DOCUMENT A/1861

2 June 2004

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Security and defence in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

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Document A/1861

2 June 2004

Security and defence in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee²
by Mr Rigoni, Rapporteur (Italy, Federated Group)
and Mr Sedlickas, co-Rapporteur (Lithuania)

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¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 10 May 2004.

² Members of the Committee: Mr Wilkinson (Chairman); MM McNamara, Goris (Vice-Chairmen); Mr Acosta Padrón, Mrs Aguiar, MM de Arístegui San Román (Alternate: Puche Rodríguez), Barquero Vázquez (Alternate: Agramunt Font de Mora), Lord Burlison, MM Contestabile, Cox, Dreyfus-Schmidt (Alternate: Le Guen), Duivesteijn, Freiherr v. Guttenberg KT, Glesener, Goulet, Gubert (Alternate: Tirelli), Henry, Jacquat, Jardim, Jonas, Kortenhorst (Alternate: van der Linden), Leibrecht, Lengagne, Medeiros Ferreira, Monfils, Nikolopoulos, de Puig, Ranieri, Rigoni, Rivolta (Alternate: Nessa), Schneider, Siebert, Szabo, Varvitsiotis, Vrettos, Walter, Wegener.

Associate members: MM Açikgöz, Bilgehan, Çavusoglu, Hegyi, Herczog, Hjörleifsson, Ibl, Janas, Komorowski, Lorenz, Necas, Mrs Nybakk, MM Surjan, Tekelioglu, Wrzodak, N ...

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

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RECOMMENDATION 745¹

(i) Noting with satisfaction that the accession of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to NATO and the European Union completes the process of integrating those countries, along with the other central European countries, in the Euro-Atlantic community, while maintaining a spirit of constructive cooperation and partnership with all the neighbouring states;

(ii) Considering that this historic event closes a painful chapter in the history of those three states;

(iii) Recalling the pioneering role played by WEU, which was the first European organisation to welcome the three Baltic States, first of all to its consultation forum and then as WEU associate partners, with the prospect of their accession and with a view to preparing them for integration in the European Union;

(iv) Warmly welcoming the constructive contribution and commitment of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the activities of WEU, and in particular the participation of their parliamentary delegations in the work of the Assembly;

(v) Recognising also the constructive efforts made by the three Baltic States with a view to strengthening cooperation among the Nordic countries and establishing a policy of partnership and good neighbourly relations in this region;

(vi) Expressing support for continuing the process of reform necessary for adapting the security and defence structures of the three Baltic States to the new missions resulting from their NATO and EU membership;

(vii) Stressing the individual and collective efforts being made by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the area of security and defence, in order to respond to the new challenges to national, European and international security;

(viii) Stressing the remarkable contributions that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are making to European and international security and stability, particularly in the peacekeeping area, through the presence of their military units in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and other crisis areas;

(ix) Underlining the qualitative and quantitative contribution the three countries are making to the NATO forces, in particular the NATO Response Force (NRF), and to the European Union's headline goal;

(x) Encouraging the three states to pursue and deepen their cooperation in areas of common interest, in particular as regards armaments and naval and airborne capabilities;

(xi) Stressing the importance for the other European member states of NATO and/or the EU to continue to support and assist the three countries with their projects in the area of security and defence;

(xii) Supporting the decision of the North Atlantic Council to deploy NATO air-based capabilities to Lithuania in order to provide surveillance and protection of the three countries' common airspace;

(xiii) Confident that there will be a successful conclusion to the dialogue being conducted between NATO and Russia with a view to convincing the latter that those air surveillance measures are not detrimental to its security interests;

(xiv) Stressing, nevertheless, that the security interests and requirements of the three Baltic States, as members of the Alliance, are inseparable from those of the other member states and that there cannot be a security guarantee with variable geometry;

(xv) Welcoming the readiness in principle of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to accede to the CFE Treaty on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe as revised in 1999, once it has been ratified by all the signatories and enters into force;

(xvi) Highlighting the important role to be played by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in framing NATO and EU strategies and policies and for establishing relations with all new neighbours of those Organisations, in particular Russia, Ukraine and Belarus;

(xvii) Stressing also that it is important for the enlarged European Union and NATO to find, together with Russia, solutions to all the specific problems concerning the Kaliningrad region that are satisfactory to all interested parties;

(xviii) Supporting the continued process of political, economic and social reform designed to modernise and strengthen democracy and the rule of law in the three Baltic States;

(xix) Considering that it is important in this context for the three Baltic States to pursue their policy of integrating minorities and of acquiring the legal, human and material resources needed to combat the threat posed by organised crime and criminal activities with international ramifications;

(xx) Recalling that the three Baltic States now satisfy the criteria defined by the WEU member states during the signing of the Maastricht Treaty for being invited to accede to WEU under conditions to be agreed in compliance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty;

(xxi) Considering that those three states have a legitimate interest in benefiting from the security guarantee of the modified Brussels Treaty establishing a link with NATO, particularly in view of the weak nature of the provisions contained in the draft EU Constitutional Treaty with regard to a mutual assistance obligation,

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1. Of all the central European countries that have just joined the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union (EU), three are somewhat special. In becoming members of the principal Euro-Atlantic and European institutions for security and defence and economic and political cooperation, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are once again rejoining the mainstream of European history. They have an unusual past as (unwilling) satellites of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR). From 1940 to 1989, both at home and in exile, both the leaderships and the ordinary citizens of these nations fought ceaselessly (including by force of arms²) to regain their independence.
2. The break-up of the USSR marked the end of this unfortunate chapter of their history; however the consequences are still being felt to this day. In the 12 years that have passed since they recovered their sovereignty, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have made valiant efforts to consolidate their regional position, especially vis-à-vis Russia, and to integrate politically, economically and in security terms with the European and the Euro-Atlantic communities. They have made immense strides, politically especially, and in terms of their economies, to reach the standards required of them for successful entry into the various institutions. Throughout the process, which is still going on, these three countries have also shown their determination and commitment to contribute actively to stability, security and defence in their own region and in Europe.
3. This is an area where it has been necessary to start over from scratch. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have re-established forms of economic and political cooperation going back to the era of their earlier independence and which reflect their particular cultural and historical heritage. They have also looked outwards for support, especially in their immediate environment from the Nordic countries and in particular from the United States and the United Kingdom. Still distrustful of Russia, the three regard membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as a strategic priority. External security and stability are essential to the pursuit of the economic and social reform that is necessary for membership of the European Union.
4. As far as defence goes, the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), formed in 1994, was the first in a series of initiatives taken with a view to developing national capabilities. It began as a joint cooperation project. With the assistance of other Atlantic Alliance member states, the three countries gradually increased their resource input and built up national and tripartite defence policies and armed forces that were to make a contribution to security throughout the region of the Baltic Sea and beyond. Since 1995, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian forces have been part of the NATO deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina and are also currently stationed in Afghanistan and Iraq.
5. Euro-Atlantic and European integration is thus a response on the part of the three states to security concerns, providing a counterweight to their relations with Russia. There are still areas of contention over minorities and political and economic differences, but this was not a major obstacle to their joining the EU and NATO. The culmination of the accession process in 2004 marks the end of a momentous chapter in the history of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They are now part and parcel of Europe, institutionally and politically, and are making an active contribution to collective defence (in the NATO framework) and to European defence through the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
6. This achievement is the direct result of each nation's individual efforts, extended through tripartite and regional cooperation. It forms the principal subject-matter of this report, which is the result of a fact-finding visit by the Defence Committee of the Assembly of WEU - the Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly - to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in October 2003. Through meetings with senior political figures and military staff and visits to military units and installations, the Committee was well placed to note and evaluate the progress that has been achieved and to find out about the three nations' future plans in regard to defence capabilities.

7. Since the three Baltic States regained their independence, their governments have given priority to consolidating their respective internal situations and embarking on a programme of economic and political reform leading to convergence with the European and Euro-Atlantic cooperation structures, followed by accession. Security and defence concerns have basically revolved around the protection of their national territories. The three nations benefited from aid readily on offer from the Nordic countries within NATO, and from the EU, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States and other countries. Such assistance not only enabled them to deal with their immediate needs but also represented a gesture of political support, and an important one, in the face of pressure from Russia.
8. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have gradually been absorbed into various arrangements for regional political, economic and security cooperation. In March 1992 they were involved in the setting-up of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, made up of 11 countries³ plus the European Commission, and they also cooperate with the Nordic Council⁴. Although neither of these two organisations has competence for defence matters, they do have an important role in security. Home affairs, justice, border controls and civilian protection are all part of their remit and cooperation through them serves to bolster regional security further. At the same time, the three states sought to draw closer to NATO by joining that Organisation's Partnership for Peace programme from its inception in 1994. In the same year they became WEU associate partners and appointed parliamentary delegations to participate in the activities of the Assembly.
9. In parallel to their preparations for accession to NATO and the EU, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have engaged in close security and defence cooperation. In this way, they have been able to optimise their resources and capabilities and avoid costly and pointless duplication. They have also been able to identify the areas where aid was needed most and thus make the most effective use of assistance from outside. Nevertheless, each individual state developed and implemented its own particular strategy to achieve its dual aim of NATO and EU accession. Cooperation has been essentially practical and tailored to national prerogatives and priorities.

1. Contributors to regional security

10. As soon as they became independent, the three Baltic States made clear their intention to become part of the geopolitical area known as "the West". They refused to join the Commonwealth of Independent States and their foreign and defence policy in those initial years was largely directed towards protecting themselves from renewed interference from Russia in their affairs. However, regional security issues have moved on and the threat of direct military intervention is now at an all-time low. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania's defence approach, initially directed towards territorial defence, is now becoming more flexible and more responsive to present NATO and EU requirements in this field.

11. The end of the cold war and the break-up of the USSR in 1991 enabled the three countries to regain independence, but their future remains tied up with internal developments in Russia. All three have a common border with Russia: Estonia and Latvia to the east and Lithuania to the west with the Kaliningrad enclave. They are still largely energy-dependent on Russia for oil and natural gas supplies. In recent years, oil deposits have been found in the continental shelf off the Lithuanian coast, but they are not as yet being exploited to any sizeable degree. Another issue for Estonia and Latvia is their Russian-speaking minorities.
12. Common borders, energy dependence and minorities are major preoccupations for the three countries' governments in their relations with Russia. Three security aspects predominate:

13. In spite of the independence of the three Baltic States and their membership of NATO and the EU, relations with Russia continue to weigh heavily on their perceptions of security. This will most certainly have repercussions for the development of the dialogue between Russia and NATO, on the one hand, and between Russia and the EU, on the other. The stabilisation and strengthening of the Russian state, notwithstanding its rapprochement with the "West", call for a foreign policy that defends its national interests and does not balk at political confrontation⁷. This worries the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which are relying on the solidarity of the other members of NATO and the EU, themselves divided on the stance to be adopted with regard to Russia.
14. To these factors must be added internal problems linked with the economic transition, as well as differences and conflicts of interest among Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The delimitation of maritime boundaries has caused disputes between Estonia and Latvia (over fishing areas in the Gulf of Riga, 1993-1996), and between Lithuania and Latvia (over oil exploration in the Baltic Sea, 1995-1996). Lithuania's decision to build an oil terminal at Butinge on the coast near the border with Latvia also caused friction between the two countries (1996-1999). The three Baltic States also each evolved their own strategy for accession to the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.
15. However, notwithstanding their differences, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have succeeded in establishing forms of political cooperation to help cope with common difficulties. The aim of such cooperation is not to set up a kind of Baltic "caucus", but rather to better coordinate their policies in areas of mutual interest. In view of the fact that, for all three, national resources are scarce, they have extended their tripartite approach to other forms of Euro-Atlantic and regional cooperation, through institutions in a position to afford them considerable assistance, as well as the security guarantees to which they aspire.

16. The Baltic Council is the instrument for general political cooperation between the three Baltic States. In 1990, the then Soviet "governments" of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania set up a Baltic Cooperation Council, which ceased to function in 1993. The Baltic Assembly, made up of 60 parliamentarians (20 per national delegation), was set up in 1991. During its third session in 1993, it adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of a Baltic Council (31 October 1993) with a Council of Ministers and an Assembly. The governments had also set in motion a process of negotiation leading to the setting-up of a Baltic Council of Ministers (Foreign Ministers). On 13 June 1994 in Tallinn the Baltic Council of Ministers was founded and the Baltic Council started its work. The Council presidency (ministers and Assembly) is discharged by individual member countries over a one-year term⁸.
17. The organisation of the Council of Ministers consists of a Council of Prime Ministers, a Cooperation Council (foreign ministers), a Council Secretariat and a Committee of Senior Officials, which also includes experts from the different areas in which cooperation takes place. The remit of the Council of Ministers is as follows⁹:

18. Cooperation over security was established in 1992 by the protocol of agreement among the ministries of defence of the Baltic states on ensuring security cooperation, which provided for joint military exercises and unified control of air, sea and land borders (2 June 1992). On 13 September 1993, a trilateral declaration regarding cooperation in the security and defence fields was adopted and a year later the "Agreement between the Governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania concerning the Establishment and Formation of a Joint Peacekeeping Unit" was signed (13 September 1994). These were followed by the "Resolution concerning Military Cooperation among the Baltic States" (13 November 1994), the "Resolution on Defence Cooperation" (2 December 1995) and the "Resolution on the Common Policy of the Baltic States concerning NATO Membership" (6 October 1996).
19. These documents make up the political and legal "corpus" of defence cooperation among the three Baltic States. Other decisions have been taken subsequently with reference to more technical aspects, such as setting up joint structures extending from BALTBAT (1994) to BALTPERS (2000), a common system of "military personnel records" covering the three countries. In parallel Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are actively involved in regional cooperation in the framework of the Nordic Council, the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the EU's "Northern Dimension" initiative. These institutions do not deal with defence matters but play an important part as far as security in general is concerned (migration, home affairs, environment, etc.).
20. One very important initiative for the three Baltic States has been the signature, on 16 January 1998, of the Charter of Partnership among the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and Republic of Lithuania. This document, which is not a treaty, is nevertheless of significant political value and indicative of the United States' commitment to the three Baltic States in the period preceding their accession to NATO (1999¹¹ - 2004). The first paragraph of the "Principles of Partnership" states:

2. The defence policy of the Baltic States

21. Once they had regained independence, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had to rebuild their security and defence apparatus from scratch. Their first priority was to consolidate the authority of their national structures and to guarantee their territorial integrity. However, the legacy of the Soviet, then Russian military presence on their territory and their lack of human and material resources stood in the way of the efforts of each state to guarantee its own defence. In the absence of formal external guarantees the three countries had to focus their efforts in the defence area on optimising their national and common resources. Cooperation was a necessity from the outset.

22. The three Baltic States have in common their geography and, particularly as regards the 20^th century, their history. However, Estonia, which has close ties with Finland, increasingly sees itself as a Nordic country, while Lithuania has moved closer to Poland and the central European region. Latvia for its part considers itself to be at the core of the "Baltic" identity. The differences between the three are equally marked as regards population size, level of economic development and national interests. This has obvious implications for defence and has led to a degree of specialisation among the three according to their particular strengths and capacities.
23. The main priorities of Estonia's defence policy are set out in its National Security Concept adopted on 6 March 2001¹³. Its prime objective is to achieve integration in the Euro-Atlantic security and cooperation structures through its membership of NATO and the EU. This theme is a leitmotiv throughout the Concept. The aim of its defence policy is:

24. That system is founded on a concept of "total defence" that involves all of society, with the Estonian defence forces (EDF) at its core. It entails maintaining conscription and compulsory military service (a strategic necessity, given the size of the population) and giving a key role to territorial defence. The EDF are being developed into a "contemporary force that meets requirements for readiness and military skill and is capable of internal and international cooperation. The military element of total defence is built upon the combined use of the principles of territorial defence and mobile defence, which, from the perspective of Estonia's possibilities, are the most effective means of national defence. Public resources to fulfil this end are provided by the military service system and the ongoing development of a total defence system as a whole".
25. The National Security Concept refers secondarily to cooperation with Latvia and Lithuania, but does not seem to consider it a priority for national and regional security policy, the emphasis being on NATO and EU membership. In the two paragraphs on tripartite cooperation, the stress is laid on preparing for participation in the Euro-Atlantic security area:

26. Latvia's National Security Concept and Defence Concept were adopted respectively in 2002 (24 January) and 2003 (30 September by the Government and 13 November by the Seima, the Latvian parliament). Its national security objectives are described as follows:

27. Three major defence policy objectives are set out:

28. Tripartite cooperation is considered to be "the supplementary element of global and European security processes". For Latvia it is part of a wider security framework in the Baltic Sea region and goes hand in hand with cooperation with the Nordic countries and the Council of the Baltic Sea States. It does, however, have one specific advantage, which is that it entails a firm commitment to common projects that are beneficial to regional security as well as to the national security of each of the three states.
29. The aim of Latvia's Defence Concept is:

30. Unlike Estonia, Latvia in its Defence Concept opts resolutely for professional armed forces and plans to end conscription in 2006. It gives the reasons for that choice as follows:

31. Lithuania defines its security and defence priorities in two documents issued in 2002, the second version of its White Paper¹⁴ on defence and its National Security Strategy. It divides its security interests into two categories: vital interests and primary interests.

0. in the Atlantic Alliance and European Union is considered to be a major strategic objective:

32. The principles and objectives of Lithuanian defence policy are described in the following terms:

33. Regarding defence capabilities, the White Paper describes the process of reform of the Lithuanian armed forces to be completed in 2006:

34. What sets Lithuania apart from the other two Baltic States and doubtless also from many other NATO and EU member countries is the role accorded within its armed forces to the catholic faith. In 2000 it signed an "Agreement between the Holy See and the Republic of Lithuania on Pastoral Education of Soldiers Serving in the Lithuanian Armed Forces" establishing an "Army Ordinariate" whose task is to:

35. Defence cooperation between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has been successful to date. It sprang from an acknowledgement of their weakness and to begin with was practically a strategic necessity. The only way to create in a short period of time a defence system beneficial to all three states was for them to pool available resources. Cooperation is not an end in itself, nor does it stem from plans for political integration. There is no "Baltic Defence Community" or "Baltic Union". Rather, cooperation was a pragmatic way of achieving two objectives: to form a united front to resist pressure from Russia and to prepare for integration in the Euro-Atlantic security area.
36. Cooperation also made it possible to more effectively channel external assistance in the field of defence. The Nordic countries, the United Kingdom and Germany were actively involved in those efforts. At the same time, the three Baltic States have always made it clear that their political, security and defence cooperation was not an alternative to NATO and EU membership, but rather a way of achieving it in better conditions, not as passive recipients of security, but rather as active contributors to a community of shared values and objectives.
37. In just over ten years Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have devised and implemented a series of common projects which also contribute to the development of national structures and capabilities. That cooperation has the particularity of bringing together the three Baltic States with a group of countries known as the "supporting states"¹⁵. All projects conducted in that framework have been coordinated via the Baltic Security Assistance Forum (BALTSEA) that was established in 1997. (The Baltic States' integration in the Alliance military structures will in time lead to the dissolution of BALTSEA). For each ongoing project there is a multinational steering committee chaired by a "leader" country. BALTSEA provides overall supervision and coordination so as to optimise resources and better pinpoint and make good any shortfalls. There are specialised working groups to deal with specific tasks.
38. The Baltic Battalion, which was set up in September 1994 and dissolved in September 2003, was the first tangible achievement of the three states in the area of defence. Its aim was to provide a joint contribution to international peacekeeping efforts and it served, above all, to promote interoperability with NATO standards and as a catalyst for the development of national defence capabilities. Its headquarters was established in Latvia (Adazi) in January 1996 and the force was declared operational in December 1997. In October 1998 BALTBAT units were deployed within the Nordic Brigade as part of the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was composed of a multinational headquarters and three infantry companies (one for each Baltic State). Logistic support was coordinated by the Baltic Support Group (BSG, Adazi).
39. The supporting state for BALTBAT was Denmark. This project, which was highly important for the three countries concerned, was the victim of its own success. The Battalion was not intended to evolve into a "Baltic force" (in the same way that the Franco-German Brigade was to be the precursor for the Eurocorps). Rather it was envisaged as a tool for managing and optimising military assets and capabilities. The national systems were enriched by the experience that the national units and officers brought back with them after serving on a rotating basis in BALTBAT. It was also instrumental in introducing into the armed forces of the three Baltic States the working mechanisms and procedures applied by NATO in its multinational formations.
40. Once the objectives in terms of national benefits had been accomplished, the future of the force was called into question. Notwithstanding a number of declarations in 2000-2001 by the Baltic ministers and defence authorities about BALTBAT's future development, political support for the organisation began to wane in 2002. In the records of the two meetings held that year by the BALTBAT Steering Committee (composed of representatives of the three Baltic States and the supporting states), there are explicit references to a lack of progress in certain areas, which according to the Danish Chairman of the BALTBAT Military Working Group was "a result of too low a priority being accorded to BALTBAT by the Baltic States". That assessment was confirmed by the decision of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Defence Ministers in May 2003 to dissolve the organisation on 26 September 2003.
41. The idea of organising the joint training of officers and experts from the three Baltic States was first put forward in 1992, in response to a crucial need at a time when the three states were in the early phases of developing their defence capabilities. However, it was only five years later, in June 1997, that the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Defence Ministers, supported by their colleagues from the Nordic Union states, finally decided to set up "a joint Baltic educational institution for senior officers staff training"¹⁶. The Defence College¹⁷ was established in Tartu, Estonia, and commenced its activities in August 1999.
42. Its main activity is to "establish and continuously improve the training and development of senior staff officers of the Baltic States' armed forces"¹⁸. It currently offers five training courses:

43. The "Baltic Virtual Military Academy" is a virtual BDCOL. The project sprang from an initiative proposed by the United States and Norway in response to one of the wishes put forward by the Baltic States in 1992, which was to set up a "Cooperative On-Line System to Educate Baltic Military Officers and Defence Civilians in the Conduct of Integrated NATO and Multinational Operations"¹⁹. BALTVIMA is one of a group of projects for introducing the use of information technologies into defence areas other than that of strictly military operations (e.g. administration and personnel management). Staff training is one such area.
44. The first practical application of the concept developed from another project, the "Baltic Simulation Network" launched by the United States together with the three Baltic States and Norway. In 2000-2001, a Baltic Distance Learning Centre was established in the Baltic Defence College and a first on-line tactical training course (the Platoon Leader's Course) was held to demonstrate the viability of the system. In parallel, the United States supplied the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian national academies with the necessary hardware and software for carrying out command exercise simulations. The three Baltic States quickly grasped the importance of those methods for speeding up and enriching the training of officers with a view to NATO membership. In February 2002 BALTVIMA become a cooperative project in the BALTSEA framework, with the United States and Norway as supporting states.
45. The idea of organising joint surveillance of the airspace of the three Baltic States emerged in 1994. However, it was only on 16 April 1998 that the three governments signed an agreement on the creation of this Baltic air surveillance network. BALTNET is "a system for acquisition, coordination, distribution and display of air surveillance data within the three Baltic states"²⁰. The project has a fairly wide scope, in that it deals with military and civil, national and international aspects. As for all cooperation projects managed within the BALTSEA framework, the leading supporting state is Norway. The United States have also made a significant financial and technical contribution to establishing the system.
46. BALTNET is composed of national centres (Air Sovereignty Operations Centres, ASOC) and a joint centre (Regional Airspace Surveillance Coordination Centre, RASCC), located in Lithuania. The latter, which the WEU Assembly visited in October 2003, is in the process of being modernised in order to link it up with the NATO Integrated Air Defence System. Norway, as the supporting state, assists the three Baltic States with regard to communications between the national centres and the RASCC. Given the scale of investments required to operate such a system, the three states are cooperating closely on the choice of equipment (at present there is a combination of Russian, German and American equipment).
47. The weak point of this system remains the lack of modern airborne capabilities. The three States' air forces do not have a sufficient number of aircraft of the requisite quality, capable of carrying out control and interception missions in case of need. To overcome that shortfall they turned to NATO, which decided on 17 March 2004 to supply the necessary air cover, using assets made available by Alliance member states to be stationed in Lithuania. The first elements of that force − four F-16 aircraft and their crews, supplied by Belgium − were deployed on the Siauliai airbase at the beginning of April²¹. However, this can only be a temporary measure (given the costs as well as the logistic and political constraints), until such time as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are able to acquire, either separately or jointly, the necessary airborne capability to cover their needs.
48. There are still vast quantities of all kinds of military equipment (mines, shells, various munitions and explosives) in the Baltic Sea region that date back to before, during and after the two world wars. Maritime mine-clearing operations are crucially important for economic development off the shores of the three Baltic States (fishing and oil reserves). In the post-cold war period, the naval forces of the NATO states have been able to conduct exercises in these previously inaccessible zones. The navies of the three Baltic States have been involved in those exercises and in 1995 they participated in the "Amber Sea 1995" tripartite exercise.
49. In December 1996 the Lithuanian Defence Minister, together with his colleagues from Estonia and Latvia, as well as representatives of NATO and/or EU member states in the region and of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, launched the process that was to lead to the formation of the Baltic naval squadron, BALTRON. Germany is the supporting state for this project, which has the following objectives:

50. BALTRON has been operational since 1998 and is based at Miinisadam, Tallinn. Each navy supplies one or two ships (minehunters) together with the requisite support and logistics. The three countries share the command on a rotating basis. The main task of this body is to conduct minesweeping and mine-clearing operations, with vessels contributed by Sweden and Germany. Particular attention is paid to crew training and BALTRON units are regularly involved in joint exercises with other allied navies in the Baltic Sea region. BALTRON's activities are gradually evolving with a view to including operations in the fields of coastal surveillance, the protection of maritime approaches and search and rescue. BALTRON's aim is eventually to become the "Naval Squadron of Permanent Readiness" within the NATO framework.
51. In connection with the reform of their defence systems, the three Baltic States have had to adapt very fast to the new geostrategic environment that has emerged in Europe since the end of the cold war. They now need mobile, combined and joint defence forces capable of operations in the NATO and EU frameworks. Since they started out from very little, they have been able in some areas to develop faster than some European states with more unwieldy defence structures. One such area is that of C3I (command, control, communications and information). Any difficulties encountered in that area have been due above all to the lack of financial and technical resources.
52. Those problems have now to a large extent been overcome, thanks to the "Baltic Command and Control Information System", for which Germany (air force) is the supporting state²³. The project was launched in 2001 and should be fully operational in 2004. The system is based on a single model that is common to the three Baltic States. Its aim is to achieve from the outset fully integrated C3I systems for the Defence Staffs and forces. Its main features are as follows:

53. The aim of these projects is essentially to improve the management of the military resources of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and to prepare them for NATO membership.

54. As far as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are concerned, the year 2004 draws a line, once and for all, under the second world war and the cold war period. Accession to the Atlantic Alliance and the EU at last gives them the security and defence guarantee, and the guarantees of economic and social progress, to which they have aspired since regaining their independence. By becoming integrated in the Euro-Atlantic security and cooperation area they acquire rights and obligations. Here the three Baltic States have adopted a proactive, positive and constructive approach, seeking to demonstrate their willingness to contribute towards global security and in terms of defence capabilities.
55. This is a major political and material undertaking, beyond their present capabilities, which will yield results in years to come. Both the achievements and deficiencies discussed earlier are substantial and the three Baltic States are still heavily dependent on other countries. At the same time, accession will give each of them individually the opportunity to play to their national strengths. Paradoxically, as far as tripartite cooperation goes, in those areas where they can act alone, EU and NATO entry could be the start of them going their separate ways. Perhaps too, there may be opportunities for them to become part of regional groupings with which they have cooperated already in various domains - for instance the Nordic and Scandinavian countries in the case of Estonia, central Europe in that of Lithuania.
56. The dual accession is also happening at a time of profound institutional and functional change in the Alliance and in the EU. Missions, objectives and ambitions are changing rapidly, largely under pressure from the United States and of the global war against international terrorism. The three Baltic States are involved in them, through external operations as part of coalitions, by lending political support to American intervention and also by supporting the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). These are very positive signs of the way their situation is evolving and of their being, simultaneously, part of both the "old" and the "new" Europe²⁸.

1. A major challenge for the three Baltic States

57. By joining the Atlantic Alliance and the EU, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have achieved one of their major strategic objectives, possibly the most important. This has been due to hard work and determination through a testing period, where high hopes have not always been fully realised. They have had the advantage of a reserve of understanding and goodwill on the part of European nations and the United States which have proffered aid and assistance down the years. The three must now see how their capabilities match up when it comes to taking part in transatlantic and European security and defence missions.

58. The process of convergence with and accession to the Atlantic Alliance has taken some ten years. The three Baltic States were involved from the outset in the Alliance's first initiatives towards the central European states: the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC, 1991) Partnership for Peace (1994), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC, 1977), the NATO Action Plan (NAP, 1999). They were also involved in the Alliance's first operations in former Yugoslavia, through BALTBAT in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1998), and in Kosovo. Since 2001, they have supported NATO initiatives in the fight against terrorism and deployed forces in the framework of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan.
59. The formal opening of the Washington Treaty accession process at the NATO Prague summit in 2002 was merely a formality to "legalise" the three Baltic States' "de facto" entry into the Euro-Atlantic security and defence area. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania want to make an active contribution to the new NATO missions, one which will nevertheless be limited in view of the restrictions and deficiencies in their defence resources. Entry into the Alliance has the effect of accelerating reform through the identification and optimisation of assets and capabilities that are likely to enhance the national contribution made by each of the new members.

60. One of the first important decisions Estonia took with a view to Alliance membership was to increase the amount of GDP it spent on defence to 2%, from 2002-2015. The Estonian Government also decided to review its defence planning and projects, the better to adapt them to the requirements of NATO membership. The emphasis was on forces projection, deployability and the necessary support. The priorities of the Force Structure Review 2004 are as follows:

61. On 4 March 2003, the Latvian Government approved its Reform Implementation Plan for NATO Membership, so as to equip the country to provide the necessary personnel and equipment to Alliance missions ranging from collective defence to peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Since 2000, in line with goals defined in the NATO Action Plan, the government submits an Annual Defence Programme (ANP) and, in 2002, revised its concept for national defence and forces structure. The 2004 ANP sets out the following objectives:

62. In much the same way as Estonia and Latvia, on 23 May 2001 the Lithuanian Government and the political parties represented in parliament reached an agreement on the country's defence budget. This was set at 2% of GDP until 2008. It was also decided to allocate at least 30% of that amount to equipment procurement over the period. In line with commitments under the NATO Action Plan, the government initiated a reform of the armed forces the objectives of which were to:

63. From a security and defence point of view the three Baltic States' accession to the EU does not hold the same significance for them as NATO entry. This is understandable in view of the differences between the two organisations in this area. However the European Union of 2004 is in the process of transforming itself into a political and military organisation, with Europe-wide and worldwide responsibilities. The fact of the European Council (heads of state and government of the 15 member states, plus the 10 applicant states) having adopted a European security strategy on 12 December 2003 serves as one illustration of the way things are moving.
64. Joining the Union is not simply a matter of becoming integrated into a developed common economic and social area. It also implies a commitment to a political project with a global reach. There is also a "soft security" dimension to this common European area which will benefit the three Baltic States, particularly in terms of border control, economic security and regional planning and development. Being part of the EU supplements the defence protection provided through NATO and, as with the latter, the three Baltic States want to be actively involved in the policies of the Union, including the ESDP.
65. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania all agree that the ESDP should not be detrimental to the transatlantic ties the Atlantic Alliance represents. The EU and NATO act in ways that complement one another, not in competition. This equilibrium was shaken during the crisis in Europe and the United States over US military intervention to topple Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, but did not call the three Baltic States' commitment to Europe into question.

66. The development of forces projection capabilities, and armed forces restructuring in relation to that concept, fits with both NATO requirements and those of the EU in terms of crisis management. Estonia subscribes to the commitments set out in the EU headline goal to which it contributes national defence assets. ESTBAT, assigned to peacekeeping or crisis-intervention missions, will be available to NATO and the EU. Operational engagement does not prevent Estonia from having political reservations²⁹ about some aspects of the ESDP, such as the possible inclusion of structured cooperation on security and defence or of a mutual defence clause in the draft Constitutional Treaty for Europe.

67. The European Union is perceived as a major factor in regional security and stability. The Latvian political authorities consider that involvement in ESDP activities and contributing to the headline goal "will promote cooperation, mutual trust and success in the prevention and management of crises". Defence efforts are thus directed towards fulfilling the criteria demanded for NATO and EU missions, while avoiding any duplication which would be counterproductive in the light of the country's limited resources. The success of the plan to create a fully professional army is in line with that twofold aim and adds value to Lithuania's contribution to strengthening ESDP operational capabilities.

68. Like Estonia and Latvia, the Lithuanian Government regards the EU as a Union of sovereign states and of European peoples. It regards the principle of equality between member states as paramount, and compatible with achieving greater efficiency. Lithuania favours the creation of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and is actively involved in the Union's ESDP capacity-building efforts. The country contributes "three infantry battalions, a combat support platoon, a combat service support section, two aircraft, one helicopter, two naval vessels and training areas in Pabrad and Rukla³⁰" towards the headline goal.

2. Involvement in external operations

69. The presence of military units from the three Baltic States in external operations gives an important political signal. First of all, it is a mark of their sovereignty, which is indicative of their complete integration into the present-day international system. It is also a pointer to the progress they have made since they regained their independence. They are no longer seeking security but contributing to regional (European) and international security and stability (in Afghanistan and Iraq). It is also an opportunity for them, with assistance from other states, to hone the military capabilities built up through sustained effort on their part under circumstances where technical, budget and human resources are far from abundant.

70. The 1991 Gulf War and the conflicts in Yugoslavia (1990-1999) paved the way for increased international military intervention, under the auspices of the United Nations and other regional organisations. The UN framework has come under fire since the Kosovo crisis and particularly since the second Gulf war (2003). There is, however, one thing most of the major operations have in common - they are led by the United States, NATO or European or Euro-Atlantic coalitions. This last characteristic - their Euro-Atlantic nature - is the most salient one. As far as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are concerned, becoming part of this security system means active participation in such external operations as are agreed in that particular political and security cooperation framework.
71. Initially, given limited resources and the inadequacy of their embryonic national defence forces for the task in hand, tripartite cooperation offered the way forward when it came to contributing to NATO operations. In 1998, BALTBAT units materialised in Bosnia as part of SFOR's Nordic Brigade. Before that even, from 1995, Baltic elements had been part of IFOR (the Implementation Force for the Dayton Agreement) - mainly so as to familiarise them with NATO procedures, but also as a way of demonstrating a Baltic political willingness to be engaged alongside the Alliance. This first experience was a positive one and opened the door to other Baltic States' units participating in other missions (Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq) on an individual (national) basis.
72. From the point of view of the Baltic States themselves, such external engagements are a way of showing their solidarity as part of Euro-Atlantic systems and a practical way for them to demonstrate that they can add value in terms of capabilities and competences. Numerically they are few, not surprisingly given that national resources are slender, but their quality and professionalism make up for the smallness of their number. The three Baltic States are reliable staunch allies, ready to take their share of the responsibility for security in Europe and elsewhere in the world. They are committed to NATO and the EU alike, although some differences in their assessment of both organisations, and of their respective member countries, mean that at times, in respect of particular actions, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania come down on different sides.
73. Clearly, in terms of security and defence (in the wider sense), as far as all three are concerned the Atlantic Alliance tends to take precedence over the EU. At the same time, their involvement in external actions takes account of the need to respond to the requirements of both organisations (as for instance with SFOR/KFOR or EU-led operation Concordia in the FYROM). The three Baltic States do not have the means to supply forces to two separate organisations on an ongoing basis, which is one reason why it is important to them for NATO and the EU to work in tandem as far as security and defence go and to complement one another. Added considerations are the geostrategic situation within the region and relations with Russia. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania's principal defence guarantee is provided by the United States through the Washington Treaty.
74. External engagement is also a way for the three Baltic States to show solidarity with the United States in the Euro-Atlantic context; hence their involvement since 2001in operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and in Iraq as part of the US-led coalition. This last decision proved a difficult one for them (given public concern at home) and was misinterpreted by some European nations opposed to military intervention. Their choice was a pragmatic one, determined by the reality of international power politics and what they felt was required in the run-up to NATO accession.

75. It is also important to the three Baltic States, in operational terms, for their forces to be involved in external missions. In the framework of NATO and the Partnership for Peace, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian soldiers were able to get to know the current Atlantic Alliance military rules, procedures and machinery. It also gave them the opportunity of focusing efforts in areas necessary to the conduct of this type of joint multinational external operation and that experience, thanks to training and troop rotation, has permeated their national forces' structures at a number of levels. Because of the relative youth of their national armed forces, adapting them to the new requirements of the post cold-war era has proved easier in their case than for other older allies.
76. Today, the structure of their national armed forces and the doctrines governing their use are essentially defined so as to meet the requirements for projection and mobility that are necessary in external operations. This has direct consequences when it comes to training and equipment. Interaction with other allied forces, especially the Nordic contingents, demands high levels of interoperability and a knowledge of the procedures they use. Interoperability has to be guaranteed also during the procurement phase though specific requirements, especially in strategic and technologically advanced instruments, such as in the aerospace field.
77. The experience the three Baltic States have gained as a result of taking part in SFOR, KFOR, Enduring Freedom, ISAF and Concordia, and their service in Iraq, are now clearly proving to be assets in terms of full NATO and EU membership. That experience has also underlined the need for endowment and capabilities in tactical air transport in order to better contribute to NATO and European-led missions. Membership of both organisations also unlocks access to more substantial forms of aid and assistance that help speed up the reform of their national armed forces and overcome existing shortfalls.

78. Over 1 000 officers and troops have taken part in external operations since 1995³¹. Estonia has military units and armed forces elements serving with NATO and the European Union in the Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo and FYROM - EU Police Mission). In Afghanistan it contributes a Rescue Board's Explosive Detection Dog Team to operation Enduring Freedom and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Diving Team to ISAF. In Iraq, it has a force of 43 soldiers, consisting of a Light Infantry Platoon and Airfield Cargo-handling Team, as part of the US-led coalition there. Armed forces elements are also present in the Middle East with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in Palestine³² and in Georgia (on a voluntary basis with the OSCE mission there).

79. Latvian armed forces were engaged in external operations for the first time in 1996 - with NATO (IFOR) and WEU (Multinational Advisory Police Element - MAPE) in Albania. They are also to be found today in Afghanistan, in the form of a medical unit (with operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF), in Georgia (with the OSCE) and in Iraq. 113 troops are deployed in Iraq (an infantry company plus support elements and explosives specialists) with the multinational division under Polish command. One of their tasks is to train members of the Iraqi civil defence corps, the fledgling future post-occupation Iraqi army.

80. Since 1994 (United Nations Protection Force - UNPROFOR), over 1 200 Lithuanian officers and soldiers have been engaged in external operations. Today, some 300 of them are involved in some 10 or so missions for the United States, NATO or the EU, or in coalitions. Over 100 troops are deployed in Iraq as part of the multinational divisions under the UK and Polish commands, in units forming part of a motorised infantry battalion, one of whose functions is to train the Iraqi police force. In Afghanistan, special force elements have taken part in Operation Enduring Freedom and medical staff are serving in ISAF.

81. The singular destiny of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has marked almost half a century of European history. Their past contributions to the development of European civilisation in the far north-eastern part of Europe had been eclipsed by successive foreign occupations, some of which were benevolent, others violent and repressive. Their return to the fold of European nations puts an end not only to the legacy of the Second World War, but also to centuries of domination of the peoples and cultures of the three Baltic States.
82. In the twelve years since their independence, those three countries − notwithstanding the European and American realpolitik of the cold war period − have witnessed the solidarity of all the western European states, whose assistance, warm encouragement and guarantees have now been given concrete expression with the Baltic States' accession to the Atlantic Alliance and European Union.
83. For years NATO and the European Union have provided them with a framework for political and economic cooperation, with a view not only to preparing for their accession, but also to helping them develop their own capacities in all areas of Euro-Atlantic cooperation. WEU played a pioneering role by giving them an associate partner status that became increasingly substantive over the five years in which they were involved in the Organisation's political and military structures (1994-1999). This gave them the opportunity not only to learn, but also to make their own contributions, in the form of proposals and participation as active as that of the full member states.
84. The WEU Assembly, to which the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian parliaments have been sending delegations since 1995, has devoted a number of debates and reports to the "Baltic" question. It provides them with a forum in which to express their positions on European security and defence as an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic security area. Thus for parliamentarians, ministers and heads of state from those three countries, the Assembly continues to provide a political instrument at the service of their countries and of Europe as a whole.
85. Those three states are facing new challenges. EU membership entails a series of constraints and obligations that even the EU founding members have difficulty complying with. As "small" countries, they have to contend with the existing balance of power in the Council, Commission and European Parliament. The diversity of the different states and the moral principle of their equality must be respected in the interests of solidarity and the common good. This is particularly important to them in the light of their past experience.
86. The same principles must prevail in NATO. For the first time in modern history those states have a guarantee of territorial security and integrity supported not least of all by the world's leading power, the United States. Here too they must preserve a sense of balance as regards the future orientations of the Alliance. These must be decided and applied collectively, and any measure aiming to transform NATO into an instrument to serve national interests not shared by all must be rejected.
87. Relations with Russia are another challenge. The three states are "protected" by their NATO and EU membership from any reversal of the situation. At the same time they have the possibility of acting, together with other countries such as Poland, as a bridge between the two Organisations and Russia. Their knowledge of the Russian reality and their experience as Russia's neighbour, including in times of conflict, give them a first-hand perspective that is rare among the European states. Indeed the three countries are already essential participants in any transatlantic or European (EU) policy directed towards Russia.
88. For this new integration enterprise to be a success, the three states must also avoid the pitfalls of isolationism or conservatism dictated by national interests. They need more effectively to combat organised crime and avert the very real risk of becoming countries of transit for illegal immigration or trafficking in people, drugs or dangerous substances. Their particular national and historical experience should provide them with a sound cultural base on which to develop their new role as members of NATO and the EU. There is no doubt that they will succeed. As prime protagonists in the events of the last century they showed a great ability to adapt and react and remarkable cohesion. All the conditions are met for the successful integration of these three remarkable new member states.

Foundations of national defence policy

Structure and size of the defence forces

Defence expenditure

Participation in international operations

Timeframe	Operation
1995	UNPROFOR (Croatia)
Since 1996	IFOR/SFOR (Bosnia)
1996/1997	UNIFIL (Lebanon)
1997-2001	WEU MAPE (Albania)
Since 1997	UNTSO (Middle East)
Since 1999	KFOR/SFOR (Kosovo)
1999-2001	UNMIK (Kosovo)
Since 2000	OSCE BMOM (Georgia)
Since 2002	Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)
Since 2003	ISAF (Afghanistan) Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq) Operation Concordia (Macedonia) EUPM (Bosnia-Herzegovina)

Foundations of national defence policy

Structure and size of the defence forces

Defence expenditure

Participation in international operations

Timeframe	Operation
Since 1996	SFOR-IFOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
Since 1999	WEU MAPE (Albania) KVM (Kosovo)
Since 2001	OSCE BMOM (Georgia)
Since 2002	Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)
Since 2003	Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq) ISAF II (Afghanistan) EU-led Operation Concordia (Macedonia)

Foundations of national defence policy

Structure and size of the defence forces

Defence expenditure

Participation in international operations

Timeframe	Operation
1994-1995	UNPROFOR II (Croatia)
Since 1996	IFOR/SFOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
1998-1999	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (Kosovo)
Since 1999	KFOR (Kosovo) UNMIK (Kosovo) NATO's Operation Allied Harbour (Albania)
2000	OSCE BMOM (Georgia)
2002	ISAF (Afghanistan) Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)
2003	Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq) EU-led Operation Concordia (Macedonia)

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¹ Adopted unanimously and without amendment by the Assembly on 2 June 2004 (2^nd sitting).

² From 1945 to the mid-fifties, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian paramilitary formations took up arms against the Red Army and the Soviet power structures in the three Baltic States.

³ Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden.

⁴ The Nordic Council was set up in 1952 by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

⁵ 2000 Census: Statistical Office of Estonia, www.stat.ee.

⁶ 2000 Census: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, www.csb.lv.

⁷ This was manifest during the Russia-EU discussions in February and March on EU enlargement and its repercussions for trade between Russia and the central European candidate countries and the three Baltic States.

⁸ Latvia holds the Presidency for 2004.

⁹ Terms of Reference for the Baltic Council of Ministers, Article 1; Tallinn, 13 June 1994, amended in Vilnius, on 28 November 2003.

¹⁰ Ibid, Article 8.

¹¹ The formal invitation was issued at the Prague NATO summit, in November 2002. The preparatory process for accession began in 1999.

¹² Appendices IV, V and VI give a detailed presentation of the three countries' defence systems.

¹³ Accession to the Atlantic Alliance and European Union will inevitably call for a revision of the Concept, but its philosophy and main orientations remain valid. The same applies to Latvia and Lithuania.

¹⁴ The first was issued in 1999.

¹⁵ Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

¹⁶ "The Purpose of the Baltic Defence College", The Baltic Defence College, www.bdcol.ee

¹⁷ Visited by the Defence Committee of the WEU Assembly in October 2003.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ "Baltic Virtual Military Academy - BALTVIMA", BALTSEA ; www.baltsea.net.

²⁰ "The Baltic Air Surveillance Network - BALTNET"; Estonian Defence Forces, www.mil.ee

²¹ Belgium will be in charge of the mission until 30 June 2004, at which date Denmark or the Netherlands will take over.

²²  "BALTRON information", BALTSEA ; www.baltsea.net.

²³ Via the "German Air Force Programming Centre GAFCCIS"  based at Birkenfeld.

²⁴ "Baltic Defence Cooperation", Estonian Defence Ministry; www.mod.gov.ee.

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ "BALT HNS", BALTSEA ; www.baltsea.net.

²⁷ Minutes from the BALTSEA Working Group Logistic Seminar, Riga 22 - 23 mai 2002 ; www.baltsea.net.

²⁸ In the sense here of institutions that have been consolidated by decades of cooperation and new missions which follow international geostrategic developments.

²⁹ "Estonia and the European Union; positions of the Estonian Government", Estonian Foreign Affairs Ministry, October 2003, www.vm.ee.

³⁰ " Cooperation between Lithuania and the European Union". Lithuanian Foreign Ministry; www.urm.lt.

³¹ The armed forces number 5 500 in total.

³² One of the oldest UN peace supervision operations (began 1948).