement, as the mobilisation of armed forces units in cases of natural disasters (floods, fires, earthquakes, etc.) goes to show. Furthermore, recourse to reservists should be an integral part of those arrangements, to avoid overburdening the active forces whose presence may be required in external theatres of operation.

²⁹ Contamination by anthrax, whose origin and perpetrators remain unknown, led to five deaths in the United States.

³⁰ "New York nuclear bomb scare kept secret for months", *Space Daily*, 3 March 2002; www.spacedaily.com

³¹ "Nuclear terrorism", *British Medical Journal*, 9 February 2002; www.bmj.com

99. The mobility of military equipment provides considerable added value for civil protection. Field hospitals, mobile NBC³² decontamination facilities and systems for detecting and identifying such substances can be used immediately to offset the lack of permanent installations which would be damaged or overwhelmed in the event of an attack in which weapons of mass destruction and terror were used. Speed of reaction is a key factor when it comes to saving lives and stabilising the situation in an area that has been the target of attack. The security of persons and assets would be considerably enhanced by a military presence while police forces concentrated on reorganising in the wake of such a catastrophe. This is an important psychological asset for reassuring the population and preventing the various services from being inundated as a result of people panicking, which could have destabilising repercussions in political, economic and social terms.

100. Today it is essential to provide joint training and exercises for military forces and civil protection units (e.g. the police, fire and health services) to prepare them to cope with emergencies and these activities should mobilise and interest civilians, who should also be kept informed of developments. The World Trade Centre towers were evacuated quickly thanks to the professionalism of trained staff, firemen and police officers and the operation went smoothly not least because the people who worked in the towers were familiar with the evacuation routes and procedures and had taken part in fire practices and the like.

101. The main responsibility in these cases falls to individual states and governments and it is quite clear that European and international cooperation has now become essential in order to deal with large-scale acts of terrorism. In Europe the consequences for countries that share borders would be inevitable: hospitals would be inundated with victims and there would be problems due to possible biological and radioactive/radiological contamination. This would require establishing close cooperation between the national civil protection services and the armed forces participating in missions providing aid and assistance. Setting up a European civil protection agency would be an important step in the right direction and it would be all the more effective if it were to comprise from the outset the essential contribution that armed forces – and sometimes they alone – can make.

V. Conclusions

102. It was the French Chief of Staff General Aillerets who coined the phrase “*défense à tous azimuts*” at the height of the cold war. At that period the concept seemed futuristic if not unreal in a bipolar ideologically confrontational world. Now its time has come in the context of the war on terrorism.

103. Terrorism does not come from one country, or even predominantly from a single organisation. Muslim separatists in Mindanao have a very different motivation from Maoist guerrillas in Nepal. Al-Qa’ida supporters in Afghanistan have a totally distinct ideology to the members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Colombia who in recent months have kidnapped a presidential candidate and murdered an archbishop.

104. Much of the most vicious terrorism today is international and requires a transnational response. It renders somewhat irrelevant distinctions between EU and non-EU countries in the context of European security, calling in question the inherently exclusive nature of the European security and defence initiative. The war in Afghanistan against the al-Qa’ida terrorist organisation and the Taliban government which supported it involved a coalition of NATO and non-NATO nations.

105. Furthermore, the distinction between national and international terrorism has largely been one of convenient political casuistry. There have always been significant contacts between terrorist organisations who have exchanged operational information, compared techniques and offered a degree of mutual support. The recent indictment of members of Sinn Fein in Colombia on charges of assisting the F.A.R.C in Colombia is one topical example.

106. Traditionally, terrorism has had clear political objectives, hence the frequent attempts to find “political solutions” to terrorist campaigns or guerrilla wars. This has especially been the case for so-

³² Nuclear, bacteriological and chemical substances.

called national liberation struggles when the armed conflict has been against a colonial or hegemonistic foreign power.

107. However, some of the contemporary terrorist organisations are almost anarchic in their aims, so profoundly revolutionary are their objectives, being inspired for example by extreme religious fervour or a desire to see the annihilation of what they perceive as their enemies, such as the State of Israel, Zionism, the United States of America, US imperialism or the materialistic, infidel American way of life.

108. Traditionally, conventional weapons such as explosives and firearms have been the terrorists' favourite arms, but intelligence reports as well as findings in Afghanistan have indicated real terrorist interest in weapons of mass destruction. The increasing prevalence of suicide attacks has demonstrated the increased fanaticism of many terrorist groups who scorn all normal constraints in pursuing their armed struggle.

109. Europe therefore needs a threefold strategy. First, in concert with Western allies and other international partners, it should seek to defuse the political tensions, injustices, and material grievances which arouse the resentment and hatred which incite radical groups to terrorism, and to support democratisation and social and economic development in the regions concerned, especially in the Middle East.

110. Secondly, terrorism must be deterred to the maximum extent feasible by demonstrating, exercising and perfecting an ever more capable range of capabilities to engage terrorist groups and to retaliate against the regimes which harbour and sponsor them.

111. Thirdly, European nations must demonstrate the will, by acting in concert with democratic Allies, to project force to crush terrorist networks wherever they pose a threat to European interests and international security.

112. The days of the blind eye and studied indifference are past. Europe is too vulnerable owing to the interdependence of its nations and the sophistication of its economies to take other than a global view. This will require a reappraisal of defence strategies and European military cooperation on every level, including weapons procurement and manpower policies within armed forces. The time to begin is now.

APPENDIX I

International security assistance force (ISAF)

On 20 December 2001, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1386 which authorised the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Nineteen countries are providing troops to the International Security Assistance Force to assist the new Afghan Interim Authority with the provision of security and stability in Kabul. Major General McColl (UK) leads the force. Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the UK signed a joint Memorandum of Understanding in London on 10 January 2002 formalising their contributions to the Force. Belgium subsequently also signed the Memorandum, and Bulgaria is also contributing personnel. On 14 March 2002 the Czech Republic also signed the Memorandum.

The force comprises around 5 000 personnel:

Force Headquarters	Multinational, centred around HQ 3(UK) Division
Brigade Headquarters	Multinational, centred around a German Brigade headquarters(UK)
Two infantry battle-groups	1st Battalion, The Royal Anglian Regiment (UK) German-led battalion, including Dutch, Austrian and Danish troops
Other infantry units	France, Italy, Turkey
Reconnaissance squadron	France
Engineer group	UK, Greece, Italy, Spain
Explosive Ordnance Disposal	Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Spain,
Medical	UK, Germany, Portugal, Czech Republic
Logistics	UK, Bulgaria, France, New Zealand, Norway, Spain
Helicopter support	Germany, Spain
Military Police	UK, Germany, Romania
Other specialist troops	Finland, Italy, Sweden
Air transport support	UK, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Portugal

EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION TO ISAF

Deployment of troops

Country	Size of force	Description
Austria	60	Patrol and security units, various support units
Bulgaria	10+	ABC technical personnel
Denmark	48+	Mine-clearance experts, military police, field officers
Finland	43	Field officers, CIMIC
France	550	Field officers, infantry, reconnaissance squadron, mine-clearance experts, various support units
Germany	800+	Infantry, field hospital, military police, air transport, air movement and other forces.
Greece	100	Engineers , air transport
Italy	300+	Infantry
The Netherlands	100	Infantry, air transport
Norway	30	Mine-clearance experts, various support units
Portugal	20	Medical experts, MedEvac
Romania	30	Military police, air transport
Spain	300	Mine-clearance experts, engineers, air transport, various support units, helicopter units
Sweden	40	Infantry
Turkey	100	Field officers, infantry
United Kingdom	1 800	Headquarters, infantry battalion, ABC experts, engineers, mine-clearance experts, military police, field hospital, various support units

NON EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION TO ISAF

Country	Size of force	Description
New Zealand	20	Field officers

APPENDIX II

European forces deployed in Afghanistan, Central Asia and in the Indian Ocean

More than 17 000 troops from 17 nations are currently deployed in the Middle East and Central Asia to help combat terrorism. US defence officials say a total of 68 nations support the war on terrorism in various ways. They have assembled to fight militarily, diplomatically, economically and financially.

Belgium: is providing one officer to the Coalition Intelligence Centre (CI) and CENTCOM and one officer to the Regional Air Movement Control Centre (RAMCC) to serve as deputy chief of operations.

Czech Republic: Czech representatives arrived at CENTCOM on 9 November 2001. Currently there are three Czechs at CENTCOM. 251 personnel are deploying to Camp Doha, Kuwait to perform local training and to support the operations underway in CENTCOM's whole area of responsibility.

Denmark: the Danish Air Force is providing one C-130 aircraft with 75 crew and support personnel. These assets began deploying on 20 February 2002. In addition, Denmark is scheduled to provide four F-16 aircraft in air-to-ground role deployment. These assets are on standby in Denmark. Approximately 100 Special Operation Forces personnel have deployed to the AOR as part of a multinational unit under US command.

Finland: the Finnish Military Liaison team at CENTCOM continues to concentrate on Civil Military Operations (CMO), with the objective of facilitating cooperation and coordination between ISAF, OEF and UN operations in Afghanistan.

France: France's first military reaction was to put the French naval forces in the Indian Ocean (frigate, tanker, naval patrol aircraft) at the disposal of the US carrier group. France's naval task group (nuclear aircraft carriers, 4 frigates, a nuclear submarine, a tanker) was dispatched to the area in mid-December for a period of four months, enabling the ground attack aircraft of that task group (1 900 flight hours) to be used alongside their US counterparts. Mirage 2000 aircraft – prior to 1 May the only ground-based allied aircraft (Manas/Bishkek/Kirghizstan) – have been involved in bombing operations since the beginning of March. That deployment is supported by an echelon of transport aircraft (up to 6 planes) and in-flight refuelling aircraft (3 C 135 – FR). Mirage IVP reconnaissance aircraft based in the Gulf states have been involved in operations since the beginning of hostilities.

Germany: On 16 November 2001 the Bundestag authorised the dispatch of 3 900 German military personnel to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom. That number includes over 2 000 crew members on board the eleven ships deployed in the Arabian Sea: two frigates, an auxiliary ship, two support vessels, one tanker and five fast patrol boats. Special force (KSK) elements are also present in Afghanistan in conjunction with the anti-guerrilla operations there.

Greece: has offered one frigate, which was deployed in the CENTCOM AOR on 15 March 2002.

Italy: has provided its only Carrier Battle Group to support operations in the North Arabian Sea. It has deployed more than 13 percent of its entire forces for use in OEF.

Netherlands: two Dutch naval frigates are currently operating in the CENTCOM AOR. Other naval ships along with Air Force P-3s will relieve US units in the US Southern Command AOR.

Norway: SOF forces are providing the full spectrum of SOF missions. Air Force C-130 aircraft are providing tactical airlift support and re-supply for these SOF forces. C-130 aircraft have also conducted numerous HA missions and are soon scheduled to deploy to Manas. Norway is to deploy fighters to Manas following the initial force rotation.

Poland: has deployed combat engineers and logistics platoons to Bagram. It has also planned the deployment of 20 soldiers to Kuwait to support operations in the CENTCOM AOR.

Portugal: country representatives arrived at CENTCOM on 13 December 2001. There are currently two liaison officers to begin coordination efforts.

Russia: provided the first coalition hospital in Kabul on 29 November 2001. The hospital treated 5 235 patients before Russia turned the facility over to the local population on 25 January 2002. Russia has supported humanitarian assistance operations by transporting more than 420 000 tons of food; 2 100 tons of medicine; 15 200 beds; 1 200 heaters; 13 mini-electric power stations; 780 tents; 11 000 blankets; 49 600 bedding kits; 11 000 kitchen utensils; and nine tons of detergents.

Spain: is providing logistics, helicopters, engineers, air transport, and explosives ordnance disposal support. It has deployed one P-3B to Djibouti, three C-130s to Manas and two naval frigates to the CENTCOM AOR to support continued operations in OEF.

Turkey: has provided basing and overflight permission for all US and coalition forces. One Turkish officer is scheduled to work as a planning officer at the Regional Air Movement Control Centre (RAMCC).

United Kingdom: The British armed forces have been involved in the military action since 7 October, in conjunction with Operation Veritas. Tomahawk missiles were launched by HMS Trafalgar and HMS Triumph submarines, while surveillance aircraft (E-3D Sentry, Nimrod MR2 and Canberra PR9) and tanker aircraft (Tristar and VC-10) supported the US air campaign and special forces were deployed on the ground. A naval task force comprising the HMS Ocean³³ landing platform for helicopters and accompanied by Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels has been in the Indian Ocean since September 2001.

A Commando Battlegroup with Chinook helicopters was deployed in Afghanistan in March 2002. It participated in the Ptarmigan and Snipe anti-guerrilla operations on 16 April and 2 May respectively. The core element of that group is the more than 1 000 strong 45 Commando of the Royal Marines, which is deployed in eastern Afghanistan in the mountains close to the border with the tribal areas of Pakistan.

³³ Which took over from the HMS Illustrious aircraft carrier at the beginning of 2002.

