DOCUMENT A/1852

1 March 2004

REPLIES OF THE COUNCIL TO RECOMMENDATIONS 733-741

Document A/1852

1 March 2004

REPLIES OF THE COUNCIL TO RECOMMENDATIONS 733-741

REPLIES OF THE COUNCIL¹
TO RECOMMENDATIONS 733-741²

RECOMMENDATION 733³

on a European strategic concept - defence aspects⁴

(i) Highlighting the current challenges facing the European Union in the field of security and defence;

(ii) Stressing the need for the European Union to develop a credible and effective security and defence policy;

(iii) Stressing the need for the European Union to draw up a strategic concept that encompasses all areas of Union action, whether it be political, economic or military;

(iv) Aware of the divisions that persist among European states with regard to the objectives to be achieved by the ESDP;

(v) Aware of the impact of enlargement on the process of implementing a common European security and defence strategy;

(vi) Stressing that the accession of new members to the European Union will contribute to enhancing the Union's role on the international stage and that it is important to define and implement common security policies for Europe and the rest of the world;

(vii) Taking the view that it has become necessary for the European Union and NATO to agree on common objectives for world peace and security and to avoid unnecessary and counter-productive duplication and competition;

(viii) Taking the view that the European strategy should not be confined to providing a military response to the problems posed by international terrorism and the threat of weapons of mass destruction and terror;

(ix) Stressing that it is important for states to maintain and strengthen the commitments subscribed to under the international treaties on disarmament, arms control and the non-proliferation of dual-use defence technologies;

(x) Taking the view that it is the duty and responsibility of the European Union to help ensure compliance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and to see to it that they are not undermined by unilateral action;

(xi) Stressing the importance for the European Union to pursue and develop dialogue and cooperation with other centres of power, states and international organisations;

(xii) Considering that the European strategic concept must be based on the principle of autonomy of European action;

(xiii) Considering that the European Union must enhance and develop its capacity for civil and military crisis management by:

(xiv) Desirous of making a contribution to the debate on a European strategic concept, in particular as regards the parliamentary dimension,

1. Participate actively in drawing up a European strategic concept, in particular as regards security and defence aspects;
2. Ensure that the European concept takes the following aspects into account:

3. Keep the Assembly informed of its initiatives with regard to the development of the ESDP.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 733

RECOMMENDATION 734⁵

on rapidly deployable European air forces⁶

(i) Recalling the terms of the 1999 Helsinki Declaration: "The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises";

(ii) Stressing the resolve of the EU member states to acquire the necessary military capabilities for attaining the headline goal, which means being able to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50 000-60 000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks;

(iii) Recalling the decision of the NATO member states to set up a 21 000-strong NATO Response Force (NRF) capable of intervening outside NATO's traditional area;

(iv) Noting the importance of the air component in the crisis-management and peacekeeping operations of recent years in Serbia/Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq;

(v) Aware of the essential role played by air forces in missions of surveillance/reconnaissance, air superiority, power projection over a long distance, strategic and tactical transport and support for ground troops;

(vi) Stressing the shortfalls in European air force capabilities, in particular in the fields of strategic lift, UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), command structures, air-to-air refuelling and precision-guided munitions (PGM);

(vii) Noting the need for the European states to be able to establish forward bases in the theatre of operations in order to conduct local airborne operations, as well as where appropriate forward headquarters;

(viii) Aware of the need to have permanently available a carrier task group with a view to deploying air power at very short notice during an emerging crisis and throughout the time it takes to build up forward airbases and headquarters facilities in the theatre of operations,

1. Participate actively in the cooperation among European air forces in the framework of EURAC (European Air Chiefs Conference) and ECAP (European Capability Action Plan);
2. Ensure that their defence budgets are sufficient to equip and train their air forces for Petersberg-type missions that may be assigned to them under the headline goal and take initiatives to coordinate better the joint European training of crews;
3. Develop European coordination of strategic airlift in the framework of the EACC (European Airlift Coordination Cell) at Eindhoven and transform that cell into a proper European air transport centre;
4. Give high priority to the procurement of transport aircraft and in particular to completing the A400M programme within the scheduled timeframe, as well as to the acquisition of genuinely heavy-lift high volume military transports;
5. Pay particular attention to surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and in particular to organising European cooperation within ECAP with a view to the development and procurement of UAVs;
6. Acquire the air-to-air refuelling capability defined under the EU headline goal, if necessary by taking interim measures consisting of adapting existing aircraft, pending the acquisition of new purpose-built tanker aircraft, preferably from the Airbus range;
7. Secure a sufficient supply of precision-guided munitions to upgrade the capabilities of existing aircraft (Tornado, Mirage 2000, Eurofighter, Rafale, Harrier, Jaguar, F-16, etc.) and building sufficient stocks of munitions;
8. Create a genuine European combat search and rescue (CSAR) capability by setting up a "European CSAR centre" responsible for drawing up an appropriate doctrine, ensuring interoperability of assets and organising the joint training of the personnel involved;
9. Develop, in cooperation, the capacity to deploy European airbases and a European air component headquarters in a remote theatre of operations;
10. Organise cooperation among naval forces to ensure that a European aircraft carrier group remains permanently available.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 734

RECOMMENDATION 735⁷

on a European initiative to strengthen the role of the United Nations
in promoting peace and security⁸

(i) Recognising the essential role the United Nations plays in promoting peace and security, in particular in the fields of conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction;

(ii) Recalling that the UN Security Council has the prime responsibility for maintaining international peace and security;

(iii) Noting the importance of perfecting a multidimensional approach to international action in promoting peace and security;

(iv) Welcoming the cooperation on peace and security that is already under way between the European Union and the United Nations, and desirous to strengthen it further;

(v) Taking the view that it would be useful to support the model of cooperation that was developed in Kosovo among the various international organisations;

(vi) Taking as a basis the European Union's capacity for entering into multilateral commitments and for helping other countries to strengthen their own capabilities with a view to implementing such commitments;

(vii) Taking the view that in future the EU countries should adopt a greater number of common positions within United Nations bodies;

(viii) Noting that it is particularly necessary for the EU member states to improve their ability to meet their commitment to concert, in pursuance of Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union, and also to defend the interests of the Union in the UN Security Council;

(ix) Observing that the European Union's role in promoting peace and security in the world will to a large extent depend on the influence the Union can exert within the United Nations;

(x) Noting the significance of the proposal made by the Convention on the Future of Europe to create the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs of the European Union;

(xi) Recalling the Assembly's proposals for improving relations between the EU and the United Nations, in particular those contained in Resolution 115 on security policy in an enlarged Europe - a contribution to the Convention, adopted on 3 June 2003;

(xii) Staunchly supporting the call by the United Nations Secretary-General for there to be radical reform with a view to strengthening the United Nations;

(xiii) Aware of the urgent need for an in-depth reform of the United Nations' modus operandi and the arrangements under which it may take action, and that these should take account of the major changes that have taken place in the world since the UN was created and of the emergence of new forms of crises;

(xiv) Desirous that the European countries should draw up common proposals on the measures needed to reform the United Nations and enhance its role in the area of peace and security;

(xv) Considering that members of national parliaments can make a positive contribution to the work of the United Nations, and being aware of the ongoing work of the IPU, supported by the Council of Europe, in this regard,

1. Reaffirm the principle stated in Article 24 of the UN Charter that the United Nations Security Council has the prime responsibility for maintaining international peace and security;
2. Support the reform efforts being made by the United Nations in the field of peacekeeping in accordance with the findings of the UN working group on peacekeeping operations;
3. Increase the human and material resources made available to the United Nations for peacekeeping purposes and insist that each UN member state pays its financial contribution on time and without reservation;
4. Ensure that in cases where a common EU position has been agreed, there is convergence among the positions and votes of the EU member states within the various UN bodies;
5. Request the EU to help establish, within the multilateral framework of the United Nations, step-by-step rules for cases in which preventive action might be taken to counter specific threats to peace and stability;
6. Encourage the EU to establish clearer and stronger relations with the United Nations, and for that purpose to:

7. Contribute to the work of the new High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change set up by the UN Secretary-General for the purpose of studying the major threats to peace and security, identifying the conditions for effective collective action and recommending the changes that are necessary to strengthen the United Nations by reforming its institutions and procedures;
8. Encourage the European Union to accept the concept of the introduction of a parliamentary dimension to the work of the United Nations, and to support the proposals of the IPU in this regard;
9. Insert in the draft Constitutional Treaty to be approved by the governments participating in the Intergovernmental Conference a provision to the effect that:

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 735

RECOMMENDATION 736⁹

on the prospects for the European Security and Defence Policy (Part II) -
reply to the annual report of the Council¹⁰

(i) Noting, with thanks to the Council, the summary of the European Union's ESDP activities during the first half of 2003 given in the first part of the 49^th annual report of the Council to the Assembly;

(ii) Stressing the usefulness of the joint meetings between several Assembly committees and the members of the WEU Permanent Council/EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) that took place on 13 February and 22 October 2003 in Brussels;

(iii) Recalling that the work on drawing up a first European security strategy based on the draft submitted by the WEU Secretary-General in his capacity as High Representative for the CFSP involves a fundamental revision of the traditional concept of defence in the face of the new global threats;

(iv) Recalling in that regard Assembly Recommendation 685 of 19 June 2001 on "Revising the European security concept - responding to new risks";

(v) Taking the view that it is essential for the WEU Secretary-General to present to the Assembly as soon as possible the main lines of the European security strategy in its revised version and to launch the necessary dialogue with the representatives of the 28 national parliaments represented in the Assembly;

(vi) Regretting that the annual report provides no information either about the activities of NATO as the organisation responsible for guaranteeing the military implementation of the mutual defence commitment subscribed to by the signatories to the modified Brussels Treaty, or about the activities of the WEU Secretary-General as the guarantor of the full application of that Treaty;

(vii) Noting with surprise that in 2003 neither the WEU Council's annual report to the Assembly nor the EU Council's report to the European Parliament on the CFSP provides any information at all about developments in the Satellite Centre or the Institute for Security Studies, or about the activities of the bodies created by the European Union to take over the relevant functions of WEU - namely the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and its working groups, the EU Military Committee and the Military Staff - or about other groups that have been created without the knowledge of the parliamentary bodies;

(viii) Welcoming the Council's reply to Written Question 383 confirming the full validity of the Declaration on WEU enlargement adopted by the WEU member states on 10 December 1991 at the European Council summit at Maastricht;

(ix) Convinced that the forthcoming enlargement of the EU and NATO makes it incumbent upon the Council to revise its assessment of 14 June 2001 and to review the status in WEU of the countries acceding to the European Union and/or NATO;

(x) Stressing the responsibility of the WEU Secretary-General, who was appointed Head of the future EU armaments agency on 17 November 2003, for developing constructive working relations between that Agency and the WEAG and WEAO bodies;

(xi) Desirous that the Council adopt a more forward-looking attitude to those parts of the negotiations in the Intergovernmental Conference that affect the areas covered by the modified Brussels Treaty,

1. Ensure that the final text of a European security strategy:

2. Follow up Assembly Recommendation 721 by including information about NATO activities in the field of European defence in its annual report, as it did in the past and promised to do in its reply to Recommendation 685;
3. Inform the Assembly in its annual report of the activities of the WEU Secretary-General and encourage him to continue presenting a status report on the European Security and Defence Policy to the plenary sessions of the Assembly, as was the custom in the past;
4. Provide more substantial replies to recommendations and written questions on subjects covered by the modified Brussels Treaty, even if those subjects are dealt with in other fora, and in particular in the European Union and NATO;
5. Refrain from discouraging European countries interested in WEU and the modified Brussels Treaty from taking the necessary steps, pursuant to the Declaration by the WEU member states of 10 December 1991, to obtain a status within WEU or to change their current status;
6. Call on the WEAG Council and on the WEU Secretary-General to ensure that any negotiations that may take place with a view to merging the functions of WEAG and WEAO with those of the EU armaments agency should fully preserve the expertise of the two bodies as well as the rights enjoyed by those of their member countries that are not members of the European Union;
7. Seek, in cooperation with the Assembly, solutions for ensuring that the representatives of the national parliaments receive adequate information about the activities of the bodies whose functions were transferred from WEU to the European Union.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 736

RECOMMENDATION 737

RECOMMENDATION 737¹¹

on security in Europe and stabilisation in the Middle East¹²

The Assembly,

(i) Considering that the European Union will be a close neighbour of the Middle East in the near future and that the instability of this region compromises the security of Europe;

(ii) Considering the importance of the many historical, cultural and economic ties between Europe and the countries of the Middle East, which have already led Europe to become actively involved in the region by including it in the Barcelona Process and by establishing the instruments for a new neighbourhood policy;

(iii) Aware that settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is essential for peace and stability in the Middle East;

(iv) Taking the view that the procedure used for the Madrid Peace Conference, with its Palestinian, Syrian, Lebanese and multilateral tracks, should remain the reference for an all-inclusive peace settlement in the region;

(v) Considering furthermore that the achievements of the 1993 Declaration of Principles (Oslo I) and the 1995 Taba Agreement (Oslo II) are essential building blocks for any future peace settlement;

(vi) Taking the view that in this context due consideration should also be given to the Arab Peace Initiative, taken in Beirut in March 2002, which provides one of the keys to a global settlement of issues outstanding between Israel and the Arab countries;

(vii) Considering the importance of the implementation of the road map as proposed by the Quartet (the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations), a process which ground to a halt following the renewed outbreak of violence in August 2003;

(viii) Considering that the October 2003 Geneva Accord, through which the initiating parties sought to pursue the Taba negotiations that were suspended in 2001, has had the merit of reviving public debate on a peace agreement and proving that the Israeli and Palestinian peoples are capable of finding representatives who can negotiate with each other responsibly on a basis of mutual trust and together propose a global settlement of all their problems;

(ix) Recalling the involvement of the international community and the UN Security Council in the Middle East conflict and regretting that despite all their commitment and endeavours, as reflected by numerous resolutions, they have never succeeded in bringing about a just and equitable settlement of the conflict;

(x) Taking account of the position of the various Arab countries and welcoming the stance taken by Jordan, which is helping to promote peace and stability in the region by taking advantage both of the close relations it enjoys with the other Arab countries and of its strategic alliance with the United States;

(xi) Aware that Jordan is making a serious effort towards democratisation and economic reform, while protecting itself against the potential risk of a "Jordanian-Palestinian confederation" and the threat represented by a surge in radical Islam;

(xii) Noting and regretting the political and strategic stance of Syria, which purports to be an observer standing back from the debate when in actual fact it is directly involved in events on the ground through its presence in Lebanon and its declared support for "radical movements";

(xiii) Noting that a result of this "strategic isolation" Syria is not taking any initiative, but has merely stated that it agrees to follow any decisions taken by the Arab countries;

(xiv) Noting that in strategic terms Syria is nonetheless at the centre of a region in which stability will not be restored until the Israeli-Palestinian problem and the current problems in Iraq are resolved, with Syria too showing commitment to the solutions found;

(xv) Regretting the decision of the US Congress to adopt the "Syria Accountability Act" which, if implemented, could be counterproductive in its effects;

(xvi) Supporting the EU's policy of seeking closer ties with Syria, inter alia through the conclusion of a Trade Cooperation Agreement within the wider framework of the Barcelona Process;

(xvii) Concerned about the situation in Lebanon, whose institutions and political parties are apparently not yet able to manage the country without substantial outside intervention, Syria being a case in point, and noting that this situation raises serious doubts about the extent of Lebanon's sovereignty;

(xviii) Noting that the problems of the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon warrant the Syrian presence but also that of Hizbullah, which is in total control of the area;

(xix) Aware of the extremely precarious situation of Palestinian refugees living on Lebanese territory, for the most part in camps and conditions of abject poverty, with no social or civil rights and very limited access to basic social services, particularly public health facilities and education;

(xx) Aware too that, in any future peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, a solution to the refugee problem that resulted in the permanent settlement on Lebanese territory of all the Palestinian refugees currently living there could upset the fragile balance between political and religious groups, and noting in this connection that the 1943 National Pact between Maronite Christians and Shiite and Sunni Muslims would appear to prevent domestic conflict and perhaps civil war breaking out in Lebanon;

(xxi) Taking the view that because of these specific problems concerning not only the Palestinian refugees but also the Golan Heights, Lebanon should be directly involved in any negotiations on a global solution;

(xxii) Welcoming the EU's policy of a renewed general dialogue with Iran, which is allowing the Union to play a useful and effective role in the crisis over Iran's nuclear programme;

(xxiii) Approving the EU's efforts to arrive at a Trade Cooperation Agreement with Iran, the conclusion and implementation of which depend closely on progress in the areas of political dialogue and counter-terrorism;

(xxiv) Noting that it will probably take time to stabilise the domestic situation and restore peace and security in Iraq;

(xxv) Considering the United States' decision to speed up the process of drafting an interim constitution and hand over power to a provisional government in Iraq by 1 July 2004, with the attendant dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority;

(xxvi) Deeming it important to give the primary role in this process to the United Nations, thus conferring legitimacy on multilateral efforts to provide the conditions for security and the reconstruction of the country;

(xxvii) Taking into consideration the positions of the protagonists in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and welcoming the Palestinian Prime Minister's intention to call a truce including a ceasefire, but taking the view that this will be possible only if Israel makes a serious effort to support such an initiative by ending its policy of targeted attacks and its incursions into Palestinian towns and villages in the occupied territories;

(xxviii) Taking the view that the proposed truce must be accompanied by effective implementation of the road map drawn up by the Quartet;

(xxix) Recalling that the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories constitutes an infringement of international law and has led to serious violations of the rights of the Palestinians living in those territories;

(xxx) Taking the view that Israel's aggressive settlement policy, combined with the building of the security fence, is an obstacle to any real possibility of creating an independent, viable Palestinian state and that this policy is fomenting the conflict;

(xxxi) Considering that an immediate step towards restoring security and stability in the occupied territories means that Israel must cease work on expanding its settlements, persuade Israeli citizens to stop migrating to those settlements, call a halt to the building of new by-pass roads and commit itself to withdrawing to the borders fixed in 1967;

(xxxii) Considering that the right of a country and a people to put up proportionate resistance to an occupying power should not in itself be considered to be an act of terrorism;

(xxxiii) Condemning any act of terrorism directed against unarmed and unprotected citizens;

(xxxiv) Recalling that it will not be possible to ensure lasting peace and security in the region and bring the human suffering to an end unless all the countries directly concerned, in particular Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, reach agreement on a global settlement of the conflict which has now been raging for over 50 years and which also involves the Golan Heights and the sensitive and painful issue of the refugees living, very often in camps, in the countries bordering on Israel;

(xxxv) Recalling that demographic trends in the area stretching between Jordan and the Mediterranean are bound to upset the balance that still makes the political solution of two states existing side by side within the borders fixed in 1967 a possibility, and the Israeli Government and the Palestinian National Authority must quickly conclude a peace agreement based on the two-state principle, which implies immediate withdrawal from the settlements and the demolition of the security fence;

(xxxvi) Recognising that each country and the international community must take on responsibility for the Palestinian refugees, whose right of return is a fundamental principle that must be complied with, as is the right to compensation, and stressing that the refugee problem is a political, economic and above all a human issue;

(xxxvii) Aware, however, that permanent settlement in provisional host countries, particularly Jordan and Lebanon, is problematic, that settlement in third countries is uncertain and that it is therefore necessary to find a pragmatic way of implementing the right of return without destabilising the countries in the region;

(xxxviii) Expressing the opinion that if the two parties are unable to implement the road map effectively within a reasonable timeframe, the only alternative would be intervention by the international community, a clear mandate for the United Nations and the deployment of a multinational force tasked with restoring security and stability in the region;

(xxxix) Noting that such intervention could improve security and stability in Europe and the world as a whole and that settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would also be an effective contribution to the fight against terrorism;

(xl) Considering that such a mandate should include the establishment of a civilian task force to help the Palestinian National Authority establish democratic, transparent and effective institutions capable of governing a viable Palestinian state;

(xli) Emphasising that the critical attitude of Europeans towards the policy of Israel and its present government as regards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and towards its policy as regards the occupied territories in particular should under no circumstances be construed as a new form of anti-Semitism,

1. To redouble its efforts to convince both the Israeli Government and the Palestinian National Authority that it is urgent to reach a two-state solution, immediately resume implementation of Phase I of the road map and prepare for the international conference referred to in Phase II, which will take account of the solutions proposed in both the Arab Peace Initiative and the Geneva Accord;
2. To work actively, should it prove impossible to resume implementation of the road map, for intervention by the international community, for a clear mandate to be given to the United Nations and for the deployment of a multinational force tasked with restoring security and stability in the region, taking care to ensure that such a mandate makes provision for the establishment of a civilian task force to help the Palestinian National Authority establish effective democratic institutions capable of governing a viable Palestinian state;
3. To ensure compliance in any event with the right of return of the Palestinian refugees, which is a fundamental principle, as is the right of compensation, taking account nevertheless of the need to find a pragmatic way of implementing this right of return without destabilising the countries in the region;
4. To continue its efforts to ensure that power and sovereignty in Iraq are transferred to the Iraqi people as soon as possible, while doing everything in its power to prevent the country from disintegrating and falling prey to regional warlords, and taking into account the member states' obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1551.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 737

RECOMMENDATION 738¹³

on the impact of the Iraq crisis on public opinion in Europe¹⁴

(i) Taking account of the effects of the Iraq crisis on public opinion in Europe;

(ii) Having regard to recent opinion polls which show that public opinion is in favour of the establishment of future common institutions for European security and defence;

(iii) Observing that those opinion polls reflect public concern and scepticism about setting up effective, democratic structures for managing the Common Foreign and Security Policy;

(iv) Regretting that information from public sources is not always clear or likely to persuade public opinion that political agreement can be reached among the partners in the European Union;

(v) Aware of the important role national parliaments should be playing at a time of institutional change in Europe;

(vi) Recalling Assembly Resolution 117 adopted by the Standing Committee on 22 October 2003,

1. Use all the means available to it to raise public awareness of the importance of the phase on which Europe will be embarking as a result of the new Constitutional Treaty;
2. Support the requirement that has been regularly stressed in the Assembly's debates as regards maintaining a dialogue on foreign, security and defence policy issues between the executive and the national parliaments in the future European framework, along the lines of the institutional links developed over fifty years in WEU;
3. Ensure, in parallel to the decision-making process under way in the Intergovernmental Conference, that citizens are regularly and fully informed about the various options proposed, in particular for making the common security and defence institutions work properly;
4. Take due account of signs of concern in public opinion, which is not sufficiently informed about the implications of setting up credible common European defence structures;
5. Do more to develop a European security and defence culture as a basis for building consensus on shared values;
6. Promote the establishment of cooperation among European bodies with responsibility for informing public opinion on defence issues.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 738

RECOMMENDATION 739¹⁵

on missile defence: the need for a common European initiative¹⁶

(i) Recalling recent Assembly Recommendations: 680 on transatlantic cooperation on antimissile defence, 690 on European antimissile defence: a role for Russia, and 703 on antimissile defence - the implications for European industry;

(ii) Considering that changes in international relations and security over the past 15 years have transformed both the concepts behind and systems for tactical (battlefield) and strategic (national territory) defences;

(iii) Conscious that an increasingly significant aspect of these changes is proliferation, of missiles and missile technology as well as weapons of mass destruction (WMD);

(iv) Noting that strategic policies are adapting to threat assessments that reflect these developments as conventional deterrence is no longer trusted as a catch-all means of warding off attack;

(v) Considering that while the need for tactical missile defence is widely accepted, the utility and role of strategic missile defences are a matter of debate;

(vi) Stressing that the decision to develop a US missile defence changes the context of that debate, through its impact on national strategic assets and the involvement of other countries and foreign companies in developing the system;

(vii) Noting the offer of the United States to extend its missile defence to cover NATO's European members;

(viii) Noting that while the desirability of missile defence is increasingly accepted, the organisational format and specific capabilities required in a European setting are open to discussion;

(ix) Recalling that changes in threat perception and security doctrine since 2001 have informed changes in the role of missile defence in US security and that the incorporation of active and preventive elements has significant implications for US foreign and security policy;

(x) Stressing that the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems) in 2002 signalled a transformation of US arms control policy and that the emphasis on denial and counter-proliferation has staked out a distinct US policy route with global implications;

(xi) Considering that as the level of performance of an operational missile defence system against prospective threats defines its effectiveness in military terms, capabilities will be fielded at an early stage and the missile defence incrementally adapted and developed;

(xii) Aware of concerns within the US Administration, that the rapid deployment schedule for its proposed missile defence will introduce immature technology, producing a false sense of security and possibly leading to very expensive alterations at a later stage;

(xiii) Noting that the emerging US system will affect the vulnerability, defence options and strategic postures of other countries and that, consequently, its development will be central in the United States' relations with allies and new associates;

(xiv) Conscious that American utilisation of foreign assets and cooperative research and development will influence indigenous development and policy positions;

(xv) Recalling that the development of American missile defence is affecting international and multilateral frameworks that govern options for developing missile defence, with the result that bi-and multilateral exchanges and collaborations facilitating missile defence deployment and development increasingly contravene regimes like the Missile Technology Transfer Control Regime (MTCR);

(xvi) Considering that, in terms of cooperation, the troubled record of the US-Russian RAMOS satellite programme, the cancellation of the Navy Area Defense programme, and recent suggestions for placing the MEADS programme under American control, are likely to fuel concern about the prospects of true partnership;

(xvii) Noting that US missile defence poses a number of political and practical challenges for European countries participating in its development, or pursuing their own missile defence systems;

(xviii) Conscious that instability and conflicts in the "Near Abroad" and terrorist attacks in Moscow have focused Russian threat perception on regional instability and WMD proliferation;

(xix) Considering that Russia's upgrading and renewal of its own missile defence is threatened by financial restrictions;

(xx) Taking the view that Russia possesses desirable expertise and technologies in the missile defence area, and its defence industry welcomes opportunities for collaboration;

(xxi) Stressing that US companies have discussed prospects for joint design and development projects with Russian counterparts;

(xxii) Considering that the US-Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT 2002) has limited the initial interceptor capability of US missile defence, reduced the US nuclear arsenal by 75% and allowed Russia multiple warhead missiles and that, for Russia, such guarantees are central for maintaining stability following the demise of the ABM Treaty;

(xxiii) Noting that US concerns about Russia's relations with Iran, including in particular its cooperation on the development of missile technology, and Russia's fear of US technological cherry-picking have in the past stood in the way of cooperation;

(xxiv) Regretting that the only instance of active involvement on the part of Russia in American plans for the foreseeable future is a joint early-warning and notification centre for tracking BM launches, to be commissioned early next year;

(xxv) Welcoming the substantial Russian effort to re-create strategic stability and develop regional tactical missile defences in collaboration with Asian and European countries;

(xxvi) Noting that Beijing perceives US missile defence as being directed against China and neutralising its strategic nuclear capability, also as a means of increasing American influence over Asian allies;

(xxvii) Considering that while US-Sino relations have deteriorated under the Bush Administration, the Chinese response to the deployment has been moderate;

(xxviii) Stressing that China's strategic capabilities and deterrence doctrine are currently changing to adapt to the new strategic environment;

(xxix) Noting nevertheless that China is developing a new strategic missile with a range of 8 000 km as the Technological and Aerospace Committee was informed at a meeting with officials during its recent visit to the country;

(xxx) Bearing in mind that the extension of US missile defence entails strategic and political implications for the wider Asian region, as the current regional and prospective global threat from North Korea has driven the United States to support missile defences for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan;

(xxxi) Highlighting the fact that China has emphasised the importance of multilateral preventive non-proliferation efforts and has been involved in negotiations with North Korea to ease international tension over its nuclear strategic posture;

(xxxii) Considering that the role of European countries and industries in US deployment, through bilateral arrangements, affects Europe's political and industrial options in the area of missile defence and that the incorporation of Europe-based assets and resources in US missile defence development calls for a new, multilateral approach to balance US deployment and protect European strategic capabilities;

(xxxiii) Noting reports according to which the High Representative for the CSFP/WEU Secretary-General, Javier Solana, has suggested the possibility of developing a security and defence shield for South-East Europe;

(xxxiv) Noting that while individual countries are increasingly accepting or supportive of US missile defence, there is no political consensus informing European responses to US efforts;

(xxxv) Conscious of the divisions that might be created in Europe by a situation where the US felt driven to deploy missile defences in European countries through bilateral agreements;

(xxxvi) Noting that NATO is considering missile defence at the tactical and strategic levels, both through the NATO-Russia Council and separately, and that while there is consensus about the need to develop a layered tactical missile defence for deployed forces protection, there is no unanimity about the prospect of extending such capabilities to developing a territorial defence;

(xxxvii) Considering, finally, that the NATO-Russia Council, which provides a forum where valuable insights are being gained through a process of shared understanding, could constitute a parallel track for the development of missile defence,

1. Develop, in a broad forum for strategic reflection involving the 28 countries, a common position on European missile defence, giving thought to:

2. Promote further studies on missile defence taking into account that:

3. Task WEAG-Panel II (Research and Technology Cooperation) to assess the implication for European industry of a missile defence system, with the aim of drawing up a European R&D programme in order to demonstrate Europe's technical and industrial capacities in this field;
4. Urge Russia to end its cooperation with Iran on the development of missile technology as well as on its nuclear capability.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 739

RECOMMENDATION 740¹⁷

on the development of armaments policy in Europe -
reply to the annual report of the Council¹⁸

(i) Noting the first part of the annual report of the Council to the Assembly of WEU, for the period 1 January to 30 June 2003, particularly in regard to WEAG and WEAO activities;

(ii) Noting with satisfaction that European Union member states have agreed to set up a European agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments;

(iii) Recalling that the Assembly has always supported the idea of setting up a European armaments agency;

(iv) Considering that European armaments cooperation, although working well in a number of instances, is not yet such as to be able to meet new armed forces requirements;

(v) Noting the delays to which European air, land and naval defence equipment programmes developed in cooperation are subject;

(vi) Concerned about uncertainties over the "Eurofighter" combat aircraft programme and the Airbus A-400M transport aircraft;

(vii) Stressing that consolidation of the European aeronautics and research and technology sectors, needs to be followed by a regrouping and restructuring of defence industry sectors involved in army and navy procurement;

(viii) Considering that governments carry the primary responsibility for such moves and have an obligation to support them using appropriate legal and financial means;

(ix) Deeming it necessary for European armaments cooperation to extend to the new NATO and EU member states and other European Alliance members and third countries with recognised capabilities in this sphere;

(x) Taking the view that pending establishment of the EU agency, it is important for the activities of other cooperative institutions, such as the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO), and the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) to continue apace;

(xi) Emphasising WEAO's unique contribution to European defence research and technology and considering that were its competences transferred to the EU agency, care must be taken that the experience, competence and expertise it has amassed throughout its existence can be used to the full and developed in support of EU capabilities in that sphere;

(xii) Considering that membership of the agency should be open to third countries with recognised weapons capabilities - irrespective of whether they are EU applicant countries - under arrangements to be defined between them and the European Union;

(xiii) Considering that the agency should also establish close working ties with the NATO bodies responsible for implementing the Prague Capabilities Commitment, so as to avoid pointless duplication and fragmentation of resources, while respecting the autonomy and priorities of all concerned;

(xiv) Hoping that the agency can also be a centre for coordination and information exchange between the various intergovernmental initiatives on European arms cooperation;

(xv) Considering that the agency should establish close working relations with European industrial players and ensure that their interests are represented within the organisation;

(xvi) Considering that the work of the EU Military Staff should be directly tied in with the agency's work and that the EUMS should have sole responsibility for all matters relating to equipment needs at operational level;

(xvii) Considering that the agency should have a budget commensurate with European requirements and, particularly in research and technology, the necessary autonomy to develop and exploit new concepts - similarly to DARPA, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency;

(xviii) Calling for more rapprochement between OCCAR and the Framework Agreement, and for their further widening to include other European nations that share their objectives and operating rules;

(xix) Taking the view that it is essential for the WEU nations, European Union member states, European members of NATO and candidate countries to implement a policy of harmonisation of their requirements, interoperability and specialisation in the field of defence equipment, so as to put available resources to best use and guarantee the preservation and development of Europe's defence industrial and technological capability;

(xx) Taking the view that transatlantic cooperation needs to be more balanced, free and fair and that there is a need to safeguard Europe's industrial interests in the face of pressure for transatlantic integration, with its inherent risk to European industry of a loss of autonomy and of its being increasingly given over to subcontracting;

(xxi) Considering that national parliaments have an important contribution to make to the debate on a European armaments policy, particularly through discussions on spending, and the adoption of structural reforms necessary for an economic overhaul without which there can be no increase in defence budgets;

(xxii) Expressing its determination to pursue and encourage debate on a European armaments policy at all levels, national, intergovernmental and inter-institutional,

1. Pursue WEU's endeavours in the field of armaments cooperation and make an active contribution to setting up the EU agency;
2. Reflect on and come up with an answer as to how the future European armaments agency is to relate to other existing initiatives and institutions in this sphere, such as WEAG and WEAO in WEU, CNAD in NATO, OCCAR and the Framework Agreement on restructuring the European armaments industry, bearing in mind that if the aim is to strengthen European capabilities and prevent present duplication in the industrial and technological spheres, and in regard to spending, the Agency should logically become the hub that links these initiatives - a centre for coordination and farming out work;
3. Ensure the Agency is in a position to assist in rationalising and providing support to efforts on the part of nations and the industry and that it has powers in regard to international cooperation with other (non-EU) European states, the United States and Canada and other weapons producers whose production and cooperation are necessary for strengthening European defence capabilities;
4. Make sure the Agency is not conceived as an instrument for setting up an exclusively "buy European" regime, which would be bound to generate further tension between the United States and European nations;
5. Lend robust support to the bid for autonomy voiced by EU heads of state and government at the 1999 Cologne Summit, with all it implies in terms of the need for a strong European defence industry, capable of facing up to the challenges of transatlantic and world competition;
6. Bear in mind that flexibility and openness to all comers must be the watchwords of the Agency's philosophy, which must, initially, provide a new working framework and qualitative support, but that greater political will is needed if decisive results are to be achieved in terms of capability;
7. Ensure that the harmonisation of schedules, a matter of crucial importance, should be regarded as one of the Agency's prime objectives;
8. Ensure that any transfer of WEAG and WEAO competences and functions to the EU Agency, safeguards the achievements and expertise - and the staff - of the two organisations;
9. Ensure that, as necessary, work in progress, particularly the research programmes being carried out in WEAO, is wound up properly and that where it is to continue, it is possible for it do so uninterrupted;
10. Ensure the necessary parliamentary dimension to guarantee the full democratic follow-up of the activities of the European Agency.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 740

RECOMMENDATION 741¹⁹

on European defence: pooling and strengthening national and European capabilities -
reply to the annual report of the Council²⁰

(i) Noting with satisfaction the progress European countries, the European Union, NATO and WEU have made in adapting their military capabilities to the new international strategic environment;

(ii) Stressing that they must persevere with this process at the political, budgetary and technical levels;

(iii) Noting the absence of any progress on the framing of a common defence policy that goes beyond low-intensity crisis management;

(iv) Calling upon the EU member states to overcome their differences and reach a compromise at the Intergovernmental Conference so as to inject fresh impetus into security and defence cooperation;

(v) Considering that the new EU member states must be integrated in the ESDP structures as quickly as possible and that the possibility of participation in those structures by other European countries able to help strengthen Europe's intervention and military crisis management capabilities must remain open;

(vi) Stressing the importance of maintaining a strong transatlantic link and cooperation with the United States on security and defence issues, while preserving and developing Europe's autonomy of decision-making and action;

(vii) Considering that while national states are sovereign and are at the core of European defence efforts, they also carry the ultimate responsibility for developing joint European capabilities and ensuring that this process does not slow down or end in failure;

(viii) Considering the desirability of launching a Europe-wide debate on defence budgets, a more rational use of resources and the setting up of a common fund for European forces, equipment and defence research and technology;

(ix) Stressing the importance of involving the finance ministers and other relevant ministries in the debate on defence budgets;

(x) Observing that notwithstanding the EU's declaration confirming that the headline goal forces are operational, they are not yet in a position to intervene effectively in the full spectrum of Petersberg tasks because of the continuing existence of shortfalls and the slowness of the decision-making procedures for deploying the relevant capabilities;

(xi) Noting that despite all the efforts made over the last ten years, the armed forces of European countries are still suffering from major shortfalls in equipment and technology at national level, while at the same time they are overstretched and understaffed;

(xii) Considering that the armaments and technology sector must give priority to equipment interoperability and that in so far as is possible, European countries should seek to procure equipment from European companies as a way of helping them to maintain and develop their activities;

(xiii) Taking the view that the setting up of a credible joint European military intervention capability in the framework of the EU headline goal and the NATO Response Force (NRF) must be based on a common definition of doctrines and requirements and on the convergence of national defence postures in terms of the management and use of personnel and equipment;

(xiv) Underlining to that end the importance of developing joint command structures and strengthening existing European multinational forces;

(xv) Stressing the need, with that in mind, to increase the number of joint training courses and exchanges between officers, and to conduct multinational exercises on a regular basis;

(xvi) Considering that the European Union should envisage the creation of a multinational, joint services European Security and Defence College where the emphasis would initially be on training headquarters staff and civilian personnel in the context of operations falling within the category of Petersberg tasks,

1. Continue with the process of adapting their armed forces to crisis management missions of the Petersberg type;
2. Give EU structures and the headline goal forces the means for autonomous decision-making and action;
3. Allocate funds, and establish rules for harmonising defence budgets among European countries, so that the EU has the resources it needs to achieve the headline goal and a common fund in order to finance operations, multinational headquarters and defence research and technology;
4. Implement a real European space policy for the purpose of exploiting space-based telecommunications, observation, navigation, listening and surveillance systems;
5. Set up a proper chain of command for EU operations which covers all the aspects necessary for mounting an operation at the strategic, operational planning and command levels;
6. Strengthen existing multinational forces so as to have access to a sufficient number of European multinational headquarters able to direct operations at theatre level (force commander);
7. Participate actively in the process that is being carried out under the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), in particular by making a financial commitment to developments proposed by the various Project Groups;
8. Establish a real European defence industry policy to preserve Europe's strategic autonomy in the field of armaments, among other things by increasing the share of budgets allocated to defence research and technology;
9. Engage in an active policy of exchanges between European military schools, and establish a European defence college with a multinational, joint services intake with the aim of promoting higher training for officers and developing a common approach to a civil and military response to operations conducted in the ESDP framework;
10. Implement an active exercise policy in the EU framework, in which all the Union's politico-military, civil and military structures involved in crisis management should take part.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 741

¹ Replies 733-741 communicated to the Assembly by the Council on 1 March 2004.

² Recommendations 733-741 communicated to the Council on 9 December 2003.

³ Adopted by the Assembly without amendment on 1 December 2003 (6^th sitting).

⁴ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Gubert on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1841)

⁵ Adopted unanimously and without amendment by the Assembly on 1 December 2003 (6^th sitting).

⁶ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Wilkinson on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1836).

⁷ Adopted unanimously by the Assembly on 1 December 2003 (6^th sitting) on the basis of the amended draft recommendation.

⁸ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Martínez Casañ on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1839).

⁹ Adopted by the Assembly without amendment on 2 December 2003 (8^th sitting).

¹⁰ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Gaburro on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1844).

¹¹ Adopted without amendment by the Assembly on 3 December 2003 (9^th sitting).

¹² Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mrs Durrieu on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1847).

¹³ Adopted without amendment by the Assembly on 3 December 2003 (9^th sitting).

¹⁴ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mrs Agudo Cardarso on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public relations (Document 1838).

¹⁵ Adopted unanimously by the Assembly on 3 December 2003 (10^th sitting) on the basis of the amended draft recommendation

¹⁶ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Braga on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document 1843).

¹⁷ Adopted unanimously by the Assembly on 3 December 2003 (10^th sitting) on the basis of the amended draft recommendation.

¹⁸ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Agramunt Font de Mora on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document 1840).

¹⁹ Adopted unanimously and without amendment by the Assembly on 3 December 2003 (10^th sitting).

²⁰ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mrs Aguiar on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1842).