DOCUMENT A/1855

2 June 2004

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European cooperation on informing the public about defence issues

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Document A/1855

2 June 2004

European cooperation on informing the public
about defence issues

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations²
by Mr Crema, Rapporteur (Italy, Socialist Group)

^{_______________}

¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 6 May 2004.

² Members of the Committee: Mr Debarge (Chairman); Mrs Castro Masaveu, Lord Russell-Johnston (Vice-Chairmen); Mr Adam, Mrs Agudo Cadarso, Mr Banks (Alternate: Mrs McCafferty), Baroness Billingham, Mrs Bousakla, MM Budin, Duivesteijn, Mrs Eymer, Mrs Fernández Capel Baños, Mr Graas, Ms Jäger, Mrs Katseli, MM Legendre, Loncle, Martins, Masson, Naro, Occhetto (Alternate: Crema), Ramoudt, Selva (Alternate: Ianuzzi), Mrs Smith, MM Vieira, van Winsen, Wodarg.

Associate members: MM Gawlowski, Gülçiçek, Gündüz Irfan, Gündüz Süleyman, Mrs Hlödversdottir, MM Kaminski, Kelemen, Mrs Kosa Kovacs, Mr Lorenz, Mrs Novakova, Mr Reikvam, Mrs Roithova, N...

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

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RECOMMENDATION 743¹

(i) Aware of the importance of communicating with the public, in order to gain greater support for the establishment of an effective system of common defence in Europe;

(ii) Observing that European citizens acknowledge that threats to their security exist, but do not appear to be ready to support the additional investment that is necessary to tackle them;

(iii) Desirous that the public share its convictions and support new programmes for the redistribution of financial and human resources in order to meet the security needs of the 21^st century;

(iv) Observing that the network of communications between national defence authorities in Europe is highly inadequate,

1. Invest more in tools for communicating with the public so as to inform it about the solutions proposed for the setting up of a security and defence system in Europe;
2. Rise above the national defence framework and make increasing use of European images and language;
3. Establish permanent links between defence authorities with a view to creating a communications network on a basis common to the European countries;
4. Facilitate the exchange of personnel with military training, making provision for the reciprocal secondment of larger numbers of staff, and involve the representatives of civil society and academic institutions in training programmes.

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1. When the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations decided to look into the subject of how the public at large is informed about defence issues in the new European context, it rapidly realised that the situation varies greatly from one country to another and indeed is often contradictory. A number of countries have expressed the desire to set up a common security and defence system but in practice there is no real consistency in the positions they adopt because national policies are influenced by history and the economic choices specific to each country and also have to take account of the different views prevailing in public opinion.
2. While defence remains an area of national policy, it has now also gained a European dimension. This meets with the approval of public opinion, which is more receptive to a European commitment in this domain than to involvement on a purely national scale. People seem to be more in favour of a joint European defence endeavour than of an increase in national capabilities. Although a collective awareness is rapidly being formed, the general public is not being given a clear message about the efforts such an endeavour entails.
3. Yet the problem is one besetting all countries and has both a national and a European dimension. It has to be tackled in its entirety so that national action is compatible with European developments and to ensure that countries do not take a series of different initiatives when it would be preferable for them to go down one road with the same objective in mind.
4. Clearly, political decisions must have the support of citizens. This requires institutions which maintain contacts, promote exchanges of information and reflect on how best to satisfy the electorate. Hence the importance of understanding trends in one's own country and those in the countries of our partners though the work done by public or private institutes which produce statistics and conduct opinion polls, taking account nevertheless of limitations as to their reliability and frequent discrepancies between forecasts and reality. The institutes which monitor trends in public opinion generally include questions about security in their surveys but rarely ask questions about defence, an area in which they have to contend with a maze of military authorities who all have their own communications strategy, especially as regards recruitment and projecting a positive image of a country's armed forces.
5. This applies to the situation at the national level given that there is no European cooperation in this area either in terms of concepts or resources. Each country is tackling the fundamentally important problem of future common European security and defence institutions in an amateurish way on the basis of existing institutions, these being structures built around the conventional model of national defence that relies on compulsory conscription. Work is being done as if we were still in the context that prevailed for fifty years when there was a military balance between two political blocs and when security and defence issues were not at the centre of public attention. The fact that everyone had to do national service meant that military authorities had no need to project an image of the armed forces that would attract future generations to a commitment to active service because such service was perceived more as a temporary obligation. For their part the political authorities did not seek to develop consensus into anything more than an acceptance of the major decisions as to whether a country should continue to form part of one or other of the alliances that resulted from the cold war.
6. When international crises brought defence policy decisions into the limelight and international missions took centre stage in foreign policy, public opinion fluctuated wildly about issues which had hitherto been kept in the background. Today, defence questions are being given increasing coverage in the media. But what are governments doing to explain the issues in this debate? How is information being circulated? Where are the sources of information in government departments and what are the possibilities for cooperation among European partner countries?
7. It has to be said that the title of the present report is more wishful thinking than reality. It would have been better to refer to the "lack" of European cooperation on informing the public about defence issues. Your Rapporteur will endeavour to examine the problem with a view to submitting to the Assembly a recommendation intended to change the present situation so as to bring about more cooperation among European countries in this particular area.

8. The Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations has regularly monitored the public's views about defence in general and the proposals for a common European defence. Your Rapporteur studied the situation in June 2002 in a report containing Recommendation 710 on "The trend in European public opinion on security and defence in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks"². In December 2003, Mrs Agudo Cadarso, a member of the Spanish Senate, submitted her report on "The impact of the Iraq crisis on public opinion in Europe" and the Assembly adopted Recommendation 738 contained therein³. In between those two reports the Assembly delved into the problem of "Developing a security and defence culture in the ESDP" in a report submitted by Mrs Katseli, a member of the Greek Parliament, which led it to adopt Recommendation 724⁴.
9. The decline in European public interest in security and defence matters was the result of a long period of peace due to the co-existence of two political blocs which kept the balance. But people were gradually shaken out of their indifference by the crises which started to appear in the 1990s. The nearby conflicts in the Balkans, international military operations and the resurgence of terrorism have brought the problem to the fore. Politicians have been fairly quick to react to this new situation but the same cannot be said for administrations and citizens, whose inertia tends to make them slower to respond.
10. To take public opinion first: at a seminar held in Paris on 5 November 2001 on the theme "Building Defence Europe with the support of public opinion", which was organised by the WEU Assembly and the French Senate, our colleague Lluis Maria de Puig, a member of the Spanish Senate and a former President of the WEU Assembly, made the following comment in his introductory address: "It cannot be said that defence needs are always clearly perceived or understood by public opinion". He said it was true that defence was one of the most sensitive and difficult subjects for the public to understand. It was therefore necessary for all national parliaments and the WEU Assembly "to try and make our citizens understand what the challenges are for security and what obligations a European country has in terms of its defence and the security of its territory". In describing the changes that had taken place following the events of 11 September 2001, Mr de Puig noted that the situation had changed by contrast to the cold war years when European public opinion was not really aware of defence-related issues and defence expenditure was not a priority item in European countries' budgets. He pointed out that the gap between public opinion and government defence requirements had narrowed: "For the first time, public opinion has woken up to a real danger in the form of a large-scale terrorist threat for which it was unprepared". Mr de Puig considered that in view of the current situation, the time had come to familiarise the public with security and defence problems and explain how vitally important it was to build a European defence system able to rise to the challenge posed by terrorism and armed conflict, so as to secure popular support for the action being taken by the governments.
11. This introductory address was followed by a speech from Mr Emile Blanc, Chairman of EuroDéfense, an association which promotes the exchange of information and the analysis, study and discussion of ideas among national associations in ten European countries. He stressed that reactions in public opinion often had an irrational basis: "When individuals are deprived of freedom and confronted with danger, they have no hesitation in pitching in and fighting, but in the absence of an immediate threat, public opinion is indifferent, passive and even blind. (...) informing, explaining, discussing and educating are what we should be doing".
12. Participants at the seminar analysed the results of a poll on public opinion in the 15 EU member states conducted in April 2001 at the request of the Belgian Defence Minister. It revealed what people's views were prior to the 11 September attacks which were still a few months away⁵. The views expressed on the role of a future European army showed that there was not much enthusiasm among Europe's citizens for Petersberg missions: fewer than one out of two Europeans was in favour of them, even though their legitimacy was acknowledged to a far greater degree in the six founding member states. The conclusions to be drawn from the survey were that while the idea of a European defence was fairly well known in most countries, it remained a somewhat vague concept and support for it was superficial". Although the majority of Europeans approved the concept of setting up a European defence in one form or another, i.e. with a policy and structure that were not just national, they were still a long way off being in favour of a properly integrated defence policy.
13. This implied that there was no real convergence of opinion in Europe about a common security and defence policy and that the public's views about it very often reflected those of their own government. A number of speakers in the debate in fact stressed this absence of convergence. Mr Guardans made the following point: "It cannot be said that there is a large body of people in Europe who respond to the same impulses, watch the same news programme, read the same newspapers, listen to the same radio station, note what political leaders say at a press conference or vote simultaneously (...). This is therefore a problem that concerns the European integration project as a whole, not just defence policy (...). There is no single European public opinion but 15 different ones (...)".
14. Things have changed since 11 September 2001. The world has been confronted with the new problem of terrorism closer to home and public support for government decisions has been sought on a number of occasions. During the Iraq crisis political decision-makers were confronted with the findings of innumerable opinion polls. But the main question respondents had to answer was whether or not they were in favour of military intervention and not what they thought of common European positions or intervention. At the very least, the views they expressed pointed to the absence of any consultation in this connection.
15. On the other hand, people were clearly more aware than previously of the dangers of terrorism and the new threats and many surveys concentrated on this development. Of particular relevance was the opinion poll organised by IPSOS in November 2003 on "Europe and its means of defence". It showed that Europeans have the feeling that they are living in an increasingly threatening world dominated by international terrorism: for more than six out of ten Europeans threats to world peace and security had increased compared with the previous year. International terrorism was still seen as one of the main threats (71%) behind that of the rise in extremism (89%). Europeans therefore considered it wholly justified for their country's armed forces to intervene in a wide variety of situations: almost all of them (95%) considered such intervention legitimate for humanitarian reasons and nine out of ten approved of intervention to defend their country's national territory. Never before had the desire to see Europe capable of taking military action independently of the United States been so strong in all the countries concerned. In Germany this view was taken by 90% of respondents and by 83% in France. The figure for the United Kingdom was slightly lower (73%) but still represented a big majority.
16. The new situation has therefore brought about a very clear desire for a European defence policy and for the joint procurement and development of technologies and equipment. Although not much is known about it, people want a European armaments agency. However, when asked what they think about increasing defence spending, respondents are far less enthusiastic because of the difficult economic climate. The number of those who want to keep the status quo is rising, probably because the joint programmes that have been set up are neither well known nor really understood by most citizens.
17. As has been the case every year since 1973, Eurobarometer conducted an opinion poll last autumn. The object of these surveys is to find out what European citizens think about the European Union, its policies and institutions. The most recent poll, whose results were published in February 2004, was conducted at a time when the general situation was gloomy. It revealed that European citizens continue to feel the need for security, but also for information. Respondents were asked first to say which were the two biggest problems their country had to contend with. Their replies were the same as those given in the earlier opinion poll conducted when the war in Iraq was at its height: unemployment came first (42%) followed by insecurity (28%). The order of priority of the issues most frequently mentioned varied in different groups of countries: maintaining peace and security in Europe came top of the list in four countries (Denmark, Greece, Finland and Luxembourg); it came second in three other countries (Austria, Germany and the Netherlands) and third in another group (France, Italy and Sweden).
18. The fight against terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking was considered a priority by 88% of citizens and particularly, as far as terrorism was concerned, by Spain which has had to contend with ETA bomb attacks, and by the United Kingdom which is engaged alongside the United States in the fight against international terrorism. 54% of those polled said they thought the EU played a positive role in this respect and almost one out of two citizens considered that it was in this area that the EU was most effective and should coordinate action against terrorism.
19. The EU was also credited with playing a positive role in the defence field by 44% of respondents while 16% did not agree. 26% had no opinion. Of those in the first category, Germans (54%), Spaniards and Luxembourg nationals (50% for both) were in the majority. This opinion was also shared by a majority of respondents in all the countries with the exception of Austria, Finland and Sweden. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the EU's role in the world is viewed much more positively by Europeans than that of the United States. Moreover, over two thirds of those polled thought that the EU's peacekeeping and security activities were very or fairly effective and in nine member states this was the area in which the EU was seen to be most effective. These aspects came second in the list of priorities in five countries and third in Finland.
20. A substantial majority of the public attached importance to the principle of a common security policy and a common defence policy. 64% of those polled supported the CFSP even though this percentage was not quite as high as it had been in the first two surveys (67% in spring 2003 and autumn 2002). More than four out of five people were in favour of the ESDP: 83% of respondents in Luxembourg, 81% of Italians and 80% of Belgians. However, there was striking difference in countries such as the United Kingdom (48%), Finland (46%) and Sweden (44%). Overall, there was a drop of four percentage points (70%) in support for a common security and defence policy whereas the number of those opposed to it went up by four points (to 19%). Neutrality continued to predominate in Ireland (stable at 61%), Finland (down two points to 52%) and Sweden (down seven points to 48%). The United Kingdom (down two points to 35%) was the only country in which the number of those opposed to a common security and defence policy was higher than the number of those in favour. The strongest support for such a policy was to be found in Luxembourg (78%), Italy (76%) and Greece (75%).
21. In parallel, the poll revealed that 53% of European citizens considered it a priority for the EU to assert its political and diplomatic importance in the world. One out of two was accordingly of the opinion that defence-related decisions should be taken jointly in the EU and more than seven out of ten shared this view as regards foreign policy decisions. However, it is interesting to note that the principle of decisions being taken by the EU attracted less support than previously in 13 of the 15 EU member states and more particularly in Sweden (down 10 points to 40%), France (down 10 points to 49%) and Luxembourg (down 9 points to 53%). Most Danes were in favour of decisions being taken by their own government and this view was shared by 46% of Finnish and 32% of British respondents. However, the greatest support was for a common position to be adopted in the event of an international crisis (at 81% this figure was down only two points).
22. Moreover, developing the CFSP and ESDP still enjoys broad support among the 15 EU member states. The idea of the EU having a seat in the UN Security Council was supported by 64% of respondents while 69% approved of the idea of setting up a rapid reaction force. The findings of the autumn opinion poll also confirmed the trend, which came to light in spring 2003, of people having less confidence in the EU. This is consistent with the poorer image Europeans have of all national and international institutions. In the poll the EU's confidence rating dropped by three points with only 41% of respondents stating that they still had confidence in the Union. This lower rating was apparent in 11 countries and remained stable in Austria. The country in which it dropped furthest was Denmark (down 10 points). However, the rating improved in Greece (up 10 points), Spain (up 7 points) and Ireland (up 3 points).
23. Asking people how they rate their own knowledge of the EU is a good way of assessing general attitudes towards the EU and more particularly the need for information. As in spring 2003, 27% of those polled in 2004 thought their knowledge of the EU was fairly sound. But this varied from one country to another. Austria was the country which registered the biggest number of people fitting into this category. However, the country in which the number of those who considered they had the poorest knowledge of the EU was Portugal whereas in the previous poll it had been the United Kingdom. More specifically, four out of ten Austrians thought they had a fairly good knowledge of the EU. They were followed by the Swedes (36%), the Germans (35%), the Greeks and Danish (34%) and the Dutch and Finns (31%). At the opposite end of the spectrum were the Portuguese (15%), the Spanish (18%) and the British (19%).
24. An analysis of the relationship between support for EU membership and a self-evaluation of knowledge about the EU showed that, on average, the more people thought they knew what the EU was all about, the more they were likely to support it. Indeed, 64% of respondents who considered themselves well informed thought their country's membership of the EU was a "good thing" as opposed to only 37% who felt they did not really know much about the Union. But this is relative because less well informed respondents turned out to be no more opposed to the EU (at 14%) than those with a good knowledge (19%). The main characteristic of people in that category was that they either had no opinion or were indifferent towards the EU.
25. The autumn opinion poll also asked questions, for the first time, about what people thought about how the media handled European news. 37% of those polled thought not enough was said about the EU whereas 44% were of the opinion that the level of media coverage was satisfactory. The traditional media − television (66%), the daily press (46%) and radio broadcasts (31%) − were the sources EU citizens used and preferred most. 15% of respondents said they used the Internet to obtain information but this option was less popular than a detailed brochure (21%) or small leaflet (16%). 73% wanted to see joint decision-making in the EU as regards providing information about the Union. It would therefore seem that for the purposes of informing the public about defence issues, the EU should use those tools to reach as many citizens as possible.
26. Finally, another poll, conducted in February 2004 by EOS Gallup Europe under the auspices of Eurobarometer, tried to ascertain how much European citizens knew about proposals concerning the future constitution. People were asked for their views on the creation of a European army. It would appear that there is great confusion over this particular issue. This may depend on whether European citizens want such an army or not. The public was divided about the statement in the poll that "a European army has been set up": in the 25 EU member states only 44% of those polled gave the correct answer "false", but it was surprising that almost as many (43%) were convinced that it was true. Geographic differences were also evident, with the citizens of the Nordic countries seemingly better informed. In Finland and Sweden 56% of respondents replied correctly followed by those in the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. People in Cyprus and Greece were among the least well informed with only 21% and 26% giving the right answer. An analysis of the socio-demographic categories showed that in those countries which already belong to the EU more women than men gave the right answers, whereas in the accession countries the opposite was true. However, when it came to age, the finding was similar in all the countries: those best informed about the EU are young people. The conclusion drawn from the poll is surprising as most of those questioned stated this time round that they were satisfied with the amount of information they had received about the future constitution and were not under the impression that they did not know much about the issues that mattered.

27. The problem of communicating with the public has been addressed in various ways in almost all departments with responsibility for the military as this is essential if programmes are to be successful and the efforts made are to be appreciated. All political regimes allow the action taken by armed forces in a war to be covered by the media, to such a point that public opinion today expects explanations about the conduct of military operations. When the international situation was such that Europe was at peace for a considerable period of time, other values emerged bringing with them different priorities. The task of sending out positive signals and making proposals about military programmes is a great deal more complicated today than it was in the past.
28. In the course of carrying out its study, the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations attended a hearing on 20 October 2003 by Mr Jean-François Bureau, the French Defence Ministry spokesman. In explaining how the administration was tackling the problems of organising information and communicating with the public he said: "Communications, an area in which the armed forces and military authorities were precursors as far as the state is concerned, have changed out of all recognition in the process of moving towards professional armed forces and reforming the defence system in accordance with the decisions taken in 1996. Defence communications are of the essence for ensuring that professional armed forces are effective. Their purpose is to establish a permanent relationship with the public based on exchanges of views and knowledge, which should help foster a defence mindset while contributing to operational missions".
29. In France, the creation in 1969 of the SIRPA, the armed forces' information and public relations service, was a vital step for communications because, for the first time, the authorities took on board the need to inform the public about major defence issues and were particularly anxious that French citizens should understand the usefulness of national service and the relevance of France's policy of nuclear deterrence. Over 30 years on, the DICOD, the delegation for defence information and communications, has responsibility for the job of informing and communicating which started in the 1970s. It has adapted its task to modern-day armed forces' missions, and made adjustments consistent with the reform of the defence system as a whole and with the wholly changed situation resulting from media developments and the advent of new technologies.
30. Mr Bureau stressed that the main objectives for defence communications fell into three categories: helping to meet the requirements for armed forces' recruitment and restructuring targets; facilitating strategic planning and helping the military authorities with the task of carrying out their missions by developing a defence mindset; playing a full part in state reforms by making objectives designed to improve performance and effectiveness transparent and understandable so as to strengthen their credibility and therefore their legitimacy. A differentiation had gradually to be made between the various groups targeted and the message adapted accordingly. To begin with it should be intended for a small group of citizens who might wish to pursue a military career. It should then be geared to a section of the public which was already specialised in military matters and therefore had a specific interest in them. Finally, it should be directed at the public at large. In the first instance the public authorities needed to define their objectives and requirements. In France for instance a model had already been proposed and making progress with the move towards professional armed forces was one of the main goals laid down in the defence planning law of 27 January 2003 which covered the period 2003-2008. The armed forces would undergo radical change over that period. They had defined the profiles of young recruits to meet their needs, identified the volume of resources available by speciality and embarked on information campaigns designed to attract applications that would enable them to meet their requirements. The Ministry of Defence was therefore taking its place in the labour market and had to compete with other employers in the public sector, in which certain security-related jobs were quite similar (the civilian police, military police (gendarmerie), prison officers, fire fighters, rural police force, customs officers). The main objective of those responsible for communications was to send out a positive message that would arouse interest and persuade recruits that they would be doing a useful, professional job, which could also lead to other career possibilities.
31. The structures that exist in the WEU countries are similar in this respect. They consist of a centre with responsibility for communications that is attached to the central press service of each defence ministry. Many national initiatives such as armed forces' days, open door events, national holiday celebrations, exhibitions and sporting events are organised on a regular basis. Each army corps has its own recruitment policy and there is even competition between the various branches of the armed forces in which the types of job and professional outlook vary considerably. There is no doubt that the higher the level of technology a job entails, the more it is geared to a motivated pool of recruitment and it is quite often the case that students in some military academies are subsequently sought after for high-level employment in the civil sector. In this connection one only has to think of the history of civil aviation, which in most countries in the modern-day world developed on the basis of the experience and performance of air forces. Paradoxically, there is a need to prevent some armed forces' jobs from being exploited and forces losing the benefit of the training investment they have made. This explains why they often apply a condition as to length of service so that trained personnel stay in the forces for a minimum number of years.
32. The second target group for information has to be wider as the public at large has to be convinced of the need to carry out given missions. It is a fact that, with the exception of national defence, there is no consensus on the need for military intervention in other forms and for other purposes. In today's society the legitimacy of the use of force is not a concept with which everyone agrees and levels of acceptance differ. Opinion polls show that people tend to approve of the use of force when the decision is taken by the United Nations. On a smaller geographic scale the use of force by Europe would perhaps have the same chance of winning approval. In contrast, public opinion, which is influenced by differences between countries' domestic policies, is less likely to approve the action of an individual country. All partner countries have to contend with internal differences of option, which may result in military decisions being removed from national interests. In such cases opposition parties are often quick to take the opportunity to create difficulties for the government. Communications would also be made easier if they were not hostage to political manoeuvring. This brings us back to our case that there is a need for a European dimension to communications strategy in the field of defence by pooling national efforts.

33. People often talk about a "defence mindset" to express awareness of universal values that must be defended and of the will to do so. It is clear that this must be impressed on the citizens of each country taking account of its history and the values that apply in particular situations, even though the phenomenon of globalisation is tending increasingly to blur individual features.
34. In the absence of a clearly identifiable threat, the challenge facing society is to take effective action, maintain cohesion and preserve the values which give meaning to our community and which must on all accounts be passed on to future generations. In an address to students at the start of the 1994 academic year, the Rector of the Academy of Paris made the following comments:

35. Before addressing the issue of how to build a European defence culture, it would be wise to reflect on the fact that this cannot be done simply by aggregating the national cultures of individual countries, even if they form the basis for future developments. European countries are very different in this respect in that their assessment of military power and the need to retain it, and of their objectives for the future is closely bound up with their own history.
36. The history of the 20^th century is still very much in people's minds and the wars which ravaged Europe have left behind the memory of a relationship between citizens and armed forces that is deeply influenced by the historical role played by the latter. But in some European countries the image of the military has disappeared to be replaced by a utopian vision of the ideology of peace, which continues to act as a brake on modern-day action by Europe. In Italy for example, the fact that the army swore allegiance to the monarch, who was associated with the fascist movement and responsible for Italy's eventual defeat, has not left subsequent generations with a very favourable image of the armed forces. For 50 years the government did not bother to make any investment and was content to maintain a skeleton army. It was helped in this by the fact that conscription was compulsory and reduced unemployment among young people. On the other hand, the defence industry has fared better because of economic development in certain sectors and as a result of programmes drawn up by groups of private or state-subsidised companies. The army has also been affected by competition from other, more effective institutions where there is greater mobility such as in the carabinieri or the police force. They also project a more positive image of career prospects and this is important for young people, especially those who have to do at least one year's national service and have the impression that it is a waste of time. In addition, from time to time rumours of a coup d'état have been rife in Italy and have prejudiced respect for the military because of the assumption that they have links with secret associations.
37. The situation is very different in the United Kingdom where the role of the army in colonial conquests, victory in two world wars and loyalty to institutions have built up a climate of confidence which serves as a basis for investment policy decisions. There is public support for a substantial defence budget even though, like other countries, Britain has to contend with social problems that require the government to dig ever deeper into the state coffers.
38. There is still a long way to go before future generations find themselves imbued with a homogenous defence culture in European countries. It will perhaps be necessary to forget the past in order to take a new, resolutely international approach that will solve the current problem of a lack of ambition in national policies. European integration could provide the ideal opportunity for a general rethink and offer a more modern vision of how to make an effective response to the dangers of the 21^st century. Various opinion polls have shown that the image of a European army meets the public's requirements. Many people see this means of taking action collectively as the solution to the problem of limited national assets.

39. Investing directly in a collective European approach, rather than trying to take the sum total of all the various national approaches to defence would pay dividends. The new enlarged European Union provides a historic opportunity to go down that road. Given that today's threats target a geopolitical entity, the response to them must not be fragmented and future generations will have to adapt to a situation that affects Europe as a whole. We as parliamentarians must therefore change the tenor of our messages and project our ideas to a European public, taking the view that defence is a major issue which concerns all European countries. Our recommendation might therefore be "talk European". Your Rapporteur believes that defence communications are still too limited to national concerns. But even at the national level visibility is not satisfactory and must be improved. So, given that there has to be change, we may as well take a radical step in one go. We must change the language we use so that our proposals fit into the new European security and defence context. Why not propose a single slogan and a joint communications programme so that the message transcends national boundaries? We should take advantage of the fact that public opinion is leaning more towards a European rather than a national response. We must promote exchanges between European military authorities and together create the momentum the armed forces in our countries need. We need to find mutual solutions to the problem of national service. There is a huge amount of work to be done and we must not tackle it in isolation. As is the case with industrial investment, the human aspect must be taken into account in a common perspective, and planning adapted accordingly. Europe's decision-makers need a revolution of this sort if they are to make the right choices at the start of the 21^st century.

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¹ Adopted unanimously and without amendment by the Assembly on 2 June 2004 (2^nd sitting).

² Assembly Document 1781 of 4 June 2002;

http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2002/1781.pdf

³ Assembly Document 1838 of 3 December 2003;

http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2003/1838.pdf

⁴ Assembly Document 1816 of 3 June 2003;

http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2003/1816.pdf

⁵ See Assembly Document 1781 of 4 June 2002 referred to in footnote 1.