DOCUMENT A/1874

19 October 2004

REPLIES OF THE COUNCIL TO RECOMMENDATIONS 742-748

Document A/1874

19 October 2004

REPLIES OF THE COUNCIL TO RECOMMENDATIONS 742-748

REPLIES OF THE COUNCIL¹
TO RECOMMENDATIONS 742-748²

RECOMMENDATION 742³

on rapidly deployable European land forces - reply to the annual report of the Council ⁴

(i) Taking note of the information on the implementation of the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM) and the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) contained in the second part of the 49^th annual report of the Council;

(ii) Recalling the terms of the European Council's Helsinki Declaration (1999) in which it underlines "its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises";

(iii) Noting that the provisions on structured cooperation in the draft EU Constitutional Treaty should faciliate the deployment of armed forces in the event of a crisis;

(iv) Stressing the resolve of the EU member states to acquire the necessary military capabilities to meet the headline goal, which means being able to deploy at 60 days' notice for a minimum period of one year 50 000 to 60 000-strong troops capable of conducting the full range of Petersberg missions, including those set out in the draft Constitutional Treaty, in particular for the fight against terrorism;

(v) Recalling the decision of the NATO member states to set up the 21 000-strong NATO Response Force (NRF) capable of taking action outside NATO's traditional area of intervention;

(vi) Noting that wars are won on the ground with sufficient numbers of troops to create the security conditions that are necessary for peace;

(vii) Aware of the essential role of land forces for the various aspects of peacemaking and peacekeeping missions: combat, assistance, intelligence and continuous control over the theatre of operations;

(viii) Noting the need for a chain of command that can be deployed to remote theatres and that has the necessary interoperability to coordinate units from the different nations;

(ix) Stressing the importance of logistic support for maintaining land forces in remote theatres for long periods of time;

(x) Noting that reserve forces can play a considerable part in deployed forces by providing skills that are specific to civil society, but aware of the specific problems involved in the use of reservists;

(xi) Welcoming the success of the recent interventions by European land forces deployed for EU-led peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Operation Concordia) and the Congo (Operation Artemis);

(xii) Noting that European troops are fully engaged in the NATO operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan;

(xiii) Stressing the existence of strong European cooperation in the field of land forces, for example in the framework of the Franco-German Brigade, the European Corps, Eurofor and Finabel;

(xiv) Welcoming the recent cooperation established within the European Union under the headline goal and European Capability Action Plan (ECAP),

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue in its annual report to provide the Assembly with information on the European Union's and NATO's new crisis-management capability goals for 2010, paying particular attention to the development of rapidly deployable land forces;
2. Invite the WEU countries to:

3. Insist that these recommendations be taken into account in the draft Constitution.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 742

RECOMMENDATION 743⁵

on European cooperation on informing the public about defence issues⁶

(i) Aware of the importance of communicating with the public, in order to gain greater support for the establishment of an effective system of common defence in Europe;

(ii) Observing that European citizens acknowledge that threats to their security exist, but do not appear to be ready to support the additional investment that is necessary to tackle them;

(iii) Desirous that the public share its convictions and support new programmes for the redistribution of financial and human resources in order to meet the security needs of the 21^st century;

(iv) Observing that the network of communications between national defence authorities in Europe is highly inadequate,

1. Invest more in tools for communicating with the public so as to inform it about the solutions proposed for the setting up of a security and defence system in Europe;
2. Rise above the national defence framework and make increasing use of European images and language;
3. Establish permanent links between defence authorities with a view to creating a communications network on a basis common to the European countries;
4. Facilitate the exchange of personnel with military training, making provision for the reciprocal secondment of larger numbers of staff, and involve the representatives of civil society and academic institutions in training programmes.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 743

RECOMMENDATION 744⁷

on the European Union's stabilisation missions in south-east Europe⁸

The Assembly,

(i) Welcoming the accession of eight central and eastern European countries to the EU, thus anchoring them solidly in a region where stability and security are a mutual interest;

(ii) Recalling that the EU represents a unique exercise in reconciliation and common purpose among democratic states committed to a social market economy and the rule of law;

(iii) Aware that following the 1 May 2004 wave of accessions, much needs to be achieved before the countries of the western Balkans can meet the obligations for EU membership;

(iv) Accepting the European Commission's recommendation to start accession negotiations with Croatia, which now meets the Copenhagen political criteria and is cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY);

(v) Satisfied that with its Stabilisation and Association Process, the EU has established a comprehensive programme to help the remaining countries of the western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro) make progress towards a realistic application for EU membership;

(vi) Recognising that this process has already resulted in significant improvements in the region in terms of stability, functioning democracy and implementation of the reform agenda;

(vii) Noting that the 2003 Thessaloniki European Council reinforced the SAP by including in it new instruments, and that this year European Partnerships are being introduced for each SAP country, which set both short- and medium-term priorities for action;

(viii) Appreciating the fact that the EU, in preparing the western Balkan countries for possible future membership, is also assuming military and police responsibilities aimed at creating a secure environment and helping countries develop effective police forces which operate in accordance with western European standards;

(ix) Concerned by the prevalence and extent of organised crime in Albania, which has also spread to other countries in the region and into western Europe;

(x) Regretting that the political will of successive Albanian governments has been insufficient to address this problem, which is adversely affecting healthy economic development and constitutes a serious obstacle to greater transparency in politics;

(xi) Observing that WEU's Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) was replaced by an EU Police Mission with a far narrower mandate, whereas the Albanian police is, as yet, far from fully prepared to cope with the demanding task of fighting organised crime which challenges the rule of law;

(xii) Judging that in the light of the European Commission's assessment which states that the fight against organised crime and corruption and the functioning of the judicial system are of particular concern, the EU should expand the mandate and size of its police mission in Albania in order to help the country meet Copenhagen standards of law enforcement and prevent the further spread of crime of Albanian origin into neighbouring countries and beyond;

(xiii) Agreeing that the EU can open negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement only when the country has made sufficient progress in the 16 areas for reform indicated in the Feasibility Study, achievement of which has so far been hampered by the slow process of political adaptation to EU standards and the under-development of its national and governmental institutions;

(xiv) Regretting, however, that progress on improving the political situation has been slow and that the institutions of government and state are still under-developed;

(xv) Regretting also that too much power in Bosnia and Herzegovina rests in institutions of local and regional government with strong ethnic and nationalist allegiances;

(xvi) Welcoming the recent defence reform establishing a unitary State Ministry of Defence to oversee the single command of the country's two separate armies and hopeful that the reforms will also be implemented in practice;

(xvii) Recognising the activities of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina but regretting that, due to the reduced mandate and size of this mission, it is unable to guide and accompany the Bosnia and Herzegovina police on a number of core tasks, such as the fight against organised crime;

(xviii) Noting the EU's intention to take over responsibility from NATO's SFOR as the foreign military presence which for some time to come will remain essential to maintain peace and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina and whose authority must be established ab initio;

(xix) Insisting that the future EU force will need to include a robust "gendarmerie-type" element to perform those tasks for which most military personnel are not trained and which normal police forces cannot perform;

(xx) Noting that the closest coordination in the fight against terrorism between all military forces, police and civilian authorities is absolutely essential, and that in Bosnia and Herzegovina this issue must not become the subject of disputes between national and international authorities over their respective areas of competence and should be handled in cooperation with both the EU and NATO;

(xxi) Paying tribute to the late President Boris Trajkovski of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for his steadfast endeavours as a moderate leader who supported national unity and the early integration of his country in the Euro-Atlantic structures;

(xxii) Conscious of the social importance of religious, historical and cultural traditions, and insisting that religious and cultural sites must be effectively safeguarded and that mutual confidence and respect must exist between communities, enhanced by a progressive educational system;

(xxiii) Convinced that the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government have an important role to play in Kosovo in combating extremism and intolerance among the population;

(xxiv) Believing that any further postponement of discussions on the issue of a final status for Kosovo can only contribute to a deterioration of the present situation in which the lack of economic development and massive unemployment are leading to even greater frustration and tension owing to the uncertainty over Kosovo's long-term future;

(xxv) Considering that there is an urgent need for UNMIK to revitalise the economy with all possible support for sound privatisation;

(xxvi) Recognising that cohabitation of different ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic society cannot be imposed on the communities concerned from without and that, in order to provide security and social services for Serb communities within Kosovo, the parallel structures established for the purpose may have to be recognised, regularised and, if need be, supported by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government,

1. Maintain a high priority for a strong European multi-dimensional effort using all available instruments to increase the prosperity, stability and security of the western Balkan region as a whole;
2. Insist that NATO continue to keep a substantial visible presence in the western Balkans, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo with adequate trained reserves available for rapid deployment to the Balkan theatre;
3. Deploy adequate, well-trained forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina to assume the role currently being carried out by SFOR, with an experienced commander and staff to carry authority from the first day of their mandate;
4. Work towards the closest cooperation between the EU Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the residual NATO presence in that country to ensure a clear delineation of the roles and responsibilities established between the two organisations;
5. Coordinate with the United Nations a further steady, progressive hand-over of responsibilities for domestic governance in Kosovo from UNMIK to the elected provisional government in Pristina from November 2004;
6. Insist that the Contact Group of five nations on Kosovo agree by early 2005 a strategy for the definition of an internationally recognised status for Kosovo which commands the confidence of the people of Kosovo across the community divides and which will be acceptable to its neighbours;
7. Urge NATO to implement a thorough reform of the Kosovo Protection Corps to render it more cost-effective with the training, equipment and personnel necessary for the full implementation of its designated roles;
8. Encourage, where appropriate with EU assistance, training and support for an educational system and further development of public services throughout the western Balkans, combining professional competence and reliability with full accountability to their democratically elected governments;
9. Support the establishment of a strong judicial and penal system based upon human rights to underpin with consistency the rule of law and to ensure that this system is properly resourced;
10. Maintain its commitment to a full recognition of the necessity for minorities to participate actively in the governance and the institutional, social and cultural development of the countries in which they live;
11. Demonstrate its political, diplomatic and, if necessary, military support for the integration of the western Balkans in the Euro-Atlantic structures.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 744

RECOMMENDATION 745⁹

on security and defence in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania¹⁰

(i) Noting with satisfaction that the accession of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to NATO and the European Union completes the process of integrating those countries, along with the other central European countries, in the Euro-Atlantic community, while maintaining a spirit of constructive cooperation and partnership with all the neighbouring states;

(ii) Considering that this historic event closes a painful chapter in the history of those three states;

(iii) Recalling the pioneering role played by WEU, which was the first European organisation to welcome the three Baltic States, first of all to its consultation forum and then as WEU associate partners, with the prospect of their accession and with a view to preparing them for integration in the European Union;

(iv) Warmly welcoming the constructive contribution and commitment of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the activities of WEU, and in particular the participation of their parliamentary delegations in the work of the Assembly;

(v) Recognising also the constructive efforts made by the three Baltic States with a view to strengthening cooperation among the Nordic countries and establishing a policy of partnership and good neighbourly relations in this region;

(vi) Expressing support for continuing the process of reform necessary for adapting the security and defence structures of the three Baltic States to the new missions resulting from their NATO and EU membership;

(vii) Stressing the individual and collective efforts being made by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the area of security and defence, in order to respond to the new challenges to national, European and international security;

(viii) Stressing the remarkable contributions that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are making to European and international security and stability, particularly in the peacekeeping area, through the presence of their military units in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and other crisis areas;

(ix) Underlining the qualitative and quantitative contribution the three countries are making to the NATO forces, in particular the NATO Response Force (NRF), and to the European Union's headline goal;

(x) Encouraging the three states to pursue and deepen their cooperation in areas of common interest, in particular as regards armaments and naval and airborne capabilities;

(xi) Stressing the importance for the other European member states of NATO and/or the EU to continue to support and assist the three countries with their projects in the area of security and defence;

(xii) Supporting the decision of the North Atlantic Council to deploy NATO air-based capabilities to Lithuania in order to provide surveillance and protection of the three countries' common airspace;

(xiii) Confident that there will be a successful conclusion to the dialogue being conducted between NATO and Russia with a view to convincing the latter that those air surveillance measures are not detrimental to its security interests;

(xiv) Stressing, nevertheless, that the security interests and requirements of the three Baltic States, as members of the Alliance, are inseparable from those of the other member states and that there cannot be a security guarantee with variable geometry;

(xv) Welcoming the readiness in principle of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to accede to the CFE Treaty on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe as revised in 1999, once it has been ratified by all the signatories and enters into force;

(xvi) Highlighting the important role to be played by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in framing NATO and EU strategies and policies and for establishing relations with all new neighbours of those Organisations, in particular Russia, Ukraine and Belarus;

(xvii) Stressing also that it is important for the enlarged European Union and NATO to find, together with Russia, solutions to all the specific problems concerning the Kaliningrad region that are satisfactory to all interested parties;

(xviii) Supporting the continued process of political, economic and social reform designed to modernise and strengthen democracy and the rule of law in the three Baltic States;

(xix) Considering that it is important in this context for the three Baltic States to pursue their policy of integrating minorities and of acquiring the legal, human and material resources needed to combat the threat posed by organised crime and criminal activities with international ramifications;

(xx) Recalling that the three Baltic States now satisfy the criteria defined by the WEU member states during the signing of the Maastricht Treaty for being invited to accede to WEU under conditions to be agreed in compliance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty;

(xxi) Considering that those three states have a legitimate interest in benefiting from the security guarantee of the modified Brussels Treaty establishing a link with NATO, particularly in view of the weak nature of the provisions contained in the draft EU Constitutional Treaty with regard to a mutual assistance obligation,

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 745

With regard to the issue raised in this Recommendation, the Council wishes to recall the terms of the reply it gave on 1 October 2003 to the Assembly's Written Question 384 of 7 August 2003. Since then, this subject has not been on the WEU Council's agenda.

RECOMMENDATION 746¹¹

on chemical, biological and radiological terrorism¹²

(i) Noting the persistent, worldwide threat of terrorism, amongst others from al-Qa'ida, more than two years after the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States;

(ii) Expressing solidarity with the Spanish people, the victim of attacks on 11 March 2004 in Madrid, and with all those in the world who suffer the consequences of terrorism;

(iii) Considering that the risk of chemical, biological and radiological terrorism is real, although difficult to evaluate in specific terms;

(iv) Highlighting the importance of the prevention and control measures implemented before and after the 11 September 2001 attacks to deal with these types of attack;

(v) Pointing to the fact that although each European state is solely responsible for those who reside within its territory, the fight against the present terrorist threat requires close and unremitting cooperation between all the countries on our continent;

(vi) Welcoming the European Council's decision on the application in advance of the proposed solidarity clause contained in Article 42 of the draft Constitutional Treaty providing inter alia for the mobilisation of military means to prevent the terrorist threat and assist a member state in the event of a terrorist attack on its territory;

(vii) Noting nevertheless that the practical measures needing to be taken for the application in advance of that clause have not been specified and that European Union countries' efforts to firm up the contribution the ESDP should make to the fight against terrorism remain limited;

(viii) Considering in that context, the importance of intelligence services and police forces in forestalling attacks, disrupting their preparation and warding off their execution;

(ix) Considering that there is a need to accelerate and intensify cooperation between the security services and forces of EU and/or NATO member countries;

(x) Noting, however, that cooperation is at present insufficient and that existing shortcomings provide many opportunities for terrorist groups, who are able to travel around Europe and elsewhere, with appalling consequences as demonstrated by the 11 March 2004 attacks in Madrid, Spain;

(xi) Stressing the need to prepare, equip and train Europe's medical profession and civil protection services to enable them to cope with any possible chemical, biological or radiological attack;

(xii) Considering that, although such measures primarily require a national effort, cooperation is essential for dealing with any cross-border consequences, and also as a token of solidarity, given that not all European countries have the same resources for coping with such eventualities;

(xiii) Considering that it is also important to continue to strengthen and extend international regimes for controlling and eliminating chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and preventing their proliferation;

(xiv) Stressing the utmost need for the Biological Weapons Convention to have an inspection and verifications system similar to that for chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention;

(xv) Considering it important to continue to eliminate stocks of chemical weapons in Russia and other countries, in order to prevent illegal trafficking and transfer of those weapons to terrorist organisations and criminal networks;

(xvi) Noting that, in order to ensure such regimes are effective, it is possible in some cases to have recourse to political and military sanctions, in compliance with the United Nations Security Council's peace and security mandate;

(xvii) Noting with concern the destabilising effects of unilateral approaches based on military force alone, which weaken international control regimes that enjoy the widest possible international support;

(xviii) Taking the view that the protection of intellectual property and technological advances in the fields of chemical and biological sciences must form part, from the outset, of the development and implementation of control regimes;

(xix) Stressing, however, that this should never be invoked in cases where research or patents have offensive military applications prohibited by the treaties and conventions in force;

(xx) Considering that the states of Europe are directly responsible for the major thrust of European research in the fields of biotechnology, pharmacy, human genetics, genetically modified organisms and nanotechnology, all of which contribute to human progress but whose effects can be dangerous to humans and to the animal and vegetable kingdoms;

(xxi) Considering that this question is one which should also be dealt with at international level, through the creation of partnerships between the principal nations with capabilities in those fields and the major multinational companies within the sector, and also the relevant international and non-governmental organisations,

1. Determine whether a terrorist attack on a member country, using weapons of mass destruction, particularly of a chemical, biological and radiological nature, constitutes an armed attack within the meaning of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, and define the practical implications this may entail for the signatory states and for the Council;
2. Generate the necessary impetus within the European Union for it to take a decision on the measures making possible the application in advance of the solidarity clause proposed in the draft Constitutional Treaty, and to define the part the ESDP is to play in the fight against chemical, biological and radiological terrorism.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 746

RECOMMENDATION 747¹³

on the European defence agency − reply to the annual report of the Council¹⁴

(i) Taking note of the second part of the 49^th annual report of the Council and in particular of the information its gives on the activities of WEAG and the WEAO Research Cell during the second half of 2003;

(ii) Regretting the decision of the WEAG Ministers not to meet in autumn 2003 as originally planned, despite the major difficulties there would appear to be for the proper transfer of the acquis of WEAG and WEAO to the European Union;

(iii) Welcoming the decision of the European Union member states to create an Agency "in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments", which marks the end of the first phase in the process of establishing the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP);

(iv) Considering that the European Union will in the near future also be acquiring a Constitution and has adopted a strategic concept, and that it has military capabilities (the headline goal);

(v) Recalling that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) it is the European states of the EU and NATO that are now shouldering the greatest responsibilities;

(vi) Noting that the European states together are developing common capabilities and that those efforts are vitally necessary, for no country is in a position on its own to deal with all aspects (combat, establishing security, post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction) of the so-called extended Petersberg missions or the tasks of the NATO Response Force (NRF);

(vii) Considering that the creation of a European Agency (EA) "in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments" is part of the process of setting up a European capability for intervention in international crises;

(viii) Noting that since the adoption by the EU Council in its General Affairs and External Relations format of the report on the EA in November 2003, an initial working structure for the Agency has been set up;

(ix) Considering that clearly the EU states will progress slowly during the initial phase of the EA, but that as its responsibilities increase, the Agency will provide the focus for European efforts in the field of capabilities, technologies and armaments;

(x) Taking account of the fact that the EU Council decision of 17 November 2003 identifies four major objectives for the EA;

(xi) Noting that the first objective is directly linked to achieving the EU's headline goal, efforts towards which are under way in the framework of the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), and that the following three objectives go beyond the strict area of crisis management and constitute a fresh attempt to rationalise and concentrate under a single authority the currently dispersed efforts of the European states in the field of armaments policy and defence R&T;

(xii) Considering that as far as forces are concerned, the notions of concepts and doctrine, structures and support, personnel and training are important and that if the Agency's remit includes those areas too, then it is much more than a simple structure in charge of technical and technological matters;

(xiii) Noting furthermore that to date the only semblance of organisation and real efforts to cooperate on defence R&T have come from WEAO with its Research Cell, which, in particular, provides a legal basis for cooperation projects through the EUROPA Memorandum of Understanding, but which, given its limited resources, cannot give decisive impetus in this area;

(xiv) Stressing, nevertheless, that most European cooperation in the field of defence R&T takes place outside WEAO, since France, Germany and the United Kingdom prefer restricted bilateral or multilateral cooperation, which can be explained by their budgetary resources and technical/technological level;

(xv) Recalling that in 1999, the European Technology Acquisition Programme (ETAP) was launched at France's initiative, with a view to making R&T projects part of a coherent overall strategy and providing structure for defence-related areas;

(xvi) Considering that the EA's responsibility for the coordination and planning of joint research activities − currently carried out by WEAG and WEAO in a multilateral framework that is broader than that of the EU − will help to rationalise existing cooperation and clarify the chain of responsibilities in the field of defence R&T;

(xvii) Noting that, if WEAG's tasks are fully taken over by the Agency, the arrangements proposed for involving WEAG member states that are not members of the European Union in specific Agency projects, where appropriate, fall fundamentally short of the rights currently enjoyed by those states in the field of European armaments cooperation;

(xviii) Stressing that the EA must serve as the instrument of a European armaments policy that in turn is part of a European defence policy, and that whatever interpretation is given to Article I-40.7 of the future EU Constitution, the EU will have de facto a direct responsibility for the territorial defence of its member states;

(xix) Recalling that the preservation and development of the European defence industrial and technological base (EDITB) is a strategic objective for the European states;

(xx) Noting that the EDITB, which also includes R&T, R&D, evaluation and expertise, research institutes and universities, is having some difficulty with the process of consolidation and that scattered structures, piecemeal budgets, conflicting or overlapping national priorities and the effects of transatlantic cooperation all contribute to this state of affairs;

(xxi) Considering that European investment in American programmes is quite high, which reduces the funding for "autonomous" European programmes;

(xxii) Recalling in that regard the participation of several European countries in the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) programme, an example which illustrates the de-structuring effect that transatlantic cooperation can have on the EDITB;

(xxiii) Wishing to know more about the role of the EA in transatlantic cooperation;

(xxiv) Emphasising that in the report on the EA adopted by the EU Council it is stipulated that specific cooperation programmes must be managed through OCCAR (Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation) or through specific arrangements on the basis of OCCAR experience, and by an EU-wide application of rules and procedures drawn up on the model of the Letter of Intent (LoI);

(xxv) Taking the view that the EA's role would seem to be subordinated to the interests of the OCCAR states, in other words, the big western European armaments-producing countries;

(xxvi) Considering that the Agency would bring together most of the activities of ECAP, WEAG and WEAO, as well as coordinating European cooperation, but that when it came to the most important phase − the practical implementation of programmes − it would hand over their management to a body outside the EU structures, such as OCCAR;

(xxvii) Noting furthermore that there are two complementary, but also divergent approaches concerning the EA's future: that of certain states in favour of an Agency with limited powers, and that of industry, for which the Agency is an important step in the process of framing a European defence industrial policy;

(xxviii) Noting that the Agency's budget is an unknown factor, despite the fact that its financial resources are the key to its ability to play a role "in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments";

(xxix) Stressing that the EA must have sufficient human and budgetary resources to be able to work effectively in close cooperation with all other relevant bodies, including the Commission;

(xxx) Considering that the budgetary issue is also decisive for lending real weight to the Agency's legal personality, which in turn is essential in the area of contracts and for determining responsibilities in the case of disputes (and claims for damages);

(xxxi) Noting that notwithstanding the maintenance of Article 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, which stipulates that armaments are the preserve of the member states, the Commission is today fully involved in this sector through two channels, industry and R&T;

(xxxii) Stressing that with the ambiguity surrounding the so-called dual-use (civil and military) technologies and products, and with defence companies that are no longer state-controlled forming industrial groups with dual competences, the Commission is inevitably a player in this sector;

(xxxiii) Deeming, moreover, that in connection with its activities the EA will sooner or later have to tackle the question of cooperation with third countries;

(xxxiv) Considering therefore that the EA's activities will inevitably at an early stage involve cooperation with the United States, particularly in view of the some five billion euros invested thus far by European states in the JSF/F-35 fighter aircraft, in addition to off-the-shelf procurements by European firms of American equipment and technologies, the takeover of European firms by American companies, and the investments made by European companies in order to ensure their presence on the US defence market;

(xxxv) Wishing to know more about the EA's role in international defence cooperation in the transatlantic and other frameworks,

1. Ensure that the legitimate rights and interests of the WEAG countries that are not yet EU member states are taken into account in the process of setting up the European Agency;
2. Hold a WEAG ministerial meeting in 2004 with a view to reaching agreement on transferring the acquis of WEAG and WEAO and giving the President of the Assembly the opportunity to address the Ministers;
3. Energetically support the request of the WEAG countries that are not members of the EU to be granted observer status at meetings of the National Armaments Directors of the EU member states and their representatives and of the ad hoc preparatory group;
4. Consult the Assembly prior to any decision with repercussions for the future activities of WEAG Panels I, II and III;
5. Ensure that the expertise and responsibilities of WEAG and WEAO are included in the transfer of the functions of those two bodies to the EA;
6. Ensure that the WEU member states and observer countries, in their capacity as members of the EU, take account of the following elements for the setting-up of the EA:

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 747

RECOMMENDATION 748¹⁵

on the European Security and Defence Policy
following EU and NATO enlargement − reply to the annual report of the Council¹⁶

(i) Welcoming the progress made on the ESDP, apparent from the information contained in the second part of the forty-ninth annual report of the Council to the Assembly;

(ii) Regretting that the Council's reply to Recommendation 736 takes a partial position only on the issues raised there by the Assembly;

(iii) Stressing the utmost importance of taking up the challenges and making the most of the opportunities offered by EU and NATO enlargement to make Europe and the world a safer place on the basis of a more homogenous and effective European and transatlantic policy;

(iv) Earnestly hoping that the adoption and entry into force of the EU draft Constitutional Treaty will turn the European Union into a more credible and effective player on the international stage, in the interests of peace, freedom, democratic values, the well being of its citizens and security in Europe and throughout the world;

(v) Recalling nevertheless that the provisions on security and defence and the relevant parliamentary dimension as currently proposed by the Intergovernmental Conference still have too many shortcomings to add value in those areas and replace the analogous provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty;

(vi) Recalling in particular that the draft Constitutional Treaty is silent on the EU's defence cooperation with NATO and the matter of how the mutual defence obligation towards the six EU member states which are not members of the Atlantic Alliance can be guaranteed militarily;

(vii) Convinced in consequence that the modified Brussels Treaty remains an indispensable element in Europe's security;

(viii) Emphasising also that, in order to prevent the formation in Europe of areas of differential security, it is up to the Council to give the new EU and NATO member states the opportunity to benefit fully from the security guarantees available under the modified Brussels Treaty or from WEU associate status;

(ix) Recalling that eight of the new EU member states now fulfil the criteria laid down under the Maastricht Declaration, adopted by the WEU member states on 10 December 1991, for being invited to join WEU, with two meeting the criteria for becoming WEU observer countries and two of the new NATO member countries for becoming WEU associate members;

(x) Recalling the Council's reply of 1 October 2003 to Written Question 383, in which it confirms the full validity of the aforementioned Maastricht Declaration;

(xi) Convinced that the position stated by the Council in its Reply to Recommendation 721 of not intending "to anticipate any official démarche (...) by third countries expressing an interest in WEU" is not compatible with the undertakings given by the WEU governments in the Maastricht Declaration inasmuch as the initiative for such invitations should come from WEU;

(xii) Welcoming Croatia's progress in its candidacy for EU accession, as shown by the European Commission's recent recommendation to the EU Council for opening accession negotiations with that country;

(xiii) Recalling that WEU and its Assembly still retain their vital importance as the sole democratic forum for strategic reflection on European security and defence matters where delegations from the national parliaments of EU member states and of all European countries that are members of NATO but not yet members of the European Union can take part, along with other candidate and third countries wanting to become more familiar with the European Security and Defence Policy;

(xiv) Stressing the utmost importance of rapid implementation of the European Security Strategy, particularly in regard to the European Union's new neighbourhood resulting from its eastward enlargement, which implies the development of a policy of constructive cooperation, including cross-border cooperation, and partnership with members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and in particular with Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasus states;

(xv) Recalling that the situation in Belarus continues to require particular attention in regard to the European Union's future policy, which must be closely coordinated with those of other international organisations and all neighbouring countries;

(xvi) Emphasising the need to speed up the process of firming up the part the ESDP is to play in combating international terrorism and the proliferation and development of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and also in the prevention of threats from "failing" states;

(xvii) Desirous that WEU members should contribute to the debate launched in the European Security Strategy on the possible reform of a country's right of individual and collective self-defence as set out in the United Nations Charter, which constitutes a key element of the modified Brussels Treaty,

1. Follow up Recommendation 732 by expressing a preference at the Intergovernmental Conference for any proposed formula in regard to the provisions of the Constitutional Treaty on security and defence matters that is equivalent to the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty, including those concerning the parliamentary dimension;
2. Maintain the modified Brussels Treaty and WEU, and apply that Treaty fully for as long as the European Union does not have either the appropriate legal means or the necessary instruments to substitute the Treaty and all WEU bodies;
3. Reply to paragraphs 2-5 of Recommendation 736;
4. Implement WEU's Maastricht Declaration of 10 December 1991, appended to the Maastricht Treaty, and invite with immediate effect:

5. Grant Croatia the status of WEU associate partner;
6. Give the European Union the necessary impetus to ensure that the European Security Strategy is implemented, in particular by:

7. Propose to the European Union that it establish a system of regular information and consultation with European NATO allies in a 25+5 framework;
8. Develop a contribution to the European Union on the implications of possible reform of a country's right to individual and collective self defence, as set out in the UN Charter;
9. Support Resolution 122 and Decision 27 which follow.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 748

¹ Replies to Recommendations 742-748 communicated to the Assembly by the Council on 19 October 2004.

² Recommendations 742-748 communicated to the Council on 16 June 2004.

³ Adopted by the Assembly without amendment on 2 June 2004 (1^st sitting).

⁴ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Kucheida on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1857)

⁵ Adopted by the Assembly without amendment on 2 June 2004 (2^nd sitting).

⁶ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Crema on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations (Document 1855).

⁷ Adopted by the Assembly without amendment on 2 June 2004 (2^nd sitting).

⁸ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Wilkinson on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1859).

⁹ Adopted by the Assembly without amendment on 2 June 2004 (2^nd sitting).

¹⁰ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Rigoni on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1861).

¹¹ Adopted by the Assembly without amendment on 3 June 2004 (3^rd sitting).

¹² Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Le Guen on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1858).

¹³ Adopted by the Assembly without amendment on 3 June 2004 (4^th sitting).

¹⁴ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Braga on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document 1856).

¹⁵ Adopted by the Assembly without amendment on 4 June 2004 (5^th sitting).

¹⁶ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr van Winsen on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1860).