Documents

DOCUMENT A/1854

2 June 2004


Parliamentary scrutiny of the ESDP and CFSP - debates and replies to parliamentary questions


Document A/1854

2 June 2004

Parliamentary scrutiny of the ESDP and CFSP -
debates and replies to parliamentary questions

REPORT1

submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations2
by Lord Russell-Johnston, Rapporteur (United Kingdom,
Liberal
Group)

________________

1 Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 6 May 2004.

2 Members of the Committee: Mr Debarge (Chairman); Mrs Castro Masaveu, Lord Russell-Johnston (Vice-Chairmen); Mr Adam, Mrs Agudo Cadarso, Mr Banks (Alternate: Mrs McCafferty), Baroness Billingham, Mrs Bousakla, MM Budin, Duivesteijn, Mrs Eymer, Mrs Fernández Capel Baños, Mr Graas, Ms Jäger, Mrs Katseli, MM Legendre, Loncle, Martins, Masson, Naro, Occhetto (Alternate: Crema), Ramoudt, Selva (Alternate: Ianuzzi), Mrs Smith, MM Vieira, van Winsen, Wodarg.

Associate members: MM Gawlowski, Gülçiçek, Gündüz Irfan, Gündüz Süleyman, Mrs Hlödversdottir, MM Kaminski, Kelemen, Mrs Kosa Kovacs, Mr Lorenz, Mrs Novakova, Mr Reikvam, Mrs Roithova, N...

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.


RESOLUTION 1191

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on parliamentary scrutiny of the ESDP and CFSP -
debates and replies to parliamentary questions

The Assembly,

(i) Recalling its earlier Resolution 118 of 2 December 2003 and Resolution 116 of 3 June 2003 which called on the national parliaments to pursue their debates on the European Security and Defence Policy in order to keep up interest in this issue at national level;

(ii) Noting that, notwithstanding procedural delay, parliamentarians are stepping up their efforts to make a stronger contribution to the scrutiny of foreign and defence policy and that greater heed should be paid to them despite the competing claims of the media, which are able to react more quickly to events;

(iii) Welcoming initiatives that have contributed to focusing the debate on the problem of parliamentary scrutiny of future security and defence policy decisions,

INVITES THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS OF THE 28 WEU COUNTRIES

  1. To continue their efforts to arrange foreign policy, security and defence debates before the European summits and ministerial meetings where important decisions are to be taken in those areas;
  2. To make the necessary changes to procedures that now seem too cumbersome in the light of demands for greater parliamentary efficiency;
  3. To support initiatives taken by international fora to enable parliamentarians to exchange ideas and work together in a wider framework;
  4. To step up their efforts to inform the general public so that the latter can follow and better understand the various stages involved in political decision-making, and to ensure that in implementing such initiatives security and defence expectations are met.





EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

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submitted by Lord Russell-Johnston, Rapporteur (United Kingdom, Liberal Group)

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I. Introduction

  1. The Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations is continuing its task of keeping the members of the Assembly informed about the systems of parliamentary scrutiny of the ESDP and CFSP set up by our colleagues in the national parliaments of the WEU member countries. This report therefore flows directly from those by Mr Budin and Mr Arnau Navarro, and gives us an insight into the real influence and effects decisions taken at European level have on our countries' domestic policies. Our parliamentarians' efforts are often praiseworthy, as foreign and defence policy in the European framework is an area that gives the impression of having been taken over entirely by a network of government mandarins and those in the know. Decisions are frequently not announced in parliament until well after the news has broken elsewhere, via press releases or television appearances by ministers, outlining the gist of their policies or view of the international situation. The task of parliamentarians is undeniably becoming increasingly difficult as the slow pace of national parliamentary procedures does not sit at all well with a rapidly changing international scene. In most parliaments, with the notable exception of one or two where the tradition of parliamentary "question time" is still alive and kicking, questions addressed to the government are a dull affair and debates are put on the agenda so late in the day that the decisions have already been taken (unofficially), and governments are simply looking to parliaments to rubberstamp them. Notwithstanding the above difficulties with parliamentary work, it is nevertheless interesting to know how debates are progressing and the way members vote on subjects of interest, so that everyone can learn from them and see which ideas are worth pursuing.
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II. Discussions on defence spending

  1. The report by Mr Budin traced parliamentary activity in this sphere up to the end of November 2003. Virtually all the national parliaments were by then engaged in examining their countries' defence budgets and some had already approved them.
  2. Governments' concern to move in step with regard to their budgets - given that some countries' efforts could be limited in scope by their partners dragging their feet over spending - is apparent from remarks made by France's Defence Minister, Michelle Alliot-Marie, before the French National Assembly, on 9 December 2003:

"The first challenge lies in the shortfalls in Europe's [defence] capabilities as compared with the United States. These are essentially due to differences in the amounts of the defence budgets of the various European nations. In only four countries is defence spending of any real significance: the United Kingdom, France, Greece and Portugal, whose levels of defence spending exceed 2% of GDP. In the others, it is below that. This automatically has an impact on equipment procurement and forces' deployability. All European countries should therefore spend more so that the few do not have to bear alone a financial burden that benefits the many (...)".

  1. This difficulty was also raised at the 78th session of the German Bundestag on 26 November 2003, by FDP member Helga Daub, who made the point that from 1999 onwards, defence spending had been out of step with the commitments undertaken by the country's armed forces. "We are at the bottom of the international league" she stated. While other countries allocate up to 2.5% of GDP to their defence budgets, the figure for Germany is just 1.3%."
  2. The debate on the draft 2004 budget continued throughout the 78th session, and members went on to discuss foreign affairs and defence spending. Like some of its European neighbours Germany has been hit by the current economic downturn, and this has had major repercussions on spending in general, and defence spending in particular, as part of necessary efforts to hold down the cost of the 2004 federal budget. This came out clearly in the remarks made by one member, Elke Leonard (SPD):

"The defence budget forms part of the 2004 draft federal budget as a whole. This has been knocked off course by continuing fluctuations in the economy, which impact directly upon it. The conditions governing the federal budget also affect the defence budget. The 2004 federal budget has to be contained and, by the same token, so must spending on the armed forces.

  1. Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU/CSU) noted that the share of total government spending allocated to the foreign affairs, defence and economic cooperation budgets had fallen sharply:

"In 1989, these three budgets still represented over 21% of the total budget whereas in the 2004 draft budget they account for no more than 11.67%. To my way of thinking that percentage shows clearly that the country's external interests and foreign policy responsibilities are being neglected. I feel that in the long term it is a serious mistake to let Germany's interests abroad slip in this way."

  1. Following on from him, Hans Raidel (CDU/CSU) expressed the view that changes in the structure and tasks of the federal armed forces should be in line with thinking on an overall foreign and security policy concept. Given that the demarcation between internal and external security was becoming increasingly blurred, he put the case for an integrated security system in which internal and external security forces would complement one another:

"The changes in the structure and tasks of the Bundeswehr (federal armed forces) should be part of a wider general concept. Reasons, concepts and resources are the prerequisites for intervention abroad. The boundaries between internal and external security are becoming increasingly blurred and we need an integrated security system where internal and external security forces complement one another. To achieve this, the Bundeswehr needs to be reorganised, and, if we are to have a modern army that is operational and capable of working with our allies, viable long-term financial planning and resources are needed. If that funding is insufficient, declarations of intent about a security and defence policy, setting up a European defence system and strengthening NATO will ring hollow".

And Bernd Siebert (CDU/CSU) further noted:

"To carry out these tasks and be able to meet our international obligations to supply troops for EU and NATO missions, and to be able to modernise and reorganise the Bundeswehr, a substantial increase in the defence budget is needed as a matter of urgency."

This remark was endorsed by Herbert Fankenhauser (CDU/CSU):

"The foreign affairs budget has suffered for years now from a basic structural flaw. While there is a desire, and a duty, to take on more and more responsibilities, the material and human resources for doing so are constantly reduced."

  1. Italy's defence spending has suffered from the country's difficulties with its budget and this has meant a halt in the upward trend of recent years. Thus, as the report from the Senate Defence Committee, discussed on 18 December 2003, notes: "defence spending as a percentage of GDP rose from 1999 to 2001 but fell away again over the period 2002-2004. The figure currently stands at 1.04% as against 1.59% in 2003 and 1.86% in 2002. The government itself admitted in its introduction to the draft budget that "the reduction in essential defence spending is such as to make it difficult to pursue fully our stated commitment to reform (...)".
  2. A range of topics were discussed in the UK parliament in relation to defence finance and detailed questions were put on the current estimates for specific equipment such as the Future Aircraft Carrier, the Eurofighter aircraft, armoured vehicles, Challenger II tanks and artillery weapons. The latest National Audit Office report was also discussed in this context. The estimates of the cost of UK military operations, especially in Iraq, were also a subject for discussion.
  3. Members welcomed the basic thrust of the Defence White Paper2, which anticipates very considerable change in the conduct of armed forces business, and repeatedly asked for clarification about specific types of equipment and financial or budgetary matters. Some had reservations about the Government's ability to sustain its current ambitions and equipment programmes. On 11 December, Lord Bach reminded the House of Lords that the previous year's spending review represented the largest sustained increase in defence spending plans for 20 years, adding over three billion pounds to defence spending over the three years covered by it.
  4. On 27 January 2004 the CDU/CSU group in the German Bundestag asked the German Government to increase "substantially" the country's defence budget as from 2005. Calling for "modern armed forces as a pillar of reliable security and defence policy for the nation", it requested that a White Paper be published at an early date affirming the government's "commitment to the defence of Germany and its people and to contributing to international crisis management in the NATO and EU frameworks". It also asked the government to take steps to preserve and enhance the strategic importance of the North Atlantic Alliance and to deepen the European Security and Defence Policy. Lastly, it urged that "in the framework of a common defence concept in which internal and external security forces work increasingly closely together" there should be "closer civilian and military cooperation at all levels - national, regional and local".
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III. Monitoring ongoing international military operations

  1. Involvement in international missions is a growing trend in nations' policies. Alongside the traditional types of crisis, new ones are emerging and seem likely to go on doing so. For the WEU nations, this means a corresponding increase in the defence budgets which their parliaments scrutinise through a variety of procedures that give them differing degrees of influence over government decisions.
  2. In Germany, Bundestag member Christian Schmidt CDU/CSU deplored the fact that parliamentarians were not sufficiently consulted on military intervention abroad and asked that a law be passed entitling the parliament to have a say:

"At the moment, we have no chance to vote on the form and extent of our intervention abroad until the end of the decision-making process. Up until now, we have always agreed to support such interventions. But even now, we are still not able take policy decisions about how future missions should develop, their structure or troop or equipment levels should develop. It would be a good idea for Parliament to discuss such matters and reach agreement on new legislation allowing it to be involved in decisions about specific forms of intervention. I speak here as a parliamentarian seeking to be answerable for every aspect of government activity. The shared responsibility this implies means we should be involved in discussions on international armed forces' contributions at a point where it is still possible to exert a real influence."

His remarks were applauded by the opposition CDU/CSU and FPD and also by Bündnisses 90/die Grünen and SPD members.

  1. Nevertheless the German Parliament kept a close eye on developments relating to international missions, especially in view of the current reorganisation of Germany's armed forces. During the present session there were many debates in which the need was stressed for a strong, efficient army, commensurate with Germany's commitments to its European partners and NATO. The Bundestag Defence Committee's visit to Brussels on 10 March 2004 - a record of which was not published - provided the opportunity for discussion, in the presence of CFSP High Representative Javier Solana, on the new conception of the German army and commitment abroad of German troops. The presence in ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan, of some 2 000 German army troops, and, above all, the reconstruction team based at Kunduz in the north of the country, deployment of which was approved by the Bundestag on 23 October 2003, were topics regularly raised in parliament, especially in March, because of the international conference on Afghanistan held in Berlin on 31 March and 1 April. Thus a motion on "The Conference on Afghanistan - a new opportunity for better coherence and coordination in reconstruction" was tabled by members on 2 March 2004 and the outcome of the Conference is to be debated in the Bundestag on 30 April.
  2. Over the last few months, the UK Parliament has frequently and thoroughly aired topical issues such as humanitarian and reconstruction work in Iraq, the security situation there, intelligence and the assessment of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Another subject discussed extensively was the presence of British troops in the Gulf and in Afghanistan, their equipment and operational logistic support. Another issue of concern has been the fight against terrorism.
  3. On 11 December 2003, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Defence, Lord Bach, made a statement in the House of Lords on the Defence White Paper, and a report entitled Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future. He emphasised that since 1998, the ability of UK armed forces to conduct the full spectrum of operations had been amply demonstrated:

"We have conducted operations - often concurrently - across three continents: in Kosovo, Macedonia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Afghanistan and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Our Armed Forces have been successfully engaged in combat operations in Iraq this year and are still heavily engaged in large-scale post-conflict activities (...). The operation was a significant military success, achieving almost all of its military objectives within only four weeks".

  1. But in order to deliver security in a changing world and to face new threats, changes were necessary:

"The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the threat posed by international terrorism, coupled with the consequences of failed or failing states, presents us with very real and immediate challenges. (...) The need for multiple, concurrent small to medium-sized operations will (...) be the most significant factor in force planning. Counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation operations in particular will require rapidly deployable forces able to respond swiftly to intelligence and achieve precise effects in a range of environments across the world. Regional tensions and potential conflicts are likely to create a sustained high demand for enduring peace support commitments (...)".

  1. Early this year, the Italian Government brought in a draft decree extending the country's current involvement in international military operations and providing funding. This form of legislation allows the government to enact provisional measures which become final if the instrument is approved by parliament within a period of 60 days. As a measure, it is rapid and politically effective, since it constitutes a form of fait accompli that is difficult for Parliament to challenge. However, it is quite customary for parliamentarians to take the opportunity, when they can, to reopen a political debate that sanctions or supports the country's involvement in multilateral missions in which the army is already engaged. The government for its part takes advantage of the position to report on Italy's international commitments, and shift the responsibility for their funding on to Parliament's shoulders, while conveying its concern at the lack of resources available for the purpose. Although a reserve fund was set up in the 2004 budget and the amounts allocated are higher than last year, it has become clear that, as anticipated, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are likely to be long-term commitments and costs will continue to rise. Involvement in Iraq in particular tends to have monopolised the debate, which has continued over a period of several months, since the opposition demanded the separation of the articles concerned with financing the war in Iraq from those relating to the funding of other international missions. Every attempt to "kill" the legislation involved the majority in lengthy procedural blocking tactics. This went on until 10 March 2004 when it was approved, opening up deep political divisions between the pacifist left and the moderate wing.
  2. One new development in the field of international operations has been the two EU-led missions, "Concordia" which replaces the NATO operation in FYROM, and "Artemis" in the Congo, pending follow-on from the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo - MONUC 3.
  3. During a hearing of the EU Delegation of the French Senate on 14 January 2004, Senator Hubert Haenel made a statement on the shared costs of European Union operations with military or defence implications. This highlights a weakness that still exists with regard to Europe's intentions in this sphere. Operations of this nature continue to be funded from the budgets of individual nations while at the same time the parliaments of the member states have no oversight of how they are implemented - a fact borne out by the general lack of information on the subject.

"Under Article 28 of the Treaty on European Union, Union operations with military or defence implications are financed by the member states outside the Community budget. The first two operations, in FYROM and in the Congo, highlighted the need for the Union to have a permanent "mechanism" for financing the common costs of such operations. A proposed draft Council decision (E 2412) sets out the way in which this mechanism, dubbed Athena, should work. Staff involved are designated by the Secretary-General of the Council, acting under the supervision and in accordance with the decisions of a Special Committee made up of one representative from each member state contributing to a Union military operation. When discussing how the common costs of a given operation are to be financed, the Special Committee comprises only the representatives of those member states contributing to that operation. The document lists the types of expenditure that may be included among common costs. The draft budget is drawn up by the Special Committee. The breakdown of contributions from member states is arrived at on the basis of GNP calculated in accordance with Article 28 TEU".

  1. The second Defence Congress, held in Berlin on 9 December 2003, offered an opportunity for German Defence Minister Peter Struck to refer to the growing importance of EU military operations, which made it possible to assess the ESDP's prospects looking ahead to the end of 2004. Given the number of conflicts to contend with, he stressed the need for Europe to be able to speak with a single voice and act as one politically. European nations had learned from the war in Kosovo and developed the EU European Security and Defence Policy, but Europe had not been as united in every case, particularly over the crucial issue of the war on Iraq. Still, although Europe's nations had not taken a firm, coordinated position the experience had nevertheless "helped drive the ESDP forward". Dr Struck illustrated his remarks with one or two specific examples:
  • the fact that the SFOR operation had been taken over by an EU-led operation in Bosnia in January 2004,
  • Operation Concordia in FYROM, which he described as a success, similarly to Operation Artemis in the Congo, recalling that the latter was the first EU-led military operation outside Europe that had not drawn on NATO assets and capabilities. Even under pressure of time, Europeans had been able to accomplish a hazardous mission, enabling the United Nations to continue the process of pacifying the region.

Lastly, he emphasised the contribution made by European nations in terms of the number of soldiers taking part in the various international interventions: over 5 000 European soldiers involved in the global war on terror, a further 5 000 made available to European states for ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom; 21 000 troops constituting the lion's share of the peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and, when it came to UN peacekeeping operations "Europeans had made 3 500 troops available, seven times more than the United States".

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IV. Scrutiny of defence policy and programmes

  1. In the UK House of Commons on 1 December 2003, Mike Hancock, put a question to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, asking whether he would make it his policy to support (a) the appending of the modified Brussels Treaty to the EU Constitutional Treaty as an optional protocol and (b) the amendment of the Treaty to oblige the EU Council to make an annual report on its activities in the fields of security and defence to the Assembly created by the modified Brussels Treaty and to the European Parliament.
  2. On 8 December 2003, the UK Minister of State for Europe, Denis MacShane, stated:

"The UK sees a clear distinction between the role of NATO as the basis of the collective defence of its members and the role of the European Security and Defence Policy as a crisis management instrument in support of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. As noted in the Government's While Paper on the IGC, we would not support anything in the EU constitution which undermined NATO's security guarantee.

The Government continue to regard national parliaments as having primary responsibility for security of CFSP and ESDP, given the central role of member states in these policy areas. There is provision in both the Treaty on European Union and in the draft constitution for the European Parliament to be regularly consulted on the main aspects and basic choices of ESDP. The Government are not aware of any proposals to change the status or role of the WEU Assembly, although there might be a case for considering this in the light of the outcome of the Intergovernmental Conference."

  1. On 16 December 2003 the following exchange took place on the floor of the House of Commons between the Shadow Foreign Secretary, Michael Ancram, and Mr MacShane. Mr Ancram asked:

"Why did the Prime Minister, who promised no separate military planning capability for the European defence force, agree to a separate planning cell, which the French rightly boast will grow into something much bigger? When will the Government stop giving away goals and start playing for Britain?"

To which Mr MacShane replied:

"For the same reason, I imagine, as President Bush welcomed the work of the Prime Minister in securing a good deal on European defence. The notion that our country's or our allies' interests would be served by Britain isolating itself from cooperation with our main defence partners is absurd - a danger to the United States and the rest of Europe. The only thing that concerns everyone in Europe is the fact that there is one major opposition party in this great democracy that is out there on the far right of the anti-European wing. While the Right Honourable and learned gentleman and his colleagues maintain the position that he expressed again today or the hatred towards Europe that we heard from the Front Bench yesterday, his party will remain permanently out of power."

  1. On 12 December 2003, in the UK House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, (which is part of the select committee system) a report was prepared on the Italian Presidency's achievements in security and defence policy. The parliamentarians thus reviewed progress on work in hand and the completion of the two EU-led missions (Artemis in the Congo and Concordia in FYROM) and a mandate for the Irish Presidency was approved. In respect of the latter it was noted:

"On the civilian side, we are keen to see developments in the field of civilian crisis management, e.g. in rule of law, given that both EU civilian missions are police missions. We are therefore pleased that the Irish are keen to focus on civilian aspects of ESDP."

The conclusion was that:

"The report makes a useful summary of recent developments and we welcome the Minister's statement of the Government's views on a number of the activities. Progress is clearly being made and from his account it appears that the UK played an active and constructive part in promoting some of these activities, for instance in relation to the civilian aspects of crisis management."

  1. On 17 December 2003, the French National Assembly's Committee on National Defence and Armed Forces held a round table discussion on European defence, at which experts gave presentations to parliamentarians on the various stages and challenges involved in building a common defence. While the institutional and logistic aspects were moving forward at a pace that was encouraging, the same could not be said of the political debate. Deputy François Lamy regretted that little thought had been given to the reasons for having a European defence, in sharp contrast to the rapid progress towards that goal. He referred to publication of a "white paper" setting out the threats facing the continent of Europe and strategies for intervention. He also wondered about the role of the French and British nuclear deterrents in a European defence.
  2. Defence policy is gradually assuming an important role in the foreign policy framework of individual nations and the ESDP is progressing at a steadier pace than the CFSP, as the Chairman of the French Delegation to the EU, Pierre Lequiller, was quick to point out, when underlining the importance of initiatives on European defence "the development of which will lead to the definition of a common foreign policy, in a reversal of the expected order of events".
  3. The French Defence Minister, Michelle Alliot-Marie, addressing the EU delegation of the Senate and National Assembly, on 9 December 2003, also referred to the progress on European defence. She underlined the fact that Europe had been able to withstand the period of crisis caused by the war in Iraq, repeatedly described as the cause of insurmountable divisions between Europeans and as marking the death knell of a European defence. And yet, at a time when disagreements ran high, Europeans had done all they could to ensure that there could be no turning back as far as European defence was concerned.
  4. The ensuing debate highlighted the unquestionable progress achieved with the European security strategy document, submitted by Mr Solana and adopted at the Brussels European Council meeting on 12 December 2003. In this, the European Union for the first time developed an assessment of threats and a distinctively European policy which differed from that of the United States in its emphasis on multilateralism and regional stabilisation policies and a thinking geared more towards preventive than pre-emptive strategies. As to the role of nuclear deterrence in European defence, it was noted that to debate this subject at the present time would almost certainly lead to divisions. Producing a "white paper" on European defence might also cause dissent since threat perceptions might differ from one country to another. It seemed preferable, in the first instance, to concentrate on the capabilities the European Union hoped to acquire for operations in which it might become involved. Moreover, with the exception of France and the United Kingdom, European countries' capacity for intervention was very limited and their only possible route for doing so was by way of the European Union. The Union's increasing security role was a reflection of a marked preference among the general public, which also supported an EU action capability that was not reliant on the United States.
  5. The President of the WEU Assembly, Armand De Decker, attended a hearing at the French Senate on 14 January 2004, when the French delegation to the European Union held a joint meeting with the foreign affairs and defence committees, to which members of the delegation to the WEU Assembly were also invited. Here, the President of the Assembly went over the course of events in the progression towards a European defence from the time of the signature of the modified Brussels Treaty - Article V of which still provided the only legal basis for Europe's security and defence autonomy, pending the approval of the current plans for reform and specifically the new European Constitution, by the EU member states. Regarding the matter of democratic scrutiny, the President did not mince words:

"Finally, I come to the matter of democratic scrutiny. It would be paradoxical indeed if, having maintained a satisfactory form of parliamentary scrutiny in the Assembly of WEU, throughout the entire cold war period (notwithstanding the fact that only a few operations took place during that time), we were now to relax that scrutiny - now when operations are taking place and that [i.e. defence] policy is set to expand further. All the international organisations set up after the second world war had a built-in parliamentary dimension. It would not make sense at all now that things are "getting serious" to dispense with parliamentary scrutiny at the European level, and rely on the European Parliament, which has neither the necessary legitimacy nor competence. It would be desirable for example for the national parliaments to be able to attend meetings at European level to hear the future Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. National parliaments are the ones that pass defence budgets and take decisions on troop deployment, not to mention having to send messages of condolence to families when soldiers' lives are lost. It is therefore quite legitimate to envisage a form of scrutiny in which national parliaments are involved.

I supported President Giscard d'Estaing's proposals for a "Congress of the Peoples of Europe" that would meet once a year to discuss the state of the Union. That body could have had special committees, for example for justice and home affairs and foreign affairs and defence. However the proposal unfortunately met with a fair amount of resistance on the part of the European Parliament and member states' governments.

The question now therefore is how scrutiny should be organised and how to convince the European Parliament and governments that it is necessary. I favour an "ad hoc" Assembly under the European Union banner which draws on the experience of the WEU Assembly. It would be responsible for scrutiny of the CFSP and ESDP. There are a number of possible permutations: it could be made up either of delegations of national parliaments only, or also include a delegation from the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the European Parliament. But the European Parliament cannot aspire to discharge that responsibility alone, having neither the legitimacy nor the capacity to do so.

Following a meeting I had very recently with the Prime Minister of Belgium, I can say with some confidence that he is now convinced of the need for a democratic body representing national parliaments to scrutinise the European Security and Defence Policy. As the national parliaments are the ones that will ratify the European Union Constitutional Treaty, I think there is room there for negotiation on how the requirement for democratic scrutiny can be met".

  1. There tends to be agreement on principle, but opinions differ as to form. Thus Senator Haenel stated that he was entirely in agreement with arrangements suggested by Mr De Decker for organising the ESDP and its parliamentary dimension, while Robert Del Picchia was more inclined towards the solution adopted for the new Euromediterrean Parliamentary Assembly of a more direct form of cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament. Daniel Goulet felt that the lack of enthusiasm for WEU stemmed from the number of overlapping institutions dealing with the same areas, while Mr De Decker pointed out that the matters under discussion might be dealt with by different institutions from different angles. The Council of Europe played a major part in the inculcation of common values, it had contributed to training officials in the central and eastern European countries which were members of the Europe of 45. As for WEU, its inclusion in the European Union necessarily implied the hoped for coordination [with the European Parliament].
  2. At the same hearing, an explanation was given to French parliamentarians by Rapporteur Serge Vinçon of another innovation in European defence - the establishment of a European armaments agency. First, he first summarised the background to the proposals that had led to the decision to create this institution, which could be set up in advance of other treaties being approved. The Agency's remit was, in point of fact, based largely on the wording of WEAO and OCCAR's terms of reference. All that needed to be done was to bring the new body into the Union and provide coordination between it and the existing research, armaments and defence planning structures. The Rapporteur highlighted the problem areas:

"Will the European Union armaments agency prove any more effective than the initiatives that preceded it, or will it add another layer of bureaucracy in an area where there are more than enough already? Of course we don't know the answer to that question right now. What we can be sure of, however, is how important it is for European integration. Without effective armaments cooperation, the notion of a European defence, which is essential if Europe is to play its full part on the international stage, cannot hope to have any credibility. The problem will basically be one of how to overcome the underlying differences in approach that persist between states. European nations that now have sizeable weapons industries are naturally very keen to maintain a strong European industrial base. Yet others want a market that is wide open, so that price becomes the sole criterion governing choice. US equipment, the related investment costs of which have largely been offset by returns in the home market, is at a distinct advantage here.

It is important therefore that the Agency does not merely identify needs but also supports joint procurement to meet them. At the same time, we must be aware that artificially supporting firms that cannot deliver technologies comparable with those America can offer would not allow Europe to narrow the technology gap separating it from the US. Extending our research effort must be one of the Agency's major functions."

  1. Harmonisation of defence procurement and cooperation between armament industries raises another difficulty, that of either creating a network, or bringing together in a centralised structure, the military training schools in the various countries. Our Committee had earlier asked Eleonore Katseli to prepare a report on the subject, which gave rise to Recommendation 724, adopted unanimously by the Assembly on 3 June 2003. The Assembly's plea struck a chord and is still being actively considered. In Belgium's Chamber of Deputies, at a meeting of the National Defence Committee on 17 December 2003, Josée Lejeune, put the following question to Belgium's Defence Minister, André Flahaut:

" ... There was also mention of opening a European defence training school. What happened to the other suggestions? No wonder the United States marvels as to why Europe has 16 different military training establishments. What are the government's views on the matter?"

To which Mr Flahaut replied:

"The European security and defence college is intended to strengthen Europe's defence culture and increase awareness of European defence policy. To avoid duplication between multinational courses and those run nationally, it is planned to set up a coordination network between existing establishments. If we had started out by setting up a single military academy, the European Security and Defence Policy might be further advanced now (...). The United States has no business commenting on our 16 defence colleges, when one considers the way things are organised over there".

  1. In his opening address to the 2nd Defence Congress in Berlin, Germany's Defence Minister, Peter Struck, also stressed the importance of the setting up of the EU defence agency, which was agreed in November 2003. This was one of the instruments enabling "groups of member states to cooperate, if they were willing and able to contribute some of their military know-how to improving Europe's ability to resolve conflicts". As far as the terms of any defence assistance clause were concerned, it was important that it should bind States in solidarity. The new EU Agency, which if all went well "would begin work in January 2004, would have a key role as far as EU military capabilities and optimisation of armaments activities were concerned". It would inter alia make it possible to define capability goals, harmonise operational needs and thus undertake appropriate procurement projects, promote research, strengthen the defence industrial and technological base and support the creation of a competitive European armaments market. Within the Agency, nations could form groups for working on common projects. Mr Struck concluded with the following remark:34. "We don't need some overarching authority, we need an operational agency linked up to a network".
  2. Topics such as reserve forces and ground-based air defence and armed forces supplies have been discussed, and also defence research and development. On 2 February 2004, Denis MacShane, the UK Minister for European Affairs, answered a question from Mr Cousins as to whether it was government policy to support defence research and development expenditure by the European Commission. Mr MacShane replied that:

"The UK supports a European Security and Defence Policy, where the responsibility for decisions relating to defence, including research and development, rests primarily with Member States (Articles 13 and 17 of the Treaty on European Union). The Government recognises the need to consider the scope for cooperation with the Community's civil research programmes. (...) In November 2003, the General Affairs and External Relations Council agreed to create an Agency, under the authority of the Council, whose responsibilities would include `promoting, in liaison with the Community's research activities where appropriate, research aimed at fulfilling future defence and security capabilities requirements'".

In this context, it remained to be seen how the Western European Armament Organisation (WEAO) activities in the field of defence research and technology could be transferred to the Agency. There was a need to keep mind that WEAO's legal personality is linked to that of WEU. There was also a need to prevent any loss of valuable assets taking place in the course of transfer3.

  1. Finally, at the plenary session of the Belgian Senate on 4 March 2004, Mr Karim Van Overmeire (Vlams Blok) put a number of questions to the Defence Minister on the Franco-British proposal for creating a rapid intervention force, which had been hammered out at the Le Touquet summit on 10 February. Prime Minister Blair and President Chirac had in fact given to understand that there would be a new initiative, involving the creation of a number of combat units or tactical groups. Each combat unit would number approximately 1 500 men, deployable both inside or outside in Europe within 15 days of a political decision, particularly in cases of acute crisis. The divisions have to be trained and equipped to be able to undertake operations lasting between 30 and 120 days, essentially under United Nations mandate. Referring to this structure of seven to nine tactical groupings, to be operational by 2007, Mr Van Overmeire asked whether this was a completely new idea, compatible with what was there already; what was the attitude of the minister towards this initiative by the three largest nations; who - the member states or European Union - would direct operations and take political decisions; where would the military staff be set up and what would be Belgium's role in the operational phase of the proposal? To this Mr Flahaut replied very briefly, that he considered the initiative by the three large states to be "positive". There would be no new headquarters, the operation would be directed from the existing one, and Eurocorps' existence was in no way under threat. He stressed that "the proposal is seen in the NATO framework as a supplementary instrument and that Belgium had a positive contribution to make towards implementing the proposal as a smaller driving force of European defence.
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V. European defence in the debates on the future European Constitution

  1. Just at the time when our Committee was taking its decision to submit the present report to the Assembly's June 2004 session, the discussions on the draft Constitution were hitting the headlines and dominating the politics of the day. During the first week of December, a general debate took place in virtually every parliament: on 1 December, the House of Commons Standing Committee on the Intergovernmental Conference held a debate on the Future of Europe. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Jack Straw, reported on the IGC conclave of European Foreign Ministers, held in Naples at the end of November 2003. He confirmed that there was no formal agreement on any single point in Naples since "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed". Mr Straw also gave a detailed explanation of the UK position on the CFSP and ESDP as presented in the draft EU Constitutional Treaty. He set out the UK's opposition to the revised proposals from the Italian Presidency for an extension of qualified majority voting in common foreign and security policy matters and made it very clear that these were not acceptable. On defence, he believed that a way forward could be found that was compatible with the UK's key interests. The arrangements for structured cooperation and mutual assistance in the face of armed aggression "should be open, flexible, militarily robust and, crucially, entirely consistent with strong and continuing commitment to NATO of all the partners". He maintained that considerable advances had been made on mutual defence. Commitments and cooperation in this field would remain "consistent with commitments" undertaken within NATO, which remained for those states who were members. That was the basis of their collective defence and the instrument for its implementation. "It makes it clear that the European Union is not a collective defence organisation". On structured cooperation, the suggestion that member states would have to fulfil higher military capability criteria had been dropped. Smaller member states, or those with lower levels of spending as a proportion of their GDP, could still become members of the structured cooperation arrangements if there were "things they could bring to the party".
  2. Mr Straw made the point that:

"(...) In any event, European Security and Defence Policy is limited to the so-called Petersberg tasks. (...) All those tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including the support of third countries in combating terrorism in their own territories. They do not, however, relate to mutual defence if there is an attack on another nation, as happened to us in the Falklands in 1982, or to major military action of the kind in which the United Kingdom has been involved in Iraq and Afghanistan. The treaties - rightly, in my view - make no provision for the European Union to be involved in such action on such a basis. We are talking about much more limited tasks, like those in which we are engaged under the EU autonomous operation in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the Balkans, the articles would have ruled out an aggressive EU military operation in Kosovo, although the operation in Bosnia after Dayton would have come within the arrangements".

  1. In the matter of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, UK concerns about the title had not been met. Mr Straw argued strongly that the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs had to be answerable to the Council rather than to the Commission on matters relating to CFSP.
  2. In Belgium, on 3 December 2003, Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt spoke before the Federal Advisory Committee on European Affairs and the Foreign Affairs Committee. WEU Assembly member Jean-Pol Henry raised the issue of defence as follows:

"You referred to definite progress, namely in strengthening European defence, having been secured at Naples. This is conditional upon two things: firstly, reassurance being given to those of our new European partners who fear NATO will be weakened; and similarly, to our transatlantic partners. Next there is an aspect that has been forgotten: parliamentary scrutiny. I strongly advise retaining the WEU Assembly as an interim measure. No doubt the defence ministers see no good reason to go there and explain themselves but, where defence is concerned, you can't be too careful. The WEU Assembly has democratic legitimacy, it has proportional representation and what is more, it now has a Belgian President."

  1. Also on 3 December 2003, at a hearing before the Cortes4, Spain's Foreign Minister, Mrs Ana Palacio Vellelersundi, took part in an exchange on the subject of the topics scheduled for discussion some days later at the Brussels European Council meeting on 12 and 13 December 2003. She set out Spain's position on these in the following statement:

"(...) In regard to Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy matters, the Council is to discuss, firstly, the adoption of the Security Strategy by the Secretary-General/High Representative, revised in the light of observations from the Member States following the Thessaloniki European Council meeting. Spain's comments dealt in particular with issues such as terrorism or aspects concerning Latin America. The text currently being circulated, which we hope will be adopted by the European Council, will be an excellent foundation for developing concrete implementation proposals. The second item for discussion is weapons of mass destruction. The Presidency is to present a report on implementation of the relevant strategy in an area that today constitutes one of the most serious threats to our security. The European Union has made considerable strides in defining a common policy in the face of this threat and designing instruments to combat proliferation. The third item will be the regular report by the Presidency on the European Security and Defence Policy, again with a view to its adoption by the European Council. This takes in the progress made this week on the ESDP which we consider satisfactory: essentially the successful completion of Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the launch of the police operation in FYROM. The fourth item is the detailed programme concerning relations with the Arab world, drawn up by the High Representative and the Commission. The Council will need to look at this carefully and Spain will do so from its own position, namely that it feels it necessary to approach any new proposals within the existing framework, essentially that of the Barcelona Process and the New Neighbours Initiative. The implementation of the Common Strategy on Ukraine is the fifth item on this agenda. We expect the common strategy, which provides the framework for our relations with this eastern European country, to be extended for a further year."

  1. With regard to the matter of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mrs Palacio observed:

"There is a high level of consensus about the most recent proposals submitted by the Presidency. These contain further details of this office, which is one of the outstanding successes and major innovations of the Convention. They clarify the minister's duties as the CFSP representative on the Council and as a member of the Commission, responsible for the coordination there of the external action of the Union, and enter into some detail in regard to the minister's status as a Commission member.

There are, however some issues that call for closer examination, for instance the title of the appointment. Some member states are insisting that the term "Minister" is inappropriate. There is also his role in chairing the External Relations Council which many, including the Spanish Government, feel sits uneasily with the minister's full collegiality within the Commission. For our part, we would also like to see clarification of some of the more practical issues, but important ones nonetheless, such as to what extent this office should rotate on an equal basis among the member states".

  1. As far as the CFSP and the ESDP went, Mrs Palacio noted that the Italian Presidency "has made proposals for reforms to the draft that came out of the Convention. As far foreign policy properly speaking is concerned the Presidency is proposing that decisions be taken by qualified majority in all cases where there is a proposal from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Presidency is insisting on the present wording of the "emergency brake" clause. This is in line with the approach we took in the Convention but it also should be said that there is no consensus on the proposal. In the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy, the de facto elimination of the mutual defence clause is being proposed and its replacement by a reference to the legitimate self-defence provision under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, while structured cooperation in regard to defence capabilities is presented as a permanent cooperation requiring Council authorisation by qualified majority of all its members. That cooperation - and this is the important point - becomes more open, with the elimination of the requirement for consensus among all the participating states as regards new states joining, and its substitution by qualified majority voting. Moreover, the Presidency proposes that enhanced cooperation on CFSP matters should be authorised by the Council unanimously and not by qualified majority".
  2. Spokespersons for the Socialist Group (Mr Estrella Pedrola) the Convergència I Unió (Mr Guardans I Cambó, Member of the Assembly of WEU) and of the joint parliamentary group (Mrs Lasagabaster Olazabal) intervened in succession, acknowledging the importance and justification of the EU Security Strategy. Mr Martínez Casañ, the spokesperson for the Grupo Popular and Chairman of the Political Committee of the WEU Assembly, noted that "there seemed to be a consensus about defence - and a very welcome one as the Minister has observed. Nevertheless the consensus was different from the one in the text of the Convention".
  3. Mrs Palacio replied to the previous speakers in the following terms:

"The contents of the Solana paper are as they are. The document says that pre-emptive action on the part of the European Union might be necessary in some instances, specifically to prevent a situation from deteriorating or a conflict becoming more entrenched".

  1. She also noted that "as far as the CFSP is concerned, Spain has never insisted there should be unanimity. I don't know why anyone should think it has but it is a matter I want to clear up immediately. We have never held that view. Lastly "in regard to structured cooperation over defence policy, we maintained that the "passerelle" clause should be deleted. That is not to say that we want unanimity. We want to avoid structured cooperation becoming closed. The minute a structured cooperation is allowed to dictate its own terms, it might become closed. That is the point of our argument. It is not a matter of our having insisted upon unanimity per se".
  2. Furthermore, on 4 December 2003, the Cortes's joint committee for Europe approved a "non-legislative motion" on European integration and the future of Europe, submitted by the Popular Party parliamentary group and published under the auspices of the sub-committee monitoring the work of the 2004 IGC on the future of the European Union. The text appeared in the official journal of the Cortes on 16 December 20035.
  3. In regard to external action and defence, it was proposed to:
  • "Arrive at a better definition in the future Treaty of the aims, purposes and principles of the external action of the Union (paragraph 3.1.1).
  • Follow though to their ultimate conclusion the decisions adopted at the Seville European Council meeting by separating the present General Affairs and External Relations Council into two separate bodies (paragraph 3.1.2).
  • Consolidate qualified majority voting as the rule for the adoption of decisions, with such accommodations as are necessary (the emergency brake, constructive abstention) to ensure that no Member State is disadvantaged in regard to matters affecting its vital interests or obliged to take part in operations against its will (paragraph 3.1.3).
  • Achieve better coordination and consistency in external action, to which end a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs should be appointed by the European Council by decision taken by qualified majority, with the approval of the President of the Commission (paragraph 3.2).
  • Looking ahead to a Union with international legal personality, convert the delegations of the Commission into delegations of the Union - to include both Union civil servants and Commission staff drawn from the foreign services of the member states (paragraph 3.3).
  • Set up or strengthen machinery to ensure appropriate coordination and cooperation between the Union's foreign services and the diplomatic services of the member states, and as a next step set up a joint school of diplomacy providing further training, emphasising common values and principles and leading to the formation of a specifically European strategic and administrative mode of thinking (paragraph 3.4).
  • Expand the range of EU crisis-management missions (Petersberg missions) by the express inclusion of the fight against terrorism and against the threats arising from weapons of mass destruction as common security and defence policy objectives (paragraph 3.5).
  • Extend the machinery for enhanced cooperation to the defence sphere, so that those members wanting to move ahead more rapidly in security and defence can cooperate in enhancing and harmonising their defence capabilities in order to respond more effectively to the operational requirements of the Union. The establishment of a European armaments agency would also contribute to this (paragraph 3.6).
  • Include in the new Treaty on European Union a clause providing for collective defence against armed attack on the territory of the member states, which would be open to those countries wishing to sign up to it and allow others wishing to join subsequently to do so in due course (paragraph 3.7)."
  1. In the institutional sphere, it is advocated that "instruments be simplified" and integration take place of the three `pillars' of the Union, but that specific aspects be retained in some areas, such as foreign and security policy" (point 5.4).
  2. This "non legislative motion" also supports the idea of "a greater involvement of national parliaments" in the EU legislative process (paragraph 1.5). It underlines the fact that "the national parliaments, representing their respective sovereign nations, are a primary source of legitimacy and hence of democratic scrutiny. National legislative chambers need to play an active part in the work of the European Union, in particular through effective scrutiny of the actions of their respective national governments. They should therefore have an essential role in ensuring that the principle of subsidiarity is adhered to, through an "early warning" procedure to ensure compliance with that principle on the part of the Commission when the latter proposes legislation (paragraph 5.11). It is proposed "to set out the national Parliaments' tasks in relation to the decision-making process in a Protocol annexed to the Constitutional Treaty, which would constitute a genuine Charter for the legislative chambers of individual nations" (paragraph 5.12). Lastly, the motion observes that the adoption of a "Charter for National Parliaments" could strengthen and help institutionalise the latter's role within the Union. It must, inter alia, stipulate that the approval of the various houses of parliaments of the Member States is required for the Union to take on areas of responsibility not hitherto referred to in the Treaties (paragraph 5.12).
  3. During the discussions preceding the approval of this draft motion at the Palacio del Congreso de los Diputados on 16 December 2003, the Socialist parliamentary group stated:

"The Socialist Group feels that to enable the Cortes Generales (...) to scrutinise the Government as a member of the Council of the European Union more effectively, it is vital that the level of resources available for parliamentary scrutiny of European policy be substantially increased (...). It is necessary to strengthen the involvement of the Cortes Generales and their function in scrutinising European policy, and for Spain's position on the broad thrust of EU policy to be subject to parliamentary debate and decision, prior to its adoption by the institutions of the European Union, and, in particular, (...) the broad outlines of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including matters with defence implications".

  1. In the UK Parliament, on 4 December 2003, Mr Hancock, a member of the Assembly of WEU and Vice-Chairman of its Political Committee, asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs' representative, Mr MacShane, what his assessment was of the effect of "dissolving" Western European Union. Mr MacShane noted that:

"The Council of Western European Union, at Marseilles in November 2000, agreed on a number of measures `designed to address the consequences for the WEU of the changes under way', particularly the evolution of ESDP. This included putting into place residual functions and structures for the WEU. There have been no decisions to dissolve the WEU. The focus of EU Partners and NATO Allies has been primarily on strengthening European security arrangements through ESDP and the NATO/EU permanent agreements. WEU nations may want to look again at its structures and functions in the light of the outcome of the EU Inter-Governmental Conference".

  1. During debates in the House of Commons on 15 December 2003, George Foulkes, a member of the Assembly of WEU, put a question to the Secretary of State for Defence, Geoffrey Hoon, about the future of Western European Union. Mr Hoon answered that: "In November 2000, the Council of the Western European Union at Marseilles agreed a number of measures designed to address the consequences for the WEU of the changes under way, particularly the evolution of European security and defence policy". Mr Foulkes further asked whether he or one of his Ministers would agree to meet the British delegation to WEU to discuss further a greater and expanding role for that important institution". Mr Hoon emphasised that the Government "entirely accepted the need to consider further how to improve the arrangements for collective oversight of areas of EU activity, including ESDP".
  2. On 11 December 2003, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Defence, Lord Bach, speaking in the House of Lords on the subject of EU/NATO relations, stated that:

"(...) Where military action is required, it will be most effective when it comes in the form of partnerships, alliances and coalitions. For the United Kingdom, the key organisations through which we act will be NATO and the European Union. NATO remains the basis for the collective defence of its members, and continues to play an important role in crisis management. It is a transatlantic organisation through which the US engages with its allies in planning and conducting military operations. The EU's European Security and Defence Policy is complementary and provides a means to act where NATO as a whole is not engaged. The forthcoming intergovernmental conference is an opportunity to strengthen European security and defence policy and European military capabilities. As a result, we will strengthen NATO, without any unnecessary duplication".

  1. An oral evidence session on the "Italian European Council" took place, also on 11 December 2003, before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, with Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and other members of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The question of an independent EU military operational planning capability was also discussed.
  2. During the debates in the House of Commons, on 15 December 2003, the UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, made a statement giving details of the intergovernmental conference and going on to highlight the fact "that the European Council welcomed the proposals put forward by the United Kingdom, France and Germany on the future of European Defence, which is limited of course to peacekeeping and humanitarian issues. Those will strengthen the European Union's collective planning capacity while in no way duplicating or conflicting with NATO which remains the basis of Europe's territorial defence".
  3. At the 82nd session of the Plenary Assembly held in the Bundestag on 11 December 2003, the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, made a statement on behalf of the government regarding the Brussels European Council meeting due to be held on 12-13 December. Speaking about foreign policy and the European common security and defence policy, he first underlined the importance of the function of the Union's Foreign Minister which meant that Europe would no longer be "faceless" in its foreign policy dealings. "The creation of the post of Union Foreign Minster and his Ministry at European level represents a major advance for the Common Foreign and Security Policy". He recalled the achievements that had taken place in the area of the common security policy since the 1999 Cologne European Council: "Military and civil capabilities have been developed, the Berlin-plus agreements between the EU and NATO have been finalised. The Union has undertaken three crisis-management operations in the Balkans and another in the Congo and announced its readiness to take command of a military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina". He also highlighted the need to continue developing and strengthening the European Security and Defence Policy and said he would be in favour of the form of structured cooperation in the security and defence area as provided under the Constitution. He went on:

" (...) We must continue developing the European Security and Defence Policy. The provisions contained in the draft Constitutional Treaty would make a decisive contribution to that goal. In particular they provide for the possibility of structured cooperation in military and security matters. The form of words proposed more recently, which the Italian Presidency put forward at the Intergovernmental Conference following the agreement reached between France, Germany and the United Kingdom, constitutes a genuine improvement to the draft. However, no criticism thereby attaches to the Convention. There was no consensus then. Now there is one, we can truly speak of progress. This is an important factor in guaranteeing a common capability for external action. An agency to deal with armaments, research and military capabilities is also to be set up and there is to be a solidarity clause for combating the consequences of terrorist attacks and natural or man-made disasters."

In his view:

"The Union should have a greater capacity for action in order to cope with the challenges and risks of the 21st century. It should act more rapidly, more vigorously and more coherently. Thus in the Council we are about to adopt the European security strategy developed by the High Representative. This is also an enormous step forward. It shows that the European Union has now understood what it ought to have taken on board directly immediately after 11 September 2001".

Mr Fischer felt that security policy was not simply something that concerned the military sphere:

"If one examines closely the European common strategy as set out in the draft and which we are at present called on to adopt - the Federal Government has made a major contribution to getting this off the ground - it is noteworthy that it corresponds to a wider concept of security and is concerned with conflict resolution in the civilian sphere and preventive diplomacy, not just the military aspect. The draft does not only analyse the whole gamut of risks and dangers, but also contains a complete "tool-box" with answers to questions. This means we are going down the wider security road and undertaking crisis prevention and management in practice. I think I speak for everyone in saying that when it comes to implementing the wider security concept Europeans are indeed the people in the world who have made the most progress".

He also wanted to impress on everyone that strengthening the European Security and Defence Policy in no way ran counter to NATO and the transatlantic partnership.

"All efforts at reform in the field of foreign and security policy also have the purpose of strengthening NATO and the transatlantic partnership. NATO remains the basis of our collective defence. It is one of the central pillars of stability in the 21st century. No-one can or wants to call into question its fundamental importance in guaranteeing our security. A security and defence policy capable of allowing Europe to think and act can give substance to the idea of a European pillar of NATO. That is the whole issue. NATO will not face a threat in the 21st century if Europeans become stronger and their political will more united, if we have more operational foreign and security policy institutions and develop our capabilities. In Mr Solana's paper we have a European strategy. It will not weaken NATO. Rather it will consolidate the transatlantic link by strengthening the European pillar. In my view a weak Europe will only contribute in the long run to NATO being eroded, which is why carrying European security policy forward is also in our transatlantic partners' interests. We are seeking to attain complementarity between NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy, not competition. That is the principle we are working on."

  1. The period that has ensued has been one for mulling things over, and parliamentary debate on this issue has died down for the time being, pending further concrete initiatives from governments. This probably accounts for why little has been heard about the only real step forward achieved at the Naples foreign ministers "conclave" on 26 November 2003, which dealt specifically with common defence. The agreement of principle in this area reached by the Union member states was an achievement for the WEU parliamentarians and the culmination of the work of an Organisation which for 50 years has painstakingly wrought the unity of thinking and attitude among Europeans and European governments that led to the rapid emergence of last December's consensus. Without WEU's experience, this would very likely have remained an area of controversy and, without the practical achievements of the various parts of WEU, a project that carried little credibility. It is perhaps opportune here to quote as an illustration, the text of Article 1-40 paragraph 7 of the EU draft Constitutional Treaty, proposed by the Italian Presidency:

"If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power (...) in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and foreign policy of certain Member States.

Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under NATO, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundations of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation".

  1. The implications of these provisions were examined and discussed on 14 January 2004 at the meeting of the EU delegation of the French Senate. Hubert Haenel, the Rapporteur, drew a comparison between the results of the Convention's work in this area and draft Article I-40:

"The compromise achieved by the Italian Presidency does not affect the first four aspects of the Convention's draft text (widening the Petersberg tasks, solidarity clause, armaments agency and the possibility of missions being undertaken by a group of member states). However, it does make significant changes to the two points that allow for differences within the Union on defence issues: "structured cooperation" and "closer cooperation".

(a) Structured cooperation (Article I-40 paragraph 6, Article III-213 and specific protocol)

The compromise changes the arrangements for `structured cooperation' in one important respect; whereas in the Convention text such cooperation was linked to the Treaty and was to have come into force at the same time, its initiation is now subject to decision by the Council on the basis of a qualified majority vote, including in regard to the list of participating states. And while it was up to the existing members participating in structured cooperation to decide whether or not to admit new participants at a later date, the decision would be taken by qualified majority vote and not by consensus as provided in the Convention text. Even now, the wording of the text is such as to convey the idea that entry is automatic, provided the state wanting to join the structured cooperation fulfils the criteria and meets the conditions laid down in the protocol. Under the Italian compromise, initiating structured cooperation would become more difficult and it would be easier to join once launched. It would furthermore be possible for a participating state to leave the structured cooperation anytime it wished.

In addition, although only participating states would be entitled to vote when decisions were taken in the framework of structured cooperation, all member states would be involved in the discussion.

The Presidency compromise - as the Convention had asked - contains a protocol on the criteria for participation in structured cooperation. However, the protocol does not in fact specify a precise commitment in quantitative terms. The commitment is rather one of playing a full part in all ESDP developments. Hence national force contributions are not specified. The forces involved can even be multinational ones provided they can be deployed within a period of five to 30 days, sustainable for 30 days and consist both of combat troops and logistic support. This looks to me like beating a retreat from the spirit of the work of the Convention where most people were thinking along the lines of a minimum percentage contribution from GDP allocated to defence spending being used for participation in the structured cooperation. The impression given is that the IGC wanted to make sure that any member state could take part in a given structured cooperation, even if that meant a reduction in the scope of the latter and the resources available to it.

(b) Closer cooperation (Article I-40 paragraph 7)

The changes are greater still when it comes to `closer cooperation' on mutual defence. It must be said that right from the time the IGC began its work, the UK had made known its opposition to the inclusion in the Constitution of this type of clause, which it felt could duplicate Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.

In fact, the wording no longer suggests a form of cooperation between some member states but rather of a clause that extends to all of them. At the same time, and this is logical for a clause that is intended to apply universally, it is far less strongly worded. It states for instance that, in the event of aggression against a member state the other states `shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance' rather than `shall give it aid and assistance'. The military means are not explicitly mentioned and there is a stipulation that `this [clause] shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states'. From the point of view of a number of member states, the Union is not and should not be a military alliance. If this clause is to apply to all member states, it can no longer be a binding commitment. Consequently, the `mutual defence clause' now becomes more like an exhortation in principle and as such can no longer be regarded as a replacement for WEU's mutual defence clause.

It is further stipulated that the mutual defence clause shall be consistent with commitments under NATO `which for those states which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation'.

Should this compromise be regarded as the final word? True, it has been agreed by the four largest states since it is based on the agreement reached between France, Germany and the UK, and the Italian Presidency is now putting it forward as its own. However, it behoves us to be cautious. The text is in fact a part of the draft Constitution which is a package. And as the saying goes: until everything is agreed, nothing is agreed. As far as voting in the Council goes the Italian Presidency text, reverts to the double majority principle which Poland and Spain have rejected. Therefore the compromise, as it stands, cannot be regarded as consensual.

Moreover, it does not seem at all certain either that the Italian draft of the mutual defence clause, although now but a pale shadow of that originally envisaged by the Convention, has the approval of the Union's four "neutral" members. Those countries reject a clause which, like the text put forward by the Convention, would not create a binding obligation on them since they have the possibility of an opt out, yet once such a clause applies to all member states, they invariably find the constraints it imposes too heavy. Thus it was that after the Naples conclave they demanded a version that was still further watered down. They therefore submitted an alternative text to that of the Italian Presidency. Whereas the Presidency proposal states that if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have an obligation towards it of aid and assistance, the proposal from Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden merely says that the victim `may request that the other member states give it aid and assistance'. In point of fact, this version means nothing at all and carries no weight, as it is hard to see, even in the absence of a clause of this nature, what would prevent a state that fell victim to aggression from seeking help from the other member states. Given the present state of play as regards the work of the IGC, it is not at all certain whether the four states behind the proposal do in fact support the Presidency compromise or have abandoned the attempt to impose their own wording.

Therefore, in the cases of both structured cooperation and the mutual defence clause, there has been a watering down process in the IGC, calculated to encourage, as far as possible, all member states to participate, thereby preventing the formation within the framework of the Treaty of a group of countries motivated to act as a spearhead in defence matters. Similarly, resolute opposition has emerged to the inclusion within the Treaty framework of anything that might constitute mutual defence.

It is here that we run into a wider difficulty. In the run-up to the European Council meeting of 12 December, there was a feeling that there was only one more problem left to resolve, that of the voting arrangements in the Council. However, it now appears that this view of things was overly optimistic. The situation is in fact much less clear cut and the Irish Presidency seems to be having difficulty in grasping just where there is agreement and about what. Even when it comes to defence, it should not be assumed that, as far as the negotiations go, we are out of the woods yet."

  1. In the ensuing debate, there was no shortage of confusion over the meaning of words. Mr Didier Boulaud was the first to complain: "The whole idea of structured cooperation does not seem clear to me. What with structured cooperation, enhanced cooperation, closer cooperation and so on, we are hard put to know where we stand". Even Senator Xavier de Villepin, was forced to admit that he too "could not really see what the point of structured cooperation was" and continued: "We need a Constitution as soon as possible. The idea of a multi-speed Europe gives rise to a lot of suspicion, where it is not rejected out of hand. Many nations, particularly among the new entrants are worried about being left out of some aspects of European integration. They need reassuring. At the same time, we must avoid treaties we promised we would simplify being made even more complicated".
  2. Mr Haenel then asked President De Decker what he looked for most from the IGC, to which the President of the WEU Assembly replied:

"I have two basic concerns.

First, the modified Brussels Treaty, the legal basis for Europe's defence autonomy, reaches its term this year. It will be possible for the signatory states to exit from it. I am worried in case this should happen. For Germany in particular, unpleasant memories attach to the early years of WEU. But it would be dangerous in the extreme if the modified Brussels Treaty became obsolete before the Constitution entered into force.

Next, and this is the main thing I want to say, once all WEU's competences are transferred to the Union, there will need to be arrangements for parliamentary scrutiny that are at least the equivalent of what existed previously. In my mind, this has to be some through some form of interparliamentary oversight. The European Parliament would like to be the Union's only scrutiny body. But facts need to be faced: the European Security and Defence Policy, along with some aspects of cooperation on justice and home affairs, will stay largely intergovernmental. We are still a long way off the day when national parliaments hand over the totality of their sovereign powers, when they no longer authorise defence spending or troop deployment. A wholly, or partly, intergovernmental policy - which is what I personally would like to see - must be subject to an interparliamentary form of scrutiny, in which national parliaments have a major role to play. Remember, the United Kingdom is Europe's largest military power. How are you going to convince British MPs to commit their nation wholeheartedly to a Common Foreign and Security Policy if they discuss it only within the confines of the House of Commons? If that happened, their view would continue to be a national one. I come from a country where there is a good deal of support for a federal Europe. I am myself a staunch supporter of Europe, but I feel we have to be realistic about the need to deal with the common security and defence policy through an interparliamentary body".

  1. There were a number of comments critical of the lack of any reference to parliamentary oversight in the proposals on the new Constitution. There were rumours in the press from time to time which suggested forward movement on a number of issues of which there was no mention in political debates. Feelings ran highest in the countries not invited to the "mini-summits" between three or four heads of state and government, which tended to give the impression of decisions being taken by fewer and fewer people. Valdo Spini pointedly remarked when raising a question in the Italian parliament on 21 January 2004: "I would like to inform this Assembly of yet another incident of grave concern and one which is by no means an isolated occurrence. On 18 February a summit will take place in Berlin, which is to be attended by France, Germany and the United Kingdom. This will deal with economic issues, ostensibly in preparation for the spring meeting of the European Council. The three countries concerned had earlier reached an agreement on defence issues and delivered it to the Intergovernmental Conference, of which Italy held the presidency. Minister, would you care to look again at government policy, or are you happy to go on sending expressions of our appreciation after the event"?
  2. On 6 February 2004, Sir Menzies Campbell asked the UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Jack Straw, what steps had been taken in relation to the establishment of a cell with civil and military components in line with the European Council's decision of 12 December 2003. Mr Straw replied that the European Council had invited the EU Secretary-General/High Representative, Javier Solana, to propose measures for the improvement of the preparation of European Union operations having recourse to NATO assets and capabilities and for the establishment of a cell with civil and military components. The European Council had concluded that these measures should enter into force as early as possible in 2004. He added that the UK Government supported the strengthening of NATO/EU planning links and of ESDP planning capacity, particularly in the civilian/military area.
  3. Sir Menzies Campbell further asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps he expected to take in regard to implementing the recommendations of the Solana paper adopted at the European Council on 12 December 2003. Mr Straw answered that the Government expected initial implementation of the European Security Strategy to concentrate on four priority areas identified by the European Council: effective multilateralism with the UN at its core, the fight against terrorism, a strategy towards the Middle East region and a comprehensive policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. He said the UK Government was committed to the full implementation of the Strategy to help bring coherence and greater robustness to the EU's external policies.
  4. On 15 February 2004, under pressure from Mr Manzella, Mr Martino, the Italian Defence Minister, addressed the Italian Senate Defence Committee, summarising broad trends in European defence policy at the close of the six-month EU presidency. Parliamentarians were thus informed of developments in progress and the results achieved. The minister first referred to the Union's capabilities, where by and large the Helsinki Headline Goal had been met by end 2003, and which, despite some shortcomings, constituted an operational potential, as the crisis-management missions already undertaken had shown. Artemis and Concordia had revealed a degree of capability that was very encouraging. The minister went on to summarise progress in defence reform through the IGC's work on the Constitution for Europe, stating that:

"The chapter of the Treaty dealing with foreign and security and defence policy was agreed unanimously and can consequently be regarded as having been approved, the more so since, with the adoption of the Italian Presidency proposal, it was universally agreed that discussion of the chapters already approved need not, in all probability, be reopened".

  1. During the ensuing question-time, Mr Gubert put the following question to the minister:

" ... The second issue relates to something you did not mention in your statement but which I would like to know about. The Assembly of Western European Union has on a number of occasions noted the need for an interparliamentary scrutiny body for defence policy, given that virtually all operational decisions will from now on be taken by the European Union. The situation is far from satisfactory, as the modified Brussels Treaty has never been assimilated into the EU. What is Italy's position on the matter? Personally, I would be in favour of keeping an interparliamentary forum but I should like to know whether the Italian government is of the same mind?"

  1. To which Mr Martino replied:

"My reply would be that I share your view entirely. I feel that the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union can play a very effective part in defence scrutiny. I am a former member of the Assembly and WEU also has a certain sentimental value for me because my father, during his career, had a hand in setting it up. My answer to your question, therefore, is `yes'".

  1. During a debate on the outcome of the European summit on 25 and 26 March 2004, which took place in the Bundestag, on 1 ApriL 2004, Hans Martin Bury, Germany's Minister for Europe, informed parliamentarians of the decision by the European Council "from now on to apply Article 42 of the draft Constitution in the event of a member state falling victim to a terrorist attack. This solidarity clause means that should such a thing occur, all member countries will mobilise the means at their disposal to support the state concerned". He told members that although that clause had given rise to much controversy during the debates on the draft Constitution "the EU had today given proof of its solidarity and determination".

1 Adopted unanimously and without amendment by the Assembly on 2 June 2004 (2nd sitting).

2 "Delivering Security in a changing World - Defence White Paper" (Cm 6041 I) and Supporting Essays (Cm 6041 II), presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, December 2003, Ministry of Defence, http://www.mod.uk .

3 Cf. Briefing by Dr Ernst A. van Hoek, Chairman, WEAG Netherlands Chairmanship, 2003-2004, Meetings of the Presidential, Defence, Political, Technological and Aerospace and Parliamentary and Public Relations Committees, Brussels, 21 January 2004.

4 Diario de sesiones de las Cortes generales - Comisiones mixtas - VII Legislatura Núm. 159. 3 de diciembre 2003, Sesión Núm. 59.

5 Cf : Boletín oficial de las Cortes generales - sección Cortes generales - VII legislatura - serie a: actividades parliamentarias - 19 December 2003 - Num. 516.