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Europe and the new United States national security strategy

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee
by Mr de Puig, Rapporteur

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*Europe and the new United States national security strategy***REPORT¹**

*submitted on behalf of the Political Committee²
by Mr de Puig, Rapporteur*

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on Europe and the new United States national security strategy

AMENDMENTS

¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 12 May 2003.

² *Members of the Committee:* Mr *Martínez Casañ* (Chairman); MM Pangalos, Hancock (Alternate: *Vis*) (Vice-Chairmen); MM André, de Assis, *Blaauw*, Mrs Bolognesi, MM *Clerfayt*, Delattre, Dubie, Duijvesteijn (Alternate: *Zvonar*), Mrs Durrieu, MM Eyskens, Floros (Alternate: *Kontoyiannopoulos*), Guardans I Cambó, Höfer, Hörster, *Liapis*, van der Linden, Lintner, Lloyd, Marshall, Masseret, *Nazaré Pereira*, Pereira Coelho, Mrs Paoletti Tangheroni, MM *Piscitello*, Provera, Puche Rodríguez, *de Puig*, Rizzi, Rochebloine, Roth, Ms Tritz, Lord Tomlinson, Mr *Wilkinson*, N...

Associate members: MM Akçam, *Ates*, Çavusoglu, Fajmon, Mrs Grabowska, MM Hegyi, Kaminski, Kasal, Kobielusz, Livanelli, Marthinsen, Nemeth, Pálsson, Pelc, Tabajdi, Width, Wojciechowski.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics*

RECOMMENDATION 725¹

on Europe and the new United States national security strategy

The Assembly,

- (i) Resolved to act in such a way as to ensure that there is less violence in the world and that it is ordered towards greater cooperation and dialogue, more pluralism and tolerance and better mutual understanding and stability;
- (ii) Convinced of the need for the further development of international law and ensuring that it prevails;
- (iii) Recalling that recourse to force must always be a last resort within the international legal sanction of the United Nations;
- (iv) Taking into account new factors, such as the constants of United States foreign policy expressed in the basic documents of the new national security strategy and in the positions and decisions of the current Bush Administration;
- (v) Taking into account also the trauma of the appalling 11 September 2001 attacks and their repercussions on US domestic policy;
- (vi) Considering trends in the new US national security strategy towards a more robust defence of US national interests, along with a greater emphasis on US military capability;
- (vii) Noting that the new geostrategic doctrine developed by the present US Administration draws on pre-emptive warfare, coalitions of the willing at the expense of multilateral instruments and alliances, and on unilateral action, and that this could give rise to a danger for global stability and the risk of the United States becoming isolated if it persists in its unilateral stance;
- (viii) Considering it helpful to deepen frank and open dialogue with the current US Administration, in order to understand fully the ideas developed in the United States national security strategy and their international policy consequences, especially in regard to its multilateralist allies;
- (ix) Particularly concerned at the consequences of the new American strategy for world security and for transatlantic relations;
- (x) Fearing the Atlantic Alliance will be marginalised in favour of ad hoc coalitions under the United States' sole leadership;
- (xi) In favour of a firm, wider, renewed and balanced transatlantic partnership, based on consensus building;
- (xii) Taking the view that in the long term the Atlantic Alliance's essential military role has to be compatible with a real European defence policy in the European Union;
- (xiii) Convinced of Europe's duty and obligation to promote its values, defend its interests and, as necessary, express its differences with its North American allies;
- (xiv) Stressing that the European Union and NATO must be mutually reinforcing and advocating close cooperation between the two organisations;
- (xv) Considering that terrorism continues to strike despite military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq and that war does not seem to be the way of putting a stop to it;
- (xvi) Pointing out that the fight against terrorism will succeed only if it attacks the political and socio-economic root causes of that scourge;
- (xvii) In the knowledge that, in spite of its military power, the United States alone, without the active cooperation of its allies across the world, cannot undertake all the action required to eradicate global terrorism;

¹ Adopted unanimously by the Assembly on 4 June 2003 (4th sitting) on the basis of the amended draft recommendation.

- (*xviii*) Noting the vital importance for Europe of its having the means to guarantee peace on its own territory and also to participate in international security;
- (*xix*) Taking the view that it is necessary for Europe to defend for the rest of the world the values it defends for itself, namely, the rule of law, democracy, human rights and social progress, without aspiring in any way to hegemony or domination, even if such a course may require increases in defence budgets around Europe;
- (*xx*) Knowing that to do so it needs to be able to rely on a common foreign policy including a common security and defence policy;
- (*xxi*) Taking account of the proposals made by the Assembly in regard to a European security concept, in Resolutions 111 and 112 and Recommendations 538, 565, 589, 605, 620, 633, 678, 685 and 693;
- (*xxii*) Aware of Europeans' inability to date to generate a true common foreign and security policy by reason of their national policies, their differing conceptions of Europe's role in the world and different approaches to the United States' role;
- (*xxiii*) Acknowledging also the importance of strengthening EU military capabilities so as to make the Union capable of exerting a significant influence in world affairs;
- (*xxiv*) Supporting the EU's having taken over from NATO military forces in FYROM, with effect from 31 March 2003;
- (*xxv*) In favour of strengthening CFSP and ESDP decision-making machinery and structures and hopeful of the Convention on the Future of Europe putting forward ambitious proposals in those areas;
- (*xxvi*) Stressing that a strong, united Europe in a multipolar world would be of benefit to both Europeans and the United States, and to global peace and stability;
- (*xxvii*) Considering the proposals made at the Le Touquet Franco-British summit and those by the Heads of State and Government of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg in Brussels with a view to moving forward Defence Europe;
- (*xxviii*) Taking account also of the agreements reached at the EU Foreign Ministers' informal meeting held in Rhodes and Kastellorizo on 2-3 May 2003, and the decision that the EU must have a strategic doctrine on security and defence;
- (*xxix*) Referring to transatlantic and intra-European divergences at the time of the Iraq crisis and bearing in mind the strength of the reaction with which Europe's citizens amply demonstrated their opposition to the war in Iraq, notwithstanding the at times supportive stance taken by their own governments;
- (*xxx*) Conscious of the impact of the present international crisis on the future of the fundamental institutions established in recent decades and especially on the role and workings of the United Nations, NATO and the European Union;
- (*xxxi*) Considering that the war in Iraq cannot help but remind countries around the world of the dangers of flouting UN resolutions;
- (*xxxii*) Recognising that the continuing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and stability in the Middle East;
- (*xxxiii*) Considering that within the context of the dialogue with the current US Administration there is a need to try and convince the United States that its new national security strategy, when taken to extremes, could prove deleterious to world stability, since militarising conflict and unilateralism could encourage terrorism and rearmament, and the United States is likely to be perceived as an intransigent and imperialist superpower;
- (*xxxiv*) Recognising that the UN Security Council is the authority which has primary responsibility for ensuring peace and international security, as the European Union did at the Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999;

(xxxv) Considering the importance in the management of international relations of all states, including the United States, respecting the entire body of international rules, agreements and conventions, and especially those on military intervention and disarmament;

(xxxvi) Pointing out that the United Nations' role is critical for the future and that the institution and in particular the Security Council needs modernising and strengthening, or even in-depth reform,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Provide vigorous support to the EU in developing a security concept for Europe that will set out European values and interests in matters of peace and security and be complementary to the operational document – the European Defence Book – currently in the making;
2. Adopt, within that concept, a common vision of the role the United Nations should play in situations such as the Iraq war and the post-war aftermath,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL URGE THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE WEU NATIONS TO

3. Act together on the international political stage to lower tensions and suggest constructive outcomes to conflicts, giving more weight to policy, diplomacy and development aid and less to the use of force;
4. Intensify exchanges of views between the United States and the EU in order to arrive at common positions on the definition of the terrorist threat and the most appropriate steps for fighting terrorism together, both through cooperation on intelligence and civilian protection and economic cooperation, development aid, technology transfer and intercultural dialogue;
5. Envisage the creation of a joint interparliamentary working group on global security policy, making provision for the participation of delegations from the US Congress, the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly;
6. Make optimum use of the Transatlantic Forum, established in WEU, whose work continues under the responsibility of the European Union Institute for Security Studies, for deepening exchanges of views on security between the United States and the EU by encouraging wider public debate involving parliamentarians and the public at large on both shores of the Atlantic;
7. Use their influence in the United Nations, the OSCE, NATO and the EU to promote crisis management and the neutralisation of threats to world peace and security through multilateral consensus;
8. Mount a resolute defence in all international institutions of the principle of explicit authorisation from the United Nations Security Council being required for any recourse to force;
9. Support United Nations Security Council Resolution 1438 and full compliance with the same, including with the provisions regarding the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their political future and have control over their own natural resources;
10. Deepen the political, diplomatic, intelligence and police instruments necessary the better to organise the fight against international terrorism, taking a forward-looking view and by means of yet more intensive cooperation across the entire international community of democracies;
11. Move towards new goals in building Defence Europe and thus achieve a breakthrough in setting up a form of structured cooperation between those member states concerned to have the kind of capability required for carrying out more demanding military operations;
12. Work together within the Convention on the Future of Europe to create instruments of a kind such as to encourage the emergence of a common political will among EU member states in regard to the CFSP and ESDP, with a view, in the longer term, to a common defence;

13. Approve, in the framework of the European Union, a European security and defence doctrine that constitutes a real common strategic concept, identifying joint threats and responses and setting out the uses to be made of European military capabilities;
14. At the same time, debate constructively the proposals made at the Le Touquet Franco-British summit and those presented by the Heads of State and Government of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg which draw on those continually put forward by the WEU Assembly;
15. Redouble their defence efforts by means of enhanced interoperability of forces and equipment and, to that end, infuse European vision, coordination and thinking into the ESDP and national defence systems alike, and if necessary increase defence budgets;
16. Act within NATO to defend our European values and interests to our American allies in a constructive and non-confrontational framework;
17. Ensure that EU/NATO relations are at all times constructive and flexible, by strengthening the institutional machinery for policy coordination and cooperation at operational level between both organisations;
18. Agree to advance European positions in the United Nations Security Council and to respect the latter's decisions;
19. Engage in joint discussions on United Nations reform.

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM*submitted by Mr de Puig, Rapporteur***I. Introduction**

1. The United States is at present the only global superpower. As an unchallenged unipolar power, America faces a dilemma: will it consolidate the force of its empire or degenerate into an empire of force²? Europe, which has not yet opted to be a “power”, risks floundering in political impotence. Europe also faces a double dilemma: that of reconciling the continued existence of an Atlantic Alliance dominated by the United States with the emergence of Europe’s strategic and political independence and of marrying respect for individual national sovereignties with building political power in common³.

2. Europe has neither the means nor the ambition to deprive the United States of leading great power status by throwing itself into a frenetic race for military supremacy. It accepts the United States’ dominant role, always providing that it is not just American national or hegemonic interests which are served by it, but humanity as a whole that benefits, in particular through the United Nations. The lure of imperialism, or permanent political “*dirigisme*”, would be unacceptable to Europeans. Europe would accept willingly enough the influence the United States inevitably wields within the framework of a multilateral system. But a unipolar one based on submission on the part of Europeans, and other countries as well, or their instrumentalisation, in the service of a single master would be unacceptable, being completely at variance with European conceptions of geostrategy and international relations.

3. It seems clear that the foreign policy assumptions of the present Republican Administration under President George Bush represent a substantial change of direction towards a heightened defence of US national interests with America using not only the full force of its political and economic clout but also wheeling out its military might. It has furthermore developed a new geostrategic doctrine (featuring *inter alia* unilateralism, pre-emptive war and coalitions of the willing) based on a moral (and religious) fundamentalist vision of a miracle-worker role in the world for the United States that verges on the messianic.

4. The new American stance – with the war in Iraq, its antecedents and immediate consequences – has brought us to a particularly critical turning-point in US/European relations. We are in fact, in the midst of an international crisis, in serious difficulty over the future of key institutions set up in recent decades (the United Nations, NATO and the European Union). The disagreements and divisions there have been over such a serious event as war have raised profound questions about the future. Apart from the differences of view between individual governments in Europe, and elsewhere, there has been a strong reaction on the part of the peoples of Europe, who have amply demonstrated their opposition to the war.

5. The conflict has served to highlight, unequivocally, the fact that the United States has embarked on a new geostrategic approach and that it is prepared to remain within a multilateral framework so long as this serves to assist it in carrying out its decisions. However, if this proves not to be the case, it will not hesitate to act unilaterally, as it decided to do in this conflict, even though a clear majority in the United Nations Security Council were against military intervention, as proposed and ultimately implemented.

6. Europe, then, is faced with the duty and the necessity of taking a stance on the new United States national security strategy. To that end, it might therefore be useful to consider how the United States develops its foreign and security policy and the main trends it embodies. There is also a need to ascertain what the position of the present Administration is and the thrust of US foreign policy as a whole over time. And there is a further need, to take the trauma of the 11 September 2001 attacks into

² “The United States: the empire of force or the force of empire?” Pierre Hassner, *Chaillot Papers* No. 54, September 2002, European Union Institute for Security Studies.

³ “La puissance et l’Europe” by Nicole Gnesotto, September 1998, Presses de Sciences Po, Paris.

account and endeavour to analyse their deep-seated causes, along with their impact on US public opinion.

7. A European interpretation of the United States new national security strategy must be concerned with predicting its consequences for global security and transatlantic relations. The discussions that took place on these topics at the colloquy organised jointly by the WEU Assembly and the Greek EU/WEU Presidency in Athens, on 17-18 March 2003⁴ yielded a wealth of ideas and argument to which we shall make reference in the present report.

8. The many differences in attitude that are apparent between the United States and Europe in a number of areas (disarmament, environment, the role of the United Nations, the death penalty, trade relations, conflicts and crises arising, and so on) should not cause us to neglect the degree to which they have interests, in terms of democratic values and economic prosperity, in common⁵. However, there are contradictions and weaknesses on both the American and the European side that should be noted. The deeply disturbing absence in Europe of a common foreign and security policy has its counterweight in the far too unequal treatment the United States accords to identifiable threats around the world.

9. The new US national security strategy, which had its official publication in September 2002⁶, found its first practical application in the war against Iraq that broke out on 19 March of this year. The Iraq crisis has laid bare, and exacerbated, the differences between both sides of the Atlantic and between Europeans and provides the litmus test both for the direction relations between Europe and the United States will take and for the future of the United Nations.

II. Europe's reactions to the new US national security strategy

1. US foreign policy, the consequences of the 11 September 2001 attacks and main geostrategic directions

(a) US foreign and security policy options

10. It is difficult to establish a single, coherent strategic vision in a country such as the United States which has multiple power and decision-making centres and is by tradition a power-house for ideas, articulated through a large number of outlets (State Department, Pentagon, CIA, Congress, university circles, advisers, think tanks etc.). However it would appear that the trend on the part of analysts and strategists towards hegemonistic and unilateralist⁷ thinking is having a decisive influence on the current US Administration.

11. As far as the international system goes, the multilateral current of thought acknowledges the principle of collective security as a voluntary partnership between states for keeping the peace, with international institutions as the nerve-centres of an agreed and effective hegemony. Those of unilateralist persuasion reckon such institutions are unable to deliver on their promises. A great debate on US national interests and the wisdom of external interventions of a humanitarian nature had

⁴ "Europe and the new United States national security strategy – fighting terrorism together", Athens Colloquy, 17-18 March 2003. <http://assembly.weu.int>.

⁵ "Bridging the Atlantic Divide". Philip H. Gordon, *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2003, Vol. 82, No.1, pp. 70-83.

⁶ The official version of the new "National Security Strategy of the United States of America" is available at the following web address: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.

⁷ Justin Vaï sse identifies four major trends, two of them forming part of the "Wilsonist" tradition favouring the idea of a US "mission", and in principle interventionist: the multilateralist liberal Internationalists (Joseph Nye, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs under the Clinton Administration), and the hegemonistic, unilateralist neo-conservatives (Paul Wolfowitz, the present Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Robert Kagan, Senior Associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and editor of the *Washington Post*). Two other trends form part of the legacy of *Realpolitik*, giving priority to the national interest and the balance of forces: the multilateralist managerial realists (Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State from 1973-1977) and unilateralist isolationist sovereigntists (Jesse Helms, Conservative senator for North Carolina until 2002). Cf. "*Washington et le monde – Dilemmes d'une superpuissance*" by Pierre Hassner and Justin Vaï sse, Collection CERI/Editions Autrement, Paris 2003, p. 32.

already taken place during the Clinton Administration, following US involvement in a number of conflicts, in particular Somalia and the Balkans. Criticism of the way such external interventions were handled has been strongest from conservative circles. They take the view that such “humanitarian” operations are a drain on the country’s resources and are opposed to the pursuit of utopian goals which held virtually no strategic interest for the United States⁸.

12. The neo-conservatives, in particular, fear that in the absence of US hegemony anarchy might break out. Under President Clinton, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright summarised her government’s position as: multilateral when we can, unilateral when we must⁹. It seems the formula has been reversed under the new US Administration. The United States, as the main repository of what is right and fair, is seeking to take sole charge, to be the guarantor of international law and, at the same time, exempt from it. In the name of the US national interest, the Administration is studiously seeking to avoid allocating a major role to an alliance like NATO, whose procedures restrict US freedom of action, as the Americans are forced, notwithstanding their dominance within the institution, to be answerable and to listen to their Allies, who in turn are frequently neither especially convinced nor accommodating. Again, the mission determines the coalition, by all accounts, not the other way round¹⁰. Therefore, within the US Administration, the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, whom some commentators perceive as a supporter of multilateralism, would seem to be a lone voice.

13. US Presidential circles take the view that in the face of future threats, firm action is required, including the use of force. They think that to do away with weapons of mass destruction, and the proliferation thereof, to do away with terrorist groupings and present tyrannies and dictatorships, diplomacy and United Nations policy and resolutions will not suffice. They believe, and they say as much, that the only sure fire recipe for success in such an undertaking is the pressure of military might and as necessary armed intervention.

14. The Bush Administration has moreover reaffirmed its evident desire for supremacy, maintaining that its own military must be such as to “dissuade future military competition”¹¹. But it should also be borne in mind that the US drive towards hegemony rests to an extent on the notion of responsibility. It would be a mistake to interpret the US attitude as simply the desire for empire. The Administration’s line can be described as a mixture of defensive nationalism and a sense of duty. It would be true to say that the Americans are convinced they are there to set the world to rights. As they understand it, this is the price they must pay for being the sole major superpower empowered to act anywhere in the world. And they also feel that they are on their own. According to Robert Kagan, as far as its global responsibilities are concerned no other nation wants take the place of the United States.

15. But this does not mean to say that the seeds of ultranationalism are not present in the United States today. They are indeed there and of concern to Europeans. But the United States has to deal with being in the paradoxical position of an empire whose institutions and ideology are unsuited to its international role. America is still an individualistic liberal republic, with no experience of colonialism. The current martial thrust of US foreign policy could therefore represent a dangerous challenge to American institutions in their bid for moral leadership. For the moral question of the legitimacy and effectiveness of the means employed is a fundamental one for the United States. As a result the new strategic direction taken by the US Administration seems to many Americans to conflict with the past. As the eminent intellectual, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. observed, “For more than two hundred years we have not been that type of country”¹².

16. It is helpful to look at American policy over time, in order to clarify the enduring aspects that have survived successive Administrations of different political hues. The United States took its

⁸ Notably Charles Krauthammer, “The Short Unhappy Life of Humanitarian War”, *The National Interest*, Autumn 1999.

⁹ Hassner and Väi sse, *op cit.*, p. 75.

¹⁰ Paul Wolfowitz. Address to the *Wehrkunde*, 2 February 2002.

¹¹ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The White House, September 2002. (See above, note 5).

¹² “Unilateral preventive war: illegitimate and immoral”, *Los Angeles Times*, 21 August 2002.

decision to move gradually towards a unipolar position in the world well before 11 September 2001. As from the end of the cold war, it ceased to think primarily in terms of multipolarity. For Ivan Eland¹³ there is nothing substantially new in the national security strategy President Bush published in September 2002. It was the same policy the United States had been pursuing since the end of the second world war and was geared to achieving US world superiority. Former Presidents Clinton and Bush Senior had also had the same policy objectives of global “primacy”. President Bush Senior intervened in Panama and Iraq with operation “Desert Storm”, President Clinton intervened in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia¹⁴ and Kosovo¹⁵. In 1994, Clinton had threatened North Korea with war because of its military programme, and retaining American military pre-eminence had always been a plank of the US national security strategy. American intervention since the end of the cold war has also been marked by a number of failures, particularly in the post-conflict and reconstruction phases: Iraq in 1991, Somalia or Haiti. The United States’ strategic vision was already that of a single great world power. The advent of the new Republican Administration and the 11 September 2001 attacks had merely shored up that view and accelerated the warlike trend by giving precedence to the military factor.

17. When it came to building Europe, earlier US Administrations, in particular that of Ronald Regan, had shown themselves wary. The debate about “fortress” Europe and US resistance to a united economic Europe are the stuff of transatlantic relations. The United States was also suspicious of WEU and stood out against the emergence of a multilateral European defence organisation, wanting “everything” to be done through NATO¹⁶. Thus a formal agreement, envisaged as early as 1994 on the availability of the Alliance’s collective assets for WEU-led, then EU-led operations (under the CFSP), was signed between the EU and NATO only on 13 December 2002. Notwithstanding US anxieties, obfuscations and sometime obstructions, Europeans were loyal and patient¹⁷.

18. When it wants to, the United States is capable of weighing in, in extremely beneficent and often decisive fashion, in order to influence global power balances or regional conflicts. Historical examples abound. The part played by the United States in both world wars, which were basically European wars, should never be overlooked – in the second especially, which liberated Europe from nazism. Then, in the economic sphere, the Marshall Plan to help Europe climb out of its post-war destitution, the formation of NATO, and the policy of containing communism; also, the US role in Japan after the second world war, or in setting up the international financial institutions at Bretton Woods, are all so many instances of the United States’ unparalleled ability to exert an influence to the good if so minded. Not to be forgotten also is US support for the changes that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the CSCE’s Paris Conference and all the economic aid and political assistance to prevent the process drifting out of control. The same is largely true of the US presence in the Balkans or its role working for the enlargement of NATO to include the countries of central and eastern Europe.

¹³ Director of the Center for the Study of War, Crises and Liberty, The Independent Institute, Oakland, California, USA. He spoke at the Athens Colloquy on 17-18 March 2003. See Note 3.

¹⁴ Europe as such was not involved in the start of the conflict in Bosnia. The Americans had to intervene when the situation became untenable. The Americans at the time agreed on an intervention with the Russians, and NATO did the rest. The Dayton Peace Agreement was negotiated between the Americans and the parties concerned. Europeans could do no more than approve, sign and pay up. “The myth of Europa – a paradigm for European Defence” Lluís Maria de Puig, Assembly of Western European Union, 2000, p. 52.

¹⁵ In the case of Kosovo, President Clinton and his allies decided to attack a sovereign nation without UN approval, but with the go-ahead from NATO, and, as Mr Eland makes clear, by simply assisting one side in a civil war, without openly trying to change the nature of the regime. It is perhaps an unfair exaggeration to speak of Europe’s conspicuous absence in Kosovo. Of the 35 000 troops sent to Kosovo nearly 30 000 were European and only 6 000 American. Yet the public view and perception of this conflict was that the NATO action was based on American criteria and considerations and that Europe’s margin for manoeuvre was very limited. Lluís Maria de Puig . *Op.cit.* p.79.

¹⁶ The setting up of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) as “separable but not separate forces” was in line with this thinking. There was also then US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright’s 3Ds (no decoupling, no duplication and no discrimination). *The Financial Times*, 7 December 1998.

¹⁷ “The United States and European Defence: American attitudes and perceptions”, Stanley R. Sloan, *Chaillot Papers* No. 39, April 2000, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris.

(b) After the 11 September 2001: the war on terror

19. The United States, a relatively young country by comparison with other nations, has known few wars and incursions into its national territory¹⁸. Before 11 September 2001, it had already been the victim of terrorist attacks on American soil (The World Trade Center in 1993) and elsewhere, directly or indirectly (Yemen and Kenya, prior to 11 September 2001, and afterwards in Tunisia, Pakistan, Bali). But the 11 September 2001 attacks, described as “acts of war” by the United States, suddenly increased Americans’ sense of vulnerability, struck deep in the heart of their national territory by stateless enemies.

20. Unlike some terrorist movements, al-Qa’ida does not espouse any regional cause or that of any state legally defined as such. The American military riposte took place first on Afghan soil in the search for Osama bin Laden (trained by the CIA in the 1980s to fight the Soviets) with the support of the *ad hoc* international coalition.

21. However, immediate retaliation apart, the 11 September attacks were hugely traumatic for the Americans. They suddenly became aware of the fact that their security system was not working. American intelligence had failed, the United States was vulnerable. This revelation of their weaknesses had enormous repercussions.

22. The attacks, and the action against terrorism that resulted from them thus provided the Bush Administration with the necessary pretext for conflating a number of different threats (terrorism and weapons of mass destruction) and ending up with a new military doctrine (pre-emptive strikes)¹⁹. The “hawkish” hegemonistic, unilateralist elements in the Bush Administration also used it as an excuse to win acceptance of earlier plans (war against Iraq, missile defence, massive increase in defence spending).

23. The 11 September 2001 attacks also provided the new Bush Administration with the chance to equate the war on terror with the struggle against nazism or communism. It represented a return to moral certainty in American foreign policy, which neo-conservatives contrasted with the lack of diplomatic transparency of the Clinton era. It was a duel of American values against the forces of evil, in which “God is not neutral”²⁰. The notion of the just war was emphasised: “The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just”²¹.

24. On 11 September 2001, in an address to the American nation, President Bush stated: “Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror”. “Today our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature”. He cited the twenty-third psalm from the Old Testament: “Even though I walk in the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me”. On 20 September 2001 the President told Congress “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”. On 25 September 2001, speaking of the coalition against terror, the President described those who committed terrorist acts as “evil people”, saying “This is good versus evil. These are evildoers. They have no justification for their actions. There’s no religious justification, there’s no political justification. The only motivation is evil”. On 6 October 2001, a new vein was introduced. The United States would “fight evil regimes”, while wanting to be “generous to the people [the terrorists] oppress”. On 29 January 2002, in his State of the Union address, he finally berated the terrorists of “rogue states”: “States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil”. In President Bush’s view, “Through the gathering momentum of millions of acts of service and decency and kindness, I know we can overcome evil with greater good”. On 11 September 2002, he stated: “We do know that God had placed us together at this moment, to grieve together, to stand together, to serve each other and our country. And the duty we have been given – defending America and our freedom – is also a privilege we share”.

¹⁸ The War of Independence in 1776, a further war against the British in 1814, the War of Secession from 1861-1865.

¹⁹ The argument advanced in favour of such strikes is the ineffectiveness of deterrence against non-state threats, in a world where danger lies in the acquisition of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons by rogue states.

²⁰ George W. Bush. Address to Congress, 20 September 2001; <http://usinfo.state.gov>.

²¹ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The White House, September 2002; <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.

25. The United States has not known (or wanted to know) what to think about the political significance of the disaster that struck²². It has not examined every facet of the attacks. It was no accident that New York and Washington were the targets. The attacks were intended as a punishment for a country that profaned Arab holy places and harassed Arabs, and at the same time sought to draw attention to the failure of the globalisation of which the United States is the driving force. They were a reaction to economic domination and exploitation of a part of the globe. But the United States has not absorbed (or wished to absorb) the political message behind the attacks. That message also embodies a religious element, with Americans accused of heresy, hedonism and injustice. Their undeviating support for Israel, the oppressor of the Palestinian people according to this thesis, is symptomatic, and the example most frequently quoted by terrorist movements or their sympathisers, not to mention the greater part of public opinion in the Arab world and many other observers above suspicion of mindless anti-Americanism. This is a view shared also by many American citizens.

26. This perception of the injustices of globalisation feeds anti-American or anti-Western feeling in many parts of the world, especially the Arab/Moslem world but also in Asia (Pakistan, Indonesia). In this context, some more of the more radical Islamic thinkers feel they are championing a cause. Bin Laden and his acolytes are not just some kind of mafia gang in lawless pursuit of ill-gotten gain. Their decision to kill is a political one with religious overtones. The attacks are therefore rooted in politics.

27. In that respect, the United States has not shown any inclination for self-criticism. Rather its position has hardened, by identifying an “axis of evil” and describing its fight against terrorism as a “war”. Its wholehearted support for Mr Sharon’s so-called “anti-terrorist” policies is strong evidence of this hardening of its attitude. Nevertheless, Mr Bush has not shown any inclination to rethink the policy that came out of the 11 September 2001 attacks by giving priority to economic cooperation, development aid, technology transfer, and a willingness to draw closer to and enter into dialogue with certain Arab Moslem countries and least of all by changing his policy towards the Middle East conflict.

(c) Main trends and consequences for world security

28. Since the most recent US elections, following the Republican victory and the arrival in power of President Bush, the new Administration has developed a new defence and security strategy with far-reaching international consequences. Speeches by the President and the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and a number of programme documents, set out a distinctly unilateralist option. The concepts developed subsequently are already implied in “Rebuilding America’s Defenses” (2000)²³, and the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001)²⁴: unilateral military intervention, with or without United Nations backing, US decision-making on the basis of national interests, pre-emptive warfare, coalitions of the willing and so on.

29. Following the trauma of 11 September 2001, and in the context of the escalating crisis in Iraq, the United States new national security strategy, unveiled in final form in the “National Security Strategy” document²⁵ in September 2002, was received with heightened interest both at home and abroad – the more so as its publication had been delayed by a year. The strategy represents both a degree of continuity in relation to earlier American strategies as well as some departures.

30. Maintaining US military supremacy is for example a recurrent theme in successive national security strategies. In Chapter IX of the new strategy, the United States reaffirms “the essential role of American military strength”, stating “We must build and maintain our defences beyond challenge”.

²² “*Europa contra la Guerra – Europa como instrumento de paz en un mundo multipolar*”, Lluís Maria de Puig, Fundació Compalans, Barcelona, 2002, pages 51-70.

²³ “Rebuilding America’s Defenses, Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century”. Report by The Project for the New American Century, September 2000, <http://www.newamericancentury.org>.

²⁴ “Quadrennial Defense Review Report”, US Ministry of Defense, 30 September 2001; <http://www.defenselink.mil>.

²⁵ The National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, September 2002; <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.

31. In terms of new thinking, the new US security strategy is essentially unilateral and admits of the principle of “pre-emptive war”. The United States reserves the right to launch unilateral pre-emptive attacks against terrorist groups and so-called rogue states, either already in possession of weapons of mass destruction or potentially on the way to acquiring them. It is difficult to ascertain whether and to what extent the United States differentiates between terrorist organisations and potentially threatening “state actors”.

32. A confusion is also introduced between the notions of “pre-emption” and “prevention”. There is a tendency on the part of the United States to assimilate anticipatory action (undertaken “even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack”) with pre-emptive strikes (which may be legitimate in the face of certain and imminent danger).

33. Chapter V reads: “We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. (...) We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. (...) We cannot let our enemy strike first. (...) We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. (...) The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively. The United States will not use force in all cases to pre-empt emerging threats, nor should nations use pre-emption as a pretext for aggression.”

34. As far as alliances go, the United States seems more inclined to favour coalitions of the willing, after the “multilateralism American Style” to which Robert Kagan refers. President Bush, in his introductory message to the strategy, states that “Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations” adding “Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions”. Further on, Chapter VIII of the strategy states that: “America will implement its strategies by organising coalitions – as broad as practicable – of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that favours freedom. (...)”.

35. Although much is made of multilateral cooperation, referred to in many parts of the strategy document, the objectives and means described in one section are at times diluted, or even contradicted, by principles set out in another.

36. In Chapter VIII for example, international cooperation is given prominence. Here it is stated that “The events of September 11, 2001, fundamentally changed the context for relations between the United States and other main centres of global power, and opened vast, new opportunities. With our long-standing allies in Europe and Asia, and with leaders in Russia, India, and China, we must develop an active agenda of cooperation (...) We can build fruitful habits of consultation, quiet arguments, sober analysis, and common action (...)”.

37. However, while recognising the importance of alliances, the United States reserves the right to act alone if its interests so require. Hence Chapter III of the strategy states: “While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists (...)”. And Chapter IX states “In exercising our leadership, we will respect the values, judgement, and interest of our friends and partners. Still, we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require”.

38. There are other worrying aspects of the US national security strategy, particularly the fact that little importance is attributed to the United Nations. There is also the idea that the US has a “mission”. What gives rise to most concern is the Americans’ propensity to assimilate that mission with their own national interests. As the documents we have just quoted clearly show, US interests invariably coincide exactly with those of humanity.

39. The US strategy must also be envisaged in a longer-term perspective. What will its impact be in a few months’ time and even beyond then on the work of the United Nations, NATO or the European Union? We need to consider the US attitude after the war on Iraq, taking account of the international

crisis it provoked, including the protest from around the world. We now wait upon events. Will the United States' official national security strategy come into its own under pressure of circumstances? Do our friends in the United States really want a unipolar world? What can we, their allies on the continent of Europe, give them? What can they, in turn, bring to Europe? As former President Clinton states in a recent press article²⁶, the United States should exercise leadership, not its will to dominate.

2. A European reading of the new American strategy

(a) Europe, its values and differences from the United States

40. Europeans have a duty to reflect on the implications of the new United States security strategy for the world, and for transatlantic relations. We have to stand up for our priorities and vision, through a process of constructive dialogue, at one and the same time both intra-European and transatlantic. This is all the more vital in the face of the threat of a rift between Europe and the United States.

41. It is clear that, in recent years, a quite different conception of international relations has developed in Europe from the one that currently predominates in the United States. This is based fundamentally on a different perception of the threats and, obviously, a different idea of how to deal with them²⁷. On the one hand, Americans feel vulnerable and insecure about the terrorist threat and believe that they are involved in a new kind of war, an expression of intrinsic human evil. Europeans do not see things that way; they do not regard it as a war and therefore do not think that the response should necessarily be a military one. For them, terrorism is not simply the work of the devil but arises from specific causes, from a wider and more deep-seated political dysfunction, as Javier Solana²⁸ WEU Secretary-General and CFSP High Representative, puts it.

42. It is clear that there are cultural differences and differences in mind-set between Europe and America, and a different form of politicisation which causes risks and threats to be perceived differently. Europeans tend to adopt a more relative approach, which takes account of human history in all its complexity, while North Americans feel constantly endangered and are inclined to take an over-simplified view both in their ideas and their responses to them. In the United States, a moralistic and religious society, what appear to be moral certainties prevail, collective psychological responses that are invariably the product of circumstance and immediacy, especially when it comes to identifying danger. In Europe, a secular, lay society with no such deep attachment to religious beliefs, tends to advocate diversity of analysis and examination of a whole range of factors – historical, economic, political and cultural.

43. This political approach means that while today the United States regards hyperterrorism, weapons of mass destruction and rogue states as a danger to homeland security and an overriding priority of international policy, Europeans believe that terrorism is undoubtedly a threat, but no less is poverty, pandemics, a rising birth rate, problems of sustained development, climatic change, all of which can give rise to instability or cause regional flare-ups, to the same extent at least as terrorism.

44. It is possible that Europe's position as described, which inclines it towards the peaceful resolution of conflict and political and diplomatic activity, has also to do with its own limitations (or incapability) from a military and operational standpoint, in the same way as US ways of thinking and action are undoubtedly influenced by the fact that it commands colossal force and is the world's only superpower. Those without force do not contemplate using it and those with it invariably have that use at the back of their minds²⁹.

²⁶ “Estados Unidos deberían liderar, no gobernar”, William J. Clinton, *El País*, 19 December 2002.

²⁷ “Democracies facing terrorism”, Document 9225, Report of the Political Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe, Rapporteur: Mr Terry Davis. Recommendation 1534 adopted by the Assembly of the Council of Europe on 26 September 2001, <http://www.assembly.coe.int>.

²⁸ “Las semillas de una posible ruptura entre EE.UU y Europa”, Javier Solana, *El País*, 13 January 2003.

²⁹ Nevertheless, Europeans also are giving thought to adapting their defence systems to the new terrorist threats. See “European military capabilities in the context of the fight against international terrorism”, Assembly Document 1783, Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Wilkinson, Rapporteur. Recommendation 706 adopted by the WEU Assembly on 3 June 2002. See <http://www.assembly-weu.org>.

45. Although Europe (and basically the European Union) is still without a set constitutional or institutional doctrine, it has developed a set of leading principles and values that provide a frame of reference and a universally recognised practice which has come to be known as the European model – a system of ideas and form of action that define Europe as a civilian power. This is a model based on consensus, multilateralism, cohesion, dialogue and discussion, a model that advocates investment in development aid, humanitarian assistance and cooperation, as opposed to military spending.

46. Such values, as listed by Jolyon Howorth³⁰, are pluralism, tolerance, a preference for humanitarian over military action, preventive policy and diplomacy over reaction and, as far as military intervention is concerned, legitimacy and legal mandate over a will to dominate and exercise control. Alyson Bailes³¹ accurately defined the conditions under which Europe might decide to use force: minimum and proportional resort to armed strength, the necessary legal basis and moral authority for doing so, respect for the Geneva Conventions, compatibility with EU undertakings in regard to armaments control, transparency and democratic answerability.

47. This is why the differences between the United States and Europe run far deeper than their different approaches on combating terrorist threats. They cover much vaster areas, like disarmament³² (in particular the American refusal to sign the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty, to ratify the Total Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, its denunciation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems, the need for a code of conduct on arms production and exports and provisions for strengthening the application of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions) the environment and sustainable development (American rejection of the Kyoto Protocol to limit emissions of greenhouse gases), the role of the United Nations (American unwillingness to engage in multinational operations under UN aegis, opposition to the setting up of the International Criminal Court) and international law (non-compliance with the Geneva Conventions in regard to the Guantanamo prisoners). There are also major transatlantic differences about crucial elements of the democratic tradition, such as human rights (abolition of the death penalty).

48. However, this Europe, capable of establishing the European Union with its model of democracy has, notwithstanding its repeated declarations, proved incapable of developing a common foreign policy, much less a common European defence – at present non-existent and with serious doubts hanging over its likely existence in the near future. Present splits have a great deal to do with the lack of a European defence and, in its absence, strictly national policies hold sway.

49. Nor have Europeans been capable of mustering forces and logistics adequate to guarantee a degree of autonomy. Nor have they given any particular preference to joint capabilities, interoperability or technology. The Americans have rightly criticised Europe for its lack of investment in security and defence, especially because, when the moment of truth arrived, it was they, yet again, who intervened in crises at the heart of Europe, like Bosnia and Kosovo.

50. Notwithstanding President Bush's radical and intransigent approach, after the September 2001 attacks, European solidarity with the United States was total. An extraordinary session of the European Council was convened on 21 September 2001. This was followed by a succession of visits by heads of states to Washington³³. Europeans were quite ready to take part in the coalition in

³⁰ "European Integration and Defence: the ultimate challenge?" *Chaillot Papers* No. 43, November 2000, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris.

³¹ "European Defence: Another set of questions" by Alyson J.K. Bailes. *RUSI Journal*, February 2000, and "The Yin and the Yang of counter-terrorism". *Idem*, December 2002.

³² "Monitoring international discussions on arms control and disarmament". Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr de Puig, Rapporteur, Assembly Document 1784, and Recommendation 714, adopted on 5 June 2002. See <http://www.assembly-weu.org> See also "Chemical and biological weapons control – new challenges", Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Schloten, Rapporteur, Assembly Document 1758, 5 December 2001.

³³ Between 18 and 21 September 2001, President Bush received President Jacques Chirac of France, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer and the Russian Head of the Diplomatic Service, Igor Ivanov. On 28 September, he received the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi and Belgian Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt, whose country at the time held the EU Presidency. On 15 October, Silvio Berlusconi also visited Washington.

Afghanistan³⁴ and demonstrated their loyalty and solidarity within NATO by activating Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

51. However, unlike the United States, Europe tried to “think through” the causes of this tide of fanatical and murderous radicalism. By doing so it was forced to accept a degree of self-criticism in regard to the West’s policy towards some countries. This train of thought should impel Europeans to identify the defects of globalisation and reconsider their future policies towards some countries.

52. The United States chose to forge ahead blindly, carried away on the tide of patriotic fervour, perhaps understandable as an emotive mass response after an aggression of the order of that of 11 September 2001, but conservative to the point of verging on the reactionary. A number of legal provisions and a whole set of surveillance measures were adopted which, while they clearly guaranteed security, undoubtedly represented curtailment of freedom³⁵. In Europe, such developments were viewed with deep concern.

53. President Bush’s religious utterances, coupled with his stated determination to fight evil, also make Europeans uneasy. When referring to the war on terror he spoke of it as a “crusade”, a sufficiently radical historical and religious concept, if not a form of intellectual “fundamentalism”, and hardly indicative of peaceful intent towards the Moslem world. Such a line of thinking is particularly dangerous if the “mission” for which the United States feels it has a calling, leads it to steer its allies and partners down the path of transcendentalism.

54. Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, Europe sought, in so far as it could, to ensure diplomacy and dialogue had priority, while the United States chose force as its first preference. For Europeans, a military solution is not always the most effective against every kind of threat. Furthermore the US tendency to see everything in terms of black and white, of “Good” and “Evil” and insisting everyone take sides “for” or “against” the United States has dismayed most of its Allies . The effect of this type of attitude is to deny the latter any independent room for manoeuvre in keeping with their own views and national and European interests.

55. No doubt European governments are primarily responsible for Europe’s weakness and its lack of political clout in world affairs. In order to bring about a better balance in transatlantic relations, our governments must express as a body the political resolve to create a powerful Europe, with a real common security and defence policy. And that resolve must be translated into action (defence spending, interoperable capabilities and equipment, common action).

56. The other essential condition for bringing about a more equal balance in transatlantic relations through complementarity, involves a real exchange of views on the common threats the United States and Europe currently face and are likely to face in the future. For such a dialogue to be productive, the United States must first be fully persuaded of its own national interest in seeking a multipolar world and abandon the double standards it frequently uses in pursuit of its policies.

(b) Consequences for NATO and transatlantic cooperation

57. The Alliance is a key institution as far as Europeans are concerned and forms part of the wider view of Europe and the areas in which it should be present or become involved. It is the concrete expression of the transatlantic link, the bridge between Europe and the United States and Canada. But NATO has gone through a crisis. Since the end of the cold war the Atlantic Alliance has tended increasingly to drift away from its function as a military alliance and to become more of a political forum to the detriment of its former role. The attitude of the United States has contributed to this crisis

³⁴ The following countries were engaged in Afghanistan (at 24 April 2002): Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, FYROM, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom. (Source: <http://www.usinfo.state.gov>).

³⁵ Creation of new federal Homeland Security Department and Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (SARPA), elimination of the separation between internal and external intelligence departments provided for under anti-terrorist legislation (USA Patriot Act) which also gave wide powers to the police authorities (secret searches, extensive electronic eavesdropping operations, extended periods of detention for those suspected of terrorist activities, etc).

of credibility, especially by its refusal to have recourse to the Alliance following the 11 September 2001 attacks. In spite of the European allies' willingness to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States effectively rejected the Europeans' offer, apart from a few AWACS aircraft to monitor its airspace, and conducted operations in Afghanistan, outside the Alliance framework, on the basis of a coalition of volunteers. It is also worth remembering Europeans' lasting discomfiture during operations in Kosovo at the random nature of US action taken without consultation with the Allies.

58. More recently, at the Prague Summit on 21 and 22 November 2002, the Americans took the initiative in proposing the setting up of a rapid response force within NATO, thus bringing about a revival of the Organisation. It should be recalled that it was also at the United States' suggestion that NATO, at the same time as organising a new wave of enlargement of the Alliance, approved a military concept in Prague that encompassed defence against terrorism.

59. The United States has at times tended to say one thing and do another in regard to NATO's future. It is worth remembering that at the start of the present Administration, rumour had it that NATO would cease to be a military alliance and become a political talking-shop. Indeed, the Alliance was in fact sidelined after the 11 September 2001 attacks, only to be revived several months later (in Prague) and in particular, prior to the Iraq war in a clear attempt by the United States to put it to use in implementing its new anti-terrorist doctrine.

60. In Europe the feeling has been that since the end of the cold war and after the Kosovo experience, NATO was no longer of interest to the Americans. Unfortunately, the way things have gone has fuelled that impression. Only when the fight against terrorism took priority was it proposed that NATO should once again have an operational role, through the creation of a rapid response force exclusively for that mission. Europeans, in the face of this surprising and new NATO task, did not fail to note that a rapid reaction force is also in the process of being built within the European Union. So now there will be two such forces.

61. On 10 February 2003, Turkey invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for the Allies to consult one another whenever, in the opinion of one of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any one of them comes under threat. Fearing to confer legitimacy in advance on recourse to force against Iraq and thus encroach upon the role of the United Nations Security Council, Belgium, France and Germany were opposed to a decision being taken in the Alliance immediately with a view to deployment on Turkish soil of AWACS surveillance aircraft and Patriot aircraft defence systems. None of the Allies took issue with the fact of Turkey's having good grounds for preventive defence measures. It was a matter of timing that preoccupied some of them (taking a decision after the UN Security Council had taken its decision). The real problem was whether the EU would stick together over the Iraq issue. A compromise was reached on 19 February 2003³⁶, but tensions between Atlantic and European partners ran high.

62. The new United States national security strategy clarifies the role that the United States wants NATO to play from now on. "NATO's core mission – collective defence of the transatlantic alliance of democracies – remains, but NATO must develop new structures and capabilities to carry out that mission under new circumstances. NATO must build a capability to field, at short notice, highly mobile, specially trained forces whenever they are needed to respond to a threat against any member of the Alliance. The Alliance must be able to act wherever our interests are threatened, creating coalitions under NATO's own mandate, as well as contributing to mission-based coalitions. (...) If NATO succeeds in enacting these changes, the rewards will be a partnership as central to the security and interests of its member states as was the case during the Cold War".

63. The US national security strategy paper makes a single reference to CFSP/ESDP, in Chapter VIII: "... we welcome our European allies' efforts to forge a greater foreign policy and defence identity within the EU, and commit themselves to close consultations to ensure that these

³⁶ Summary record of the visit of WEU Assembly members to NATO HQ on 5 March 2003, A/WEU/CP (2003) CR", 12 March 2003.

developments work with NATO". While the United States welcomes the development of CFSP/ESDP, it has nevertheless entered a proviso as to how it should develop.

64. There is not a single European government that would advocate the weakening or disappearance of NATO. All of them are resolved to overcome present tensions and go through with enlargement. If America were to make proposals for cooperation rather than issuing orders, putting out press statements and applying political pressure, NATO would recover its unity and its status. Europeans have a major interest in continuing to work together within the Atlantic Alliance, but in an alliance between true allies, not one that consists of decision-makers on one side of the Atlantic and those who follow meekly on the other side. Europeans are entitled to take steps within NATO to try and ensure that European values and interests prevail.

III. A renewed and balanced transatlantic relationship³⁷

1. Contradictions between the United States and Europe

(a) United States: double standards in the face of threats

65. The American Secretary of State, Colin Powell, said recently: "I believe the broader tapestry of our foreign policy has become clear: to encourage the spread of democracy and market economies ..."³⁸. However, in point of fact, this goal is not always and everywhere pursued with the same vigour. Afghanistan for example, would appear to be a blatant example of American unwillingness to achieve fully the stated goal of promoting democracy. The Americans threw themselves into the fray against the Taliban and the hunt for Bin Laden in order to destroy al-Qa'ida. However, the military operations now over, the United States has not committed itself to a vast programme for rebuilding the country, preferring to limit the ISAF mandate to a mission confined to the region around Kabul, which leaves the rest of the country insecure and is hardly favourable to the advent of a stable democratic regime.

66. Moreover, it can be observed that the United States does not always take the same view of countries or movements that might prove potential or real threats to peace. Its policies are sometimes contradictory. North Korea provides a good example of this. There is a striking contrast between United States policy towards Iraq and North Korea. The United States has come out clearly in favour of a multilateral solution to the present crisis in North Korea. On 10 January 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, citing as the reason for its decision threats to the security and sovereignty of the country as a result of aggressive US policies. On 15 January it threatened to start test firing missiles again, thus putting an end to the moratorium in force since 1998. On 5 February, it reactivated its nuclear installations forcing the IAEA to have recourse to the United Nations. On 25 February, it fired a missile over Japanese territorial waters and on 10 March tested a new medium-range anti-ship missile.

67. In spite of provocation the United States decided to adopt a strategy involving multilateral dialogue, involving the United Nations and all regional actors. This double standards policy was criticised even in the United States. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recently stated that in all respects, the danger from North Korea looked "more imminently dangerous than Iraq"³⁹. The United States therefore seems disposed to have recourse to dialogue, at least until the Iraq issue has been settled⁴⁰. It tends to play down the crisis. Colin Powell said shortly after the firing of the Korean missile on 25 February that it seemed a "fairly innocuous kind of test". He did not "find it particularly surprising, shocking or disturbing"⁴¹. Saddam Hussein had always refused to allow international inspections, while North Korea had agreed to freeze its nuclear programme in 1994. Furthermore, Pyongyang had openly acknowledged resuming its nuclear activity, unlike Iraq. The Korean nuclear

³⁷ See Franco-British summit Declaration on strengthening European cooperation in security and defence, Le Touquet, 4 February 2003, point 1.

³⁸ Colin Powell to Senate Committee on Europe, 24 April 2002.

³⁹ *Le Figaro*, 13 January 2003.

⁴⁰ *The Herald Tribune*, 17 February 2003.

⁴¹ *Le Figaro*, 26 February 2003.

programme was more advanced. Furthermore the country had medium-range delivery systems and would soon have long-range ones and sold such systems abroad to the highest bidder⁴². The United States' allies in the region are under direct threat and the North Korean arsenal contains biological and chemical weapons. A full-scale onslaught on North Korea would therefore be highly risky. North Korea initially announced that the war in Iraq justified its strategy of rearming quickly, but nevertheless said that it was ready, for the first time, to take part in multilateral negotiations, still with the supposed aims of normalising relations with the United States, signing a non-aggression pact and benefiting from a programme of sustained economic aid in exchange for abandoning its nuclear weapons programme.

68. It must be acknowledged that the United States sometimes acts on the basis of short-term assessments of what are immediate concerns, to the detriment of its long-term interests. During the period prior the first Gulf war, for example, the United States pushed Iraq into a war against Iran. Saddam Hussein was at that point the United States' friend and the US gave him both encouragement and arms⁴³. The US also supported the Taliban in its campaign against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Osama Bin Laden and his followers benefited in similar fashion from American support and know-know. Now, the chickens have finally come home to roost!

69. The Bush Administration's unconditional support for Mr Sharon has also proved a mistaken policy. The situation has become untenable from a humanitarian point of view. Moreover, as time passes, political solutions become increasingly difficult to achieve. We have gone back at least ten years. Finally, given the catastrophe of the last Intifada and the warlike response of the Israeli Government, the United States came round to the idea of working with Europeans, the Russians and the UN in a "quartet" to try and lay down a "road map". This document envisages three phases and a final date of 2005 in making progress towards setting up a viable, independent and democratic Palestinian state. In spite of all the efforts by Europeans, the United States delayed publication of the road map, which has been ready since 20 December 2002. However, it has now finally been published and was conveyed to the Israeli Government and Palestinian Authority on 30 April 2003. With the appointment on 10 March 2003 of Mr Mahmoud Abbas to the new post of Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, and his avowed intention of ending the Intifada and terrorism, there has been constructive progress on the Palestinian side. In any event, the US Administration is not putting much pressure on the Israeli Government to stop settlements being built in the occupied territories. On 18 April 2002 President Bush had described Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as a man of peace. Under such circumstances the chances of a full-scale remodelling of the region with a view to lasting peace still seem doubtful. It is essential for the quartet's plan to come to fruition and for Israel to comply with United Nations resolutions.

70. Furthermore, US support for a country such as Saudi Arabia⁴⁴ offers a paradigm of the paradoxical side of US policy. The United States supported the Saudi regime in full knowledge of the latter's "double standards" policy towards it (granting the Pentagon permission to deploy US troops on Saudi territory while at the same time handing out aid to extremist anti-American groups). The US announced its withdrawal after the occupation of Iraq, once it had found another epicentre for its

⁴² <http://www.globalsecurity.org>.

⁴³ See in particular "Bush contre Saddam: Irak, les faucons et la guerre", by Jean Guisel, Editions La Découverte, Paris, 2003.

⁴⁴ The United States made Saudi Arabia its main Arab ally in the Middle East, in view of its strategic situation in the Gulf, its influence in the Arab world and the US's dependency on it for energy (Saudi oil accounts for over 20% of American imports). In exchange, the Saudi monarchy enjoys the protection of the US in terms of its security. Military relations between the two countries date back to the 1940s. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, with US backing, funded the Afghan Mujahadeen. It also supported international terrorist groups. Militant Islamic fundamentalism had a powerful hold there. It was significant that the majority of the hijackers involved in the 11 September 2001 attacks had been identified by the FBI as Saudi Arabian citizens. In view of Saudi Arabia's reluctance to provide the United States with a rear base during the war with Iraq, the US had to deploy troops in other Gulf States and are currently preparing to redeploy their military forces in the Gulf, starting with the forthcoming transfer of the central air operations command from Al Kharg in Saudi Arabia to Al Udeid in Qatar.

military forces in the Middle East. Donald Rumsfeld informed Riyadh of this decision, marking a change in the relationship between the two countries, on 29 April 2003.

71. Another example is offered by Egypt, the main US military partner in the southern Mediterranean⁴⁵, not to mention Pakistan, a new US partner ruled by a dictator who seems to want to “go democratic”, but in a context that is nevertheless extremely worrying: a Moslem people in the grip of highly intense religious fervour; in dispute with India over the territory of Kashmir and in possession of nuclear weapons⁴⁶. Then there is US support for the government in Indonesia, the largest non-Arab Moslem state, with a recent history of and widespread reputation for corruption and despotism⁴⁷. In the same way, the United States described Prime Minister Mahatir Mohamed’s Malaysia as a force for regional stability and a model of economic development and tolerance⁴⁸. The real difficulty with such policies is not that they are different and disparate; it is that they often run counter to the democratic values representatives of the US Administration propound in speeches, and the Administration often forms *ad hoc* or longer-term alliances with countries with non-democratic political regimes.

72. In the same order of things, the war on terror has recently also been used at times as an excuse for leniency towards and military aid to other regimes of dubious character such as that of Algeria. Williams Burns, the American Assistant Secretary of State for North Africa and Near Eastern Affairs announced when visiting the Maghreb countries that his country envisaged signing an agreement with Algeria for the sale of military equipment for fighting terrorism⁴⁹. Or take the case of Yemen. In the United States view, Yemen oscillates between the status of suspect and ally. On 12 October 2000, a booby-trapped rubber dinghy exploded alongside the American destroyer the USS Cole in the port of Aden, while it was in the process of refuelling, leaving 17 dead and 39 injured. However, in March 2002, Vice-President Dick Cheney visited Yemen to assess the country’s needs in relation to the war on terror⁵⁰.

73. President Bush denounced the “axis of evil”⁵¹ (or “of the devil”) consisting of North Korea, Iran⁵² and Iraq. But those countries do not properly speaking constitute an “axis”. There is no strategic coordination between them, nor do they have convergent aims. Furthermore the black list of undesirable regimes in the world drawn up by the United States varies over time with the prevailing definition of the national interest. Libya for example no longer features on that list, Syria has a fair chance of being included on it before too long if certain US statements made in the post-Iraq war aftermath are to be believed, even though its main coalition partners are openly opposed to any military confrontation with Syria⁵³.

⁴⁵ Quite recently, the United States threatened to defer payment of an increase in its aid to Egypt because of the latter’s prosecution of the human rights activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim.

⁴⁶ Pakistan under the leadership of General Musharraf is the keystone of the new anti-terrorist coalition. The United States removed the economic sanctions that applied to the country since 1998 and provided him with 600 million dollars in aid, as well as military assistance, at the same time exercising subtle pressure on the regime to introduce democratic reform. The logistical requirements of Operation “*Enduring Freedom*” have also brought the United States close to the authoritarian regimes of Central Asia.

⁴⁷ After the violent repression and attacks on human rights in East Timor in the 1990s, the United States halted aid to the Jakarta government. It resumed its programme of assistance by granting 50 million dollars in aid to police forces for the fight against terrorism.

⁴⁸ “Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror” by Thomas Carothers, *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2003.

⁴⁹ *Le Monde*, 13 December 2002. This decision broke with the policy of neutrality the United States had pursued for more than ten years towards the Algerian crisis, regarded as an internal conflict in which there should be no involvement.

⁵⁰ On 3 November 2002, in Yemen, a vehicle transporting members of al-Qa’ida was destroyed by an American Predator drone. On 10 December 2002, a ship flying no flag was discovered transporting 15 Scud missiles destined for Yemen, which argued that the delivery was for national defence purposes. The cargo ultimately reached its destination.

⁵¹ State of the Union Address, 29 January 2002.

⁵² On Iran, see footnote 71.

⁵³ See recent statements by President Bush and Secretary of State Powell referred to in footnote 70.

(b) Europe: the lack of a common foreign and security policy

74. But it is not enough to criticise the United States, now on grounds of interventionism now for isolationism, for as long as Europe is not ready to defend its values and take responsible for ensuring stability in its back yard (the Balkans) and beyond (the Middle East, the Maghreb and Africa as a whole, Asia). European countries' military capabilities and defence expenditure are by and large insufficient for any form of sizeable military action, notwithstanding the creation of a rapid reaction force in the EU framework. Even if Europeans are credible in military terms, they are not politically and diplomatically. In point of fact European countries have major difficulties in reaching agreement on common policy positions.

75. Until now, Europe has had neither the will nor the capability to act as a counterweight to existing hegemonies, the main reason being the divisions between European governments on what Europe's role in the world should be, and especially, disagreement about US relations and its role of unchallenged leadership in the military sphere.

76. National policies continue to predominate in external policy and defence matters. They give rise to positions that differ, and are at times contradictory, on the part of the various European nations. What is more, the United States, in its dual role as sole superpower and as friend/ally, often puts pressure on European governments individually to obtain their support, which tends to encourage division between Europeans⁵⁴. The Iraq crisis is a case in point.

77. Europe must be seen as having its own set of values and being capable of military action when this proves necessary. If we do not give Europe the wherewithal to guarantee peace in its own territories and defend human rights in the world, we cannot complain, upon the advent of a crisis, if other countries, with goals different from our own, intervene in their own way.

78. The idea of a European defence, of Europe as a power in its own right, is not born of hegemonic ambition. Let us be quite clear about this: Europe must be capable of resorting to force, but this is only to be used in moderation, without a desire to dominate and subject always to the democratic scrutiny of parliaments and the authority of the United Nations. Europe must at all times base its action on defensive doctrines, using force only for legitimate reasons and as a last resort.

79. Greater autonomy for Europe in defence matters would enable it to stand up to bellicose imperialism, militarisation of international relations, armed riposte as the main instrument of the war on terror and a new arms race. Europe must be firm in its opposition to a policy likely to cause further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the development of a global missile defence system and pre-emptive warfare.

80. According to the decisions taken at the St Malo Franco-British Summit on 4 December 1998, the European defence project should rest on the two major principles of autonomy and complementarity: EU autonomous action, complementary to that of the Atlantic Alliance. "The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces (...) in order to respond to international crises". The collective defence commitment given by the member states (in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty) must be maintained. In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, "... we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members"⁵⁵. Over four years later, at the Franco-British Summit held in Le Touquet on 4 February 2003, the idea that found favour was again that of "a renewed and balanced transatlantic partnership" based on the "close relationship that the EU and NATO have developed" in regard to crisis management"⁵⁶. As a response to the new security challenges that Europe has to face up to, such a partnership seems more eminently desirable than ever. In calling for greater efforts for the improvement of EU military capabilities, and inviting their partners to unite with them in such

⁵⁴ De Puig, "*Europa contra la Guerra*", pp. 20-22.

⁵⁵ See the joint Declaration issued at the Franco-British Summit, St-Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998 (para. 2).

⁵⁶ See the joint Declaration on strengthening European cooperation in security and defence, issued at the Franco-British Summit, Le Touquet, 4 February 2003 (para.1).

action. France and the United Kingdom noted that the outcome would “also be of direct benefit to the Atlantic Alliance, as envisaged at Saint-Malo”⁵⁷.

81. The US defence budget amounted to 368 billion euros in 2003 and is likely to increase to 400 billion euros by 2007⁵⁸. However Europe invests a great deal more in humanitarian and development aid than the United States. In 2000, the United States spent 10.3 billion euros in development aid, while the seven largest European contributors together invested 27 billion euros in those areas. Americans have provided development aid worth 1.4 billion euros to the Balkans, while Europeans have provided 12 billion euros in support to the region out of total aid of 17 billion euros.

82. It is true that Europe must develop its political capabilities further. Even divided among themselves, European countries have a not inconsiderable influence on the world stage. Therefore, if they were to unite and speak with a single voice in the conduct of a common policy, it is possible to imagine the very formidable influence they might have on world problems. The aim of the Convention on the Future of Europe is to create instruments that will assist the emergence of a common political will among the member states of the European Union, but there is no substitute for political will which cannot come into being “by decree”⁵⁹.

83. Europe does not want to be, nor should it be, either subject or in opposition to the United States. It is a question neither of allegiance nor confrontation. Is the diktat “for us or against us” or stances taken instinctively along national lines all we have to show, at the end of the day, for our fifty years of Euro-Atlantic alliance, based on so many common values and struggles for democracy⁶⁰? What is needed is a Europe that is organised, autonomous and complementary to the United States, one that acts as a great power in a multipolar world. Europe should continue to expand its economy, trade and development aid, just like the United States.

84. In any case, there is little point in Europeans holding the United States responsible for their own shortcomings. If there is no community of ideas and interests in regard to foreign and defence policy Europeans, unable to harmonise standards and form a common view of what Europe’s role in the world should be, cannot lay the blame at anyone else’s door but their own. Europeans have proved unable to date to break out of the confines of their respective national defences and think in terms of a European defence, even in the face of lack of capability and the failures that have dogged Europe in recent years, when it was unable as an entity to command respect or solve its own problems (for example in the Balkans).

85. The Europeans were the ones who willingly accepted American primacy in geostrategic and military matters, joining NATO and relying for years on the security guarantees being offered them by the United States, with its investment and technology, knowing that this involved a very high degree of political dependency. Therefore, when Europe again experienced armed conflict, governments had to go back to the United States (as in the past) and ask it to use its might to end the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the United States came to the rescue once again.

86. It has often been claimed that Europe’s weakness stems from the fact that its lack of operational capability prevents it from acting as a defensive power. This criticism contains a grain of truth, but also a fair sprinkling of falsehood and one obvious contradiction. True, Europe has major operational deficits as far as large-scale intervention is concerned: strategic airlift, AWACS (Airborne Warning

⁵⁷ *Idem.* para. 3

⁵⁸ The increase of 54 billion euros forecast for 2003 is twice Italy’s annual spending and exceeds that of the United Kingdom, the third highest spender, by 14 billion euros. In 2003, the United States spent 3.5% of GDP on defence, Germany 1.5%, Italy 1.9%, Belgium 1.3%, Spain 1.9%, UK 2.6% and France 2.4%. It should be noted that US GDP is double that of Germany, UK, France and Italy taken together and that these are respectively the third, fourth, fifth and sixth largest economies in the world. De Puig “*Europa contra la Guerra*”, pp. 37-38.

⁵⁹ See the contribution by Mr Jean-Luc Dehaene, Vice-Chairman of the Convention on the Future of Europe, Plenary Session, 6-7 February 2003, Brussels and article entitled “*Europe et défense, les promesses de l’aube*”, by Mr Michel Barnier, European Commissioner and member of the Convention in *Le Figaro*, 19 February 2003.

⁶⁰ Nicole Gnesotto, Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies, “*Ni allégeance, ni affrontement*”, *Le Figaro*, 7 February 2003.

and Control System), satellites, interoperability, logistics, intelligence. Nevertheless, to compare it with the military might of the United States would be misleading, because the two are not comparable. Europe does not want, cannot attain and does not need the same potentiality as the United States. Such criticism also goes so far as to imply that Europe will not be able to intervene in certain sorts of crises. While this is true to an extent, it should be noted nevertheless that this is to see things in terms of black and white. If United Kingdom forces are capable of intervening in Iraq and French forces in the Gulf, and we know what the capabilities of other large and medium-sized countries are, it is obvious that Europe, taken together, is a very considerable military power, probably the world's second largest, when considered in its totality. However, that might has never been envisioned as a whole, in terms of a European defence or European armed forces. Until now, there has never been the political will to think of it in those terms.

87. It is also the case that Europe is perplexed by the United States' attitude to Europe's lack of military capability. On the one hand, it accuses Europeans of not investing in defence (justifiably so) but on the other, each time Europe takes a tiny step towards organising its own defence dimension, it runs up against US opposition. Defence investment in NATO alone meets with agreement. WEU never found favour with the US, nor the ESDP within the European Union. Clearly the United States only wants a transatlantic Europe and is opposed to an autonomous one, even when allied with it. Indeed, that is a view shared by some European governments⁶¹.

88. The meeting on European defence attended by four heads of state and government, those of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg, in Brussels on 29 April 2003⁶² is an initiative that should be monitored but to which for the time being only the countries that proposed it are committed. It can be regarded as constructive in terms of the proposals these four European countries have put forward for "more Defence Europe" following a direction that draws greatly on ideas advanced for a long time now by our own Assembly and on which there is likely to be broad agreement all round.

89. The breadth of the initiative has brought new elements into play which will need to be openly debated at the Convention on the Future of Europe and the Intergovernmental Conference among the Fifteen and with new EU member states, for it is obvious that some of them will not agree with all the proposals advanced by the Four, any more than how they have gone about things. There have already been criticisms on that score. And it must be acknowledged that all the proponent countries have a right of initiative (shades of St Malo) and to make known their desire to speed up the process for building a European defence. It would, however, be deplorable if such a move merely reflected the transient interests of certain countries in the wake of the Iraq crisis, without real future commitment. If Europe wants a European defence and thinks that such a development is of the utmost importance, it has to be one to which everyone can contribute.

90. The speed, timetable and formulae all still need to be discussed. However, as far as the proposal for including a collective defence clause in the EU Constitutional Treaty is concerned, a reminder that the modified Brussels Treaty and Article V thereof are in force, having been signed and ratified *inter alia* by the Four, might all the same be salutary. There is no point in forever reinventing the wheel.

91. It is also helpful to note that, doubtless as an immediate consequence of the crisis that has arisen as a result of the war in Iraq, that a decision was taken at the EU Foreign Ministers meeting held in Kastellorizo (Greece) on 2 and 3 May 2003, to ask Mr Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, to produce a report with a view to adopting a common strategic concept, or rather a European security and defence doctrine. It would appear that the new international situation has made European governments aware of the urgency of making progress in the defence sphere. It should also be noted that the President of the Assembly, Jan Dirk Blaauw, from whom a contribution to the preparatory

⁶¹ *Financial Times*, 29 April 2003, interview with Tony Blair: "Some want a so-called multi-polar world where you have different centres of power and I believe that that will very quickly develop into rival centres of power. And others believe, and this is my notion of this, that we need one polar power but which encompasses a strategic partnership between Europe and America and other countries too – Russia, China – where we are trying to ensure that we develop, as I say, a common global agenda".

⁶² Statement made at the meeting of the Heads of State and of Government of Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Germany on European Defence, Brussels, 29 April 2003; <http://www.elysee.fr>.

discussions for the informal meeting of European Foreign Ministers on 2 and 3 May was requested by the EU/WEU Presidency, has suggested that “the EU should draw up a European Security and Defence Concept in response to the US National Security Strategy, and identify common security threats and joint responses. He also asks the question: what do we want our military capabilities for?”⁶³.

2. The Iraq crisis

(a) Transatlantic and intra-European differences

92. The crisis in Iraq provides the litmus test for the future both of transatlantic relations and of the United Nations. It pits the various world outlooks against the facts. It sets before each player decisive choices for the future of world stability. Will the United States have the wisdom to choose multipolarity for running the world? Will Europe have sufficient determination to achieve not only economic but political union, and thus become a true world power?

93. In the course of the intense diplomatic exchanges that preceded the unleashing of the war in Iraq, major divergences emerged between the various European nations. European public opinion everywhere was, by a large majority, hostile to any recourse to force. However, European governments did not always heed the views of the public at large. Although the governments of Belgium, France, Germany and Russia spoke out against the war, there were nevertheless very different shades of opinion in their various positions. Chancellor Schröder for example ruled out the use of force, while President Chirac wanted to give the inspectors more time to fulfil their remit, without ruling out force if the inspection route proved ineffective. Other European countries, however, supported the use of force in order to secure Iraq’s disarmament. The United Kingdom, Spanish and Italian prime ministers in particular supported the American position from the outset.

94. On 31 January 2003, the President of the Czech Republic, and the prime ministers of Spain, Portugal, Italy, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Poland and Denmark, published a letter stating “The Iraqi regime and its weapons of mass destruction represent a clear threat to world security”. It was up to Saddam Hussein. “The opportunity to avoid greater confrontation rests with him”. They were “confident” that the Security Council would “face up to its responsibilities”⁶⁴. The Foreign Ministers of the 10 Vilnius Group of Countries (NATO accession candidates) also made a public statement along the same lines on 5 February 2003. They felt that “... The United States [had] presented compelling evidence to the United Nations Security Council detailing Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programmes, its active efforts to deceive UN inspectors and its links to international terrorism”⁶⁵ and said they were prepared to contribute to an international coalition to enforce the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and the disarmament of Iraq.

95. The American Administration has demonstrated its move towards unilateralism in its public statements and in practice, declaring that “when it comes to our [ie. US] security, if we need to act, we will act, and we really don’t need United Nations approval to do so”⁶⁶. According to US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, France and Germany represented “Old Europe” for with NATO enlargement Europe’s centre of gravity was shifting to the east⁶⁷. This was a profound shock to many Europeans. Even in regard to the United Kingdom, the United States’ main coalition ally, the US Administration’s attitude at times gave cause for concern⁶⁸. After two months of intense diplomatic

⁶³ Contribution by Jan Dirk Blaauw, President of the WEU Assembly, to the informal meeting of EU Foreign Affairs Ministers, Rhodes and Kastellorizo, 2 and 3 May 2003.

⁶⁴ “Europe and America must stand united”. *The Times*, 30 January 2003 and *Le Monde*, 31 January 2003. So-called letter from the “Eight” (Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom).

⁶⁵ Declaration of the Vilnius Group of Countries on Iraq, in response to the presentation by the United States Secretary of State to the United Nations Security Council concerning Iraq. So-called letter from the “Ten” (Albania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia, FYROM, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia).

⁶⁶ Press Conference on Iraq. President George Bush. 6 March 2003. <http://www.whitehouse.gov>.

⁶⁷ Briefing by Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of State for Defense, 22 January 2003.

⁶⁸ Press statement given by Donald Rumsfeld on 11 March 2003 during which he hinted at the possibility of going to war without the United Kingdom. A press release of the same date clarified that in the event of force

negotiations, realising that they would not achieve a majority in the UN Security Council authorising them to engage in military action, the United States and the United Kingdom launched their attack against Iraq on the morning of 20 March 2003, without United Nations support.

96. There is no doubt in the minds of the Europeans that Saddam Hussein was a tyrant and that the fact that his regime has fallen is the only good news to come out of the war. Nevertheless, many Europeans think that the war was not justified. The reasons for it were not clear, the death and destruction it caused was not proportionate, and moreover it did not have UN backing. In the eyes of some governments and many ordinary citizens it is clear that the war was illegal, unlawful and unjust⁶⁹.

97. Nevertheless, in spite of everything, several governments, in particular those attending the Azores summit⁷⁰, supported the need for intervention in a show of strong support for the major superpower, and on the basis of the political case against Saddam Hussein and the threat he presented to humanity. What is true is that those who supported the war had to have very strong convictions or deep-rooted reasons given the very serious challenges the majority of governments had to fight off from the public at home.

98. The United States had used the fight against weapons of mass destruction as an argument to justify its accusations. However, no such weapons have been found to date. There was no obvious connection to al-Qa'ida, in anyone's view. The Iraqi people did not welcome the troops with open arms. Right from the start, some Europeans had the impression that the United States had ulterior motives that were not being made clear (among them control over energy sources). The United States might also possibly intend to change the geostrategic balance of the regions (primarily to help Israel).

99. But, in the matter of such geostrategic and energy issues, the United States never consulted its European allies. If it is a matter of changing the geostrategic balance in the region and seeking stable institutional solutions, and of encouraging democratisation throughout the countries of the region, Europe too has a part to play and its own interests to look to in a region quite close to home. Europe is able to assist the economic and democratic development of the region. While the experts and the press talk incessantly of these major regional geostrategic and economic concerns, the American authorities never refer to them to their European counterparts, which causes Europeans to feel both puzzled and disappointed.

100. The war that was won was an invasion, and there is a feeling that, as in Afghanistan, it will take a long time for the country to get back to normal and that the process will be long, hazardous and very expensive. Will the post-war period see the advent of a protectorate, official or unofficial? If the final aim was the freedom of the Iraqi people, why have elections not been planned to take place immediately under United Nations auspices? How long will the transition last?

101. For most Europeans US national interests are the main underlying reason for the war in Iraq. The United States wants to have a presence in what is, as far as it is concerned, a strategic area from the point of view of energy supplies. It also wants to bring its weight to bear on the region, particularly by keeping an eye on Syria⁷¹ and Iran⁷². Another reason is that it wants to reduce its oil

being used, the United States had every reason to believe that the United Kingdom would make a significant military contribution.

⁶⁹ "Europe and the war in Iraq" Document 9768, Report: Political Affairs Committee, Rapporteur: Mr Andreas Gross. Recommendation 1603 adopted by the Assembly of the Council of Europe, 3 April 2003. <http://www.assembly.coe.int>.

⁷⁰ Statement by the United States, Britain, Spain, Portugal at the Azores Summit meeting (16 March 2003).

⁷¹ On 12 April 2003 Mr Powell stated: We have designated Syria for years as a state that sponsors terrorism (...). On 13 April 2003 President Bush warned: "Syria just needs to cooperate with us". On 14 April 2003 Mr Powell further stated "... we are concerned that Syria has been participating in the development of weapons of mass destruction and, as the President noted, specifically of chemical weapons. And we believe in the light of this new environment, they should review their actions and their behaviour, not only with respect to who gets haven in Syria and weapons of mass destruction, but especially the support of terrorist activity". On 15 April 2003, Mr Fleischer, White House spokesman, stated: "Syria is indeed a terrorist nation". The same day Mr Powell smoothed over the tension, remarking: "But there is no list. There is no war plan right now to go and

dependence on Saudi Arabia. For all these reasons therefore, the United States needs influence over Iraq. And this is why the war in Iraq, willy nilly, will count as a precedent, for the United States and for other countries around the world.

102. It is also important to envisage the role that the United Nations can play in the post-war aftermath. At a meeting in Belfast on 8 April 2003, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair agreed that the United Nations should have a “vital role” in the reconstruction of Iraq. They also announced that the coalition forces would remain as long as was necessary to help the Iraqi people develop their own political institutions and reconstruct their country, but no longer than that⁷³. France and Germany also referred to a central role for the United Nations. But there was uncertainty still over the extent of that role. On 3 April, Secretary of State Colin Powell had met with his EU and NATO counterparts in Brussels to discuss the post-war interlude. The NATO Secretary-General pointed out that there was agreement on the need for the United Nations and other organisations to contribute to reconstruction. Some countries were in favour of a role for NATO, while no country ruled this out.

103. The United States would appear to want to limit the UN contribution to humanitarian aid. For the transition period, the United States seems to incline towards setting up what would be basically an interim authority, made up of various sections of Iraq’s population, to work with the coalition’s civilian administration coordinated by General Jay Garner. But for an indefinite period the military component of the coalition will undoubtedly predominate. Indeed Mr Powell has made quite clear that the US-UK coalition having expended resources, taken risks and sacrificed lives, should play a predominant part in the reconstruction and in setting up representative government.

104. In Europe there is an extremely widespread belief that the United States is tending towards hegemony and unilateralism. This is based on recent irrefutable evidence such as its decision to act without UN Security Council agreement, the way in which the intervention was presented, using a number of threats as the excuse for it: weapons of mass destruction, danger to humankind, links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qa’ida (which have proved unfounded) the refusal to allow the United Nations to supervise the democratisation process, and so on. The threats by Colin Powell to “punish” France⁷⁴ for not having supported the intervention, make it difficult to believe that there is no dirigist, hegemonistic intent (to the point of retaliation) at work and virtually impossible not to assume that the present US Administration is incapable of respecting its allies’ position when different from its own.

attack someone else, either for the purpose of overthrowing their leadership or for the purpose of imposing democratic values”. The following day he admitted to wanting to resume diplomatic dialogue with Syria. On 20 April 2003, President Bush acknowledged the need to do this: There’s some positive signs. (...) Secretary Powell will be going to visit the Syrians. It seems like they’re beginning to get the message. (...) I’m confident the Syrian Government has heard us. And I believe it when they say they want to cooperate with us”. See, Press Conferences and Interviews: <http://www.whitehouse.gov> and <http://www.state.gov>.

⁷² In January 2002, Iran was identified by President Bush as belonging to the countries that formed the axis of evil. The United States, which believes Iran supports some terrorist groups, sees many worrying aspects. Through the Shiite majority in Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran could have an influence on the new Iraqi regime (however Iran’s anxiety over the Kurdish question in Iraq should also be noted, since Kurds form 9% of Iran’s population). Finally, Iran is developing a nuclear programme, officially a civilian one, with the help of Russia, China, and North Korea, notwithstanding its large gas and oil energy resources and in a region where regional proliferation has been rife for a long time, since India, Pakistan and Israel already have nuclear weapons. Unlike the United States, Europe has been conducting a policy of critical dialogue over time, which includes economic and financial cooperation. However, like the Americans, it is against the risk of nuclear proliferation and condemns human rights violations. See in particular, “Unacceptable Behaviour: America has other worries in the region. First Iran”, *The Economist*, 5 April 2003, page 27; “Un Irak proaméricain achèverait l’encerclement de l’Iran”. Interview with Mohammed-Reza Djalili, *Libération*, 7 March 2003; “Reimagining US-Iranian relations” by Ray Takeyh, *Survival*, The ISS Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 3, Autumn 2002.

⁷³ Joint statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair on Iraq, Hillsborough Castle, Northern Ireland, 8 April 2003. <http://www.usinfo.state.gov>.

⁷⁴ Interview by Mr Powell with Charlie Rose of PBS, Washington, 22 April 2003, during which the US Secretary of State confirmed that France’s diplomatic moves within the UN Security Council designed to prevent a majority vote in favour of intervention in Iraq would have “consequences”. <http://www.state.gov>.

105. The divide in Europe over the Iraq crisis laid bare a factor that was already clear enough: there are some countries that have a view of a strong, autonomous Europe, ready to defend its values and interests, which at certain times may not coincide with those of the United States, while there are others that instead see Europe tied to its transatlantic allies, to the point where it must stick by them whatever the circumstances, even if it means sacrificing a part of its European principles, like multilateralism or the conditions governing the use of force. This has made a common position impossible and has given primacy to a nation-state, as opposed to a European mentality. This crisis has led to a marked “nationalisation” of policy in Europe. States and not the Union have been the ones to take the decisions.

106. The end of the Iraq war showed that the reasons for intervening were neither weapons of mass destruction nor the links with al-Qa’ida. European public opinion was also in no doubt about this. Nor, notwithstanding earlier claims to the contrary, did the Iraqis after all welcome their liberators with open arms. Now a significant section of the Iraqi people is demanding that the occupying forces leave. The economic sharing out of reconstruction work, control over the oil and the democratisation process, which is being managed by the Americans rather than the United Nations, would seem to show that the mission objectives were very different to those set out by the White House leadership prior to the operation.

107. Europe, setting aside the fallings out prior to the start of the war, should help as much as it can in the pacification and reconstruction of Iraq. It should provide as much humanitarian aid as possible and try as best it can to ensure that the United Nations is responsible for the political process within the country. This will not be easy. Because of the war, many question marks now hang over Iraq’s future and, contrary to what was anticipated for the post-war period, there are serious threats to stability in the area: criticism of Syria, the stationing of troops on Iraqi soil, control over the oil in non-Iraqi hands, contracts awarded to some firms in a way suggestive of a new wave of exploitation, anti-American and anti-Western feeling throughout the Arab world, Shiite plans for an Islamic Iraq, the Kurdish factor and its consequences, along with new and extremely serious problems for which there is no ready solution. In any event, Europe must endeavour to ensure that such difficulties are resolved peacefully, by political means.

108. The future new order in Iraq is a source of worry to Europeans. It is ridiculous that the attitude of the Iraqi Shiites is now being presented as coming out of the blue. We all knew that 60% of Iraqis are Shiite and that whoever was in power, the Ba’ath party was dominated by the Sunni minority. The Shiites are now demanding an Islamic regime and that the Americans leave. In this they are supported by Iran, which again is logical and to be expected. It is now clear why the Shiites (some of them, others resisted) and the Kurds were waiting for Saddam’s dictatorial regime to fall. In Europe, where the fall of the dictator was met with satisfaction (despite the fact that many sectors of public opinion rejected war as a means of dislodging him) there is great unease about the immediate political future in Iraq and many wonder whether those who supported military intervention had in fact foreseen the present scenario as the outcome of their decisions.

109. In spite of the rift in the European Union between countries in favour of the Iraq war and those against it, one or two positive moves are worth noting such as the meeting between the French and British Foreign Ministers in Paris on 9 April 2003 and the moves by Mr Blair and Mr Chirac at the Le Touquet Summit on 3 February 2003, with a view to convergence in regard to the ESDP, including agreements to ensure further progress on its development. Mr Blair, also insisted (without any very positive result) on the role the United Nations should play in the period following the war. Furthermore, France and Germany have called for moderation in the post-war aftermath and have shown a clear resolve to re-establish unity once more in multilateral circles to overcome the crisis that has developed as a result of the military intervention.

(b) The role of the United Nations: a challenge for the future

110. The position taken by Europe is as follows: any military action has to be legitimated by the United Nations. This is acknowledged in paragraph 26 of the Presidency Conclusions of the EU Helsinki Summit (11-12 December 1999): “The Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security”.

111. The role of the United Nations is one of the major challenges for the future. Europeans must fight to ensure that the Security Council can act effectively and that its decisions are respected. This is sometimes, but not always, the position of the United States. It should furthermore be recalled that in addition to France and the United Kingdom, which are permanent members of the Security Council, Germany, Bulgaria, and Spain are currently also members.

112. The post-war outcome is crucial for the United Nations. The role it is given will be an important test as regards its future. European countries are insisting that it should have a “central” role in the post-war aftermath. This is the strong position taken by the British Prime Minister – the mainstay of the coalition in the war on Iraq. On 16 April, in Athens at a press conference given jointly with Mr Annan he stated: “We are agreed on the importance of the United Nations in post-conflict Iraq. That role should be there, not simply in respect of humanitarian issues but also in respect of political and reconstruction issues that arise.” Two days previously Mr Blair had assured British MPs that “For all the difficult times in the past few months, I remain committed to the UN, committed to making it more effective, committed to the notion that we need its legitimacy for the international community to be worthy of its name”⁷⁵.

113. The repercussions of the Iraq crisis will eventually and inevitably impact upon the necessary in-depth reform of the United Nations. A major rethink was started under the previous Secretary-General, Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali⁷⁶ and important new ideas were put forward in 1992 with the “Agenda for Peace”. This affirmed: “The United Nations is a gathering of sovereign States and what it can do depends on the common ground that they create between them” (para. 2). “The nature of peacekeeping operations has evolved rapidly in recent years. (...) [but] the basic conditions for success remain unchanged: a clear and practicable mandate; the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of Member States to contribute to the military, police and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field; and adequate financial and logistic support (para. 50). The conclusion was “The powerful must resist the dual but opposite calls of unilateralism and isolationism if the United Nations is to succeed” (para. 80). In 1995, a position report by Mr Boutros Ghali – in the form of a supplement to the “Agenda for Peace”, provided a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the UN’s peacekeeping and security work. It identified the fact that “The new face of conflict (...) requires us (...) to address simultaneously the immediate as well as the root causes of conflict, which all too often lie in the absence of economic opportunities and social inequities. Perhaps above all it requires a deeper commitment to cooperation and true multilateralism than humanity has ever achieved before.” (para. 103).

114. The report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations chaired by former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi was published in 2000. This also recommended radical changes in doctrine, strategy and decision-making for peacekeeping operations⁷⁷. The implementation of the concrete proposals formulated in this report made it possible to deal with new challenges, particularly in Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East Timor, more effectively than in the past. The report noted that the best intentions in the world were no substitute for the one essential element in their success: the credibility that capability for action gives. The UN has learned this by bitter experience over the last 10 years (in Srebrenica, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Angola and Somalia⁷⁸). But force alone cannot lead to peace: the most it can do is create a breathing space where peace can take hold.

115. Besides, as Carl Bildt, the then Special Envoy of the (UN) Secretary-General for the Balkans stated, people turned to the UN when things got complicated and at the end of the day the UN

⁷⁵ Statement by the United States, Britain, Spain, Portugal at the Azores Summit meeting (16 March 2003); Statements by Mr Blair at various press conferences: “A strategy for peace in Iraq”, 14/04/03; “The importance of the UN in post-conflict Iraq”, 16/04/03; <http://www.number10.gov.uk>.

⁷⁶ See “An Agenda for Peace – Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping” Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. <http://www.un.org>.

⁷⁷ A/55/305-S/2000/809. 23 August 2000, General distr., 21 August 2000.

⁷⁸ “L’ONU et le maintien de la paix: de l’autocritique aux réformes” by Dominique Moï si, Ramsès 2002, eds. T. de Monbrial and P. Jacquet, IFRI, Dunod, Paris, pp. 63-65.

Security Council was left with the most intractable tasks, hence the high failure rate⁷⁹. Although the United Nations Charter empowers the Organisation to take enforcement action against those responsible for threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General has the power to deploy, direct, command or control operations carried out to that effect, except perhaps on a very limited scale⁸⁰.

116. However all structures of the Organisation need to be completely reworked. In 1997, Mr Kofi Annan, the present UN Secretary-General, published a programme for reform⁸¹. In 2002 Mr Annan put forward a programme for further changes towards UN renewal⁸² and turn it into a more effective tool for achieving the priority aims set out in the United Nations Millennium Declaration. In this declaration which was adopted on 6 September 2000, at the Millennium Summit held at UN HQ, the Heads of State and Government set out guidelines for adapting the United Nations to the new century. They stated their belief that: "... the central challenge we face today is to ensure globalisation becomes a positive force for all the world's people" (para. 5). In order to achieve this they resolved in particular to "strengthen respect for the rule of law in international as in national affairs" and to "make the United Nations more effective in maintaining peace and security (...)" (para. 9)⁸³.

117. No reform of the United Nations would be complete without reforming the Security Council. Article 24 of the UN Charter confers on the Security Council "primary responsibility" for the maintenance of international peace and security, and this should continue to be the case. But there is a need to find a satisfactory solution to the problem of the representiveness of the Council and of the way it arrives at its decisions. Particularly controversial is the right of veto held by the Council's five permanent members⁸⁴. As Kofi Annan⁸⁵ has pointed out, for nearly a decade "agreement on a formula that would allow an increase in Council membership" has continued to elude the Member States. At the same time, "it is important to remember that authority derives also from the capacity to take prompt and realistic decisions, and from the will to act on them. A reform process that consisted only of an increase in membership would be unlikely to strengthen the Council in this vital respect".

118. Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali recently identified a threefold tendency in the United Nations: towards unilateral intervention on the part of states, towards "jurisdictionalisation" of conflicts, and towards regionalisation of their settlement⁸⁶. In regard to the second of these, the emergence of the International Criminal Court⁸⁷ constitutes solid progress for the early years of the 21st century (following the setting up of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in 1993 and that for Rwanda in 1994). The United States and Europe differ on this issue. The Americans have brought strong pressure to bear (with some success) on European nations, on both EU and NATO members and applicant states, to sign bilateral agreements granting US citizens, particularly US troops, immunity from prosecution. In a common position⁸⁸, the EU committed itself strongly to supporting the smooth running of the Court and guaranteeing full respect for the integrity of the Rome Statute.

⁷⁹ International Symposium "Pour défendre la paix, réformer l'ONU". Paris, 31 January-1 February 2001, Information report submitted on behalf of the Defence and Armed Forces Committee by Paul Quilès, Deputy, French National Assembly, Paris, Document No. 3106/2001, page 60.

⁸⁰ "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, para. 77

⁸¹ "Renewing the United Nations: a programme for reform". Document A/51/950. 19 July 1997.

⁸² "Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change". Report of the Secretary-General (A/57/387), 9 September 2002.

⁸³ United Nations Millennium Declaration, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 8 September 2000, A/Res/55/2.

⁸⁴ "Le Conseil de Sécurité à l'aube du XXIème siècle: Quelle volonté et quelle capacité at-il de maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales?", Pascal Teixeira, UNIDIR/2002/7, Geneva, July 2002.

⁸⁵ "Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change" (para.20).

⁸⁶ Quilès, *op. cit.* page 56.

⁸⁷ The draft statute establishing a permanent International Criminal Court was adopted at a conference held in Rome under UN auspices from 15-17 June 1998. The Rome Statute came into force on 1 July 2002. The official inauguration ceremony took place in The Hague on 11 March 2003.

⁸⁸ General and External Relations Affairs Council, Brussels, 30 September 2002. <http://europa.eu.int/>.

119. Carl Bildt was wont to stress that peace was a political not a military concept and consequently that there was perhaps less of a need to concentrate on the means required for conflict management and more on how to prevent conflicts, and subsequently on rebuilding the peace. Those tasks could not be achieved without political vision, without knowing where one was going and why, irrespective of the part of the world in which it was proposed to intervene⁸⁹. Now, as Mr Brahimi observed, talking of crises, the international community meant something different to everyone. It was a group of nations with interests and influence⁹⁰. And as Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Undersecretary-General for the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, has observed “the United Nations will never be what the Member States want it to be (...) The importance of the UN’s role will be proportional to the size of the means that States see fit to grant it”⁹¹. In this optic, Mr Brahimi acknowledged the importance of the role of parliaments in the world and the essential nature of national delegations’ support to the United Nations⁹². The United Nations must develop a culture of responsibility and democratic control among its member states and staff. The future of the Organisation depended on it.

120. Europe should endeavour to persuade the United Nations and other countries of the world of the UN’s indispensable and irrevocable role so that unilateral stances such as that adopted by President Bush during the Iraq crisis (“when it comes to our security, if we need to act, we will act, and we really don’t need United Nations approval to do so”⁹³) followed by military intervention not authorised by the United Nations Security Council, are not taken ever again. The fact that the proposal for war against Iraq failed to convince the majority of Security Council members, notwithstanding the pressure exerted by those in favour of such a course, is a proof of the strength of the United Nations and not its weakness. Countries should not be able to opt for the United Nations framework because it suits their own interests and to reject it when their ideas encounter opposition. The point is that, in future, prior to acting, countries should seek a legal basis for that action by arguing the case in the United Nations.

121. This is why Europe must hold joint discussions on the reform of the United Nations. Europeans need to be in agreement on putting forward European positions in the UN Security Council and on compliance with the latter’s decisions. In the framework of a security concept for Europe, a document that would define European interests and values in regard to peace and security, European countries could adopt a common view of the role the United Nations ought to have in situations like Iraq and the post-war aftermath.

IV. Conclusions

122. In the face of terrorism and other future security challenges, is some form of complementarity possible between the US and European powers? One thing certain is that Europe must be instrumental in securing peace in a multipolar world. Therefore “more Europe” is needed, and specifically more European defence. We need “more Europe” and “more multilateralism” not “against” the United States but “in cooperation with” the United States, for the good of both Europe and America, in the service of world peace. The aim is to avoid unilateralism which is harmful to the world and to the United States itself.

123. The principle of autonomy must take shape in a strategy of Europe’s own making directed towards the propagation of European democratic values, human rights and social progress. Europe must stand up on the world’s behalf for the values it stands up for on its own account. Which means that Europe must have the will and the means to exert influence and command respect. It needs a common foreign policy that also comprises a common security and defence policy.

124. Europeans are unanimously in favour of maintaining the Atlantic Alliance. It would be perverse and erroneous to abandon the US to its brand of unilateralism. As America shares our values, so we

⁸⁹ Quilès, *op cit.* page 61.

⁹⁰ Quilès, *op cit.* page 98

⁹¹ Quilès, *op cit.* page 18.

⁹² Quilès, *op cit.* page 96.

⁹³ See para.95 above and footnote 65.

must stand together, whilst accepting, especially within NATO, that Europeans will stick up for their priorities and their vision, through a process of constructive exchange. In this respect then, a strong, united Europe would be highly beneficial, both for Europeans and the United States.

125. The United States will need to think again and return to the multilateral fold. If it does not wish to be or appear to be an imperialist power, it should adopt a different course of action. Neither is a bid for leadership supremacy – which will only lead to isolation and generate more of the anti-Americanism that we saw in this last crisis⁹⁴ – the way to go about matters. Furthermore, its new hawkish, hardline strategy is hardly a recipe for attaining a global primacy that others can accept and support. Unilateral pre-emptive wars are more likely to produce intolerable hegemony than leadership. The present Administration must understand that its hardline stance will create more problems for the United States than it will solve. There are many who take the view, for example, that “militarisation” of the fight against terrorism and the indiscriminate use of force will end up in more terrorism and rearmament all round.

126. Europe, for its part, must overcome its divisions. If it wants to carve out a role for itself in the world, it must act in unison, with a sufficient degree of independence, to defend its attitudes, values and interests, but above all to bring its wealth of knowledge and experience to bear on achieving peace and prosperity across the globe. Clearly, in order to do this, it will need a CFSP and ESDP, for without them its voice and its influence will be the weaker.

127. We need less aggression in the world, more dialogue, more policies of cooperation, more compromise, pluralism, tolerance and stability. It is possible that somewhere, sometime, a situation may arise that demands military intervention in a just cause. But it must be as a last resort, and backed up in every case by the legality and legitimacy that the United Nations confers.

128. Following the crisis in Iraq, a great deal of effort will need to be put into pacifying and stabilising the entire Middle East region, and getting it back to some kind of normality. The Arab world cannot cope with more wars, more policies calculated to destroy, more geostrategic force and provocation. If there is a real desire for peace and an end to terrorism, the West must be generous in terms of aid, cooperation and solidarity. There must be development in Afghanistan, democratisation of Iraq and foundations laid for a solution for the Palestinians. Only by means of policy, diplomacy and multilateral action through the United Nations can there be the hope of stability once again for a part of the world where a mistake from any quarter could lead to an explosion of incalculable consequence.

⁹⁴ Cf. William J. Clinton, *El País*, 19 December 2002.

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION***on Europe and the new United States national security strategy***

The Assembly,

- (i) Resolved to act in such a way as to ensure that there is less violence in the world and that it is ordered towards greater cooperation and dialogue, more pluralism and tolerance and better mutual understanding and stability;
- (ii) Convinced of the need for the further development of international law and ensuring that it prevails;
- (iii) Recalling that recourse to force must always be a last resort within the international legal sanction of the United Nations;
- (iv) Taking into account new factors, such as the constants of United States foreign policy expressed in the basic documents of the new national security strategy and in the positions and decisions of the current Bush Administration;
- (v) Taking into account also the trauma of the appalling 11 September 2001 attacks and their repercussions on US domestic policy;
- (vi) Considering trends in the new US national security strategy towards a more robust defence of US national interests, along with a greater emphasis on US military capability;
- (vii) Noting that the new geostrategic doctrine developed by the present US Administration draws on pre-emptive warfare, coalitions of the willing at the expense of multilateral instruments and alliances, and on unilateral action, and that this could give rise to a danger for global stability and the risk of the United States becoming isolated if it persists in its unilateral stance;
- (viii) Considering it helpful to deepen frank and open dialogue with the current US Administration, in order to understand fully the ideas developed in the United States national security strategy and their international policy consequences, especially in regard to its multilateralist allies;
- (ix) Particularly concerned at the consequences of the new American strategy for world security and for transatlantic relations;
- (x) Fearing the Atlantic Alliance will be marginalised in favour of *ad hoc* coalitions under the United States' sole leadership;
- (xi) In favour of a firm, wider, renewed and balanced transatlantic partnership, based on consensus building;
- (xii) Taking the view that in the long term the Atlantic Alliance's essential military role has to be compatible with a real European defence policy in the European Union;
- (xiii) Convinced of Europe's duty and obligation to promote its values, defend its interests and, as necessary, express its differences with its North American allies;
- (xiv) Stressing that the European Union and NATO must be mutually reinforcing and advocating close cooperation between the two organisations;
- (xv) Pointing out that the fight against terrorism will succeed only if it attacks the political and socio-economic root causes of that scourge;
- (xvi) In the knowledge that, in spite of its military power, the United States alone, without the active cooperation of its allies across the world, cannot undertake all the action required to eradicate global terrorism;
- (xvii) Noting the vital importance for Europe of its having the means to guarantee peace on its own territory and also to participate in international security;

- (*xviii*) Taking the view that it is necessary for Europe to defend for the rest of the world the values it defends for itself, namely, the rule of law, democracy, human rights and social progress, without aspiring in any way to hegemony or domination, even if such a course may require increases in defence budgets around Europe;
- (*xix*) Knowing that to do so it needs to be able to rely on a common foreign policy including a common security and defence policy;
- (*xx*) Aware of Europeans' inability to date to generate a true common foreign and security policy by reason of their national policies, their differing conceptions of Europe's role in the world and different approaches to the United States' role;
- (*xxi*) Acknowledging also the importance of strengthening EU military capabilities so as to make the Union capable of exerting a significant influence in world affairs;
- (*xxii*) Supporting the EU's having taken over from NATO military forces in FYROM, with effect from 31 March 2003;
- (*xxiii*) In favour of strengthening CFSP and ESDP decision-making machinery and structures and hopeful of the Convention on the Future of Europe putting forward ambitious proposals in those areas;
- (*xxiv*) Stressing that a strong, united Europe in a multipolar world would be of benefit to both Europeans and the United States, and to global peace and stability;
- (*xxv*) Taking account also of the agreements reached at the EU Foreign Ministers' informal meeting held in Rhodes and Kastellorizo on 2-3 May 2003, and the decision that the EU must have a strategic doctrine on security and defence;
- (*xxvi*) Referring to transatlantic and intra-European divergences at the time of the Iraq crisis and bearing in mind the strength of the reaction with which Europe's citizens amply demonstrated their opposition to the war in Iraq, notwithstanding the at times supportive stance taken by their own governments;
- (*xxvii*) Conscious of the impact of the present international crisis on the future of the fundamental institutions established in recent decades and especially on the role and workings of the United Nations, NATO and the European Union;
- (*xxviii*) Considering that the war in Iraq cannot help but remind countries around the world of the dangers of flouting UN resolutions;
- (*xxix*) Recognising that the continuing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and stability in the Middle East;
- (*xxx*) Considering that within the context of the dialogue with the current US Administration there is a need to try and convince the United States that its new national security strategy, when taken to extremes, could prove deleterious to world stability, since militarising conflict and unilateralism could encourage terrorism and rearmament, and the United States is likely to be perceived as an intransigent and imperialist superpower;
- (*xxxi*) Recognising that the UN Security Council is the authority which has primary responsibility for ensuring peace and international security, as the European Union did at the Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999;
- (*xxxii*) Considering the importance in the management of international relations of all states, including the United States, respecting the entire body of international rules, agreements and conventions, and especially those on military intervention and disarmament;
- (*xxxiii*) Pointing out that the United Nations' role is critical for the future and that the institution and in particular the Security Council needs modernising and strengthening, or even in-depth reform,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Provide vigorous support to the EU in developing a security concept for Europe that will set out European values and interests in matters of peace and security and be complementary to the operational document – the European Defence Book – currently in the making;
2. Adopt, within that concept, a common vision of the role the United Nations should play in situations such as the Iraq war and the post-war aftermath,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL URGE THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE WEU NATIONS TO

3. Act together on the international political stage to lower tensions and suggest constructive outcomes to conflicts, giving more weight to policy, diplomacy and development aid and less to the use of force;
4. Intensify exchanges of views between the United States and the EU in order to arrive at common positions on the definition of the terrorist threat and the most appropriate steps for fighting terrorism together, both through cooperation on intelligence and civilian protection and economic cooperation, development aid, technology transfer and intercultural dialogue;
5. Envisage the creation of a joint interparliamentary working group on global security policy, making provision for the participation of delegations from the US Congress, the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly;
6. Make optimum use of the Transatlantic Forum, established in WEU, whose work continues under the responsibility of the European Union Institute for Security Studies, for deepening exchanges of views on security between the United States and the EU by encouraging wider public debate involving parliamentarians and the public at large on both shores of the Atlantic;
7. Use their influence in the United Nations, the OSCE, NATO and the EU to promote crisis management and the neutralisation of threats to world peace and security through multilateral consensus;
8. Mount a resolute defence in all international institutions of the principle of explicit authorisation from the United Nations Security Council being required for any recourse to force;
9. Work together within the Convention on the future of Europe to create instruments of a kind such as to encourage the emergence of a common political will among EU member states in regard to the CFSP and ESDP, with a view, in the longer term, to a common defence;
10. Approve, in the framework of the European Union, a European security and defence doctrine that constitutes a real common strategic concept, identifying joint threats and responses and setting out the uses to be made of European military capabilities;
11. Redouble their defence efforts by means of enhanced interoperability of forces and equipment and, to that end, infuse European vision, coordination and thinking into the ESDP and national defence systems alike, and if necessary increase defence budgets;
12. Act within NATO to defend our European values and interests to our American allies in a constructive and non-confrontational framework;
13. Ensure that EU/NATO relations are at all times constructive and flexible, by strengthening the institutional machinery for policy coordination and cooperation at operational level between both organisations;
14. Agree to advance European positions in the United Nations Security Council and to respect the latter's decisions;
15. Engage in joint discussions on United Nations reform.

AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENTS 1-5⁹⁵

tabled by Mr de Puig, Rapporteur

1. After recital (*xiv*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation add a new recital as follows:
“Considering that terrorism continues to strike despite military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq and that war does not seem to be the way of putting a stop to it;”

2. After recital (*xix*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation add a new recital as follows:
“Taking account of the proposals made by the Assembly in regard to a European security concept, in Resolutions 111 and 112 and Recommendations 538, 565, 589, 605, 620, 633, 678, 685 and 693;”

3. After paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper add the following paragraph:
“Support United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 and full compliance with the same, including with the provisions regarding the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their political future and have control over their own natural resources;”

4. After paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper add the following paragraph:
“Deepen the political, diplomatic, intelligence and police instruments necessary the better to organise the fight against international terrorism, taking a forward-looking view and by means of yet more intensive cooperation across the entire international community of democracies;”

5. After paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper add the following paragraph:
“Move towards new goals in building defence Europe and thus achieve a breakthrough in setting up a form of structured cooperation between those member states concerned to have the kind of capability required for carrying out more demanding military operations;”

Signed: de Puig

⁹⁵ See 4th sitting 4 June 2003 (amendments adopted).

AMENDMENTS 6-7

tabled by Mr Masseret

6. After recital (*xxiv*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation add a new recital as follows:

“Considering the proposals made at the Le Touquet Franco-British summit and those by the Heads of State and Government of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg in Brussels with a view to moving forward Defence Europe;”

AMENDMENT 7

7. After paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper add a new paragraph as follows:

“At the same time, debate constructively the proposals made at the Le Touquet Franco-British summit and those presented by the Heads of State and Government of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg which draw on those continually put forward by the WEU Assembly;”

Signed: Masseret

