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The United States national security strategy and  
its consequences for European defence

**REPORT**

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee  
by Mr Gubert, Rapporteur

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Development of the United States national security strategy since 1991

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<sup>1</sup> Adopted in Committee on 13 May 2003 by 15 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

<sup>2</sup> *Members of the Committee:* Mr Wilkinson (Chairman); MM McNamara, Goris (Vice Chairman); Mr Acosta Padrón, Mrs Aguiar (Alternate: *Anacoreta Correia*), Mrs Alvarez-Arenas (Alternate: *Agramunt Font de Mora*), Mr de Arístegui San Román, Lord Burlison, MM *Contestabile*, Cox, Dees (Alternate: *Zvonar*), Dreyfus-Schmidt, Glesener, Goulet, *Gubert*, Henry, Mrs Hoffmann, MM Jacquat, Jardim, Kortenhorst, Koulouris (Alternate: *Kontoyiannopoulos*), Leibrecht, Lengagne, Medeiros Ferreira, *de Puig*, Ranieri (Alternate: Mrs *De Zulueta*), *Rigoni*, *Rivolta* (Alternate: *Nessa*), Siebert, Schneider, Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg, Timmermans F, Timmermans J, *Walter*, Mrs Wegener, N..., N...

*Associate members:* Mr Açıkgöz, Mrs *Bilgehan*, Mr Çavusoglu, Ms Fjeldsted, MM Hegyi, *Ibl*, Janas, Komorowski, Lorenz, Neças, Mrs Nybakk, MM Surjan, Tabajdi, *Tekelioglu*, Wrzodak, N..., N...

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

## RECOMMENDATION 726<sup>1</sup>

### *on the United States national security strategy and its consequences for European defence*

The Assembly,

- (i) Stressing its attachment to the principles of the United Nations Charter and expressing the conviction that only genuine multilateral cooperation between the United States and its allies, friends and partners can make it possible to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century;
- (ii) Rejecting any unilateral approach to those questions based solely on superior military strength, apart from cases of legitimate self-defence and intervention for urgent humanitarian reasons;
- (iii) Condemning any threat on the part of the United States to impose political and trade sanctions on allied states that refused to support the coalition's military operations against Iraq without a mandate from the United Nations Security Council;
- (iv) Concerned about the consequences for global security of applying certain points in the United States national security strategy, in particular the concept of pre-emptive warfare;
- (v) Noting with regret that the European states have thus far been unable to draw up a common strategic concept which could provide a link with that of the United States, thereby strengthening transatlantic cooperation on international security;
- (vi) Stressing that unless there is unity among European states, it will not be possible either to reform NATO's military structures or to develop and strengthen the ESDP;
- (vii) Desirous that the differences among European states with regard to Iraq may be overcome with a view to defining common positions regarding participation in the reconstruction of that country and the role that should be played in the region, now and in the future, by the United Nations and the EU;
- (viii) Stressing the important task currently being carried out by European military forces present in Iraq in providing security and stability during the post-conflict period;
- (ix) Considering that unless there is a major qualitative improvement of their national and joint military capabilities, the European Alliance partners and the EU member states cannot claim to be credible partners for the United States in the field of security and defence;
- (x) Taking the view that the success of the project for creating a NATO Response Force and the achievement of the EU headline goal are essential in order to avoid a situation in which the two organisations merely become pools of forces to be drawn upon by coalitions of the willing, with no regard for their political role;
- (xi) Considering that it is important to preserve and develop what has been achieved in European cooperation on security and defence, particularly as regards the inclusive nature of that cooperation, in order to avoid the emergence of new divisions among states and organisations that would be detrimental to the global effort;
- (xii) Considering that this approach also entails the possibility of more limited cooperation projects among countries that so wish, provided that those projects remain open to the later participation by other partners subscribing to common objectives, as was the case, for example, for OCCAR and the European Corps;
- (xiii) Stressing that the transatlantic link remains the central element of European security and defence but that it should be used for the benefit of all parties;
- (xiv) Desirous that the national governments should involve the national parliaments more closely in the decision-making process on the deployment of armed forces for military missions, unilaterally or in a coalition, in particular in the absence of a mandate from the United Nations Security Council,

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<sup>1</sup> Adopted unanimously by the Assembly without amendment on 4 June 2003 (4<sup>th</sup> sitting).

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call on the WEU nations to:

1. Make efforts to overcome the divisions that arose during the Iraq crisis among WEU nations as members of NATO and the EU or accession candidates;
2. Launch a debate within NATO on the consequences of the United States national security strategy for the NATO Strategic Concept, the cohesion of transatlantic security and NATO reform;
3. Draw up and implement a Euro-Atlantic concept designed to actively combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in application of NATO's 2002 Prague Declaration;
4. Encourage the WEU states to honour their commitments as regards setting up the NATO Response Force and with respect to the EU headline goal and to prepare themselves for taking on European military stabilisation missions with a view to demonstrating that the European countries are capable of shouldering a fair share of the burden for crisis management;
5. Keep the Assembly informed of any initiatives taken by WEU states with a view to implementing those projects and strengthening and developing overall European military capabilities, particularly in the field of armaments cooperation.

**EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM***submitted by Mr Gubert, Rapporteur***I. Introduction**

1. The United States has been at war since 11 September 2001. The terrorist attacks against the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington have had a major impact on its domestic and international security policy, placing the prime focus on actively combating external terrorist threats and, by extension, those governments whose policy is deemed to constitute a threat to United States security. Since the threat is global, the response too is global, taking either an overt form (military operation in Afghanistan in 2001, use of force to bring about disarmament and a regime change in Iraq in 2003) or the more discreet form of autonomous operations by American security agencies (Yemen<sup>2</sup>, 2002) or cooperative action with national authorities (in Pakistan and Europe, for example).

2. Military means continue to take centre stage, but the political, economic and media pressure being brought to bear behind the scenes is no less effective, whether it be to “persuade” reticent friends and allies (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia) to cooperate more actively in the combat against the al-Qa’ida networks or to convince the international community of the urgent need to bring about a regime change in Iraq by force. The United States is reproached by some for using its presence and power in an aggressive and unilateral fashion that serves its sole political and economic interests. The American leadership for its part invokes the right to self-defence (first phase of the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan) and the need to avert further terrorist attacks (efforts to track down al-Qa’ida networks) and justifies its policy on Iraq by the need to counter the threat of weapons of terror and mass destruction and to establish democracy.

3. The United States wields such overwhelmingly superior military, political and media power that only two out of the three “rogue” states (North Korea, Iraq, Iran) have, as it were, dared to resist the American offensive: Iraq for obvious reasons – the survival of Saddam Hussein’s regime was directly at stake – and North Korea, which is brandishing the nuclear threat to extract concessions from the United States at a time when its attention is almost fully focused on Iraq. Elsewhere the predominant attitude with regard to the United States is to cooperate or fall in line, or to adopt a policy of wait and see. Nevertheless, the shock caused by the 11 September attacks has now subsided and doubts about the United States’ motives and actions, in particular with regard to Iraq, are being voiced more openly. Western European states, allies of the United States, have strongly protested against the methods advocated by the Bush Administration for the disarmament of Iraq. Far from stemming from feelings of transatlantic rivalry, their position is a call for moderation and an appeal to the US leaders to consider not only their national interests, but also the global consequences of their actions and the reactions they are likely to trigger.

4. This challenge to the “infallibility” of the United States’ judgment, in that it justifies its actions on the grounds of the common good of humanity (it may prefer to act in agreement or coalition with its allies, but reserves for itself the sole right to judge the expediency of a given course of action) has sparked off a fierce transatlantic debate which will have major political consequences for the development of the European Union and its desire to stand alongside its American allies as a power in its own right. This has obvious repercussions for security and defence with, on the one hand, the European states, wishing – either alone or in concert – to enhance and develop their military capabilities with a view to being taken seriously by the United States as partners on an equal footing – which does not rule out some degree of competition – and, on the other hand, the (current or future) US Administration, which increasingly appears to be actively engaged in a policy explicitly designed to prevent the emergence of any alternative to the current unipolar system dominated by the United States’ military, technological and economic superiority.

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<sup>2</sup> On 3 November 2002, just outside the Yemeni capital, six presumed al-Qa’ida members including a US citizen were killed when the vehicle in which they were travelling was destroyed by a Hellfire missile fired by a Predator drone.

5. While the two sides still have many common values and interests that prevent a more open confrontation, they also have very real differences, not only in the fields of international policy (the Middle East peace process, Iraq, role of the United Nations, Iran), human rights (the death penalty, US stance on the International Criminal Court), the environment (Kyoto Protocol), weapons of terror and mass destruction (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention), but also in the economic area (EU-US trade disputes, technological and industrial cooperation on defence, development aid, efforts to combat poverty and AIDS, for example). To believe that these considerable differences can be brushed aside with a reference to the solidity of transatlantic relations is a recurring illusion in Europe that hampers the development of European autonomy.

6. The fault does not lie with the United States, which is only using the instruments at its disposal as a powerful state to defend its interests and a particular conception of society that it deems applicable to the rest of the world. It is the division between Europeans and Americans and the lack of resolve on the part of European states both at national and European level to frame strategic European objectives capable of scaling this transatlantic relations “wall” that opens the way for the United States to behave (justifiably, from its own point of view) as the only global power. That is not a bad thing in itself, since there will always be a need for a policeman to maintain the law and order necessary for sustainable progress and development. The problem is that for the United States this means trying to mould the world according to its national interests – preferably among friends, but going it alone if necessary – and inaugurating the “American century”, a term is currently in vogue among various specialised intellectual circles (both conservative and liberal) in the United States. For those who are unhappy with this or who fear for their sovereignty, military force and political and economic pressure can be used to set them on the “straight and narrow”. The American empire is becoming a tangible reality. Is it Europe’s destiny to be no more than an allied province?

## *II. A strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> century: the world according to George W. Bush*

7. Section 404a (Chapter 50, Article 15) of the United States Legislative Code makes provision for the preparation and presentation by the Speaker of Congress of the National Security Strategy (NSS):

“(a) Transmittal to Congress

(1) The President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States (hereinafter in this section referred to as a “national security strategy report”) (...).

(b) Contents

Each national security strategy report shall set forth the national security strategy of the United States and shall include a comprehensive description and discussion of the following:

- (1) the worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States;
- (2) the foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States;
- (3) the proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1);
- (4) the adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy;
- (5) such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States”.

The report is presented in two versions, one public, the other classified and restricted.

8. This obligation was introduced as a result of the “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986” (Section 603), which remains to this day one of the main legislative instruments for the organisation of the United States’ national security and defence. Over the period spanning the presidencies from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush, there have been 13 reports setting out each Administration’s national security and defence priorities. These reports, which are submitted in conjunction with the draft budget for the following year, also provide the basis for the “Quadriennial Defense Review”<sup>3</sup> (QDR) and serve as an indicator of budgetary orientations in the field of defence.

9. Following the events of 11 September 2001 and in connection with the war on Iraq, there has been a growing interest in the NSS both within and outside the United States, particularly in view of the fact that it was presented only in September 2002, a year late and one year after the QDR. While the current NSS marks no radical break with previous reports, it is strongly influenced by the consequences of 11 September and by a concern to identify, avert or eliminate everything deemed to threaten the national security, either at home or abroad, of the United States and its allies. From that point of view it comes across as bold and innovative, aggressive and in some areas unilateralist, particularly as regards the efforts to eliminate and prevent the proliferation of weapons of terror and mass destruction. On one point there can be no doubt: the strategy for a new century has been replaced by the strategy for an American century.

### *1. Allies, friends and partners*

10. The preamble to the NSS refers to defending, preserving and extending (political and economic) freedom to the rest of the world and defines the United States’ role vis-à-vis the other nations as follows:

“Today, humanity holds in its hands the opportunity to further freedom’s triumph over all these foes. The United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission”.

The NSS explains that, in order to conduct that mission and to demonstrate the Bush Administration’s worldwide commitment, the United States relies first and foremost on its own political, military, economic and technological resources, and then on the networks of alliances and bilateral and multilateral agreements linking it to a large number of countries. Its world vision could be represented by a set of concentric circles with American values and interests at the centre, then, moving outwards, those of the United States’ allies and partners, the international organisations and the rest of the world, and then, outside that structure, the states and organisations that represent a threat to the “centre”. Differences of interests and priorities within the system are acceptable, as long as they do not call into question the United States’ leadership.

#### *(a) Unshared leadership*

11. Four out of the NSS’ nine chapters directly concern international cooperation. They discuss the role of alliances and of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the settlement of regional conflicts, the protection of allies and friends and cooperation with state partners and international organisations. There are repeated references throughout the text to the United States’ desire to act in concert with other nations and the international organisations, whether it be to fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of terror and of mass destruction or to meet international challenges in the economic, development, environmental and health sectors, where destabilising developments have major repercussions for international peace and security. Thus the United States’ international commitments play an important part in the NSS, which stipulates that,

“Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. And this path is not America’s alone. It is open to all”.

12. However, the text includes a major exception, more particularly worrying for third states, as regards the use of military means to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of terror and

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<sup>3</sup> The QDR is a quadriennial review of US defence policy (means, aims, organisation and budgets). The first QDR was published in 1997.

mass destruction. Indeed, Part III on the role of alliances in combating the current threats stipulates that:

“While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-emptively against (...) terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country”.

13. This claim to the right to use pre-emptive unilateral military action is worrying not just for the United States’ enemies, but also for some of its allies, friends and partners. The confusion in the NSS between pre-emptive and preventive military action will lead to armed force being used routinely to settle conflicts of interests between states or to resolve international security problems. “Pre-emption” – in other words, anticipated self-defence to avert an imminent and identified attack – is a concept that can be justified in terms of international law. The current war on terrorism contains a number of clear elements of pre-emption, such as the dismantling of terrorist cells and networks in order to neutralise them before they can act. But pre-emptive action is a political and military act which potentially could be highly destabilising to the present international order.

14. In the absence of an internationally accepted definition of a terrorist state and of objective criteria for assessing the threat posed by a state accused of being one, this is tantamount to granting almost supreme rights to the United States in matters of war and peace and placing it above the present international system founded on the principles of the UN Charter, which attribute that role to the UN Security Council. This is currently a major source of discord between the United States and a number of European states as regards the war in Iraq. The NATO intervention against Serbia and Montenegro, for which the legal basis was provided retroactively by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on Kosovo, does not constitute a precedent for Iraq, where the situation is completely different.

15. In the case of Kosovo, the argument put forward was that swift action was needed to deal with a grave humanitarian crisis that had destabilising consequences for the neighbouring countries. However, there was no question of directly instigating a regime change, of a military occupation of the country (except for the province of Kosovo with its ethnic Albanian majority) or of taking control of the economic resources of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In the second case, while there can be no doubt that the Iraqi leader was a dictator whose past and present actions demonstrate the will to develop a military capability, including in the field of weapons of terror and mass destruction, there is currently no proof that Iraq is part of a terrorist conspiracy or that it represents a real short- or medium-term threat justifying armed intervention, the occupation of a sovereign state and placing it under supervision.

16. However, the Bush Administration has made it clear that the United States does not wish to share its leadership. It may agree to act in cooperation with other states or with international organisations where this proves necessary or useful, but not on the basis of an equal partnership. The NSS is quite clear on that point:

“In exercising our leadership, we will respect the values, judgment, and interests of our friends and partners. Still, we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require”.

If, as stated by President Bush in an address to the West Point military academy in June 2002, the United States exercises global responsibilities in the service of peace and freedom, then any military, political or economic intervention on its part will automatically be in the interests of all countries and peoples. Any opposition from America’s allies, friends and partners to such “enlightened” leadership thus appears anachronistic, once the United States has expressed the resolve to act.

17. The NSS explains that:

“When we disagree on particulars, we will explain forthrightly the grounds for our concerns and strive to forge viable alternatives. We will not allow such disagreements to obscure our determination to secure together, with our allies and our friends, our shared fundamental interests and values”.

Given the disproportion between the United States and its allies, particularly in the military sphere, the latter's possibilities for bringing any influence to bear on decision-making in the American Administration are limited. Their range of options is small: falling in line, adopting an attitude of wait and see or, occasionally, expressing opposing views. These are perceived as irritating, but are played down by the media or by public statements designed to isolate the "culprits", as was the case, for example, with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's comments on France and Germany – the two major European opponents to unilateral military action against Iraq – designating them as "problems" and as representatives of "old Europe".

*(b) Division of tasks*

18. The United States' military, political and economic power is extensive, but not unlimited. The NSS, while declaring that "the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence", recognises just as explicitly that "no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations". While the United States exercises its "natural" leadership alone, it must work in common with other international power centres, both states and institutions, to settle the problems. The developed nations – preferably under the guidance of the United States – must be united in the fight against all forms of terrorism and in the efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of terror and mass destruction, while the developing countries, which need assistance, must first of all "govern themselves wisely, so that aid is well spent. For freedom to thrive, accountability must be expected and required".

19. This division of tasks enables the United States to concentrate its resources on those areas designated by the US Administration as priorities, giving it more flexibility in its choices. In the case of the conflict in the Balkans, most of the air-based operations were conducted by American forces while European troops carried out operations on the ground. Only after the Dayton Peace Agreement did it send large numbers of troops to Bosnia, thereby demonstrating to the various Bosnian factions the seriousness of its commitment and motivating its European NATO allies and other states to participate in the implementation force (IFOR). Since that time the American presence, including in Kosovo, has been continually scaled down, and is now practically non-existent in the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

20. Although the NSS assigns an important role to alliances and coalitions, and in particular to the Atlantic Alliance, which is dealt with at length in Part VIII ("Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power"), it recognises practically no role at all for the United Nations in the field of international peace and security. Indeed, the only direct reference to the Organisation relates to the issue of economic development and the war on AIDS. In taking as its basic premise that "the reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just", the United States already places itself above the existing international system and clearly prefers to seek solutions to the present threats in coalitions of the willing and bilateral relations.

21. The United States defines the objectives and calls on other states and organisations to support its efforts to attain them. That support may be political, economic or military, but must be in line with American interests. In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, for example, the United Nations adopted a resolution providing a legal basis for military intervention in Afghanistan, and NATO invoked the mutual assistance clause in Article 5 of its Treaty and dispatched its AWACS aircraft to monitor US air space, while the United Kingdom, France, Germany and a number of other states, including Australia, participated in military operations in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa. However, the bulk of operations in Afghanistan remained almost entirely under American control, contrary to what happened in Kosovo, where the European states played a direct part in the NATO decision-making process.

22. Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate the Bush Administration's resolve to be the exclusive judge of whether military intervention is called for and of the means to be deployed. Once "victory" is assured, the tasks of peacebuilding and reconstruction fall to the "international community", in other words, to the United Nations, for peacekeeping and civilian and economic assistance, to NATO, for the day-to-day management of the allied military forces stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo,

FYROM and Afghanistan (assistance to the ISAF command) and to the European Union, which plans to add a military involvement to its political and economic responsibilities in south-eastern Europe. This division of tasks enables the United States to save on the human (civilian and military) and economic resources that it would otherwise need to devote to maintaining the stability of a country or region in the aftermath of a crisis. The same model is being proposed for Iraq, but with a major difference: any action by the other international parties is to be subordinated to the authority of the United States.

23. All this helps strengthen the United States' hand when it advocates a military "solution" to a crisis. Force may be used to create conditions conducive to a settlement, according to the experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. By putting an end to terrorist activities or bringing down a regime that is endeavouring to acquire weapons of terror and mass destruction for offensive purposes, military intervention would appear to be the least costly option, as well as the most profitable in terms of gaining prestige and political advantage both at home and abroad. Post-conflict reconstruction, stabilisation and development, whether in Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq, is a joint responsibility, and the blame for any failure will be borne by the "managers" of the moment. Since this is a process over time involving many players, the political consequences in terms of public image are easier to manage.

24. There is also a division of tasks as regards military operations themselves, in which the United States' allies and partners may each be involved with their specific contributions, but where only the Americans have the tools needed for a complete overview. When British forces are engaged alongside the Americans in operations in Afghanistan or Iraq, the United States supplies them with the intelligence needed to accomplish their task, but does not give their political and military authorities access to all available information. Conversely, if only to avoid problems of coordination and friendly-fire incidents, the United Kingdom must constantly keep the American planners supplied with practically all intelligence concerning their forces or gathered by them. This is one reason why some European states are seeking, not without some difficulty, to acquire the ground-, air- and space-based means needed to gather tactical and strategic intelligence, with a view to achieving greater autonomy in the field of political and military decision-making.

## *2. The threat: terrorism and "rogue" states*

25. The NSS identifies two immediate major threats to American security and interests: terrorism in all its forms (in particular that perpetrated by Islamic extremist movements) and "rogue" states, a term which has come back into use after being temporarily replaced by the term "states of concern" towards the end of the Clinton Administration. Another threat in the longer term comes from the other "big powers" which one day might defy the United States' power (and superiority). For the moment, however, the priority is to "defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants", or, in more general terms, to "combat evil". These are not just declarations designed for domestic consumption but provide the political basis for action taken by the Bush Administration in defence of the United States' security and interests.

26. A striking feature of the Bush Administration is its deep conviction and almost infallible belief that its military, political and economic action is "right". The reference to the struggle between good and evil that European leaders tend to play down is, in fact, an integral part of the United States' security strategy, as explained by President Bush in an address to the West Point military academy in June 2002:

"Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree. Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities".

A failure to take serious account of this ideological – almost religious – dimension of the current US Administration – one that is supported by influential conservative circles – would be a mistake that could generate further misunderstanding and discord between the United States and some European (and other) states and leaders.

(a) *The global enemy: the fight against international terrorism*

27. Since 11 September 2001 terrorism has been the number one threat. Up until then the Bush Administration did not have a very specific agenda on international issues. There were a number of initiatives at the start of its term of office, particularly in the traditional areas of arms control negotiations and the development of a sophisticated strategic missile defence. Moreover the United States adopted a controversial stance on a number of issues, such as the Kyoto Protocol dealing with the emissions of pollutants into the atmosphere, the International Criminal Court and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It had clearly identified the rogue states – the trio composed of Iraq, Iran and North Korea – but had not yet precisely determined its policy towards them. The 11 September events were a major catalyst, giving the Administration a mission worthy of its lofty ambitions, namely, the fight against international terrorism, the struggle for global domination, the fight of “good” against “evil”.

28. The war on international terrorism is a real war, involving conventional modern military technology, with the aim not only of eliminating the threat but also physically occupying the ground, in order to prevent the development of “sanctuaries”. Political discontent, poverty and underdevelopment are recognised as underlying causes of violence, but the violence itself is categorically rejected. The same applies to outside intervention by the United States against other states and to its support for Israel and for authoritarian and corrupt regimes, which may provoke violent reactions against the United States and its allies. Whatever its cause, violence is no longer an acceptable option when it is directed against the interests of the United States. The international community (including the United States) must mobilise its efforts to remedy the root causes, but it is up to the United States and its allies, preferably in the framework of *ad hoc* coalitions of variable geographic composition, to put an end to the violence stemming from them.

29. A global threat calls for global action, which may be overt or covert, and involving, where necessary, the deployment of military capabilities in other countries that are themselves unable or not sufficiently well-equipped to wage war on terrorism. Thus American forces have been deployed in Afghanistan, central Asia, Pakistan, the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, special forces or security agents in Yemen) and the Philippines, and there is a discreet presence in Columbia. While the troops are small in number, their advantage resides in the type of forces (special forces) and their tasks (intelligence, infiltration, identification and elimination), and in the event of escalation troops and capabilities can always be strengthened.

30. In this war, according to the famous words of President Bush on 20 September 2001, there are no neutrals: “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”. The NSS reiterates that warning: “The United States will make no concessions to terrorist demands and strike no deals with them. We make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them”. The difficulty that Europeans have with this line of reasoning is that there is no internationally accepted definition of the concept of terrorism, but this does not seem to pose any particular problem for the Bush Administration. The NSS defines terrorism as follows:

“The enemy is terrorism – premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents. In many regions, legitimate grievances prevent the emergence of a lasting peace. Such grievances deserve to be, and must be, addressed within a political process. But no cause justifies terror”.

31. In those conditions it is clear that the fight against terrorism is a long drawn-out process using all available means, both domestic (creation of a special security command, strengthening border surveillance and controls, special legislation, more careful surveillance of communications and financial flows, for example) and external (direct military intervention, military and political assistance, intelligence cooperation, political and economic pressure). The NSS specifies that:

“The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of successes – some seen, some unseen”.

The NSS sets out in detail the Administration's strategy for combating terrorism<sup>4</sup>, including the "war of ideas" to be waged vis-à-vis the Muslim countries of the Near and Middle East.

32. This whole approach has a single objective, which is to "disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations" that threaten the United States, wherever they may be. The way in which the United States' domestic, foreign and defence policy is dominated by the concern to protect against that threat is reminiscent of the cold war. In intellectual circles, within the Administration or among public opinion the same vision prevails. There are differences only as regards the choice of means and the appropriate course of action. In the field of foreign policy, this obliges other states to redefine their own policies on terrorism and domestic security to avoid exposing themselves to attacks from the media, from diplomats in the case of the United States' allies, friends and partners, or from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in person in the case of all those perceived by the United States to be "hostile", with all the negative consequences that this entails.

33. One of the immediate consequences of this global dimension of the fight against terrorism is that, in some cases, this threat – which does not emanate from "a single political regime or person or religion or ideology" – is transformed into a clearly defined threat from identified states. The NSS states that "America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists – because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization" and that "We make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them". Afghanistan is given as an example to illustrate that approach, but the NSS takes things further by establishing a link between terrorism and the threat emanating from weapons of terror and mass destruction and their proliferation. When it states that "Our immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors", the NSS is opening the door to the use of force to settle the problem posed by "rogue" states which, by definition, are part of the terrorist camp.

*(b) "Rogue" states: pre-emptive warfare and the nuclear threshold*

34. The NSS provides what is to date the most complete definition to have been given by any administration of the concept of "rogue" state, which dates back to the first half of the 1990s. Such states:

- "brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers;
- display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party;
- are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes;
- sponsor terrorism around the globe;
- reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands".

35. This is aimed directly at three states: Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The fact that the European states have subscribed to no such definition is somewhat problematic for transatlantic relations. Indeed, the notion of "rogue" states put forward in the NSS is so general that any number of countries would comply with at least one of those criteria and therefore fall into that category. Since the United States has adopted an aggressive policy to combat terrorism and "rogue" states, it will be difficult for them to attack one without sooner or later, according to the circumstances, applying the same treatment to others. This explains why North Korea's leaders are in such a hurry to throw off the weak international constraints which stand in the way of their nuclear ambitions in the military field. Their aim is not so much to directly threaten the United States as to obtain a guarantee of non-aggression,

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<sup>4</sup> Terrorism was dealt with in a special document dated 14 February 2003 entitled "National Security for Combating Terrorism": <http://www.whitehouse.gov>. However, that document does not have the same political impact as the United States national security strategy (NSS).

thereby securing the survival of their regime. That approach will have unforeseeable consequences in one very delicate area of international relations: that of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

36. The response to the challenges of nuclear proliferation will be another source of disagreement between the United States and Europeans in the years to come. Indeed, the confusion that the NSS maintains between pre-emption and prevention will also have implications as regards the use of nuclear weapons and the development of nuclear programmes. In the preventive war against rogue states, there will always be a risk of escalation of the means used. One of the governments in question, which is in possession of an – albeit limited – arsenal of weapons of terror and mass destruction, would very soon be led to use those capabilities against American forces stationed around or even on its territory in the event of an attack. The Administration and part of the military nuclear “lobby” are envisaging stepping up research in the years to come on tactical nuclear weapons that could be used in such a situation without devastating the whole country and its civilian population, with all the political consequences this would entail. The December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)<sup>5</sup> stipulates that “nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities)” and that research is being envisaged on “warheads that reduce collateral damage”. Since the real capabilities of the “rogue” states are a well-kept secret, the risks of using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state are non-negligible and could be highly detrimental to the international efforts (which the United States also supports) in favour of arms control and the non-proliferation of weapons of terror and mass destruction.

37. It is obvious that following the armed intervention against Iraq, the governments of Iran, Pakistan and India will step up their nuclear programmes, not just with regional considerations in mind, but also as a kind of “life insurance” against the United States. Other longer-standing nuclear states like Russia and China, which from the “preventive” standpoint are also a threat to the United States (according to the NPR), are likely to be less cooperative in the future on disarmament and non-proliferation issues when their own arsenals are at stake. The fact that the United States has not signed up to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is another obstacle in its efforts to combat nuclear proliferation and attain its goals.

38. The dilemma created by the NSS in this field is the result of the explicit affirmation by the US Administration of the United States’ right to take action before the threat actually materialises. If this reasoning is pursued to its logical conclusion, there is no need for a state even to actually acquire weapons of mass destruction, all it takes is for its government to express the idea or intention of acquiring such capabilities. The NSS states that:

“We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends (...).

Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first (...).

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries (...).

The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively”.

39. That last sentence is particularly portentous for international stability and security in the years to come. While pre-emption is a response to a verifiable and foreseeable crisis – this would have been the

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<sup>5</sup> The Nuclear Posture Review report of 31 December 2001 identifies seven states with nuclear capabilities which it considers as potential sources of “immediate, potential and unexpected contingencies” to be taken into account in United States nuclear planning. Those countries are China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Russia and Syria: [www.globalsecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org) .

case during the cold war in the event of preparations for a large-scale attack – preventive action seems to pay little heed to the time and place and paves the way for all sorts of interpretations and speculation. This is all the more true in view of the fact that the NSS would seem to offer one option only: the use of armed force. However, and even though this might have allayed criticism about the destabilising consequences of that approach for international relations, the United States does not recognise the same right to pre-emptive action for other states that might espouse the NSS criteria.

40. In addition to preserving its leadership, it is a matter for the United States of avoiding the collapse of the international system into a continuous series of conflicts between states (for example Israel-Iran, India-Pakistan, China-India, Japan-North Korea, to mention but a few possible scenarios). This applies solely to states whose actions constitute a threat to the United States, which is why the NSS stipulates that “The United States will not use force in all cases to pre-empt emerging threats, nor should nations use pre-emption as a pretext for aggression”. And for the benefit of those who might wish to contest that exclusive right of pre-emption, the NSS adds that “The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just”. With its intervention in Iraq the US Administration put those principles into practice and created a precedent that could be applied to other countries deemed to represent a threat.

41. The other consequence of that reasoning, which makes the United States all at once a world legislator, judge and policeman, is that the system of balance based on the UN Charter and on the primacy of the UN Security Council in matters of world peace and security is envisaged as a means of backing up US action. Should it fail to attain that objective the United States will – this also applies to its traditional alliances – strive to defend its current priorities and interests, either alone but preferably in the framework of *ad hoc* coalitions. In keeping with the principles of “either you are with us or you are against us” and of a “just cause”, its allies and friends will have no choice but to follow America’s leadership, on the grounds that such action is being carried out on their behalf and in the general interest. Criticism from outside may be tolerated, but within the “inner circle” it is heresy, as illustrated by the reaction of some members of the Administration and part of the American press and other media (relayed by some European governments and media) to the French and German stances on Iraq.

42. By extending the war on terrorism – the aims of which meet with a fairly broad consensus among the United States and its allies and partners – to include the “rogue” states, the Bush Administration wished to give itself the political means to counter both threats. That analysis is not supported outside Washington, however, and where governments have not dared to openly express disapproval, public opinion is showing concern and openly protesting and expressing doubts about the wisdom of the United States’ choices. The cliché of American “cowboys” versus European “pacifists” is far too simplistic to reflect the state of unease in transatlantic relations that is undermining the joint achievements of the fight against terrorism. The differences on Iraq are just one more symptom of the growing rift between the Bush Administration, with its unshakeable convictions and world vision, and the international community and, more especially, between Washington and some of the more influential European capitals. The NSS had the merit, in the first instance, of clarifying the United States’ choices and future orientations in the field of security and defence. The European states are free to follow them or to find their own way forward. Inertia, however, is not an option and would, in the long run, lead to Europe being sidelined.

### ***III. The United States and Europe: the dilemmas of transatlantic relations***

43. The election of the Bush Administration was greeted with some scepticism in Europe. During the first half of 2001, its conservative and “religious” side, its declared resolve to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and not to subscribe to (and even on some points to oppose) the Kyoto Protocol and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as well as the treaty instituting the International Criminal Court were viewed with apprehension and disapproval by the European states. However, following the events of 11 September all this was pushed to the back of peoples’ minds in the name of a “sacred” transatlantic union. The European Union and NATO expressed support for the United States’ efforts to combat the

terrorist threat, European police forces were mobilised to hunt down the al-Qa'ida support networks and texts were drafted to facilitate police and judicial cooperation among the European states.

44. After a three-week period of reflection, NATO declared the 11 September attacks to be an armed attack under the terms of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and put its AWACS aircraft at the disposal of the United States so that the latter could deploy its own surveillance aircraft for military operations in Afghanistan. However, NATO as such did not directly participate in those operations and national forces were deployed under the sole responsibility and control of their respective governments. As for the EU, the weakness of its political and military structures made any coordinated military action impossible. Contrary to what happened during the Gulf crisis and war in 1991, when Europe's navies successfully coordinated their action under the WEU umbrella in order to monitor the UN embargo against Iraq, Europe was only able to contribute to Operation Enduring Freedom on a national or bilateral basis (with the United States). The same happened in the case of Operation Iraqi in Iraq, where the countries that have joined the United States have done so on a bilateral basis.

45. Now that emotions have died down after the events of 11 September and given the rift between Americans and Europeans and among Europeans themselves with regard to the armed intervention in Iraq, the situation has become a lot more complex. The Bush Administration, buoyed up by the initial allied support for the operations against Afghanistan and international terrorism, is resolved to take decisive action to win the war against terrorism and the "rogue" states, and above and beyond that to deter any other states that might one day constitute a threat to the United States' interests or superiority. Its European allies support the general objectives of this fight to defend peace and security, but have expressed one major caveat – a matter of form rather than substance – about the role of military force in this process. Given the military imbalance that exists between the United States and its European friends and allies, the latter have only very limited influence on the decision-making process in the United States.

46. In order to defend their positions and interests, the EU states are seeking to strengthen and develop their defence capabilities at national and European level, as well as within NATO. They are endeavouring to preserve the transatlantic link and to make the best possible use of multilateral cooperation opportunities in a wide range of areas that are decisive for world peace and security (arms control, inspection systems, development aid, promotion of human rights, international treaties and agreements, United Nations etc.). This approach, for which EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten has coined the term "soft power", is perceived by part of the Bush Administration as an obstacle, rather than as being complementary, to the United States' efforts in favour of world peace and security, in particular as regards the "rogue" states.

### ***1. The challenges of the ESDP***

47. The Common Foreign and Security Policy is a European ambition that deserves a full and convincing commitment on the part of all the European states concerned. The success of this undertaking could give the European states (of both "old" and "new" Europe) the means to stand alongside the United States as an equal partner. There would not be a competitive, but a more sound and balanced relationship, which is doubtless for the moment the only one which will bring to the world the full benefits of the political and economic freedom referred to in the NSS. The ESDP is, for the moment, a way of conferring greater credibility on European initiatives for peace and security, of avoiding a fragmentation of national policies and divisions among Europeans and of achieving genuine political and military decision-making autonomy at European and international level. The starting-point – the headline goal based on the Petersberg missions – may be modest, but positive results could pave the way for a transformation of the EU into a proper political and military organisation.

#### *(a) The dream of autonomy*

48. There is no denying that progress on the ESDP is too slow. The aim of creating by 2003 a force of at least 60 000 troops deployable at two months' notice and sustainable for one year (including rotations) has not yet been attained, despite the efforts the EU countries have made since 2002. The decision to establish a link between the headline goal and access to NATO planning and command

structures (in the form of headquarters) was intended to convince some of the allies that there would be no competition between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance in the military sphere, but the resulting discussions between the two organisations have somewhat checked Europe's momentum. Indeed, when WEU's military functions were transferred to the EU, the interests of the non-EU European NATO member countries which had been involved in WEU's military activities (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Turkey and Poland) were not taken sufficiently into account.

49. Those negotiations, which finished only at the end of 2002, delayed implementation of the first EU operation in the Balkans the takeover of the NATO mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia<sup>6</sup>. However, the EU political authorities in charge of the ESDP used the opportunity to propose taking over from the NATO stabilisation force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a decision which demonstrated the seriousness of the EU's intentions to shoulder responsibility for maintaining security and stability in south-eastern Europe. With US and British forces mobilised for the "Iraqi front" (without excluding the forces of other nations), this would facilitate the transfer of troops, while allowing a credible and well-adapted military presence to be maintained in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

50. 2003 will be crucial for testing and, where appropriate, improving and developing the EU's capacity for more autonomous politico-military action at a regional level. Indeed the NSS encourages that idea: "We welcome our European allies' efforts to forge a greater foreign policy and defense identity with the EU, and commit ourselves to close consultations to ensure that these developments work with NATO. We cannot afford to lose this opportunity to better prepare the family of transatlantic democracies for the challenges to come". Given that the majority of NATO states are also members of the EU (this will hold true after the next round of enlargement in 2004 and, beyond that, as regards Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey), synergy between the two organisations should in principle not be too much of a problem.

51. The key issue for the EU over the next few years will be that of its autonomy vis-à-vis NATO, and hence the United States, in the field of security and defence. The aim of achieving such autonomy, first mentioned in the European Council's Cologne Declaration, was reaffirmed in succeeding declarations but does not figure in the Treaty of Nice, which came into force in 2002. The heads of state and government stated in Cologne that "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO". It was for that purpose that the Union set up its politico-military crisis-management structures and Military Staff.

52. However, that desire for autonomy is hampered by two factors. First of all, the Military Staff does not have operational planning capabilities and secondly, what should have been purely technical discussions on recourse to NATO assets and capabilities (operational planning capabilities, technical means and infrastructure) have turned into a political debate involving a number of subjects which are not directly related, but which are holding up the negotiations. Another point to be taken on board is the incapacity of the European states to draw the logical conclusions from the 11 September attacks and from the link that the United States has established between the terrorist threat and the risk of proliferation of weapons of terror and mass destruction. We might also add that the eruption of the Iraq question into the NATO internal debate in connection with the issue of assistance to Turkey in the event of an armed attack by Iraq have shown the limits of Europe's "autonomy" vis-à-vis the United States. Those discussions revealed the existence of very real political divergences among European countries on issues of security and defence and the role of alliances which will have lasting consequences for the ESDP.

53. Thus, while NATO, under United States impetus, is in the process of being transformed into a political and military organisation for combating the threats of post-11 September 2001, the ESDP remains confined to the Petersberg missions (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking) defined within WEU in response to the crises and conflicts confronting Europe at that time and which involved, in particular, protecting

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<sup>6</sup> Operation Concordia was launched on 31 March 2003. The European force commanded by Admiral Feist (Germany, Operations Commander) and General Maral (France, Force Commander) is composed of more than 300 servicemen from 27 European countries.

refugees and intervening in civil wars (peacekeeping and peacebuilding). Hence the criticism of the EU's role in maintaining peace and security, the implication being that NATO is the organisation with the real responsibilities (defence, war and peace), leaving the tasks of creating a secure and stable environment and reconstruction to the Union. A broad interpretation of the Petersberg tasks may allow the new threats to be included, but since this would require unanimous agreement to be reached on a case-by-case basis, it would be preferable to reformulate the Petersberg missions to explicitly include those threats.

54. The autonomy debate also has direct repercussions for military capabilities. To attain their – albeit currently very modest – objective in this area, the EU's political and military authorities need the means to respond to a crisis with or without NATO. Indeed Europe's autonomy will be measured by its ability to take action without recourse to NATO. This presupposes the national forces and those allocated to EU and NATO missions (in most cases the same units) having the necessary state of readiness and equipment to respond to all types of crisis in either framework. Paradoxically, the greater the EU's autonomy, the stronger and more credible the “European pillar” of the Alliance would become (and the more it would have to be involved in the decision-making process). A successful strengthening of the European states' military capabilities is the key, not to competing with America, but to strengthening their strategic negotiating position (in the EU and NATO frameworks alike) with regard to the United States. Nevertheless, this initiative will encounter opposition from the Bush Administration, which sees a strengthening of European military capabilities as a welcome extra but not as the contribution of equal partners.

*(b) European shortcomings and American superiority*

55. The assets and capabilities gap between the European states (NATO, EU) and the United States is an undeniable fact that aggravates the tensions affecting transatlantic cooperation on security and defence. Less evident is the reason why the European states, since they are aware of that gap, are unable to make even modest progress towards overcoming it. It is not a question of trying to vie with the not only technological, but also doctrinal and conceptual advantages that the United States enjoys over the majority of its friends and allies in the field of military capabilities. The real problem to be tackled is the lack of political resolve at national and European level and the inability to envisage a European defence that goes beyond the sacrosanct texts of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Treaty of Nice and its successors.

56. One could debate endlessly about defence budgets, industrial problems, the lack of cooperation among the academic and industrial worlds and the national (and European) defence authorities, the fragmentation and dispersal of efforts and resources in the equipment sector, the pros (and/or cons) of transatlantic industrial and technological cooperation, the insufficient use of IT in the military sector and the lack of any serious reflection on the military use of outer space. However, an analysis of the actual and potential industrial and technological capacities of the EU member states and European members of NATO, for example in the field of the new information and communication technologies, very quickly shows that the problems are more of a political than technical nature.

57. Let us take the example of the defence aeronautics, missiles and space sector. That sector has improved thanks to the restructuring and rationalisation efforts of the 1990s, opening up new prospects for the development and production of high-tech equipment. The results of those efforts are plain to see: EADS (Eurofighter, Airbus A400-M), Eurocopter (NH-90), Dassault (Rafale), SAAB-BAe (JAS-Gripen), MBDA (Meteor), Euromissile, Astrium (the Helios 1 and 2 observation satellites), to give a few examples. In parallel, intergovernmental cooperation has been developed and stepped up through WEAG and WEAO, OCCAR, the Framework Agreement on restructuring the European armaments industry, the Defence Capabilities Initiative (NATO), the European Capabilities Action Plan (EU) and the New Initiative on Capabilities – Prague Capabilities Commitment (NATO). All those initiatives and acronyms show that there is a consensus on requirements, but this is not enough to make the most of Europe's industrial, R&D and defence technological capacities.

58. The result is a number of key programmes of recognised strategic importance, but bogged down by budgetary problems and differences of national policy, subject to constant changes during the study and pre-production phases and with deadlines that keep being extended from one year to the next,

increasing the industrial and financial risks. On the one side, then, is Europe, with its dispersed and fragmented defence sector, and on the other the United States, with its industrial and technological power – a situation in which the commercial balance is one-sided. The Europeans are competing with each other – which is normal enough in what is supposed to be a single market – but also face competition from the United States. This has some attraction for certain states, which prefer to limit investments in European programmes in favour of direct procurements or transatlantic cooperation, which they find more advantageous.

59. Already, a growing number of European states are seeking to join the American Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme, in which Canada, Australia and Israel have also shown interest. Those decisions will doubtless benefit the national defence industries and armed forces as well as being an expression of the national decision-makers' transatlantic commitment. The consequences for Europe's defence aeronautical sector and decision-making autonomy and for its aim of achieving more balanced transatlantic relations thus take second place to short-term national priorities. It is true, however, that those choices are also the result of the delays, difficulties and failures encountered in the efforts to obtain the binding commitments at European level needed to equip national armed forces at an acceptable cost and pace. European military staffs have been waiting since the 1991 Gulf war for a modern and efficient transport aircraft, space-based intelligence and high-tech electronics capabilities, transport ships, modern aircraft carriers, sophisticated combat aircraft and the requisite munitions (guided bombs, cruise missiles and other high-tech weaponry). Meanwhile, efforts to achieve battlefield digitisation, C4I systems<sup>7</sup> interoperability or simply the widespread use of night-time detection and sighting equipment are being conducted in the framework of national projects or limited cooperation, due to a lack of the requisite resources.

60. Europe's industrial and technological potential is not being fully tapped, due to the budgetary constraints that no European state is spared, given the lack of sustained economic growth at a level comparable to that of the United States (twice that of the EU). Thus defence budget increases are spread over long periods of time in the hope of better days to come, while they have a more immediate effect in the United States. Following 11 September 2001, none of NATO's European members used the activation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty as an opportunity to significantly increase national, and hence also the common pool of European, defence capabilities. The increases announced by the United Kingdom and France refer to a longer timeframe, pending an improved economic situation, and were in any case already planned. Moreover, it is no easy thing for the European states to follow the American example, given that the United States' proposed defence budget for 2004 (\$380 billion) is six times the budgets for education (\$61 billion) and health (\$66 billion, including social security).

61. All this only bolsters the United States' superiority over its European allies and reduces their influence on the US Administration. The United States' recourse to coalitions of the willing and its inclination to by-pass NATO in its efforts to combat terrorism and "rogue" states show that the American political and military authorities see Europe as a source of "auxiliary troops", which like the *auxilia* of the Roman legions, are less well equipped and integrated, but nonetheless necessary, for essentially tactical reasons<sup>8</sup>, for the success of a campaign. And, in the absence of credible military participation, Europe can at least provide political support, thereby backing up President Bush's assertion of his readiness to cooperate and of his preference for a multilateral approach to the current

<sup>7</sup> Command, control, communications, computing and intelligence systems.

<sup>8</sup> Replying to questions from journalists about the uncertainty of UK participation in military action without a second UN Security Council resolution during a briefing session at the Pentagon on 11 March 2003, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said, "what will be ultimately decided is unclear as to their role; that is to say, their role in the event that a decision is made to use force. There's the second issue of their role in a post-Saddam Hussein reconstruction process or stabilization process, which would be a different matter. And I think, until we know what the resolution is, we won't know the answer as to what their role will be and to the extent that they're able to participate in the event the President decides to use force, that would obviously be welcomed. To the extent they're not, there are workarounds, and they would not be involved, at least in that phase of it". The strong displeasure expressed by the British Government at this reply led Mr Rumsfeld to qualify his remarks in a communiqué published on 12 March 2003: <http://www.usembassy.org/organisation.uk>

security problems. There has to be significant qualitative and quantitative progress on European assets and capabilities. It is not a matter of presenting the ESDP as an alternative to transatlantic cooperation, which is not what most Europeans want anyway, but rather of achieving the enhanced equal partnership with the United States that will strengthen the Atlantic Alliance and prevent it from turning into a transatlantic discussion forum without any real influence on the American decision-making process in matters of world peace and security.

### ***2.The United States and NATO reform***

62. In the preamble to the NSS, the Alliance is quoted as one example of the United States' multilateral commitments, since it cannot solve all the world's problems alone: "Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation, the Organisation of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions". This report does not just recognise the Alliance's role in world security, it also proposes a detailed outline for NATO in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as approved at NATO's Prague Summit in November 2002.

#### *(a) The NSS, the Prague Summit and the new Alliance*

63. Although the United States is NATO's most influential member, the NSS presents the Organisation as but one among many other partners. NATO is not mentioned at all in Chapters III ("Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends"), IV ("Work with others to Defuse Regional Conflicts") and V ("Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction"). Only in Chapter VIII, ("Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power"), is there any precise reference to the Alliance as the "fulcrum of transatlantic and inter-European security" alongside the EU, described as "our partner in opening world trade". This playing-down of NATO's role was already apparent after the war in Kosovo, following this "committee war" which, in the view of some US military leaders and parliamentarians (in particular conservative Republicans) had prevented a swift air victory in the FRY.

64. Taking note of the decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the NSS states that "NATO must develop new structures and capabilities to carry out that mission under new circumstances". To do so, the Organisation must acquire a "capability to field, at short notice, highly mobile, specially trained forces whenever they are needed to respond to a threat against any member of the alliance". Thus the Alliance is seen as an integral part of the strategy developed by the United States in response to the events of 11 September and as a complement to action by the United States, rather than as a player in its own right: "The alliance must be able to act wherever our interests are threatened, creating coalitions under NATO's own mandate, as well as contributing to mission-based coalitions".

65. In order to meet those obligations, the Alliance is called upon to reform itself as follows:

"NATO must:

- expand NATO's membership to those democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing our common interests;
- ensure that the military forces of NATO nations have appropriate combat contributions to make in coalition warfare;
- develop planning processes to enable those contributions to become effective multinational fighting forces;
- take advantage of the technological opportunities and economies of scale in our defense spending to transform NATO military forces so that they dominate potential aggressors and diminish our vulnerabilities;

- streamline and increase the flexibility of command structures to meet new operational demands and the associated requirements of training, integrating, and experimenting with new force configurations; and
- maintain the ability to work and fight together as allies even as we take the necessary steps to transform and modernise our forces”.

66. NATO’s future is directly linked to the successful implementation of that action plan over the coming months and years: “If NATO succeeds in enacting these changes, the rewards will be a partnership as central to the security and interests of its member states as was the case during the Cold War”. The alternative is presented as being *ad hoc* coalitions of the willing, in which the Alliance may be relegated to a secondary role, for example as a reservoir of forces and capabilities to be called upon for post-conflict activities such as ensuring a secure and stable environment, freeing up American forces so that they can be used in other theatres of operations. With Afghanistan in mind, the European allies pledged in Prague to reform the Alliance’s structures and capabilities as soon as possible.

67. The declaration adopted by NATO heads of state and government on 21 November 2002 develops in more detail the outline set out in the NSS and which US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had presented to the allies during an informal meeting of the Alliance defence ministers in Warsaw on 24 September 2002. It makes two major announcements concerning the accession of seven new central European members and the future creation of a NATO Response Force in which the United States would not participate directly, and to which national units would be allocated. In keeping with the rationale of the NSS, the NATO leaders placed particular emphasis on the “new missions” linked with the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of terror and mass destruction.

68. The new round of NATO enlargement is simply the next logical step in a process that started in the first half of the last decade. All the new members’ accession requests were accepted as of 1994-95, but the first round of enlargement was limited to a small number of countries for functional reasons and in order to preserve the cohesion of the Alliance. The integration of those countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – was a preparatory exercise for the latest round of enlargement. From the geographic standpoint, NATO now reaches to the borders of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia (Kaliningrad) providing territorial continuity towards northern and central Europe as well as towards south-eastern Europe and the Caucasus. For the United States, this represents a secure geopolitical area that is of strategic importance, in particular due to its proximity to the Near and Middle East and the Caspian Sea with its rich reserves of oil and gas.

69. At a time when, following 11 September, the United States is anxious to diversify its energy supplies and reduce its imports of Gulf oil, NATO enlargement is one way of eventually achieving that aim, particularly since the American and European presence in central Asia (including Afghanistan) provides short-term stability and security for the transport routes and energy lines linking that region with the rest of Europe. The development of the Alliance’s activities with regard to the Caucasus and central Asia is part and parcel of that strategy and will certainly lead to differences of opinion with Russia and China, which are worried about the fall-out of the Iraq conflict.

70. That enlargement is a good thing for the Alliance, but it also entails risks in terms of cohesion and the efficiency of military capabilities. The new members have neither the resources of the older members, nor their experience of Alliance military structures. Their equipment is not always compatible. Their training, methodology and doctrines for the use of military force have undergone some reform in order to bring them into line with NATO standards, but this process has not been extended to all the armed forces of all the new member states because of the major budgetary and human costs (in terms of staff reductions, for example) of the operation. The proposal to set up the NATO Response Force gives those states a chance to be integrated from the outset in Alliance military structures by putting to use those capabilities that are most compatible with NATO, in particular the units and headquarters that have gathered experience of NATO operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and FYROM. This, together with the new capabilities initiative – the Prague Capabilities Commitment – the aim of which is to improve Alliance capabilities (equipment and resources) in

“more than 400 specific areas”<sup>9</sup>, is a way of all at once strengthening the cohesion of the Alliance, facilitating the integration of its new members and enabling it to participate actively in the American strategy for combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of terror and mass destruction.

*(b) Broadened tasks, strategic partnerships and divergences*

71. The NSS focuses almost entirely on combating the “new” threats posed by international terrorism and “rogue” states. That effort involves cooperating as broadly as possible with other states and with international organisations, which are called upon to redirect their security strategies accordingly. It is therefore logical that in the absence of a direct geographic threat, the Alliance’s main task of collective defence should be broadened to take account of the new post-11 September 2001 situation. But, from the practical standpoint, NATO is not an alliance of equal partners. The differences, for example in terms of resources, capabilities, equipment and national priorities, hamper the transformation of the Alliance into an efficient fighting force comparable to that of the United States. To put it more plainly, while all the European allies (to differing degrees) need the United States, the United States does not need all its allies or the Organisation as a whole. According to the NSS, NATO is just one more “center of global power”.

72. Restructuring the Alliance to face the immediate enemy, just when it has to deal with both the positive effects and constraints of enlargement, is a delicate task, particularly since the fight against terrorism and civil protection are areas in which the EU is also actively engaged (judicial and police cooperation, protection of the population against the threat of attack using offensive biological and chemical weapons, for example). The decision was taken in Prague to strengthen the Organisation’s capacity to deal with those threats, in particular by adopting a new “military concept for defence against terrorism” and a “Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Action Plan” to deal with biological, chemical or radiological attacks. In parallel, “the implementation of five nuclear, biological and chemical weapons defence initiatives” was endorsed and new impetus was given to cooperation in the field of missile defence, with a view to protecting population centres in addition to military forces.

73. The Prague Declaration also marks the beginning of a strategic partnership between the Alliance and the European Union. Indeed such a partnership was envisaged in the NSS, which defines the EU as another “center of global power” alongside NATO. The NSS states that “we welcome our European allies’ efforts to forge a greater foreign policy and defense identity with the EU, and commit ourselves to close consultations to ensure that these developments work with NATO”. Thus it establishes a link between the ESDP (or any other part of Union foreign policy with security implications) and NATO, which logically should mean more convergence with American priorities. This strategic partnership is in keeping with the NSS argument in favour of cooperation, namely that no state is able to solve the world’s problems on its own. Thus, in a presentation of the Prague Declaration, it is stated that “the security challenges of today are too multi-faceted to be handled by one single institution, no matter how capable. NATO works together with a variety of institutions, organisations and countries to build a web of mutually reinforcing, interlocking security arrangements”.

74. Implementation of this strategic partnership with the EU – of which the first tangible result is the decision for the EU to take over from the NATO force in FYROM – nevertheless (and like the implementation of the headline goal) remains contingent upon finding “solutions satisfactory to all Allies on the issue of participation by non-EU European Allies” in the Union’s defence activities, an issue which was resolved in the margins of the Prague Summit. What seems to be gradually emerging within this partnership is a division of tasks among the European states in the two organisations: NATO, for the war on terrorism and the efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of terror and mass destruction and the EU for the Petersberg tasks. Since the same states are involved in both, there should logically be a division of labour even within each of the organisations, each country taking on those tasks best suited to its particular capabilities, which will free up American forces for operations elsewhere. NATO and the EU will “guard” Europe on its northern, central European, Mediterranean and south-eastern borders and will supply, on a case-by-case basis, the means to secure and stabilise other crisis zones (Afghanistan and post-war Iraq, for instance).

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<sup>9</sup> “NATO after Prague”, <http://www.nato.int/prague>

75. The other major partner of the Alliance is the Russian Federation. According to the NSS, “Russia is in the midst of a hopeful transition, reaching for its democratic future and a partner in the war on terror. (...) With Russia, we are already building a new strategic relationship based on a central reality of the twenty-first century: the United States and Russia are no longer strategic adversaries”. However, it also expresses some reservations: “At the same time, we are realistic about the differences that still divide us from Russia and about the time and effort it will take to build an enduring strategic partnership”. Similarly, the Prague Declaration states that, “In accordance with the Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, we are determined to intensify and broaden our cooperation with Russia”, in particular “in areas such as peacekeeping, defence reform, WMD proliferation, search and rescue, civil emergency planning, theatre missile defence and the struggle against terrorism”.

76. Thus NATO as a whole is in the process of becoming closely integrated in the Bush Administration’s security and defence strategy, whether it be with regard to terrorism or to weapons of terror and mass destruction. The only “psychological” barrier which remains among the European allies concerns the issue of “rogue” states, to which there is no reference in the Prague Declaration. This is likely to be a source of disagreement and deadlock, as was already the case in January and February 2003 with regard to Iraq. There is a serious risk of the Alliance being increasingly sidelined by the current US Administration in reaction to the “insurrection” on the part of some of the allies. Such opposition may be tolerated in the United Nations or on the part of the EU, but is viewed much more seriously when it happens within the very organisation that has embodied the transatlantic link for 54 years. This partly explains the letter published in the American press by eight European heads of state and government on 3 February 2003, followed two days later by a similar declaration signed by the heads of government of ten central European EU and NATO accession candidates. Those political gestures of support for the United States were intended more to reassure the current US Administration about the allies’ loyalty than to express agreement with Washington’s proposed method for dealing with Iraq (indeed both letters referred to the central role in these matters of the UN Security Council). It should also be noted that of the eight signatories, only one – the United Kingdom – has played an active part in the military operations in Iraq.

77. It is no less clear that NATO, rather than being depicted in the United States’ strategy as the essential means for dealing with the threats to US security listed in the NSS, is seen as merely one instrument among others. In some cases its full engagement will be called for, in others it will supply politico-military and technical support (communication systems, ground and air bases, port facilities and other such infrastructure). However, the capability gap between the United States and its allies, as well as among the allies themselves, is already too large for the Alliance to have any real autonomy of judgment and action vis-à-vis its leading member. Implicit in the NSS, which reads like an “instruction manual” on NATO’s structural reform, mode of operation and “new” tasks and priorities, is an indication of the price to be paid for failure: a gradual sidelining of the Organisation in favour of what the Bush Administration deems to be more flexible and efficient forms of cooperation.

#### **IV. Conclusions**

78. The NSS, which has found its first practical application in Iraq, is in fact fully in keeping with the rationale that has developed since the end of the cold war. One could take, for example, the Wolfowitz memorandum<sup>10</sup> published in 1992 on maintaining American military superiority in order to “establish and protect a new order that accounts sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership, while at the same time maintaining a military dominance capable of deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role”<sup>11</sup>. Throughout the last decade this new American century was repeatedly extolled and justified by American intellectuals, scientists and experts.

<sup>10</sup> Paul Wolfowitz was at that time Undersecretary for Policy at the Pentagon. As Deputy Defense Secretary he is now one of the most influential members of the Bush Administration.

<sup>11</sup> “Keeping the U.S. first; Pentagon would preclude a rival superpower”; *The Washington Post*, 11 March 1992.

79. Francis Fukuyama was the first to leave his mark on peoples' minds with his famous article, published in 1989, on "The End of History?"<sup>12</sup>, which subsequently inspired his book entitled "The End of History and the Last Man", published in 1992. He sees the future of the world as the liberal market model of democracy which has prevailed over socialist and other systems and which is at the heart of the American political, economic and social system. American values are seen as universal, flexible and adaptable. They must be adopted, resistance is useless.

80. However, there is conflict with other models (e.g. the "European social model"), cultures, values and religions. Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilisations" is an attempt to explain the possible conflict of values, perceived as a clash between the "West" and the rest of the world. Indeed, this was the title<sup>13</sup> of one part of the article he published in 1993 and which provided the basis for his famous and (especially in Europe) much criticised book<sup>14</sup>. Attempts to impose a single model will inevitably give rise to opposition, whether peaceful or violent.

81. Military power clearly tops the list of the means of defence against such opposition, particularly since the attacks of 11 September 2001. The American or "western" model must be propagated, even if this means imposing it by force; indeed this is the purpose of the military campaign in Iraq. Might is right. Fear and submission are necessary to gain respect and admiration. Clearly the United States and Europe are following different paths, but as part of the western world they share the same aims. Europe has no choice therefore but to fall back into line with the United States. This is how Robert Kagan depicts the situation in his article "Power and weakness"<sup>15</sup>, subsequently turned into a book entitled "Of paradise and power: America vs. Europe in the new world order".

82. These ideas about the United States' role in the world permeate the NSS report submitted in September 2002, but they are taken beyond the stage of an academic debate. The report is in fact a political strategy document which heralds a new chapter in international relations. The NSS and its first practical applications break with the traditional system of alliances and cooperation that dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, when "the concept of a balance of power gradually replaced the dream of a universal monarchy"<sup>16</sup> and whose modern expression is the international system based on the 1945 United Nations Charter. This system takes into account the diversity of nation states and the rights of those states and is by nature multilateral. Conversely, the NSS favours a unipolar and gradually integrated world in which the United States plays the main role in all important areas: war and peace, economic growth as a social, cultural, religious and ethnic model.

83. The Iraq debate is not a debate about waging war on a state with an undeniable potential for regional destabilisation, ambitions of acquiring weapons of mass destruction and terror and leaders who govern by repression. Rather, it is a debate about two world visions: one multipolar, the other unipolar. This has led to a number of interesting paradoxes. For example, France and Germany, two major beneficiaries of the American post-war assistance provided under the Marshall Plan, not only took a different stance from the United States and expressed criticism of the latter, but also denied it any international legitimacy for the disarmament of Iraq by force. Their allies of the moment were countries such as Russia and China, which scarcely ten years ago were still perceived as a threat to the western world.

84. Any multilateral undertaking entails the risk of a conflict of interests, in which case the actions of one or several countries may be opposed or hampered by others. There are two possible ways of overcoming such deadlocks: intensive diplomatic dialogue with a view to finding points of agreement – the common denominator – or recourse to force. Each solution reflects its own vision of a multipolar world, one based on cooperation, the other on Manicheism. In the first case there is interaction among

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<sup>12</sup> "The End of History?", Francis Fukuyama; "The National Interest", summer 1989;

<http://www.nationalinterest.org>

<sup>13</sup> "VI. The West versus the rest"; *Policy Review*, summer 1993; Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?"; <http://www.policyreview.org>

<sup>14</sup> "The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order"; Samuel Huntington; published by Simon & Schuster; 1997

<sup>15</sup> *Policy Review*, summer 2002 ; Robert Kagan, "Power and weakness"; <http://www.policyreview.org>

<sup>16</sup> "Les Traités de Westphalie", French Foreign Affairs Ministry, <http://www.france.diplomatie.fr>

the different “poles” (political, economic, religious and ethnic, for example) in the form of an ongoing dialogue. This creates relations of interdependence while allowing differences of interests and active efforts to defend those interests. In the second case the predominant world vision is that reflected in the NSS, in which direct and violent confrontation between competing “poles” (possibly with a view to the destruction of some of them) is accepted in order to ensure the supremacy of one over the others.

85. This is a direct challenge to the idea of coexisting “poles”, which are accepted only if they are integrated in a dominant model in which differences of opinion are recognised but in which no alternatives to that dominant model are authorised. This is in simplified form what former US President Clinton referred to as the transition from global interdependence to global integration, the final aim being an “integrated global community of shared benefits, shared responsibilities and shared values”<sup>17</sup>. At the centre of that system is the United States, which plays the role of “mankind’s guide to universal happiness”. Those who seek to deviate from that path suffer the reprisals that are directed against “enemies” (the rogue states and others) or against the allies, partners and friends that have ambitions of independence, or quite simply autonomy (France, Germany, Russia and Turkey, for example, as regards post-war Iraq).

86. The American “center of power” tolerates such free electrons as long as they continue to wheel in the desired direction. Solidarity is taken for granted, discussions are kept “between allies”, behind closed doors, with no consultation of the national parliaments or public opinion. For the others, the more recent “partners and friends” in the war on international terrorism, an information bulletin is deemed sufficient. This is the case of the UN Security Council, whose political credibility has been severely tried by a single member (the United States). None of the other four permanent members or ten non-permanent members considers the UN and its security system as a mere instrument that can be used to serve purely national interests.

87. While it is too early to evaluate the full implications of the United States’ new national security strategy and of the pre-emptive war against Iraq, one fact is clear: the traditional system of alliances and of a balance of power among states, indeed the very principle of the sovereignty of nation states and of respect for their territorial integrity has been demolished. On the Iraq issue the Bush Administration has preferred the use of military force, persuasion, threats or political and economic pressure to diplomacy and dialogue with its allies, friends and partners. The principle of “either you are with us or against us” applied to Iraq has been the cause of deadlock in the UN Security Council, a crisis in NATO and rifts among the major European states and it is likely that the aftermath of the current crisis will lead to further political confrontation (with economic ramifications) between the transatlantic partners.

88. The United States has quite unambiguously stated its resolve to impose the world vision and interests of a small number of conservative groups close to the military-industrial complex that President Eisenhower warned his citizens against in 1961<sup>18</sup>:

“A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction. (...)

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence – economic, political, even spiritual – is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

<sup>17</sup> Lecture by former US President Bill Clinton at the University of Texas on 12 February 2003; <http://www.utexas.edu/spotlight/clinton030122.html>

<sup>18</sup> Military-Industrial Complex Speech, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961; Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960, p. 1035- 1040; <http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu>

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together”.

89. To the military-industrial complex we might easily add the financial interests and new security structures designed to combat the terrorist threat, in order to fully grasp the risk involved in allowing such a great power to extend its control to the whole world in the name of some Messianic mission<sup>19</sup> that is contested by most European citizens and even by large swathes of American public opinion, including intellectuals and members of Congress<sup>20</sup>. In spite of Colin Powell’s conciliatory remarks to Europeans concerning post-war Iraq and the European wish to rebuild transatlantic relations, it is clear that the Bush Administration has no intention of returning to the pre-crisis *status quo*. A President who, like some Angel of the Apocalypse, declares that “we will export death and violence to the four corners of the earth in defense of this great nation”<sup>21</sup> has a vision of international relations diametrically opposed to that which Europeans have been fighting for for years, namely, a more interdependent world of peace, security and solidarity, where war may only be waged as a last resort.

90. Following the Iraq war and the peacebuilding process, there will be other scenarios to test the NSS. Syria and Iran, North Korea and – why not, from the “pre-emptive” perspective? – China and Russia, India and Pakistan. There is a danger of the United Nations system falling apart before a new balance has emerged in order, not to confront the United States, but to help shape tomorrow’s world in a way that respects the diversity of states, cultures and civilisations. The NSS claims that the United States’ cause is always just and hence beneficial to the rest of humanity. The intentions are generous and the United States has demonstrated several times in the recent past its capacity for an active commitment to worldwide development and prosperity.

91. However, the current Administration is not motivated by the altruism of a Roosevelt or a Truman or by the visionary idealism of a Ronald Reagan, but by a desire for universal supremacy (some commentators talk of hegemony<sup>22</sup> and empire-building<sup>23</sup>), in which the European states are invited to participate, but only according to pre-defined roles. This approach nevertheless has its limits, namely the current divisions among European states with regard to a US Administration that has decided to implement a programme that significantly changes the *status quo* to its own advantage. That is a logical approach for a country as powerful as the United States. In his book “Prospects of Industrial Civilisation”, the British philosopher Bertrand Russell<sup>24</sup> already predicted in 1923 that “it is of course, obvious that the next Power to make a bid for world empire will be America. America may not, as yet, consciously desire such a position, but no nation with sufficient resources can long resist the attempt. And the resources of America are more adequate than those of any previous aspirant to universal hegemony”.

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<sup>19</sup> “Bush’s Messiah Complex”; *The Progressive*, February 2003 ; [www.progressive.org](http://www.progressive.org)

<sup>20</sup> A few days before the beginning of hostilities against Iraq, Democrat Senators Patrick Leahy and Edward Kennedy expressed concern about the unilateral approach of the Bush Administration. Senator Leahy stated, “I cannot pretend to understand the thinking of those in the Administration who for months or even longer have seemed possessed with a kind of messianic zeal in favor of war”: “Senior lawmakers attack Bush Administration’s Messianic zeal on Iraq”, Agence France-Presse, 14 March 2003 ; [www.afp.com](http://www.afp.com)

<sup>21</sup> Quoted by journalist Bob Woodward in his book “Bush at war”; *The Guardian* book review, 29 Jan 2003, [www.guardian.co.uk](http://www.guardian.co.uk)

<sup>22</sup> Ivan Eland with reference to the United States national security strategy; Colloquy organised by the WEU Assembly on “Europe and the new United States national security strategy – fighting terrorism together” Athens, Greece 17-18 March 2003; <http://www.assemblee-ueo.org>

<sup>23</sup> “The American Empire”, Stratfor (United States); 2002; [www.stratfor.biz](http://www.stratfor.biz) ; “The madness of Empire”, Scott McConnell ; “The American conservative “; 24 February 2003 ; <http://www.amconmag.com>

<sup>24</sup> Bertrand Russell (1872-1970): “Prospects of Industrial Civilisation”, published by Routledge, 1923.

92. US leadership on the basis of such a model may be acceptable to the extent that one agrees that the American cause is always “just”. But it is desirable for the European states to have a say in the transatlantic decision-making process if they are to be involved in such a policy. Their role should not be that of subordinates or auxiliaries but of allies within a community of democratic states which share the same respect for the rule of law, which means respecting differences of opinion. The action against Iraq was the first practical implementation of the NSS, but other examples will follow in the name of a “just cause”. However it is important also to bear in mind the words of the former US Defense Secretary under President Kennedy, Robert McNamara, with regard to Vietnam:

“We of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations who participated in the decisions on Vietnam acted according to what we thought were the principles and traditions of this nation. We made our decisions in light of those values. Yet we were wrong, terribly wrong. We owe it to future generations to explain why”<sup>25</sup>.

There is no more time to wait and see. Europe must unambiguously state its position in this new century, which will be American or multipolar.

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<sup>25</sup> “In Retrospect: The tragedy and lessons of Vietnam”; Robert S. McNamara with Brian Vandemark; 1996, Vintage Press.

**APPENDIX*****Development of the United States national security strategy since 1991***

1. As the only superpower left at the end of the cold war, the United States found itself with special responsibilities for security. As issues of domestic and foreign policy became ever more closely intertwined, the United States geared its security policy to an active involvement in world affairs, which in turn required it to maintain its military supremacy. While some aspects of American security policy have evolved over the last ten years, that point has remained unchanged.
2. The National Security Strategy (NSS) presented by the first Bush Administration in 1991 reflected both the hope and concern with which it regarded the changes in the international system. The international coalition led by the United States to restore the territorial integrity of Kuwait following its invasion by Iraq in 1990 had given rise to hopes for a new world order founded on peace and prosperity. However, the Bush Administration perceived the new risks arising, for example, from regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of terror and mass destruction, transnational threats and drugs trafficking as an obstacle to achieving its goals (respect for international law, economic development and prosperity, promotion of democracy and human rights), and for that reason deemed it necessary for the United States to remain actively involved in world affairs. It perceived itself not as the world's policeman but rather as a guiding and driving force behind international affairs, and hence as a world leader.
3. The change of government did not call into question the strategic goals defined under the Bush Administration when the Clinton Administration came into power in 1992. The 1994 NSS report adopted a more resolute approach to international problems founded on commitment, prevention and partnership, with a view to countering the new threats and seizing the opportunities offered by the new post-cold war era. It set three objectives: to maintain international stability by taking the necessary measures to deter potential troublemakers; to promote national prosperity by striving in favour of more open world markets and to broaden the "community of democratic nations". The Clinton Administration shared the previous government's view that there was no alternative to United States leadership, and insisted therefore on the need for the United States to maintain its military superiority.
4. Under pressure from Congress the Clinton Administration was forced in 1995 to adopt a more cautious approach to the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy. It argued in defence of its policies that the United States' own well-being was closely linked with its willingness to engage in international affairs. It was a matter not of idealism, but of realism and of defending its national interests. That strategy was, however, difficult to put into practice as long as there were no direct threats confronting the United States, which explains its hesitation to intervene in the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. Following his re-election in 1997, President Clinton announced an integrated security strategy and defined three key security policy objectives: to combine all available means in order to shape the international environment, to maintain the capacity to respond to all kinds of crises in order to defend American interests and to prepare and adapt the country to deal with the new strategic challenges, in other words, to modernise its military capabilities.
5. United States strategy was to undergo a radical change under President George W. Bush, particularly in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. During his election campaign, Mr Bush had stated his intention to carry out an in-depth review of United States security and defence policy. That review – directly inspired by concepts and doctrines shaped over the preceding ten years in Republican circles and Congress – reflected a world vision of a United States wielding its military power to defend its national interests. This meant enhancing and adapting American military capabilities to effectively counter the new threats posed by terrorism and weapons of terror and mass destruction. Although for budgetary reasons those intentions had initially met with reticence on the part of Congress and the military establishment, the context in which the Bush Administration presented its programme was marked by a new awareness of the United States' vulnerability to those threats. The resulting consensus at political and financial level on the need for large-scale defence investments enabled the programme to be approved with no major objections.
6. All NSS reports unambiguously assert the universal nature of the United States model (democracy, freedom and peace) and stress that it is endangered either by the "rogue" states, or, since

the end of the Clinton Administration, by so-called transnational threats such as terrorism, currently embodied by al-Qa'ida. A significant change in the NSS report for 2002 is the link that it establishes between the threat posed by weapons of terror and mass destruction in the possession of the "rogue" states or about to be acquired by them, and non-state threats. It calls for pre-emptive action to counter the danger and to hit the enemy before it is in a position to strike the United States.

7. Recourse to pre-emptive action means adapting the military tool, replacing the model geared to a well-defined enemy with one based on capabilities. The aim therefore is to achieve absolute superiority in the fields of intelligence, detection, active and passive defence, anti-forces strike capability and high-precision strikes against hardened targets (it should be noted that nuclear forces are undergoing the same changes as conventional forces) in order to avert attacks of all kinds against the United States and its allies. While the advantages of a multilateral engagement are constantly emphasised, the United States also stresses its right to take unilateral preventive action when its security is at risk. It therefore gives preference to *ad hoc* coalitions over recourse to international organisations and traditional transatlantic cooperation, on the grounds that action against the new threats is more effective if the coalition is determined by the task at hand, rather than the other way round. The NSS thus gives the United States the key role in the fight against the new threats. Inevitably the United States is the leader and those who are not with it, in the words of President Bush, are necessarily against it.



