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Rapidly deployable European land forces –
reply to the annual report of the Council

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mr Kucheida, Rapporteur (France, Socialist Group)

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
THE INTERPARLIAMENTARY EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE ASSEMBLY
43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16
Tel. +33(0)1.53.67.22.00 – Fax: +33(0)1.53.67.22.01
E-mail: assembly@weu.int
Internet: <http://assembly.weu.int>

*Rapidly deployable European land forces –
reply to the annual report of the Council*

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¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 10 May 2004.

² *Members of the Committee:* Mr Wilkinson (Chairman); MM McNamara, Goris (Vice-Chairmen); Mr Acosta Padrón, Mrs Aguiar, MM de Arístegui San Román (Alternate: *Puche Rodríguez*), Barquero Vázquez (Alternate: *Agramunt Font de Mora*), Lord Burlison, MM Contestabile, Cox, Dreyfus-Schmidt (Alternate: *Le Guen*), Duivesteijn, Freiherr v. Guttenberg KT, Glesener, Goulet, Gubert (Alternate: *Tirelli*), Henry, Jacquat, *Jardim*, Jonas, Kortenhorst (Alternate: *van der Linden*), Leibrecht, *Lengagne*, Medeiros Ferreira, Monfils, Nikolopoulos, de Puig, Ranieri, *Rigoni*, Rivolta (Alternate: *Nessa*), Schneider, Siebert, Szabo, Varvitsiotis, Vrettos, Walter, Wegener.

Associate members: MM Açıkgöz, Bilgehan, Çavusoglu, Hegyi, Herczog, Hjörleifsson, Ibl, Janas, Komorowski, Lorenz, Necas, Mrs Nybakk, MM Surjan, Tekelioglu, Wrzodak, N ...

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

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RECOMMENDATION 742¹***on rapidly deployable European land forces – reply to the annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Taking note of the information on the implementation of the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM) and the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) contained in the second part of the 49th annual report of the Council;
- (ii) Recalling the terms of the European Council's Helsinki Declaration (1999) in which it underlines "its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises";
- (iii) Noting that the provisions on structured cooperation in the draft EU Constitutional Treaty should facilitate the deployment of armed forces in the event of a crisis;
- (iv) Stressing the resolve of the EU member states to acquire the necessary military capabilities to meet the headline goal, which means being able to deploy at 60 days' notice for a minimum period of one year 50 000 to 60 000-strong troops capable of conducting the full range of Petersberg missions, including those set out in the draft Constitutional Treaty, in particular for the fight against terrorism;
- (v) Recalling the decision of the NATO member states to set up the 21 000-strong NATO Response Force (NRF) capable of taking action outside NATO's traditional area of intervention;
- (vi) Noting that wars are won on the ground with sufficient numbers of troops to create the security conditions that are necessary for peace;
- (vii) Aware of the essential role of land forces for the various aspects of peacemaking and peacekeeping missions: combat, assistance, intelligence and continuous control over the theatre of operations;
- (viii) Noting the need for a chain of command that can be deployed to remote theatres and that has the necessary interoperability to coordinate units from the different nations;
- (ix) Stressing the importance of logistic support for maintaining land forces in remote theatres for long periods of time;
- (x) Noting that reserve forces can play a considerable part in deployed forces by providing skills that are specific to civil society, but aware of the specific problems involved in the use of reservists;
- (xi) Welcoming the success of the recent interventions by European land forces deployed for EU-led peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Operation Concordia) and the Congo (Operation Artemis);
- (xii) Noting that European troops are fully engaged in the NATO operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan;
- (xiii) Stressing the existence of strong European cooperation in the field of land forces, for example in the framework of the Franco-German Brigade, the European Corps, Eurofor and Finabel;
- (xiv) Welcoming the recent cooperation established within the European Union under the headline goal and European Capability Action Plan (ECAP),

¹ Adopted unanimously and without amendment by the Assembly on 2 June 2004 (1st sitting).

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue in its annual report to provide the Assembly with information on the European Union's and NATO's new crisis-management capability goals for 2010, paying particular attention to the development of rapidly deployable land forces;
2. Invite the WEU countries to:
 - (a) Participate actively in the European land forces' cooperation that is organised through the meetings of the European chiefs of army staff (Finabel) and the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP);
 - (b) Ensure that in the context of further specialisation and rationalisation their defence budgets are sufficient to equip and train their land forces for Petersberg missions that may be assigned to them under the headline goal, in particular for militarily self-sustaining long-duration operations in remote theatres;
 - (c) Equip their forces with automated command and rapid communications systems, making use in particular of satellite-based communications in order to facilitate interoperability and the link-up with international command systems;
 - (d) Ensure that deployable land forces have the requisite logistic support, in particular as regards airlift, to enable them to be deployed rapidly for long periods of time to very remote theatres such as Afghanistan;
 - (e) Set up in their respective countries a system of reserve forces, in particular by creating databases indicating the civilian qualifications of personnel and by reaching agreements with their employers, allowing them to be released for operations in external theatres;
3. Insist that these recommendations be taken into account in the draft Constitution.

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr Kucheida, Rapporteur (France, Socialist Group)

I. Missions of European forces

1. The EU framework: ESDP

1. At its Helsinki summit in December 1999 the European Council underlined “its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.”
2. At the same meeting it took the decision to acquire the necessary military capabilities to attain what is now commonly known as the EU “headline goal”:

“Cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50 000-60 000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks”.
3. The Petersberg Declaration adopted by the WEU member states in 1992 made provision for:
 - “humanitarian and rescue tasks;
 - peacekeeping tasks;
 - tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”.
4. The draft Constitutional Treaty that is currently under discussion in the Intergovernmental Conference defines the EU missions in somewhat broader terms, stipulating that “all these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories”.
5. The principle of a European defence entity was established at the Franco-British Saint Malo summit in December 1998, where it was agreed that “the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO’s European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework)”.
6. As a result of the major efforts undertaken since those declarations of principle, a number of institutional structures for politico-military and military crisis-management have been established within the Union. An agreement guaranteeing the Union access to NATO’s operational planning capabilities (the “Berlin plus agreement”) is now in force (Copenhagen summit, December 2002).
7. Finally, the draft Constitutional Treaty that is currently being negotiated makes provision for “structured cooperation” among those member states wishing to take part. This should make it easier to set up a European rapid reaction land force more quickly in the event of a crisis.
8. As regards forces, the European Union declared in June 2003 that it was now able to generate forces for Petersberg operations in accordance with the Helsinki headline goal. However, corrective measures are required to overcome the large number of shortfalls that were identified under the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP). The forces catalogue describing all the member states’ proposals (Helsinki forces catalogue) showed that the proposed land units were inadequate.

2. The NATO framework: the NATO Response Force (NRF)

9. The Prague Declaration presents the NRF as follows:

“(…) NATO Response Force (NRF) consisting of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the Council. The NRF will also be a catalyst for focusing and promoting improvements in the Alliance’s military capabilities. We gave directions for the development of a comprehensive concept for such a force, which will have its initial operational capability as soon as possible, but not later than October 2004 and its full operational capability not later than October 2006, and for a report to Defence Ministers in

spring 2003. The NRF and the related work of the EU Headline Goal should be mutually reinforcing while respecting the autonomy of both organisations”².

10. Thus the aim of the NRF is to enable the Alliance to deal with the “new” threats of the 21st century and to react swiftly to situations like that following 11 September both within and outside the Alliance’s “traditional” zone of responsibility (the territory of its member states). This will make it a global force with its sole limits being those dictated by politics. The NRF will consist of the best national units with the best training and equipment and should be some 21 000 strong.

11. The NRF will be able to carry out the full spectrum of Alliance operations (including missions arising out of the application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty). It will be a force with a high degree of preparation and high readiness levels (HRL)³. It will be a NATO joint, trained and “Certified” force which will be able to act as a stand-alone force or prepare for the arrival of follow-on forces in due course. It must have its own logistics, be sustainable in the field for at least 30 days (pending the arrival of supplies) and be able to act as an offensive combat force as well.

12. The NRF will be capable of a very wide range of missions, including:

- operations in an opposed entry scenario;
- consequence management (including in a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear environment);
- crisis response operations including peace enforcement operations;
- embargo operations (maritime and ground embargoes and no-fly zone operations);
- appropriate engagement and flexible deterrence operations;
- maritime interdiction and naval mine counter-measures operations;
- evacuation of nationals.

This list is not exhaustive as the multi-purpose, joint and combined nature of the NRF should enable it to adapt to any new situation and/or threat that arises. It is a catalogue of “reinforced Petersberg missions” and as in certain cases the same units will be serving in both the EU’s headline goal force and in the NRF, the result will strengthen all European crisis management and military intervention capabilities (of the organisation taking responsibility for a given operation).

3. “Land force” aspects of peacekeeping operations

13. The various crises in which Western armed forces have been involved since the end of the cold war have brought home the crucial importance of land forces. This is particularly true of the inevitably lengthy stabilisation and normalisation phases that follow the first phase of intervention. During that initial phase, which is often short, it is often only possible to call on one armed forces component, the choice of which will depend on the political objectives. Thus, for example, if the aim is to rebuild a country or establish a political regime, then it is necessary from the outset to call in land forces rather than organising the large-scale engagement of other armed forces for solely destructive action, as made clear by Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999. The two Gulf wars illustrate the same point: the aim of the first was to force Saddam Hussein to withdraw his troops from Kuwait, and the form of engagement chosen by the coalition was therefore to call in air forces for the wide-scale destruction of forces and infrastructure, before engaging land forces. The purpose of the second war was to overthrow the regime, rebuild the country and establish democracy. Thus it called for more a restrained engagement involving, as a priority, the deployment of land forces.

² Prague Summit Declaration, 21-22 November 2002, www.nato.int

³ “High readiness levels, for example, require personnel to be fully trained, with the necessary equipment, on stand-by and ready to go quickly in the event of a crisis”; Chief of the Defence Staff, Canada, 2001-2002 annual report; page 19, chapter on “force modernisation, sustainability and the commands”; www.cds.forces.gc.ca

14. Land forces must therefore be prepared well in advance, even before the emergence of the crisis and then during the planning phase, for peacekeeping or crisis-management operations on the ground. Indeed, we have learned from experience that while battles may be won in the air or on the seas, wars are won on the ground by sufficient numbers of fully trained, properly equipped and well organised troops. They are the ones who pave the way for restoring peace and, through their daily contact with the local population, gradually shape the conditions for achieving the political objectives that led to the military engagement in the first place.

4. Operational missions of deployed land forces

15. A land force deployed to a theatre of operations will be required to perform a number of different tasks, such as humanitarian action, evacuation of nationals and peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. In most cases different types of mission will need to be conducted either at the same time or in the same place. Hence, for example, the component parts of a single force engaged in an essentially humanitarian operation may need to carry out simultaneous combat missions and assistance tasks in different parts of the theatre, or a single force may need to conduct very different missions one after the other in the same area, as the operation moves into its different phases.

16. Land force operations are highly complicated due to the complexity of their environment and their crucial role for any military operation; nevertheless it is possible to divide operations into several basic types. Essentially these are: assistance, intelligence, continuous control of the environment and combat action.

(a) Assistance

17. Land force assistance operations are as a rule complementary to the action of humanitarian organisations, in cases where the latter are unable to intervene in a theatre for security reasons or cannot respond swiftly enough to an emergency. In either case, as soon as circumstances permit, assistance should as a priority be provided by non-military bodies. The assistance provided by land forces essentially entails setting up refugee camps, making emergency infrastructure repairs and providing logistic support and medical care for the population.

(b) Intelligence

18. Such operations involve deploying the full range of means for gathering, processing, analysing and disseminating intelligence from different sources: human intelligence, electromagnetic data or images. In addition to those specific means for gathering intelligence, land forces must also have their own means of processing and analysing the information provided by other engaged forces, the air component in particular.

19. Intelligence gathering may be dictated by strategic interests – for example the need to ascertain the enemy's possibilities and intentions – or geared to more tactical information, regarding, for example, enemy manoeuvres or tactical targets.

(c) Continuous control of the environment

20. This task can only be performed by the land component of a force. It must be carried out at each stage of any military operation, from the moment of entry into the theatre through to final withdrawal. Depending on the scale of disorganisation in the country concerned, it may entail a whole range of activities such as crowd control, psychological action, operational intelligence gathering, creating safe areas, providing static and mobile protection and conducting surveillance and patrols. In each case the success of such a mission will depend on establishing direct contacts with the local population and involved parties, as well as on the deterrent effect produced by land forces with a sufficient combat capacity.

(d) Combat

21. Combat missions may be offensive or defensive, depending on enemy posture and the force mandate. They may entail penetrating deep into the theatre of operations to attain strategic or tactical targets or engaging in tactical confrontation with established enemy lines. They always call for a combination of manoeuvrability (mobility), fire power and protection capabilities. The composition of

the opposing or belligerent forces and the geographic characteristics of the theatre of operations will determine the nature of the land force: how heavy it is, the size of its air component, etc. In all cases the need to protect the force will set certain limits on how light it can be. All combat missions are conducted in a joint framework and a land force must therefore be capable of coordinating its action with that of the other services, the air forces in particular, which provide it with essential support and help defend it against threats from the third dimension.

II. Deployment of land forces

1. Legal, diplomatic and political aspects

22. These are essential but vary considerably according to the type of engagement and are highly specific to land forces. They are determined by:

- the legal framework: existence or not of a mandate from the UN or other international organisation (NATO, OAU, EU), a coalition, defence agreement etc.;
- the type of intervention (peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement);
- the type of deployment (from home territory, using air or sea lift or land transport from a neighbouring state).

23. A peacekeeping or peacemaking operation, according to Chapter VI of the UN Charter, requires the agreement of the host country and of the different parties or entities involved in the conflict.

24. In the case of a peace enforcement operation coming under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the agreement of the country in which the forces are engaged is no longer necessary. It is the United Nations' mandate (e.g. as for Operation Artemis) which legitimises the deployment of forces.

25. For a land operation to be launched from a neighbouring state, the authorisation of that state is required (e.g. that of FYROM for the land forces operation in Kosovo).

26. In all cases of intervention by such units, very precise rules of conduct and engagement and in particular rules as regards the opening of fire must be defined and validated at the highest level and accepted by the parties to a conflict meeting the criteria set out in Chapter VI. In spite of high-speed communications systems, very small units commanded by young officers (patrols, checkpoints, surveillance posts) may find themselves in highly delicate situations in the midst of the local population and far from their superior officers and without a clearly identified enemy. They need such rules to be able to take swift and proper action. This aspect should also be taken on board during their training.

27. Given the complex nature of modern forms of engagement, force commanders in the theatre are surrounded by political, diplomatic and legal advisers to provide expertise, in particular for the drafting of operational orders, even at the lowest level of command (Fragmentary Orders or FRAGO).

2. Operational planning, forces build-up, forces generation

28. During an EU-led operation land forces may be engaged at two separate levels:

- at the tactical level, as a simple land component of a joint force that has overall responsibility for the theatre of operations;
- at the operational level in the case of an operation with a strong land component, in which case the land force will supply the operational headquarters in charge of the overall operation.

In the first instance, the land component – and indeed the naval and air components – must draw up a supporting plan (SUPPLAN) specifying the land forces' role in the conduct of the operation and the details of their contribution. In the second case, the land component will put forward an operational plan (OPLAN) for the whole theatre of operations, which may be supplemented by contributions from the other components. In both instances the land forces are involved in the forces generation efforts designed to achieve the capabilities identified as necessary in order to obtain the desired results in the

theatre, as well as in determining and selecting from among the participating nations the assets needed to perform the identified tasks.

3. Command

29. Deployed land forces constitute the land component and together with the air and naval components make up the tactical level of the combined joint force deployed to a theatre of operations.

30. Within each operational chain of command⁴ the Component Command of a land component army corps⁵ with its various sub-levels (divisions, brigades etc.) requires a permanent headquarters as well as deployable command structures.

31. That system of command must enable the land forces' action to be coordinated with that of other engaged forces.

32. This calls for a high level of interoperability with all other coalition partners, whether they be European states, NATO countries or others. This in turn makes it necessary to harmonise command concepts, procedures and even equipment.

33. The framework nation concept makes for greater interoperability. Indeed, the nation or group of nations aspiring to perform that role must:

- deploy, equip and arm the HQs corresponding to the chosen types of engagement and levels of operation;
- supply the coalition members with efficient, redundant and scalable command systems that are consistent from end to end, interoperable and automated. This provides coherent global C3I⁶ systems and information superiority;
- link up all subordinate levels within the command structure.

34. To that end and on the basis of NATO criteria the main European countries have developed a framework nation/headquarters capability at the level of a high readiness force (HRF).

4. Logistic support

35. The main challenge when it comes to supporting a deployed air/land force operation is to provide sufficient strategic lift capabilities to transport the force and guarantee the initial autonomy needed for an immediate engagement. The second challenge, given the lack of geographic continuity between the home base and theatre of operations, is to keep up a satisfactory logistic flow in order to maintain the force at the highest level until the very end of its engagement. All this makes it necessary from the earliest possible stage to guarantee close cooperation among the different nations contributing to the operation and to deploy in theatre a multinational logistics coordination centre capable of anticipating the force's requirements and coordinating the means of satisfying them.

36. Support for a multinational land force operation may be achieved by combining several complementary modes of action, while dividing tasks and defining each partner's responsibilities and share of the costs. Support may be national (for specific aspects) or multinational (by applying the concept of lead and/or specialised nation) and provided from the home base or from the theatre (it may be supplied by the host nation or even outsourced locally when security conditions permit and provided the local economy can meet requirements). A judicious use of these different procedures (Operation Artemis in Ituria is a case in point) makes for effective support of engaged units while making economic use of the resources and assets provided by the contributing nations.

5. The use of reserve forces

37. In recent years the role and mission of reserves has increased both in importance and in scope. No longer are they called up just to fill a gap for active or regular forces in their defence and crisis-

⁴ The operational chain of command consists of: the strategic level (Operation Command), the operational level (Force Command) and the tactical level (Component Command).

⁵ JFLCC/AC : Joint Force Land Component Command/Army Corps

⁶ C3I: command, control, communications and intelligence.

management role. Reserve forces are needed right from the beginning of crisis-management operations. The spectrum of missions that NATO and the EU now face is more wide-ranging and challenging than ever. Within this spectrum the use of reserves is considered as a serious option for many missions. As military operations tend increasingly to involve cooperation with the civil sector – witness the IFOR, SFOR and KFOR missions in the Balkans – the deployment of highly qualified citizen-soldiers is bound to be an asset. As both military personnel and responsible civilian members, reservists are one of NATO's and the EU's most valuable resources.

38. A reservist is any person not normally on full-time service who may be called up for temporary military activities. Reserves possess a wide range of useful specialised skills in the cultural, professional, administrative, academic, economic and political fields (e.g. medicine, engineering, logistics, law, civil affairs, public relations and management information systems). They are thus crucial to success in new areas of military operations, bringing much-needed expertise and skills to a mission. Their engagement is relevant not only in 'operational', but also 'social' terms, as they provide a useful interface between civil society and military institutions. This not only increases the importance of reserve forces, but is also a strong justification for strengthening their training, readiness and use. The ability of the Atlantic Alliance and the EU to respond rapidly to regional crises, as well as to engage in peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and humanitarian assistance operations, is derived not only from the readiness of their active forces, but also from the availability and readiness of their reserves. This is one of the most difficult challenges facing most European countries.

39. The availability and readiness of reserves is strictly related to domestic factors, such as political will, community encouragement and employer support. Reserves are part of a country's national military capability. There are substantially differing national approaches to the structure, quantity, type, availability, funding, training, call-up and utilisation of reserves. Some nations are reluctant to train, deploy and employ reservists, while others deploy almost fully structured reserve units. Two major groups of countries may be identified, according to their willingness to engage reserve forces in crisis-management operations abroad. The first group consists of those countries that use a considerable number of reservists in their contribution to peace-support missions (i.e. the United Kingdom, Germany, the Nordic countries and the Netherlands). The second group comprises those countries that do not engage reservists abroad. Some of them have still not developed a 'model' for the participation of reserves in international crisis operations. For others the reason is a legislative framework which prevents reserve forces from being engaged in missions abroad (i.e. Greece, Ireland and the former East bloc countries). Besides strategic, cultural or legal constraints, there are other motivations which may prevent the full utilisation of a country's reservist potential. Reserve forces are affected by the shift in national defence priorities and financial considerations, which limit training possibilities and reduce the stocks of available equipment. However, some countries, such as Romania and Poland, are in the process of modifying their national legislative framework to allow the participation of their reserve forces in missions abroad. Thus there would seem to be considerable further potential to be tapped in the future as regards the use of reserve forces in crisis-management operations.

40. One feature of the peace-support operations in the Balkans has been the considerable proportion of reservists from member states serving within the SFOR and KFOR task forces. The SFOR and KFOR operations are the most conventional missions involving reservists, but some nations have also engaged them in Afghanistan and Iraq.

41. Hence the deployment of reserves in rapidly deployable European land forces alongside the regular forces is to be highly recommended. The emphasis on reserve forces corresponds not only to the desire to have sufficient human resources to deal with crisis situations – in particular as regards providing a useful and effective specialised force capable of integration with regular forces – but also to the recognition of the special skills that reservists can contribute to the active force. In their dual role as both citizens and service members, reservists can play a vital part in forging the bonds of understanding and appreciation between the civilian and military communities. Reserves can help foster a better understanding among the civilian community of the nature and purpose of military forces.

III. Lessons learned from recent experience

1. Operation Artemis in the Congo

42. The second EU military intervention, Operation Artemis, conducted from 12 June to 15 September 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and planned and commanded mainly by the lead nation, France, was the first truly autonomous EU operation. It was a brilliant demonstration of the Union's ability to respond rapidly to crises in unfamiliar regions outside Europe without having to confine action to the lower ranges of intensity.

43. Operation Artemis was conducted in the north-eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo to the north of the Great Lakes in the province of Ituri. Its aim was to put an end to the humanitarian disaster resulting from the armed conflict that broke out between two rival ethnic groups, the Hemas and the Lendus, after the withdrawal of the Ugandan forces following the Luanda agreements in 2002. The UN Secretary-General asked France to lead a multinational force. France agreed, but laid down a number of conditions: the operation had to be conducted on the basis of a mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter allowing recourse to all necessary means, in a limited area and timeframe and in cooperation with the states of the region and in the EU framework.

44. It was possible to conduct this operation in the Union framework by sharing the political risk and engaging, among others, British, Swedish and Belgian forces on the ground. Moreover, UN Security Council Resolution 1484 had made the notion of a European defence more popular with public opinion in certain countries. The political, diplomatic and military achievements of Operation Artemis enabled the European partners to broaden the scope of the ESDP, and indeed of the CFSP, to include Africa. Thus, although European defence is in its preliminary stages, it has already demonstrated its remarkable potential.

45. Land forces were the major players in this robust, complex and at times dangerous mission, in which they demonstrated their professionalism and ability to intervene outside Europe as part of a multinational coalition. Thus, for the purposes of this deployment at short notice to an unknown theatre in an enclaved and mountainous region, and in the face of poorly-identified rebels, the rule of "one commander, one mission and the requisite means" proved its worth. The Force Commander, General Thonier of France, was given authority over all deployed capabilities. There were clear and unambiguous rules of engagement, but great freedom of action at tactical level. Finally, the deployed equipment and personnel were perfectly adapted to the mission requirements: those of a force capable of action up to combat level to impose a decision by force if necessary.

2. Afghanistan

46. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States, bolstered by international support (as reflected in UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373), decided to bring down the Taliban regime. The Americans, with the support of some European countries, launched Operation Enduring Freedom on 7 October. On 19 October, helicopter-borne commandos penetrated Afghan territory in the region of Kandahar. This was the context in which the first units of European land forces set out for Afghanistan in October 2002. On that occasion they confirmed that they could be deployed at short notice to an unknown and distant theatre.

47. Resolution 1378 of 14 November 2001 provided the reference framework for a political solution and constituted an appeal for international humanitarian assistance. Following the fall of the Taliban regime in November 2001 and the establishment of Mr Karzai's interim government on 22 December, and with its adoption of the Bonn agreements and then Resolution 1386, the international community pledged to support the security of the interim government and the process of stabilisation by dispatching an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan. This multinational force consisting of some 5 500 troops had the task of assisting the interim Afghan administration with maintaining security by controlling key areas, carrying out patrols, supporting the establishment of new institutions and participating in decontamination and reconstruction efforts. Giving military units the task of reconstruction has to be viewed with some reservation and, indeed, a number of NGOs working in Afghanistan do not think it is a good idea. ISAF's area of responsibility was initially limited to Kabul and its immediate surroundings but at the end of 2003 it was extended to several

provincial towns for the purpose of enabling “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” to carry out civil-military action at local level. Furthermore, since May 2002, the British and French have been involved alongside US personnel in training the Afghan national army.

48. This stabilisation operation (ISAF), though not specifically European, benefited from strong participation by EU countries, with the largest units being sent by France and Germany. Today ISAF is a NATO operation involving 23 Atlantic Alliance countries. Furthermore, a number of European countries also provided sizeable land component special forces to fight alongside the Americans in their combat against the Taliban and al-Qa’ida in the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom.

3. Macedonia

49. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the European Union presented itself for the first time as an organisation with the will and capacity to conduct a military operation. While that operation was modest in terms of the results achieved on the ground, it was politically significant in that it provided the occasion to test and adapt the necessary EU structures and procedures for assuming such new responsibilities. The EU’s logistic and legal arrangements are of particular importance in that respect.

50. Operation Concordia was a multinational peacekeeping operation decided by the EU Council and conducted under EU auspices in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Its aims were to contribute to the continued implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid accords and to maintain stability in the country. The mission, based essentially on the work done by liaison teams deployed to the crisis area, involved three main types of activity: gathering intelligence on the situation in the region, making a show of force to deter aggression and providing support for the observers from the international community.

51. This first EU military operation, which ended on 15 December 2003, provided the opportunity to validate the so-called “Berlin plus” agreements, in particular by testing in practical conditions the complementarity between the NATO and EU chains of command. Those agreements provide the framework for EU-NATO cooperation and enable the EU to have access to NATO assets and capabilities, including its command structures, planning capabilities, logistics and intelligence.

52. The Eurofor headquarters were set up in record time and in excellent conditions thanks to the decisive role played by the “framework nation”, in this instance, France.

4. Former Yugoslavia/Kosovo

53. In the Kosovo theatre, following the initial phase of aerial bombardment, land forces fully assumed their role of maintaining continuous control on the ground. They were in constant contact with the local population and different parties to the conflict, in close touch with the physical, economic and human environment, and were a crucial tool for restoring and keeping the peace, and for helping the region return to normal. The volume of deployed forces is a key indicator of the part that each EU country is willing to play and the participation by a number of smaller countries in the European contingent was a demonstration of their desire for international involvement, which becomes possible for them with this type of operation.

54. Two major principles emerged from the deployment of land forces in Kosovo during the “peacekeeping” phase:

- depending on the nature and intensity (level of violence) of actions by the local population, such as demonstrations, only properly armed land forces with a sufficient deterrent capability can control crowds with lasting effect. Once the level of violence abates, the land forces can hand over to police forces, which are better suited to permissive security environments and to combating crime and banditry;
- in support of or as a follow-up to the intervention by contact land forces and to gain the trust of the local population, whichever parties are involved in the conflict, it is necessary to conduct support operations, which may include psychological assistance or other civil-military actions such as humanitarian aid, rebuilding infrastructure, or the transport and protection of minorities.

IV. Present situation and future prospects for rapidly deployable land forces

1. European cooperation

(a) The Franco-German Brigade

55. After 15 years of existence the Franco-German Brigade (FGB) is recognised as a fully operational unit. Some 5 000 strong, its military credibility now extends well beyond its initial task, which was to provide a laboratory for testing the interoperability of personnel and equipment. Indeed it has become a model for Franco-German cooperation.

56. It earned that recognition as a major operational tool during several successful operations in the Balkans⁷, but also in view of its results during its regular participation in numerous training exercises in France, Germany and sometimes even Spain, under the authority of the Eurocorps or various French or German commands.

57. Of the 4 580 troops that currently make up the FGB, 2 223 (including 201 women) are French and 2 357 (34 women) are German. It has a bi-national headquarters and command and logistics battalion, two infantry regiments (one for each nation), an armoured reconnaissance division (French) and a German artillery regiment and engineering company.

58. In operational terms the FGB is currently geared to three types of mission:

- common defence of allies, in application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- peacekeeping and peace-making missions;
- humanitarian operations.

59. In the near future, however, the FGB will have another, even more demanding task. Indeed, having successfully incorporated the necessary changes resulting from the reform of the French army and then that of the Bundeswehr, it is now about to tackle the challenge of its own transformation into a Eurocorps initial entry force. In that capacity it will be involved as a priority in the exercises and operations conducted by the Eurocorps Headquarters, for missions requiring the deployment of forces. Finally, the FGB will provide the land component core during the Eurocorps turn of duty as the NRF force on alert in the second half of 2006.

60. In the declaration issued on 22 January 2003 following the Franco-German summit (40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty) France and Germany also announced their desire for the FGB to be used as a high-readiness unit within the EU rapid reaction force.

61. In the road map that accompanied the declaration, Ministers affirmed their resolve to develop the FGB into the core of an initial entry force for Eurocorps, thereby strengthening the latter's capabilities for both NATO and EU operations.

62. Finally, following the decisions taken in Brussels by the four-power defence summit on 29 April 2003, Belgium (with a commando unit) and Luxembourg are soon to be involved in the FGB, and indeed a small number of Belgian officers are even to join its headquarters, although this will not change the bilateral structure of the Brigade or the essentially bi-national nature of its headquarters and mixed units. The FGB continues to evolve thanks to its participation in operations and exercises, either within the Eurocorps (the Cobra 2001 and Common Effort 2002 exercises) or other multinational frameworks (the Guibert 2002, Goldener Schild 2004 and European Challenge 2005 exercises), which place it systematically in a multinational environment.

63. Up until now the equipment allocated to the mixed units has been equally shared among the two nations, but a number of shortcomings in terms of interoperability and compliance with standards have been identified in certain areas. The efforts to overcome those problems are ongoing. The FGB should

⁷ The last one took place at the end of 2002 and beginning of 2003 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as part of the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe.

be receiving new equipment to strengthen its operational capability and autonomy, particularly as regards headquarters command, communication and information systems.

(b) Eurocorps

64. The Eurocorps was created in 1992 as the result of a Franco-German initiative. It now comprises personnel and equipment not only from France and Germany, but also Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg. It is one of Europe's first defence instruments. It is a army corps-level structure composed of a multinational headquarters in Strasbourg, division-level forces and organic elements made available by each nation. Furthermore, France and Germany have placed the FGB under the permanent operational command of the Eurocorps Commanding General.

65. The period 2001-2002 was marked by the restructuring of the Strasbourg headquarters and the force's involvement in the KFOR 3 command in Kosovo. In 2001, during the Cobra 01 exercise, it demonstrated its capacity to deploy an advanced command post to southern Spain (around Cadiz) in order to conduct a crisis-management mission that included a high-intensity phase.

66. 2002 brought with it in-depth preparations for the various stages of Eurocorps' certification by NATO as a high readiness forces (HFR) land headquarters, its aim being to strengthen its operational capability and hence its military credibility for participation in EU and NATO operations. It received that certification at the end of 2002, following the "Common Effort" exercise (a major operational deployment exercise), during which NATO was able to inspect its operational capabilities.

67. In 2003 it developed and adopted new procedures and enhanced the interoperability of the command structures and special units that had been newly acquired or made available by the participating states following its certification as a rapid reaction corps.

68. 2004 will be devoted to strengthening Eurocorps' capabilities by implementing equipment programmes and further improving the interoperability of its command systems with a view to an operational review in 2005.

69. The Eurocorps must be able to act in the following configurations:

- as an LCC (Land Component Command) parent headquarters in which the core is provided by the Eurocorps Headquarters;
- as a rapid reaction corps composed of high readiness units that may also be supplied by non-member nations;
- as an army corps in the framework of a collective defence action.

70. It is open to other NATO and EU nations which must participate in all its activities (exercises, seminars, operations). Thus since 2002, officers and NCOs from Austria, Canada, Finland, Greece, Poland, Portugal and Turkey have been integrated in the Eurocorps Headquarters. The United Kingdom, Italy and the Netherlands are represented by liaison officers.

71. Hence, the term Eurocorps now designates the Eurocorps Headquarters in Strasbourg comprising the Staff, the Headquarters Support Battalion (HQSB) and the Multinational Command Support Brigade (MNCS Bde). The nations will allocate divisions to the Eurocorps for specific training or operational missions according to requirements. Similarly, the different nations have earmarked specific capabilities to provide the organic elements that are essential for support of Eurocorps and its forces.

72. The cost-sharing formula for the national contributions is as follows: France: 38.5%, Germany: 29%, Belgium: 12%, Spain: 19% and Luxembourg: 1.5%.

73. Eurocorps equipment is either provided by the member states or purchased from the common budget. The latter mainly concerns equipment that is essential for deployment and for rapidly linking up the different command posts (command tents and shelters, protected systems for information exchanges and videoconferences).

74. Finally, interoperability is a key objective and most of the work being done in this field is focused on the command and communication systems that are essential for the Eurocorps to be operational.

(c) Eurofor

75. The Euroforces – Eurofor and Euromarfor – were created (at the WEU Ministerial Council of 15 May 1995 in Lisbon) as a result of a common resolve on the part of Spain, Italy and France and Portugal to give tangible form to cooperation between their armed forces under WEU auspices for the purpose of the missions defined in the Petersberg Declaration. They are not standing forces and all that exists during peacetime are their two headquarters. The command rotates among the participating states.

76. Eurofor was declared operational in two stages:

- the headquarters in November 1997;
- the force as a whole in 1998, following the EOLE exercise.

77. Eurofor is a lightly equipped land force. Its maximum size is that of a light division, with each country contributing the equivalent of a brigade. It has access to a pool of forces some 25 000 strong supplied by the different countries and renewable every two years. It must be able to supply a rapid reaction capability to assist the local population in a crisis, evacuate nationals, act as a buffer force and conduct local surveillance and control operations.

78. The headquarters is composed of 94 servicemen, including 52 officers from the four nations. It is based in Florence and support is provided by the host nation, Italy, which has made available a general headquarters unit with a staff of 220. Its task is to draw up operational plans, participate in the definition of logistic and training objectives, organise exercises (including the two-yearly EOLE exercise), prepare the force for its missions and, if necessary, to conduct operations.

79. In the event of an operational deployment the Eurofor force is brought together at the request of a high-level inter-ministerial Committee (CIMIN). It is composed of a number of “modules” formed by the national units made available by the member states. Its headquarters must be able to deploy within the following deadlines:

- a precursor unit within five days;
- the main body of the force by the end of the second week;
- the final elements in less than 25 days.

80. Eurofor, which figures in the EU forces catalogue, may also be made available to NATO and can intervene in application of UN resolutions or possibly under the auspices of other international organisations. It was engaged in the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia in October 2003 (Operation Concordia in support of international observers in FYROM, following NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony). It withdrew on 15 December 2003.

(d) FINABEL

81. The FINBEL Committee, as it was called at the time, was set up in October 1953, with the authorisation of the defence ministers of France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, by the army chiefs of staff of the five countries with the aim of exploring together the possibilities for coordination in the field of armaments. Its existence was officially declared to the NATO standardisation authorities in 1954. It is the only inter-allied regional organisation at that level, and now brings together ten western European countries⁸. It was designed to provide a forum for reflection, exchanges, studies and proposals on subjects of common interest concerning the future of the different armies. It provided a framework in which the chiefs of staff and experts of the member

⁸ Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom,

countries could meet, thereby promoting the establishment of fruitful contacts in a spirit of openness and mutual understanding.

82. Since FINABEL's creation was not the result of an intergovernmental agreement, it is not a legal entity under international law and cannot therefore deal with governments in that capacity. Its proposals and recommendations are conveyed to governments by their own representatives, the army chiefs of staff of each nation.

83. The FINABEL Committee is recognised *de facto* by NATO and WEU as an international organisation at regional level.

84. Its purpose is to develop interoperability among the land forces of the member states in a joint framework, by harmonising concepts, doctrines and procedures across the full spectrum of military missions, in order to promote the success of operations and enhance cooperation. It remains an independent multinational forum for European armies, based on the principle of consensus and equality among its member states. It enhances interoperability among the land forces of its member countries in the NATO and EU frameworks as well as in *ad hoc* coalitions. Through the work of its groups of experts⁹ it:

- organises exchanges of know-how and experience at key levels in an efficient and cost-effective manner;
- provides a framework for reflection, generation of new ideas and studies on subjects of common interest and future challenges;
- makes a major contribution to the development of forces;
- constantly adapts to new developments and threats;
- identifies opportunities for the common definition and development of equipment;
- provides input for the process of reflection leading to the definition of national doctrines at national level.

85. In order to avoid duplication and efficiently disseminate information, an official procedure has been established for liaison with the bodies responsible for the equipment and future tactical concepts of the member states' armies: NAAG (NATO), EU Military Staff, EU Institute for Security Studies, WEAG (WEU).

86. By 2003, there were some 340 FINABEL documents (reports, agreements and conventions). The results of six or seven studies are published every year, while older documents are constantly being updated or abrogated.

87. In addition to the abovementioned results we should also recall the following aspects which, although difficult to quantify, are highly positive:

- (i) FINABEL is the only inter-allied organisation at the level of the chiefs of staff working exclusively for land forces. The FINABEL working method obliges working groups to present their results within a set timeframe that is quite short for a multinational body (18 months to two years for a report);
- (ii) FINABEL emphasises operational aspects, whereas other inter-allied structures give priority to economic problems;
- (iii) thanks to their meetings within FINABEL, the member states are able to present common positions within NATO on a number of issues;
- (iv) the use made by other inter-allied organisations of FINABEL documents illustrates the importance of that Committee for those other bodies.

⁹ Nine working groups study tactical doctrines, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air support, air mobility, training, concepts, logistics, NBC engineering and protection, intelligence and command.

2. Rapidly deployable land force capabilities and the headline goal

88. At the December 1999 Helsinki summit the member states defined an EU headline goal to be attained by 2003 in order to enable the EU to conduct the Petersberg missions defined at the WEU Ministerial Council in 1992. These “humanitarian and rescue” and “peacekeeping” tasks, and “tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” have been taken over by the EU since the Nice summit in December 2000. Land forces play a central role under the headline goal, since the aim is “to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks (...), including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements (...)”.

89. Various scenarios were put forward for the Petersberg missions with a view to defining the necessary composition of land forces and studying the possibility of conducting several European operations simultaneously. Those scenarios corresponding to the different types of engagement are as follows:

- (i) Assistance to the civilian population:
 - Humanitarian operations;
 - Evacuation of nationals;
- (ii) Conflict prevention/Preventive deployment;
- (iii) Separation of parties by force.

90. If an operation to separate the parties by force has to be combined with an evacuation operation, this will pose problems of speed and deployment. If a consolidation phase following the separation of parties has to be combined with an evacuation and conflict-prevention mission, this will pose a problem of capabilities, particularly in terms of the division headquarters, light infantry battalions, transport helicopters and deployable NBC laboratories.

91. Generally speaking, the scenario involving the separation of parties by force is the most demanding in terms of capabilities. Indeed, it requires the protection of a 3 000 km² enclave to be conducted simultaneously with a control mission in a demilitarised zone measuring 300 km x 25 km.

92. With the presence of belligerent parties as envisaged in this scenario, the European force – as envisaged by the EU Military Staff – which would be 56 000 strong not including national support units – would need the following capabilities:

Corps Command	1 LCC/HQ and an “information group”	1 600 persons
Theatre entry unit	1 amphibious brigade or 1 (mechanised or light) infantry brigade	4 900
Demilitarised zone force	1 division with 1 armoured brigade and 3 mechanised brigades	19 500
Enclave protection force	1 division with 1 airborne assault brigade and 2 mechanised brigades	14 100
Organic elements	1 reconnaissance brigade 1 artillery brigade 1 airborne brigade 1 surface-to-air defence brigade 1 engineering brigade 1 transmissions brigade 1 logistics brigade Miscellaneous (military police, special forces etc.)	1 350 2 300 2 500 1 000 2 800 1 400 4 100 2 000

93. Thanks to the various European countries’ contributions to the forces catalogue it has been possible to achieve the headline goal, including for operations involving the separation of belligerent parties by force. The proposals for the participation of the various EU member states are set out in the appendix.

94. Furthermore, although originally 42 gaps and five shortfalls were identified, the Headline Goal Progress Catalogue issued in 2003 recognises only 26 gaps and eight shortfalls, none of which is deemed sufficiently serious to prevent the headline goal from being attained.

95. However, the various ECAP¹⁰ groups made a number of proposals for remedying capability shortfalls:

¹⁰ ECAP : European Capability Action Plan.

ECAP group	Findings/Recommendation
Target surveillance and acquisition/UAV/RADAR	Improvement of situation as of 2005. Recommended to review doctrines to achieve common European definition of capabilities.
Assault helicopter (AH) battalion	Recommended additional contributions from states since AH resources exist.
Mixed army air battalion	Recommended additional contributions from states and to modify availability times of certain contributions.
Battalion of medium/heavy transport helicopters Battalion of reconnaissance/liaison helicopters	Recommended additional contributions from states and use of “air” or “sea” helicopters (concerns transport helicopters only).
NBC battalion and company	Integration of a UK NBC company in the multinational battalion under French command. Additional contribution from Italy
Collective medical protection unit	Improvement of capacities of role 2 medical units by adding specialised modules
Deployable laboratory	Additional contributions from France and Germany. Strengthening laboratories proposed by some countries with specialists from other countries.
Land Component Command HQ	Adoption of a general command post reinforcement procedure. Identification and training of reinforcements.

APPENDIX

Contributions by EU member states to the Helsinki headline goal

Austria	2 000 troops
Belgium	1 000 troops,
Denmark	no contribution by virtue of a derogation from the Amsterdam Treaty in regard to defence
Finland	2 000 troops
France	12 000 troops
Germany	13 500 troops
Greece	3 500 troops
Ireland	1 000 troops
Italy	6 000 troops
Luxembourg	100 troops
Netherlands	5 000 troops
Portugal	1 000 troops
Spain	6 000 troops
Sweden	1 500 troops
United Kingdom	12 500 troops
Total	67 100 troops
Cyprus*	176 troops
Czech Republic*	550 troops
Estonia	± 450 troops
Hungary*	250 troops
Latvia*	± 85 troops
Lithuania*	750 to 1500 troops
Malta	35 troops
Poland*	± 500 troops
Slovakia*	421 troops
Slovenia*	± 85 troops

Contributions by non-EU European countries to the Helsinki headline goal

Country	Forces / Personnel
Bulgaria	960
Iceland	25 to 50 civilians
Norway*	± 600
Romania*	1300
Turkey*	5000

* According to the figures given in the Helsinki Force Catalogue of 23 November 2000. Figures are being currently updated.

