DOCUMENT A/1839

1 December 2003

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A European initiative to strengthen the role of the United Nations in promoting peace and security

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Document A/1839

1 December 2003

A European initiative to strengthen the role of the United Nations
in promoting peace and security

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee²
by Mr Martínez Casañ, Chairman and Rapporteur

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¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 3 November 2003.

² Members of the Committee: Mr Martínez Casañ (Chairman); MM Pangalos (Alternate: Sfyriou), Hancock (Vice-Chairmen); MM André, de Assis, Mrs Azevedo, Mr van Baalen, Mrs Bolognesi, Mr Delattre, Mrs Delvaux-Stehres (Alternate: Glesener), Mr Duivesteijn, Mrs Durrieu, MM Floros, Goutry, Guardans I Cambó (Alternate: Arnau Navarro), Höfer, Hörster, Liapis, van der Linden, Lintner, Marshall, Masseret, Nazaré Pereira, Mrs Paoletti Tangheroni, MM Piscitello, Poty, Provera (Alternate: Gaburro), Puche Rodríguez, de Puig (Alternate: Yañez Barnuevo), Rizzi, Rochebloine, Roth, Ms Tritz, Lord Tomlinson (Alternate: Lord Judd), MM Versnick, Vis, Wilkinson.

Associate members: MM Akçam, Ates, Çavusoglu, Fajmon, Mrs Grabowska, MM Hegyi, Kaminski, Kasal, Kobielusz, Livanelli, Marthinsen, Nemeth, Pelc, Tabajdi, Width, Wojciechowski, N...

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

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RECOMMENDATION 735¹

(i) Recognising the essential role the United Nations plays in promoting peace and security, in particular in the fields of conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction;

(ii) Recalling that the UN Security Council has the prime responsibility for maintaining international peace and security;

(iii) Noting the importance of perfecting a multidimensional approach to international action in promoting peace and security;

(iv) Welcoming the cooperation on peace and security that is already under way between the European Union and the United Nations, and desirous to strengthen it further;

(v) Taking the view that it would be useful to support the model of cooperation that was developed in Kosovo among the various international organisations;

(vi) Taking as a basis the European Union's capacity for entering into multilateral commitments and for helping other countries to strengthen their own capabilities with a view to implementing such commitments;

(vii) Taking the view that in future the EU countries should adopt a greater number of common positions within United Nations bodies;

(viii) Noting that it is particularly necessary for the EU member states to improve their ability to meet their commitment to concert, in pursuance of Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union, and also to defend the interests of the Union in the UN Security Council;

(ix) Observing that the European Union's role in promoting peace and security in the world will to a large extent depend on the influence the Union can exert within the United Nations;

(x) Noting the significance of the proposal made by the Convention on the Future of Europe to create the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs of the European Union;

(xi) Recalling the Assembly's proposals for improving relations between the EU and the United Nations, in particular those contained in Resolution 115 on security policy in an enlarged Europe - a contribution to the Convention, adopted on 3 June 2003;

(xii) Staunchly supporting the call by the United Nations Secretary-General for there to be radical reform with a view to strengthening the United Nations;

(xiii) Aware of the urgent need for an in-depth reform of the United Nations' modus operandi and the arrangements under which it may take action, and that these should take account of the major changes that have taken place in the world since the UN was created and of the emergence of new forms of crises;

(xiv) Desirous that the European countries should draw up common proposals on the measures needed to reform the United Nations and enhance its role in the area of peace and security;

(xv) Considering that members of national parliaments can make a positive contribution to the work of the United Nations, and being aware of the ongoing work of the IPU, supported by the Council of Europe, in this regard,

1. Reaffirm the principle stated in Article 24 of the UN Charter that the United Nations Security Council has the prime responsibility for maintaining international peace and security;
2. Support the reform efforts being made by the United Nations in the field of peacekeeping in accordance with the findings of the UN working group on peacekeeping operations;
3. Increase the human and material resources made available to the United Nations for peacekeeping purposes and insist that each UN member state pays its financial contribution on time and without reservation;
4. Ensure that in cases where a common EU position has been agreed, there is convergence among the positions and votes of the EU member states within the various UN bodies;
5. Request the EU to help establish, within the multilateral framework of the United Nations, step-by-step rules for cases in which preventive action might be taken to counter specific threats to peace and stability;
6. Encourage the EU to establish clearer and stronger relations with the United Nations, and for that purpose to:

7. Contribute to the work of the new High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change set up by the UN Secretary-General for the purpose of studying the major threats to peace and security, identifying the conditions for effective collective action and recommending the changes that are necessary to strengthen the United Nations by reforming its institutions and procedures;
8. Encourage the European Union to accept the concept of the introduction of a parliamentary dimension to the work of the United Nations, and to support the proposals of the IPU in this regard;
9. Insert in the draft Constitutional Treaty to be approved by the governments participating in the Intergovernmental Conference a provision to the effect that:

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1. Over the last decade the Assembly has staunchly supported the measures adopted by governments with a view to strengthening the United Nations' role in the field of peacekeeping and security (see Appendix I). The current international situation makes a stronger UN role more necessary than ever in order to avert conflicts and pave the way for the emergence of an efficient system of international cooperation characterised by good governance, economic prosperity and social progress for all.
2. In parallel, the European Union countries are beginning to express their commitment to "facing up to our responsibilities, guaranteeing a secure Europe and a better world", as underscored at the Thessaloniki summit². On that occasion the High Representative for the CFSP/WEU Secretary-General Javier Solana presented a global strategy in the field of foreign and security policy³ which stated explicitly that "the fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, must be a European priority".
3. EU-UN interaction is founded on legal instruments (Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, Treaty on European Union - TEU) and a political resolve (Helsinki European Council of December 1999, EU security strategy), as well as on experience on the ground in countries like Bosnia, Kosovo and the Congo. It is therefore useful to consider the ways and means of strengthening cooperation between the two organisations. The joint declaration on UN-EU cooperation in crisis management signed on 24 September 2003 (see Appendix II) is a step in the right direction.
4. The draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe⁴ contains a number of provisions concerning EU-UN relations. The text of the Treaty was submitted to the governments of the EU member states and accession countries with a view to the Intergovernmental Conference, which began on 4 October 2003. However, those provisions are not very different from the relevant articles of the current TEU and there is doubtless a need to go further and to put forward more ambitious political ideas.
5. The Assembly is therefore making a number of recommendations on a European initiative to strengthen the role of the United Nations in promoting peace and security.

1. The use of force and United Nations peacekeeping operations

6. The UN Charter prohibits the use of force in international relations (Article 2.6). To ensure compliance with that requirement the UN can apply the procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes set out in Chapter VI. But it can also call on the collective security arrangements set out in Chapter VII in order to take "action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression". There are two exceptions to the ban on the use of force: assistance to UN action (Article 2.5) and self-defence (Article 51).
7. As far as United Nations action in the case of a threat to peace is concerned, the members of the Organisation have conferred on the Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (Article 24.1). The Security Council has a choice of measures, including the possibility of military sanctions (Article 42 and the following articles). However, to be able to use force the UN relies on the national assets and capabilities that the member states are prepared to make available to it. The only common structure envisaged to assist the Security Council on military matters has never actually functioned: this is the Military Staff Committee composed of the chiefs of staffs of the permanent members of the Security Council (Article 47). The General Assembly for its part is entitled to debate all questions pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security and to make recommendations, but any question calling for action must be referred to the Security Council (Article 11). The Secretary-General may also "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security" (Article 99).
8. In practice, and although they are not explicitly mentioned in the Charter, peacekeeping operations have continued to evolve. Initially their primary purpose was to supervise ceasefires and the separation of belligerents at the end of a conflict. Since the 1990s there has been a rapid development towards "peace consolidation" activities involving various types of civil and military action designed to ensure a lasting settlement of the conflict (reintegration of former combatants in civilian life, strengthening the rule of law, promoting human rights, technical assistance for democratic development etc.).
9. Following the painful experience of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and of UNOSOM in Somalia, UN operations of the "Blue Helmet" type (in other words conducted under UN auspices and command, and funded out of the compulsory contributions of the member states) are now confined essentially to operations to which the main parties to the conflict have given their consent and are conducted in the framework of an agreement with those parties.
10. Authorised operations by multinational forces made available to the UN, conducted under the provisions of Chapter VII and funded by the participating states are becoming increasingly frequent for peacemaking purposes. In many cases there is a humanitarian emergency to deal with and the consent of the different parties has either not been given or is uncertain (for example, KFOR in Kosovo or INTERFET in East Timor), or else the operation may concern geographic regions for which a number of interested states have decided to take charge of the stabilisation effort (for example, ISAF in Afghanistan).
11. In his recent report on the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration⁵, the UN Secretary-General explains that "There are certain instances where peace must first be established and the situation stabilised before a peacekeeping presence can be deployed. In such circumstances, the "Blue Helmets" are the not appropriate instrument. For these reasons I advised against their deployment in favour of multinational forces under the operational control of lead nations in Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Bunia, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and, most recently, Liberia". He continues thus: "Once a situation has stabilised, a robust United Nations peacekeeping mission can be a logical successor, provided that Member States with the capabilities required come forward to put their troops at the disposal of the Organisation". But what happens in practice is that the countries which make their forces available for UN peacekeeping operations are not so much those with substantial military capabilities as those from the developing world⁶.
12. It would seem that the question of a member state's right to use force in application of the principle of self-defence (Article 51) is now being seen in a new light by a number of states. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States' new national security strategy published in September 2002⁷ introduced a reference to the convergence of three threats - rogue states, weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism - and announced that the United States would not hesitate to take preventive action in order to defend itself. Given the new threats to security, Europeans are increasingly being urged to rethink the rules that give military action its legitimacy⁸. On 10 September 2003, in an address to members of the European Parliament and of the national parliaments, Mr Solana also referred to the desire of certain states to revise Article 51 of the UN Charter, without the states concerned having formally stated their intentions in that regard⁹.
13. In his 23 September address to the UN General Assembly the Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that "Article 51 of the Charter prescribes that all States, if attacked, retain the inherent right of self-defence. But until now it has been understood that when States go beyond that, and decide to use force to deal with broader threats to international peace and security, they need the unique legitimacy provided by the United Nations. Now, some say this understanding is no longer tenable, since an "armed attack" with weapons of mass destruction could be launched at any time, without warning, or by a clandestine group. Rather than wait for that to happen, they argue, States have the right and obligation to use force preemptively, even on the territory of other States, and even while weapons systems that might be used to attack them are still being developed."
14. Mr Annan takes the view that "the Council needs to consider how it will deal with the possibility that individual States may use force "preemptively" against perceived threats. Its members may need to begin a discussion on the criteria for an early authorisation of coercive measures to address certain type of threats - for instance, terrorist groups armed with weapons of mass destruction".
15. Furthermore, the Security Council should start a serious study of the best way of responding to threats of genocide or other mass violations of human rights. As Mr Annan stressed, "Once again this year, our collective response to events of this type - in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in Liberia - has been hesitant and tardy". However, it has to be said that because the permanent members of the Security Council have a right of veto, some cases of genocide or flagrant violations of human rights will never appear on its agenda. Similarly, it sometimes happens that in the case of certain infringements of international law, a permanent member uses its veto for protectionist purposes (this happened recently in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict).

2. Reform of UN peacekeeping operations

16. The UN is composed of sovereign states. Hence its scope for action depends on the level of agreement they are able to reach among themselves. It can only intervene when the members of the Security Council - and in particular the five permanent members, each of which holds the right of veto - agree to act. The Organisation can take no action without the agreement of the Security Council.
17. Currently 35 000 UN soldiers and police officers are involved in 14 peacekeeping operations. Each time its member states call on it to act, the UN endeavours to adapt its response to the specific requirements and political realities of the situation. In East Timor the task at hand was to facilitate the transition towards sovereignty, in Sierra Leone to keep the peace, in Afghanistan to provide support for the government in Kabul and in Cyprus, Lebanon and the Golan Heights to monitor demarcation lines and avoid the resurgence of regional conflict and genocide. Alongside its traditional role of interposing ceasefire observer forces between belligerents, the UN is increasingly being called upon to intervene in order to keep the peace in weak and disintegrating states¹⁰. This was the case in the 1990s in former Yugoslavia, central Asia, the Caucasus, Somalia and the Great Lakes region. It is still the case today in West Africa (Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda) where there has been an implosion of state authority.
18. The process of reforming UN peacekeeping operations is under way. In 1992 the then UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, published the Agenda for Peace¹¹ in which he clearly defined the basic conditions for the success of an operation: a clear and practicable mandate; the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of member states to contribute to the military, police and civilian personnel required, including specialists; effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field; and adequate financial and logistic support.
19. In 1995, a status report by Mr Boutros-Ghali in the form of a supplement to the Agenda for Peace provided a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the UN's peacekeeping and security work, recalling that although the UN Charter empowers the Organisation to take enforcement action against those responsible for threats to peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General has the power to deploy, direct, command or control operations carried out to that effect, except on a very limited scale¹².
20. In August 2000 the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations chaired by former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi published a report recommending radical changes in doctrine, strategy and decision-making for peacekeeping operations¹³. The purpose of the reforms carried out on the basis of the so-called Brahimi report and of subsequent reports¹⁴ was to enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations as an instrument, first of all by amending the role of the Secretariat in the analysis, design, organisation and conduct of operations and secondly by better preparation of the military and civilian capabilities supplied by the member states.
21. Most of the reforms of management and structure concern the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) within the Secretariat and were adopted by it in 2001 and 2002. The DPKO has undergone a staff increase of almost 50% which has particularly benefited the Office of the Military Adviser, the Civilian Police Division and the Training Service.
22. Furthermore, particular attention has been paid to strengthening rapid deployment capabilities for operations, which was one of the key recommendations in the Brahimi report. The UN should set itself the target of being able to deploy a conventional peacekeeping force within 30 days of the adoption of the relevant resolution by the Security Council and within 90 days for more complex operations (of the Kosovo type, involving a large "peace consolidation" component). For that purpose two sets of reforms were adopted at the end of 2002:

23. The Security Council's role in this restructuring process is twofold:

24. The management and structural reforms have now been practically completed. Implementation of the Brahimi report has now entered a new phase focusing more on concrete measures for putting the reforms into practice. Particular attention should be paid to the following areas:

25. The Organisation is now able to plan and deploy missions more rapidly and to work with different partners in order to more efficiently provide a range of both military and civilian services. The reform has already had a perceptible impact on the ground, particularly in Kosovo and East Timor, following the bitter lessons learned over the past ten years (in Srebenica, Rwanda, Angola and Somalia). Thus a reasonable amount of progress has been achieved in two years. Several of the adopted reforms have been put into practice, for example for the planning and conduct of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in March 2002 (integrated and pluri-disciplinary teams) and for strengthening the mandate of MONUC in the Congo (Resolution 1493 of 28 July 2003), for which a prior study of the necessary means was carried out.
26. However, a number of problems remain¹⁵. The idea of giving the UN a better capability for strategic analysis making for more coherent planning of missions has been dropped, in particular due to concerns on the part of some developing countries. The creation of a "pool" of military forces, which is crucial for conducting large-scale missions over a long duration, is also a problem. Member states are reluctant to accept the extra costs involved in any reserve capacity (however justified) within their armed forces. Moreover the United Nations lacks the wherewithal to work in a context of "regional fragmentation".
27. In Africa in particular the UN has relied heavily on regional organisations but so far these have failed to live up to expectations as far as peacekeeping is concerned. The European countries and the United States are pressing the African countries to take responsibility for resolving armed conflict on their continent themselves, if possible through regional organisations, in coordination with the United Nations. However, regional action has turned out to be disappointing these last few years due to the absence of any unity of purpose among African states and the lack of interoperable military capabilities.
28. Nevertheless, in the recent case of Liberia, the Security Council, following the signature of the ceasefire in Accra on 17 June 2003, adopted Resolution 1497 on 1 August 2003 in which it authorised member states to establish a multinational force in Liberia under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Against the background of a renewed outbreak of civil war this force, dubbed ECOMIL and composed of some 3500 peacekeepers, most of whom were Nigerian, carried out its mandate from 1 August to 1 October 2003. This West African mission was replaced by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) established by Security Council Resolution 1509 of 19 September 2003 for the purpose of supporting the provisional government following the departure of President Charles Taylor and implementing a comprehensive peace agreement in Liberia. Despite a belated and modest response from the international community, some progress has been made compared with previous international intervention in Liberia in the 1990s¹⁶.
29. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the European Union recently provided the UN with support through Operation Artemis. Blue Helmet troops had been stationed in the country since 1999 as part of the UN's mission there. Following a serious deterioration in the security and humanitarian situation in Ituri, the Security Council authorised the UN to deploy an interim force as an emergency measure (Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003). Operation Artemis, conducted under UN auspices, achieved the objectives it was set, which were deliberately of a limited nature, namely, to ensure security at Bunia airport and stabilise and improve the humanitarian situation in cooperation with MONUC. It paved the way for the deployment of a strengthened UN force from September 2003 on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1493 of 28 July 2003. Operation Artemis was the first practical example of military cooperation between the EU and the UN. The multinational force led by France as the framework nation consisted of 2000 troops of 17 different nationalities including Europeans but also South Africans, Canadians and Brazilians. In the course of a public debate, the EU made a detailed report to the UN on the action it had taken. This manner of proceeding was considered to be extremely positive and should serve as an example for any further such operations.
30. UN action in what was at the time East Timor was a success which led to the newly named country of Timor-Leste being able to take its place among the member states of the United Nations thanks to the good work of the UN Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET), which completed its mandate and then handed over to a support mission. Moreover, the UN Secretary-General suggested that the arrangements made in 1999 for Timor-Leste could serve as a workable model in the future when he said: "The fact that core elements of the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) remained in theatre and re-hatted as "Blue Helmets" enabled a smooth transition to a robust and credible United Nations force, with units provided by both the developed and the developing world"¹⁷.
31. As regards Afghanistan, the agreement concluded at the Bonn Conference in December 2001 paved the way for the creation of a partnership between the Afghan Interim Authority, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)¹⁸ mandated by the United Nations to help the new Afghan Interim Authority ensure a secure environment in and around Kabul with a view to supporting reconstruction work in Afghanistan. The initial international force (ISAF I) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1386 of 20 December 2001. For the first six months of its mandate it was commanded by the United Kingdom. Under Resolution 1413 Turkey took over the command of ISAF II until February 2003. The adoption of Resolution 1444 in November 2002 paved the way for the joint command of ISAF III by Germany and the Netherlands. In autumn 2002 NATO itself began to become involved in Afghanistan and on 16 April 2003 the North Atlantic Council decided to reinforce the Alliance's support for ISAF by taking on the command, coordination and planning of its operations (ISAF IV). This it did on 11 August. Thus, for the first time, NATO as an organisation is involved in military operations outside Europe.
32. ISAF currently consists of some 5800 troops including 3600 European soldiers. It has helped to strengthen the Afghan Interim Authority and has provided protection for UN agencies and NGOs. It has also helped train the first units of the new national army and national police force. However, as the UN Secretary-General stressed in a recent report to the General Assembly : "The precarious nature of the peace today in Afghanistan stands as a reminder of how crucial it may be to dedicate even greater attention and effort in the second year of an operation, in order to consolidate the gains achieved in the first"¹⁹. There are now plans to deploy troops outside the capital and increase the strength of ISAF. The European Union for its part undertook at the donors' conference held in Dubai on 21 September 2003 to provide 50 million euros to support the Afghan police and promote security in the country. This is in addition to the 400 million euros already earmarked for reconstruction work over the period 2003-2004. The stabilisation of Afghanistan is therefore the result of joint action on the part of a number of actors consisting mainly of the United Nations in taking charge of the political tasks, NATO in assuming responsibility for security and the EU in providing substantial financial aid despite its low political profile on Afghanistan. As Mr Annan pointed out, the challenges to peace and security today "require complex and collective responses, which are possible only if the web of multilateral institutions is adequately developed and properly used"²⁰.
33. In south-eastern Europe²¹ the UN has been closely involved in the process of stabilising both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In both cases cooperation with the EU has yielded positive results. On 21 December 1995 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1035 which created the International Police Task Force (IPTF) as part of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) which had taken over from UNPROFOR. Its purpose was to reorganise the local police force. The IPTF ceased its activities on 31 December 2002 and, with the consent of the Security Council (Resolution 1396 of 5 March 2002), an EU police mission (EUPM) took over its work in January 2003. In parallel, the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR), which was established in 1996 to take over from IFOR, with the authorisation of the Security Council (Resolution 1088 of 20 December 1996), has responsibility for implementing the military aspects of the peace agreement. SFOR, which initially had 32 000 troops, now consists of some 12 000 including 7 400 Europeans and 2 000 Americans. The EU would be prepared to take over from SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, if a decision were taken to that end. It has already taken over NATO's more modest operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
34. In Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council authorised the creation of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) headed by the Secretary-General's Special Representative. This post is currently held by Harri Holkeri of Finland. The UN is responsible for civil administration, the police force and justice system, while humanitarian assistance comes under the direction of the United Nations High Commissariat for Refugees (HCR) and economic reconstruction under the aegis of the European Union. In parallel and at the military level, the multinational Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR) is working under NATO unified command to re-establish security in the province. KFOR currently has a total of 20 500 soldiers including 16 000 Europeans and 2 000 Americans. Although some observers consider that the "pillar" structure of cooperation is working relatively well, others stress its complexity and the risk of inconsistency, even duplication, which it presents. Only a single political and military chain of command would eliminate those obstacles.
35. UN action in post-war Iraq has been reduced to a minimum because of the climate of insecurity. On 14 August 2003, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1500 in which it decided to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) for an initial period of twelve months. But only a few days later, on 19 August, a truck-bomb explosion partially destroyed the UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing 23 people including the UN Special Representative, Brazilian diplomat Sergio Vieira de Mello. The members of the Security Council are divided on the strategy to be followed and disagree in particular about the timetable for giving Iraq back its sovereignty and the scale of UN involvement in post-war Iraq. However, on 16 October the 15 members of the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1511 which authorises a multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq. Its initial mandate allows it to operate for one year. The member states are accordingly requested to contribute military forces to the multinational force and the United States, acting on behalf of the latter, is requested to report to the Security Council on the efforts and progress of the force, one of whose main tasks is to contribute to the security of UNAMI. It is to be hoped that these arrangements will allow progress to be made on stabilising the country so that economic and political reconstruction work can go ahead.
36. It is therefore clear that the action the United Nations is taking in regions throughout the world is vitally important to preserve peace and security, notwithstanding the fact that its record of achievement in this respect is "decidedly mixed"²². It should also be noted that UN action is more effective where it is working in cooperation with other international organisations able to interact with it. The large-scale, long-duration operations conducted in East Timor, Kosovo or Afghanistan can be viewed as a series of experimental workshops and it is important to learn the lessons of both the positive and negative results they have produced, in order to make progress in establishing better methods of cooperation.

1. Legal basis: provisions of the UN Charter and the United Nations' place in EU strategy

37. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter deals with regional organisations. Article 52.1 explicitly states that the existence of regional organisations dealing with peacekeeping actions at a regional level is compatible with the Charter. Article 53.1 makes provision for the Security Council to call on regional security bodies to implement coercive measures under its authority. However, it prohibits coercive action by regional organisations without a mandate from the Security Council. Moreover, there is an obligation for the Security Council to be kept fully informed at all times of activities undertaken by regional bodies for the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 54). WEU was thus able to participate in the coalition during the 1990-91 Gulf war and to be involved, together with NATO, in enforcing the maritime embargo against Serbia and Montenegro during the crisis in former Yugoslavia²³. Chapter VIII of the Charter also makes provision for the EU to take action under a UN mandate.
38. The Treaty on European Union states that "Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold common positions in such forums. In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions" (Article 19.1) and also specifies that they "shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest" (Article 19.2). These obligations apply in particular to the United Nations and its various constituent organisations. Furthermore, as far as the UN Security Council is concerned, the TEU expressly states that "Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter" (Article 19.2). In fact there is still substantial scope for improving the practical implementation of Article 19, thereby reinforcing the efficiency and coherence of EU external action. Furthermore, in a recent Communication²⁴, the European Commission expresses the view that the EU member states in the Security Council "should explore more systematic ways of fulfilling their commitments under Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union". However, before they can do that, there has to be a common European position.
39. In addition to the basic legal texts there are a number of EU political declarations recognising the importance of the United Nations and defining stronger forms of cooperation between the two organisations in their efforts to maintain international peace and security. In the conclusions of the Cologne European Council of 3-4 June 1999, provision is made in the very first paragraph for a strengthening of the EU's capacity to contribute to international peace and security, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. In section II of the conclusions of the Helsinki European Council of 10-11 December 1999, the Union "recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security".
40. At the Nice European Council from 7 to 9 December 2000, the Secretary-General/High Representative for the CFSP and the Commission submitted proposals for building more effective partnerships, in particular with the United Nations in the field conflict prevention. A number of essential short-term recommendations were made with a view to intensifying cooperation with the United Nations, including the:

41. At its meeting in Gothenburg on 15 and 16 June 2001 the European Council reiterated that the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security lay with the UN Security Council (paragraph 47 of the Presidency conclusions). It agreed to strengthen the political dialogue and step up cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations.
42. In 2003 the European Council asked Javier Solana to prepare a document defining a global strategy for the EU in the field of foreign and security policy. At its Washington Summit in 1999 NATO too defined its global strategy in a document entitled "The Alliance's new Strategic Concept"²⁶. In an EU document, entitled "A secure Europe in a better world"²⁷, which was presented to the Thessaloniki European Council on 20 June 2003, Mr Solana takes stock of the new threats in the new international environment: the rise of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disintegrating states and organised crime.
43. Faced with these threats, the EU must give priority to three strategic objectives. It must extend the security zone around Europe, strengthen the international order and take active measures to counter those threats. This has political implications for Europe. The EU should be more active and consistent in pursuing its strategic objectives. It needs to strengthen its capabilities and cooperate more with partner countries. As regards strengthening the international order, the document points out that:

44. The document assigns considerable importance to cooperation between the EU and NATO. It describes the objective as "strengthening the international order" and stresses the following: "One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship. (...) the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world".
45. Mr Solana was instructed to "bring this work forward, to further examine our security challenges, in close cooperation with Member States and the Commission, with a view to submitting an EU Security Strategy to the GAERC in order to be adopted by the European Council in December. This strategy should also encapsulate Member States' interests and citizens' priorities and constitute a living document subject to public debate and to review as necessary"²⁸. It would also be expedient for the document to place more emphasis on the importance and form of cooperation between the EU and the UN for maintaining peace and security.
46. The EU also defined the basic principles for an EU strategy to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which refers "in case political and diplomatic measures have failed", to the use of "coercive measures, including as a last resort the use of force in accordance with the United Nations Charter". It states furthermore that "the UN Security Council should play a central role. (...) In this context, the role of the UN Security Council, as the final arbiter on the consequences of non-compliance - as foreseen in multilateral regimes - needs to be effectively strengthened"²⁹.
47. In the accompanying Action Plan, the EU calls for the UN Security Council to play a stronger role in handling the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and proposes to "explore [the possibility of securing the adoption of] a resolution in the UN Security Council to identify the spread of WMD and their means of delivery, as a threat to international peace and security³⁰.

2. Experience of cooperation on the ground

48. In Gothenburg on 15 and 16 June 2001, the European Council announced that high priority would be given to the western Balkans, the Middle East and Africa in the EU's strengthened cooperation with the United Nations. That promise was kept.
49. Following its failures in south-east Europe during the 1990s, the EU has considerably strengthened its presence these past few years in the still fragile region of the western Balkans. An important development was the replacement on 1 January 2003 of the United Nations police operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the EU Police Mission (EUPM). The EU also took over from the NATO military mission in FYROM on 31 March 2003 (with Operation Concordia). The EU pillar (economic reconstruction) of the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) acts as a complement to the interim administration and there is excellent cooperation between the European Commission and the United Nations in applying standards and legislation compatible with those of the EU.
50. As regards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the United Nations and the European Union are endeavouring to act in concert with other international players. In spite of the current tensions, the Quartet (composed of the United States, the UN, Russia and the European Union) continues to give strong political support to the peace plan contained in the "road map" it made public on 30 April 2003³¹. In another of the Political Committee's reports for the December 2003 session, entitled "Security in Europe and stabilisation in the Middle East"³², the Rapporteur, Mrs Durrieu, gives a detailed analysis of the latest developments in the conflict and proposes recommendations designed to promote peace in the region.
51. As far as Africa is concerned, on 14 May 2001 the EU had already adopted a common position on the prevention, management and settlement of conflicts in Africa and confirmed the resolve of the EU and its member states to contribute to strengthening African peacekeeping capabilities.
52. On 12 June 2003, the EU Council approved the launch of Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in the north-eastern province of Ituri. This was the EU's first autonomous operation (without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities) and its first military operation outside Europe. This first EU military operation on the African continent enabled the situation in Bunia to be stabilised, and provided the UN observer mission MONUC with support. The mandate given under UN Security Council Resolution 1484 to a 1 500-strong rapid reaction force under French command expired on 1 September 2003. A reinforced MONUC has now taken over the peacekeeping operation. As stated in the latest annual report of the WEU Council to the Assembly, Operation Artemis "provides a strong impetus to cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations. The speedy decision of the European Union to participate in a Joint Action based on the threat analysis conducted by its situation centre represents a new departure in terms of military responsiveness"³³.
53. The EU Council³⁴ welcomed the excellent cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations in managing this crisis and pledged that the EU commitment would continue in other forms (technical and financial support for the Ituri Interim Administration; support for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process; preparation of a socio-economic rehabilitation programme for Ituri; etc.) and that the Union would use all its instruments in support of the political process under way (measures in the police sector; a substantial contribution to the funding of aid and development efforts in the DRC; support for the electoral process). To that end, on 9 July 2003 the Council adopted a 205 million euro programme of strategic support for the DRC.
54. More generally speaking and for the longer term, the EU is prepared to support efforts made by the African Union (AU) to develop a comprehensive security architecture in Africa in coordination with the United Nations. The AU is endeavouring, in particular, to implement its new Peace and Security Agenda and to make an emergency multinational stand-by force operational. However, a major question is whether the AU will really be able to overcome the deadlock resulting from internal divisions or personal affinities among certain African leaders, so as to be able to take action against all threats to peace on the continent of Africa. In any event the EU has already contributed 12 million euros to the AU's new Peace and Security Agenda. It wants to promote coordination and operational ties with African sub-regional organisations. The Council is therefore encouraging the Commission to consider ad hoc assistance that can be provided at short notice to ongoing African peace-support operations (Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Burundi, DRC etc.).
55. The EU's capacity and readiness for military intervention should increase over time and the EU could play a useful role by providing both the UN and the OSCE³⁵ with the rapid reaction capacities they lack. The UN is generally able to muster sufficient numbers of peacekeeping troops, but lacks the troops for an intervention force that could be flown into a crisis area as soon as the first blood-bath occurs. The UN was unable to take sufficiently swift action in East Timor in 1999, for example. A strengthening of European rapid reaction capabilities was among the objectives set out by Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac at the Le Touquet summit³⁶ in February 2003, during which they agreed that the EU should be capable of deploying land, sea and air forces at short notice, within 5-10 days. Europe therefore needs more professional forces available at short notice and special forces trained to use intelligence sources. In that regard, intelligence-sharing arrangements will be crucial for the success of EU military operations.

3. Paving the way for stronger UN-EU relations

56. The draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe³⁷ contains a number of provisions concerning EU-UN relations. The EU's resolve to conduct its foreign and security policy in compliance with the principles of the UN Charter is expressed both in the Treaty on European Union and the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (see Articles I-3.4, I-40 paragraphs 1 and 7, III-193.2c).
57. Article III-206.2, second paragraph, of the draft Treaty is the same as Article 19.2, second paragraph, of the TEU as it resulted from the Nice negotiations. It is agreed that those member states which are also members of the UN Security Council will concert and keep the other member states fully informed of any matter of common interest. Ensuring that this actually happens in practice will require stronger political will and arrangements for enhanced cooperation.
58. One innovation is that those EU member states which are also members of the Security Council will also be obliged to keep the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs fully informed. An even more substantive development is that when the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the agenda of the Security Council, those member states which sit on the Security Council are to request that the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs be asked to present the Union's position (Article III-206.2, 3^rd paragraph). It is therefore to be hoped that the appointment of an EU Minister for Foreign Affairs will inject further impetus into the process of arriving at clear common positions in the EU and then presenting them to the United Nations.
59. Article III-229 stipulates that "The Union shall establish all appropriate forms of cooperation with the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (...)" (paragraph 1). It continues "It shall also maintain such relations as are appropriate with other international organisations" (paragraph 2 ) and "The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Commission shall be instructed to implement this Article" (paragraph 3).
60. Article III-214.3 states that "The United Nations Security Council shall be informed immediately of any armed aggression and the measures taken as a result". However, there is a need to go further. In Resolution 115 on security policy in an enlarged Europe - a contribution to the Convention³⁸, the Assembly:

61. At its meeting on 21 July 2003 during which it reviewed the development of EU-UN cooperation in crisis management, the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council came to the following main conclusions:

62. A particularly important aspect of the European Security and Defence Policy is the protection of civilians during EU-led crisis-management operations conducted in the framework of EU-UN cooperation in that area:

63. Furthermore, at its Gothenburg meeting on 15 and 16 June 2001, the European Council expressed the wish to enhance EU-UN cooperation by "the conclusion of framework agreements between the European Community and relevant UN organisations" (Presidency conclusions, paragraph 53). On 29 April 2003, the European Commission and the United Nations signed a new financial and administrative framework agreement governing Community funding of UN operations which will apply to the UN Secretariat and to agencies and programmes which the UN wishes should benefit from Commission resources.
64. Finally, building on their successful experience of cooperation so far, the UN and EU recently issued a joint declaration on cooperation in crisis management⁴⁰. It states that the two organisations "agree to establish a joint consultative mechanism at the working level to examine ways and means to enhance mutual coordination and compatibility" in the areas of planning, training, communication and best practices (see Appendix II).

1. The urgent need for United Nations reform

65. As already underscored in a recent Assembly report⁴¹, the role of the United Nations is of crucial importance for the future. An in-depth reform of the United Nations' peacekeeping action is therefore imperative in the new international context, but that specific reform is part of a wider reform of the UN in general. In 1997 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan published a programme for reform⁴². In 2002 he proposed more sweeping changes with a view to strengthening the UN⁴³ and making it a more effective instrument for achieving the priority goals set out in the "Millennium Declaration" adopted by the UN heads of state and government on 6 September 2000⁴⁴.
66. In his address to the UN General Assembly on 23 September 2003, Secretary-General Annan stated that "we must not shy away from questions about the adequacy and effectiveness of the rules and instruments at our disposal". Regarding the question of enlarging the UN Security Council, which had been on the Assembly's agenda for over a decade, he underlined that while virtually all member states agreed that the Council should be enlarged, there was no agreement on the details. He stressed, however, that the fact that the political leaders had difficulty in reaching agreement was no excuse in the eyes of their peoples for their failure to do so.
67. The process of reform should, he said, embrace not only the Assembly, which needed strengthening, but also the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council, whose roles needed to be reviewed. He proposed to set up a High-Level Panel of eminent persons⁴⁵ to examine the current challenges to peace and security, the means of addressing those challenges, the functioning of the major organs of the United Nations and the relationship between them. The Panel would also be asked to recommend reforms that would strengthen the UN and to submit its report in time for the next session of the General Assembly the following September. Mr Annan concluded that "the United Nations is by no means a perfect instrument, but it is a precious one".
68. There is a need to reform the composition and modus operandi of the Security Council, which according to Article 24 of the UN Charter bears the main responsibility for international peace and security. But, as Mr Annan points out, over the last ten years the member states have been unable to find a solution for broadening its membership. The reality of the situation in the world today should be taken into account and the Security Council should be made more representative by admitting new permanent and non-permanent members. However, at the same time it must also be capable of taking swift and realistic decisions and of demonstrating the resolve to put them into practice.
69. Two interesting currents of thought are emerging in the UN as regards international security: one calling for a greater role for international courts in the settlement of conflicts and the other advocating a regional approach to conflict management. Regarding the first, a major step forward at the beginning of this century has been the creation of the International Criminal Court⁴⁶ despite the fact that the United States and a number of European countries have differing views as regards immunity for their citizens and in particular for their armed forces engaged in peacekeeping operations.
70. As regards the second trend, while a regional approach is positive in itself (take, for example the joint efforts by EU countries in the Balkans, by ASEAN⁴⁷ countries, including Australia, in East Timor, by CIS⁴⁸ members, including Russia, in the Caucasus), it is not enough to guarantee peace and security. This is particularly true of Africa (the AU, ECOWAS⁴⁹), in spite of the important but limited role played by Nigeria or South Africa. In any case, it is difficult to achieve multilateral military action and where regional powers exist, they are inclined above all to intervene in their "near abroad". Yet in order to reduce response times it would indeed be useful to be able to call on the forces of regional organisations such as the EU (as in the Congo), ECOWAS (as in Liberia) or NATO (as in Afghanistan). Some people also take the view that the United Nations should make more use of the lead-nation concept for conducting military or civil operations at multinational level⁵⁰. Effective procedures should be established for cooperation between the UN and national military forces or forces mandated by regional organisations. In addition, steps should also be taken to establish and use a UN force.
71. Despite the case made out by some legal experts⁵¹, there is no unanimity about a far-reaching reform of the UN Charter - or even the convening of a new Constitutional Assembly like the one that held a conference in San Francisco on 25 April 1945. But over and above the debate on the need to revise its provisions, the most important question is whether countries still believe in the spirit of the Charter and have the political will to act together in an effective and credible manner, where necessary using force to defend the principles enshrined in the Charter. It is in that framework that a united Europe could play a decisive role in pushing for a reform of the UN and strengthening its role in promoting peace.

2. Strengthening the UN's role in promoting peace: a European initiative

72. A process of reflection on UN reform must be launched at European level. The European countries must do their utmost to ensure that the UN Security Council is able to take effective action and that its decisions are complied with. France and the United Kingdom are permanent members of the UN Security Council, but other European states regularly also have seats on it. Currently this is the case for Bulgaria, Germany and Spain. The European countries must agree to promote European positions within the UN Security Council and compliance with the latter's decisions, as stated in the Treaty on European Union (Article 19.2) and reiterated in the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Article III-206.2).
73. In the General Assembly the European countries find it easier to speak with one voice and adopt common positions (this is the case for almost 95% of resolutions⁵²). It is in the Security Council that coordination is most difficult because that is where power politics take over, and what matters to each state is that it defend its national interests above all else. This often results in those European countries which are members of the Security Council voting differently. But what they should do is try and reach general agreement in the EU institutional framework, and at a very early stage, on issues on which decisions are likely to be taken in due course at major UN conferences or meetings, and particularly by the Security Council. It is essential for the EU member states increasingly to adopt common positions on specific questions discussed in the UN framework. Furthermore, with a view to the European Union's imminent enlargement, the accession and candidate countries should be fully involved as of now in coordination meetings held for the purpose of arriving at such common positions.
74. In the framework of the document on an EU security strategy defining European values and interests in the field of peace and security, which is due to be adopted by the European Council in December, the European states should be more ambitious and arrive at a common vision of the role the United Nations and the EU should play in situations similar to those in post-war Afghanistan or Iraq.
75. Europe must respond energetically to the call by the UN Secretary-General for radical change in order to strengthen the United Nations. To that end it should take the necessary steps to:

76. The joint declaration on UN-EU cooperation in crisis management, signed on 24 September (see Appendix II) is a first step in the right direction as is the Action Plan (see Appendix III) contained in the Communication from the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 10 September 2003 entitled "The European Union and the United Nations: the choice of multilateralism". That plan should be implemented in its entirety as soon as possible. The European Parliament too is in the process of drawing up very constructive specific proposals for strengthening cooperation between the EU and the UN⁵³.
77. At the operational level European countries should adopt common standards and increase working contacts between the EU and the UN, in particular as regards military exercises and lessons learned from past experience notably in Bosnia, Kosovo and the Congo. It would also be extremely worthwhile to give the EU Situation Centre a bigger role with a view to EU-UN coordination on the analysis of geographic areas which are of the greatest concern for peace and security.
78. The draft Constitutional Treaty that is to be approved by the governments participating in the Intergovernmental Conference should contain a provision to the effect that: "the Union is prepared to make available to the United Nations military capabilities with a view to it taking coercive measures in the event of a threat to peace, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter".
79. Lastly, it is to be hoped that by the end of the Intergovernmental Conference, European governments will have agreed to the proposal by the Convention on the Future of Europe to create the post of EU Minister for Foreign Affairs. A political figure of this stature could present the EU's positions on specific issues, particularly when they feature on the agenda of the UN Security Council. This would make for considerable progress.
80. The ideas put forward in this report are not intended to be exhaustive and will benefit from further analysis in the course of the Assembly's subsequent work.

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APPENDIX I

1. Ten years ago already the Assembly expressed the wish for "the working methods of the United Nations to be strengthened and a more effective command to be created for its operations" and recommended that the Council "support and strengthen the action of the United Nations, now involved in, a series of regional conflicts which are bringing it face to face with a serious crisis of responsibility". In its reply to the Assembly's recommendations, the Council explained that it was "aware of the heavy responsibilities borne by the United Nations in the field of peacekeeping and international security" and noted that "the member states of WEU support and reinforce the United Nations action by their various contributions"⁵⁴.
2. In May 1993, in a report dealing specifically with UN operations, the Assembly expressed the wish that WEU should provide operational assistance to the United Nations and explicitly stated its determination "to uphold the authority of the United Nations Organisation and to support moves to make it much more effective", and:

3. The Assembly also expressed concern about the consequences of the UN operation in Somalia, which "is degenerating in a way that may be harmful to the authority of the United Nations"⁵⁶ and called on the Council to "meet as a matter of urgency to coordinate the efforts of member countries in order to ensure that the operation in Somalia respects the principles governing action by the United Nations".
4. In November 1993 in another report dealing with the political relations between the United Nations and WEU, the Assembly:

5. Two years later, in a report on Europe and the establishment of a new world order for peace and security, the Assembly:

6. More recently, in December 2002, the Assembly recommended that the Council "adopt a policy of European multinationality in peacetime, for setting up the headquarters and major units declared available to relevant international bodies like the European Union, NATO or the United Nations"⁵⁹. The Assembly also expressed its views on the Iraq issue, calling on the EU member states to act in concert and stating its conviction "that a preventive war without the explicit authorisation of the UN Security Council would severely damage the authority of the United Nations, have an adverse effect on the international legal order and set a precedent for the unilateral use of force by others"⁶⁰.
7. During its last plenary session in June 2003 in Strasbourg, the Assembly took a stance on the new United States national security strategy. Against the backdrop of the war in Iraq and the divisions among the UN Security Council members, the Assembly recalled