DOCUMENT A/1877

1 December 2004

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New challenges for transatlantic security cooperation

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Document A/1877

1 December 2004

New challenges for transatlantic security cooperation

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee²
by Mrs Papadimitriou, Rapporteur (Greece, Federated Group)

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¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 8 November 2004.

² Members of the Committee: Mr Agramunt (Chairman); MM Pangalos, Hancock (Vice-Chairmen); MM André, de Assis, Mrs Azevedo, Mrs Bolognesi (Alternate: Manzella), Mr Dees, Mrs Durrieu, MM Goerens, Goutry, Höfer, Hörster, Landrain, van der Linden, Lintner, Masseret, Meimarakis (Alternate: Dendias), Nazaré Pereira, Mrs Paoletti Tangheroni (Alternate: Zacchera), Mrs Papadimitriou, MM Piscitello, Provera (Alternate: Gaburro), Puche Rodríguez, de Puig, Rizzi, Rochebloine, Roth, Mrs Serna Masiá, Mr van Thijn, Ms Tritz, Lord Tomlinson, MM Versnick, Vis, Wilkinson, N..., N...

Affiliate members: Mrs Dubovská, Mr Hegyi, Mrs Herczog, MM Kaminski, Kasal, Kobielusz, Ms Maripuu, MM Nemeth, Partljic, Pelc, Sinkevicius, Strazdins, N..., N ..., N...

Associate members: MM Akçam, Ates, Benediktsson, Çavusoglu, Livanelli, Marthinsen, Width.

Affiliate associate members: MM Dumitrescu, Roman, Timis, Tzekov, N...

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

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RECOMMENDATION 757¹

(i) Recognising that the United States and Europe have in common vital interests such as safeguarding democratic values and combating threats to security and prosperity;

(ii) Noting that the United States National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy both have a fairly similar analysis of the security threats their respective continents face but that the United States and the European Union are often at variance over methods and ways of dealing with common threats;

(iii) Expressing their deep concern over the danger of terrorist attacks such as occurred, on both American and European soil, in the appalling events of 11 September 2001 in the United States and of 11 March 2004 in Madrid;

(iv) Confirming that solidarity between Europeans and Americans in the fight against terrorism is indivisible;

(v) Confirming also that it is essential to conduct the fight against terrorism in a manner that respects fundamental rights and freedoms and the right to a fair trial, and therefore expressing concern with regard to the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay;

(vi) Aware of the importance of better consultation between both sides of the Atlantic, particularly in the NATO framework, and stressing that dialogue can be usefully conducted only when undertaken in a spirit of openness and mutual understanding;

(vii) Considering the common interest the United States and Europe have in promoting the benefit of political systems that are transparent and respectful of human rights, and of healthy and prosperous economies;

(viii) Bearing in mind change within NATO and in particular efforts to adapt its military capabilities to the new security challenges and extend the geographic limits of NATO action;

(ix) Regarding it essential for the transatlantic allies to continue to be able to operate alongside one another, while recognising that high-technology arms and equipment are not a universal remedy against all threats;

(x) Regretting that some US authorities are highly critical of European security and defence policy and that even many political analysts have mistaken views about where Europeans stand on issues, and vice versa;

(xi) Emphasising the importance of all members of the United Nations complying with all of its resolutions and in that connection deploring the United States' recent unilateral recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as the "Republic of Macedonia" as running counter to the spirit of UN Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993);

(xii) Recalling the European Council's determination that the European Union have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces in order to respond to international crises;

(xiii) Stressing that by reinforcing solidarity between European Union member states so that Europe can have more influence in world affairs, EU countries can contribute to the vitality of a renewed Atlantic Alliance and to strengthening the authority of the United Nations;

(xiv) Recalling the predominant and constructive role being played in Afghanistan by the United States and European allies, particularly through NATO, welcoming the election of President Karzai, but concerned nevertheless at the worrying upsurge in the powers of the warlords and the further extension of opium production;

(xv) Considering European-American cooperation to be necessary for rebuilding Iraq's economy and improving security conditions in the country, in particular by strengthening the Iraqi army through NATO's training mission;

(xvi) Considering that any viable solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must include all the parameters of the Road Map and concerned too about the route taken by the security barrier currently under construction, but welcoming the adoption by the Knesset of the plan for Israel to withdraw from the Gaza Strip;

(xvii) Considering it essential, following the death of President Arafat, for the transatlantic allies to coordinate closely in supporting the holding of the elections scheduled for 9 January 2005 and in promoting a renewal of the peace process in the region;

(xviii) Considering that Iran has admitted concealment of an ambitious nuclear programme and having engaged in enriched uranium production without notifying the International Atomic Energy Agency, and taking account of recent demands made of Iran by the IAEA Governing Council in connection with the country's nuclear programme;

(xix) Hoping earnestly that Americans and Europeans will combine their political offices to secure compliance with, and a strengthening of the existing treaties, in order to prevent proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction;

(xx) Stressing that transatlantic cooperation is the more justified as the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is further amplified by the risk that terrorist groups may try and produce such weapons themselves or procure them illicitly for their own ends,

1. Undertake, following the recent presidential elections in the United States, to work closely with President Bush and the new administration, including in multilateral institutions, to promote the rule of law and create a just, democratic and secure world;
2. Deepen the dialogue in NATO which continues to be the main forum for transatlantic consultation;
3. Ensure that the efforts the EU and NATO make towards securing the new military capabilities that both genuinely require for dealing with new security challenges complement one another, and endeavour to make good shortcomings and eliminate duplication in this sphere;
4. Undertake to explain more clearly to the US authorities the mutual advantage to be had from the development of the European Security and Defence Policy and of that policy being complementary to NATO policy;
5. Strengthen cooperation between the United States and Europe over intelligence;
6. Make serious efforts to ensure American public opinion is better informed about major developments in Europe, and vice versa;
7. Deploy within the ISAF framework the requisite peacekeeping forces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams needed on the ground in Afghanistan, and provide Afghans with additional funding towards economic reconstruction;
8. Give an undivided commitment to setting up a robust NATO mission for training Iraqi security forces and act together in the EU and UN frameworks to contribute both to political stability in Iraq and to the reconstruction of its economy;
9. Urge the parties to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to apply all the measures contained in the Road Map, with the aim of achieving permanent settlement of the conflict on the basis of two states, Israel and a sovereign Palestine, living side by side in peace and security;
10. Draw up, with immediate effect, a closely targeted strategy to assist the Palestinian Authority with policing and political and economic reform and to support the electoral process;
11. Put pressure on Iran to conform to demands made of it by the International Atomic Energy Agency and ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol providing for a stricter inspection regime at nuclear sites;
12. Convince the United States to support the establishment of a permanent, independent international agency for verifying disarmament, able to come rapidly to the assistance of the United Nations Security Council and urge the US authorities to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;
13. Reach agreement with the United States on giving priority to the fight against the causes of terrorism, in particular by working for greater political openness and economic development in the Islamic world.

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1. At the end of the second world war, a profound change occurred in the distribution of power across the globe. The United States and the USSR overtook other major and medium-sized powers, particularly those in Europe. For over 40 years these two superpowers, each with a huge military arsenal, were locked in constant conflict across the world in a bid to impose their political influence. Europe was the main battleground for this clash of ideologies. And yet this East-West standoff did not ultimately lead, as might have been feared, to major armed conflict in Europe. The reverse in fact took place. The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of the cold war and the dawn of a new era. The United States for the time being remains the world's only superpower. In the groundswell of German reunification, the entire continent of Europe was reunited once more.
2. This opens up new vistas of action and influence over world affairs for the enlarged European Union, currently in the throes of political and economic integration. It also puts the question of transatlantic relations into a new light. Since the end of the cold war, transatlantic ties, while not fundamentally called into question on either side of the Atlantic, have become more complex. Their analysis in terms of basic shared values is prompting a degree of soul-searching into the nature of those ties and, consequently, the likelihood of their continuance.
3. Developments in the world's geostrategic situation are accompanied by growing threats (of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional crises etc.) common to Europe, to the United States and other nations of the world. Transatlantic cooperation is essential for facing up to those threats. The Atlantic Alliance, the framework that constitutes the expression par excellence of transatlantic solidarity, has had to adjust its objectives and means to the new security challenges facing both Europe and the United States. Note should also be taken of the EU's endeavours to develop a highly effective common security and defence policy (CSDP).
4. In the fight against terrorism, there is a basic agreement that there will be cooperation across the Atlantic, but with shades of meaning that need spelling out. When confronted with international crises, especially those in the Middle East or in the Balkans, the goals of peace and stability are ones that are shared by Americans and Europeans alike. However, the means advocated for achieving those goals at times differ from one Atlantic shore to the other. In any transnational issue with global consequences (such as disarmament or the environment) there is also an advantage to be had from more joint discussion and joint effort between both sides of the Atlantic.
5. Some transatlantic security challenges are not new but in the present international context have now become acute or pressing as never before. The danger of proliferation among states of weapons of mass destruction is matched by the danger of the use of those weapons for terrorist purposes. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to lie at the root of Middle East tensions against a background of disturbance across the whole region (in Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran).
6. The Political Committee visited Washington between 30 August and 3 September 2004. Exchanges of views that took place with various think-tank experts and senior political staff at the Department of State and the Pentagon enabled members to learn more about the positions being taken in the US (both official and independent) in regard to transatlantic ties and common security challenges. In the light of those talks and recent international events our political recommendations seek to offer pointers to European and American decision-makers the better to help them deal jointly with the new security challenges.
7. Following the US presidential elections on 2 November 2004, the European Council, which met on 4 and 5 November in Brussels, warmly congratulated President George W. Bush on his re-election. On 4 November, President Bush for his part, speaking about the war on terror, observed that whatever disagreements there had been in the past, he would continue to reach out to his country's friends and allies and partners in the EU and NATO.

1. Shared values and preferential economic ties

8. When the Committee visited the United States most American contacts were concerned that public opinion should in the main be against American foreign policy, especially in Iraq. They feared a wave of anti-Americanism in Europe that would persist and prove damaging to the future of transatlantic relations. Europeans insist for their part that it is possible to be a friend and an ally without agreeing with one or more of the political courses of action adopted by the United States. The fact that 76% of EU citizens disapproved of the US's present foreign policy does not mean that Europeans are anti-American. 71% of Americans and 60% of Europeans consider that Europe and the US have a sufficiently common value system to be able to cooperate over major world issues. The main difference between the two Atlantic shores is recourse to force². For 54% of Americans but for only 28% of Europeans military might is the best way of keeping the peace³.
9. The United States and Europe have common interests and the same priorities in terms of security and external action:

10. However, differences of approach and differing views are to be found on both sides of the Atlantic Cultural differences influence styles of governance and internal policy (carrying weapons, the death penalty, genetically modified organisms, customs barriers, the role of religion or the appropriate size of a social security system). As all the members of the Atlantic Alliance are democratic countries, it is hardly surprising that their opinions differ on ways of best organising their respective societies. There have always been differences but, during the Iraq crisis, they have been deliberately politicised.
11. There are also differences on international policy. In recent years the European allies and the United States have disagreed over issues such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)⁴ the "Mine Ban Treaty"⁵ or the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM)⁶, the Kyoto Protocol (to limit greenhouse gas emissions) or the International Criminal Court.
12. Thus in March 2001, the newly elected President Bush decided to withdraw his country's signature from the Kyoto Protocol (which the US Senate was doubtless not inclined to ratify then, any more than it is today). The Kyoto Protocol, negotiated in 1997, is however a useful (if still inadequate) milestone in the fight against global warming. It sets rigorous and quantified limits on greenhouse gas emissions. The United States, which has the highest levels of carbon dioxide emissions in the world (25% of total emissions) followed by China, the EU, Russia and Japan, is fearful of high economic costs and criticises the fact that developing countries (which include China and India) are not subject to the same rigorous ceilings. Conversely, the 25 EU countries have signed the Protocol and EU members have undertaken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 8% as compared with 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012.
13. The United Nations International Criminal Court is another question generating heated opposition between Americans and Europeans. The Court, which was established in 1998, is a permanent international tribunal with universal jurisdiction, competent to try anyone suspected of crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression. On 1 July 2002, the Court's founding treaty came into force. The United States, in principle opposed to a supranational court with authority to prosecute its nationals, and fearing also that the Court would become politicised, voted against the Final Act setting it up. President Clinton finally signed the Rome Statute on 31 December 2000, but President Bush withdrew that signature on 6 May 2002. In addition, on 2 August 2002, the US Congress adopted the American Service Members' Protection Act, which prohibits any form of cooperation with the Court and any military assistance to any country that ratifies the Rome Statute⁷. Moreover, the Act authorises the United States President to "use all means necessary" to free American nationals detained to appear before the International Criminal Court. Lastly, the United States has gone about signing bilateral agreements giving immunity to its nationals (with up to 80 countries to date). Conversely, the European Union member countries have given staunch political and financial support to the Court's establishment. On 11 June 2001, the EU Council adopted a common position on the Court. In May 2002, a European Union plan of action was launched as a follow-up to the common position. On 30 September 2002, the EU Council set conditions on EU members entering into such agreements with the United States and, again very recently, the EU Presidency referred to the Union's unwavering support for the International Criminal Court and its opposition to any bilateral agreements not in conformity with the Rome Statute⁸.
14. During the Political Committee's visit to the United States in early September 2004, the American authorities were also extremely pressing on the matter of the suggestion that the arms embargo on China, (imposed in 1989 following repression by the government), might be lifted. Within the EU Council European nations have begun discussing the possibility of a removal of the embargo⁹. Although it does seem, inevitably, that it will be lifted sooner or later, the United States criticises Europeans for being willing to consider sacrificing human rights to commercial ambition and is roundly opposed to such a step. It fears China could use European technology transfers to develop weapons which might then be used against the Americans, particularly in the event of a conflict involving Taiwan. The Americans are also afraid of the spread of an arms race in the region.
15. However, American experts¹⁰ maintain that taken together such disagreements are no more serious than those in the past over the Suez crisis in the 1950s, the Vietnam War in the 1960s, the Yom Kippur War and the energy crises of the 1970s and the Euromissile crisis in the 1980s. The present hurdles can be surmounted within the framework of strategic goals that are genuinely shared.
16. As far as security is concerned the American government welcomed the European Security Strategy, adopted by the Brussels European Council in December 2003, entitled: "A Secure Europe in a Better World". The American authorities acknowledge they agree on the same security threats (terrorism, armaments proliferation, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states, organised crime). They also agree on the same security guidelines the EU has laid down (preventive action, combination of military and non-military action to counter threats, more flexible and mobile armed forces, better intelligence sharing. Europeans, as their Security Strategy states, feel that "The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence". Although the principle of partnership is a longstanding one, the conditions for its effectiveness and the balance that needs to be struck within it still give rise to tensions.

17. Today, the European Union and the United States together account for 40% of world trade¹¹ and are each other's most important trading partners. This relationship is essential to the prosperity and growth of both. The economic, commercial and financial ties between the two Atlantic shores are, by a wide margin, the deepest and broadest between any two continents in history and they continue to grow.
18. Trade in goods and services between the European Union and the United States stood at 595 billion euros in 2003. Together the two represent 33% of the world's exports and 42% of imports¹². Similarly 59% of incoming and 79% of outgoing foreign direct investment (FDI) originates from the transatlantic area which also accounts for 85% of the world's company takeovers and mergers¹³.
19. The combined transatlantic workforce of associate companies on both Atlantic shores is over 12 million people¹⁴. 60% of research and development undertaken by American foreign affiliates is carried out in Europe. European companies' R&D expenditures in the United States are also very substantial and far exceed those of their Asian counterparts.
20. Moreover, bearing in mind their shared vulnerability to energy crises, Europeans and Americans would both find it much to their advantage to give thought to how to make drastic reductions in their widespread dependence on oil. In September 2004, the barrel price rose to over US$50.
21. However, the United States and the European Union are both partners and competitors. As a result, their attitudes differ on several scores. Some areas of transatlantic disagreement have already been subject to rulings by the World Trade Organisation (for example steel, the Foreign Sales Corporations¹⁵ regulations or the Byrd Amendment¹⁶), others have been resolved (Galileo/GPS) or are in the process of being so (air transport/the "Open Skies"¹⁷ agreements), while yet others continually present difficulties (aerospace and agricultural exports), imports of genetically modified organisms or hormone-treated meat.
22. For example, the ending of the US monopoly in satellite navigation systems represented a decisive strategic and commercial change of direction. Notwithstanding initial opposition from the United States, Europe has developed its own satellite navigation system, Galileo¹⁸, alongside America's Global Positioning System (GPS), designed for military use but available since the 1990s for civilian applications. The Galileo system, which will be operational in 2008, will provide Europe with substantial commercial benefits and facilitate its strategic autonomy. After years of thorny negotiations, a cooperation agreement in this area was concluded between the United States and the European Union at a summit on 26 June 2004. The agreement provides for interoperability between GPS and Galileo.
23. In short, space and defence equipment technologies are essential for maintaining strategic autonomy and the technological edge of a regional or world power. There is significant competition in those fields between the United States and Europe. In aeronautics in particular, the United States is currently raising questions about the bilateral agreement dating back to 1992 governing direct and indirect subsidies to Boeing and Airbus and the possibility of taking the case to the WTO. In 1999, the United States filed 42.2% of international patents in the defence sphere and the states of the European Union 32.8%¹⁹. The American market is a tightly closed one and technology transfer rules are highly restrictive²⁰. On the other side of the Atlantic attempts have been made for several years to strengthen European armaments cooperation and improve European industrial competitiveness. These are two of the objectives of the European Defence Agency in the process of being established.
24. Overall, despite occasional differences between them, vital economic ties bind the United States and Europe, which also have common security interests. The Iraq crisis has had no effect on the flow of trade and investment between the United States and Europe and this is something politicians in both countries can point to as an argument in favour of transatlantic relations, thus playing down the significance of isolated political disagreements.

2. The transformation of the Atlantic Alliance and the development of the EU's security policy

The adaptation of the Alliance's military capabilities

25. The break-up of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in the 1990s led the Allies fundamentally to change their strategy. Faced with new challenges, NATO needs forces which are rapidly deployable, pro-active, global and make use of precision equipment - as compared with the past when they were basically static, reactive, regionally-based and centred on weapons of mass destruction. The Alliance countries are engaged in a process of adapting their military capabilities to allow them to undertake crisis-management and peacekeeping actions of the kind currently under way in Kosovo and Afghanistan.
26. It has become apparent through NATO military operations, particularly those in the Balkans, that the European Allies need to make good a number of shortfalls in areas of their military capabilities (in-flight refuelling, strategic transport and observation by satellite). Deployability - the capability to act in countries remote from national territory - remains a weakness for most allied nations
27. A capabilities commitment was entered into at the November 2002 Prague NATO Summit to remedy shortcomings in four key areas: deployability and sustainability, information control, combat effectiveness and defence against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. A number of multinational project groups were set up to enhance capabilities in specific areas, for example air-ground surveillance, strategic transport by air and sea or in-flight refuelling. At the same time, reform of the Alliance's command structure has produced two strategic commands with different functions - one in Mons (Belgium), responsible for operations, and the other in Norfolk (United States) responsible for transformation.
28. In addition, the decision has also been taken to set up the NATO Response Force (NRF). The aim is to increase still further the degree of availability of forces placed at the service of the Alliance by its member states. Europeans provide most of the NRF's troops and the US authorities say they are suitably impressed with the degree of European engagement. The NRF, which is a joint force, must be deployable within five to 30 days. The first NATO Response Force, essentially a prototype, was set up in 2003. By end 2004 it will have an initial operational capability and will be fully operational by October 2006 at the latest. The main shortcomings noted during the course of setting up the NATO Response Force were in connection with strategic air lift and protection against chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. The NRF also has a number of challenges to deal with: the decision-making process, information-sharing and the inclusion of forces from non-NATO countries including partner countries.
29. At the Alliance's Istanbul Summit on 28 and 29 June 2004, it was decided to forge ahead to achieve the goals set at the November 2002 Prague Summit. However, some US commentators feel that steps to improve the capabilities of the Allies will not achieve their objective as Europeans are not ready substantially to increase their defence spending. The United States for its part spends vast sums on designing extremely sophisticated military equipment which certain American experts themselves acknowledge is not terribly useful, particularly in combating the priority threat - terrorism. Therefore some of their number suggest reducing the list of new capabilities the Alliance should develop so as to concentrate on those the Allies genuinely need to square up to the new threats.

NATO-EU relations

30. With the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) the question of EU/NATO cooperation, in terms of operational ties but above all at the political level, becomes crucial. NATO's capabilities commitment has, for example, the same objectives as the European Union's European Capability Action Plan (ECAP). The European Union Headline Goal, or its Battle Group concept, needs to be in phase with the NATO Response Force. It should also be remembered that the same contributor countries are involved with both and more particularly the same military forces, doing double duty to both organisations. Even if most EU member states are also members of the Atlantic Alliance²¹, the two organisations act independently of one another. The matter of which has political "precedence" over the other therefore invariably hovers in the background.
31. At the Istanbul Summit on 28 and 29 June 2004, the Heads of State and Government declared their determination "to work together to further develop the NATO-EU strategic partnership (...) in a spirit of transparency and respecting the autonomy of our two organisations". They confirmed that both shared "common values and strategic interests". NATO-EU relations now cover a wide range of issues of common interest relating to security, defence and crisis management, including the fight against terrorism, the development of coherent and mutually reinforcing military capabilities and civil emergency planning.
32. In the EU, there have been recent important milestones in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU adopted a European Security Strategy in December 2003. The EU Constitutional Treaty, adopted in June 2004, incorporates substantial progress on ESDP. More than ever before, therefore, NATO and the EU will be called upon to cooperate ever more closely. The relations between the two organisations are governed by the "Berlin plus" arrangements allowing the EU to draw on NATO assets and capabilities, HQs and command and control facilities. "Berlin plus" was implemented for the first time for Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (April-December 2003) which was directed from the EU cell set up in SHAPE. The EU military operation "Althea" currently taking over from SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also a "Berlin plus" operation. Some military experts, however, take the view that in practice the two organisations still have a tendency to go their own way, or even compete with one another, rather than acting in partnership, notwithstanding the declarations of intent on the part of their member states.

The future of the Atlantic Alliance

33. NATO is active and carrying out a number of operations, the most significant of which, in terms of troop numbers and political visibility are those in Afghanistan and Kosovo. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the handover from NATO to the EU is in progress. In regard to Iraq, as well as the support NATO already provides to the Polish multinational sub-command, it was decided in Istanbul that NATO would train Iraqi troops. Furthermore, NATO is developing instruments in order to be able to take part in the fight against the terrorist threat (see section III).
34. Any engagement increases the risk of political ambitions and reality coming adrift, opening up a credibility gap. NATO's action capability is subject to constraints: all the Allies must express their willingness to act together (consensus principle) and need to have the capability to do so. In terms of the willingness to act together, differences of views between Allies can often produce stalemate²². As far as the capability to act together goes, forces that can be projected and sustained are crucial in allowing NATO meet its political commitments.
35. The United States National Security Strategy, published in September 2002, a year after the 11 September 2001 attacks, introduced notions of "preventive" warfare and "coalitions of the willing"²³ as possible ways of giving the United States greater freedom of action in protecting its national interests. If the Strategy is anything to go by, action based on ad hoc coalitions of the willing seems to be gaining ground over institutional alliances like the Atlantic Alliance. Although the Alliance invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty following the 11 September 2001 attacks, in Afghanistan the United States preferred to act in the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom, with the help of allies "of convenience" (most of them NATO members). NATO only came into the picture in 2003 with ISAF, directed up to that point solely by the lead nations.
36. For decades a recurrent debate on burden sharing has taken place within the Atlantic Alliance. Since the cold war ended, the Allies have been seeking to adapt their military capabilities to the changed geopolitical reality. The Americans criticise Europeans for their low levels of national defence spending and for foot-dragging over the reform of their armed forces. Pentagon officials whom the Committee met during its visit to Washington regretted that out of a total of 2.3 million Allied troops, less than 55 000 were deployable. They maintain that most European Allies deploy less than 1% of their troops abroad. A few European nations only deploy the numbers that the United States feel are adequate (of the order of 10% of a given country's total armed forces)²⁴.
37. What reasons do individual Alliance members have for wanting it to continue? For the United States, NATO is more than ever an alternative (rather than a compulsory) means of securing its Allies' territorial defence, and above all for undertaking "non-Article 5" missions on a "case-by-case" basis in the NATO multilateral framework. The United States has always sought to reserve the right to act alone when its interests so dictate. It is not alone in doing so but the fact remains that such a choice on the part of the United States carries more weight, given that it is the dominant partner in the Alliance, which now comprises 26 members, and the linchpin holding it together.
38. As far as the "old" European members of the Alliance are concerned, the latter long represented the American defence "umbrella" against the Soviet threat. For the "new" European entrants it still constitutes an "insurance" against Russia, at the same time providing a measure of their progress in the reform of their armed forces, initially through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and then through the Membership Action Plan (MAP). For all the European Allies, new and old, the Alliance is the political-military cooperation framework linking them in tangible and permanent fashion to the United States (and Canada). It is also the frame of reference for the joint military standards, indispensable for the interoperability of Allied troops in NATO operations, and even for those conducted outside the NATO framework.
39. The NATO Secretary-General also referred, in the form of a series of questions, to crucial problems facing the Allies: "Don't we need a discussion about the stronger pooling of resources? Don't we need a discussion about what we call the eligibility criteria for common funding? Don't we need a discussion on the disconnect between force planning and force generation? "²⁵.
40. At the Alliance's Istanbul Summit on 28 and 29 June 2004, the Heads of State and of Government concluded that NATO's "fundamental purpose, based on the common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, endures: to serve as an essential transatlantic forum for consultation and an effective instrument for Europe and North America to defend peace and stability, now and in the future". It remains for all the Allies to decide on what the ultimate purpose of NATO (whose membership recently increased from 16 to 19, then to 26 members) and that of its partnership programme should be. Following the recent major Alliance expansion, the issue now arises of the shape of the PfP in the longer term. NATO's open door policy will doubtless be extended to the countries of South Eastern Europe, but what about the Caucasus? Where will the Atlantic Alliance end? The Alliance's long-term strategy also needs to take account of the EU's new security and defence ambitions and demonstrate its "added value" over "ad hoc" coalitions, if use is to be made of it by the Americans and Europeans together to cope with their common security challenges.

41. Today, even more so than in the past, the United States is sharply divided about whether to encourage greater European unity. The Americans are unanimously opposed to building up Europe to "counterbalance" the United States. While repeatedly expressing the hope that Europe will stand on its own two feet and develop its own, more effective military capability so as to engage in more "burden sharing", the American authorities are concerned at their declining influence and at the emergence in the longer run of an entity capable of restricting their freedom of action. They perceive the emerging might of the European Union as a political and economic entity, fearing they will find it more difficult to impose their views if Europe speaks with a united or indeed with a single voice. American concerns became heightened with the ending of the cold war and European countries' much reduced strategic dependence on the US as a result of the removal of the Soviet threat. They feel particular resentment towards France and Germany, which, with Russia, were at the forefront of those countries opposed to the Bush Administration's decision to invade Iraq.
42. US officialdom is preoccupied with and recommends caution in regard to the development of a European common security and defence policy which according to it could undermine NATO. The Americans would rather see a modest but effective European projection capability suited to providing them with useful military (and political) support in NATO or in ad hoc coalitions. The messages Europeans receive from the research institutes (think-tanks) of the US capital are often at variance with official American thinking: the US is moving away from you, they say; it is essential to kick start European political and military integration so as to be able to act independently. The feeling is, nevertheless, that all players in American political life (government, elected members and experts) whatever their persuasion, are sceptical about Europeans' capability to develop strong unified policies, increase their defence spending, harmonise their operational needs and adopt an integrated approach to their defence.
43. The first provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) appeared in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, negotiated in December 1991, which took effect on 1 November 1993. In June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers defined the so-called "Petersberg tasks" (humanitarian, peacekeeping and crisis-management operations). The Petersberg missions were included in, and the office of CFSP High Representative created by the EU's Amsterdam Treaty, signed in October 1997 and effective from 1 May 1999. At the Saint-Malo bilateral summit in December 1998, the British and French sides expressed their common political intention that the European Union should have an autonomous action capability in order to respond to international crises. At the Cologne European Council in June 1999, a capabilities headline goal was defined with a view to setting up a European rapid reaction force. New political and military bodies were also created within the EU (Political and Security Committee, Military Committee and Military Staff). Since then, the European Security and Defence Policy has moved forward by leaps and bounds. The EU published its "security strategy" in December 2003 and the EU Constitutional Treaty, signed on 29 October 2004 (but still to be ratified), provides for the appointment of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, the extension of the Petersberg missions, a European Defence Agency (already being set up), a mutual assistance clause in the event of armed aggression, a solidarity clause in the face of terrorist attack and structured cooperation between member states wanting to enter into it which fulfil "higher" military capability criteria. For the first time, therefore, in the continent's history the building of Europe's security and defence is progressing apace.
44. Now that they have their single currency, Europeans are envisaging changes that some American experts perceive as "potentially revolutionary", for example, creating the posts of elected President of the European Council and of EU Foreign Affairs Minister, as well as substantial developments in the direction of a common defence. They feel that the provisions leading to a multi-speed Europe are particularly welcome and are a "realistic and effective" way of avoiding moving forward at the pace of the slowest, in defence and in other areas. In general terms, Americans realise that the EU will perhaps not always be in the position of trailing along in the United States' wake.
45. On 29 April 2003, in a joint declaration on European defence, the Heads of State and Government of Germany, France, Luxembourg and Belgium had proposed to their European partners "the creation of a nucleus collective capability for planning and conducting operations for the European Union" for use in cases where the EU decided to conduct operations without resorting to NATO assets and capabilities. "In order to maintain a close link with NATO" this nucleus "would also have to establish liaison arrangements with SHAPE, including its possible use to support DSACEUR (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe) in his role as a primary candidate to command EU-led operations having recourse to NATO assets and capabilities". The American government reacted with extreme hostility to these suggestions and accusations that the project pointlessly duplicated NATO planning and command structures.
46. At the Brussels European Council on 12 December 2003, a NATO/EU agreement on consultation, planning and operations was ratified. A small civil-military Planning Cell (comprising 35 military and civilian staff) was set up within the EU Military Staff in Brussels, with a view to the planning and conduct of EU operations carried out without NATO support. However, this is not a permanent headquarters. The role of the cell is to support a national headquarters appointed to lead an autonomous EU operation (as in the case of Operation "Artemis" in the Democratic Republic of Congo). Within the cell, an operations centre can be activated by decision of the Council to lead a specific operation, temporarily, as a last resort, if no other headquarters is available, and solely for the duration of the mission. That cell is also responsible for coordinating and planning civilian operations. Moreover, the agreement provides for the permanent presence of NATO liaison officers within the EU Military Staff. Similarly, on a reciprocal basis, a separate, permanent EU Cell is attached to SHAPE, NATO's military HQ at Mons, with responsibility for the preparation of EU operations undertaken with NATO assets, in the framework of the Berlin Plus agreements.
47. The anxieties expressed by the United States, which fears that ESDP development might harm NATO, were taken account of, indirectly, in the agreement reached within the EU. For some nations the national headquarters are adequate, tried and tested. They should therefore continue to be used first and foremost. Among the EU nations, the United Kingdom and France have "multinationalisable" operational headquarters (Northwood and Mont Valérien, respectively). Three other countries should shortly have similar structures: Germany (Potsdam), Greece (Larissa) and Italy (Rome). For the other countries, the cell and Brussels operations centre should eventually be able to carry out operations involving a force of the order of 60 000 troops (in line with the EU's 2003 Headline Goal).
48. During the Political Committee's recent visit to Washington, Pentagon officials expressed concern at the creation of a planning cell within the EU Military Staff and the setting up of EU battle groups. Their view was that the defence planning process needed improving but that this should be done only within NATO. They recalled that at the outset the idea had been a European defence "identity", not a European defence "policy", which would have played down any suggestion of competition between the two bodies. The EU's recent operation, "Artemis" in the Democratic Republic of Congo (from June to September 2003) was cited as an example. NATO seems not to have been informed about the forces generation process for this first autonomous EU operation²⁶. Yet NATO and the EU draw on the same pool of forces. The Americans would therefore have wished for greater transparency between NATO and the EU.
49. It is likely that a stronger affirmation of European strategic autonomy right at this moment will give rise to mounting tension between the transatlantic Allies. However, in the longer term, some Americans would interpret this as a positive move for Europeans and Americans alike. With the tangible prospect of a strong Europe with a common defence, the Americans, as pragmatists, would in all probability, after strong misgivings, get used to it, as they did to the euro and the Galileo satellite navigation system. This would put an end to the United States perceiving Europeans as unable to make a direct contribution alongside them to larger-scale military action - a factor which causes resentment on the American side for being the ally invariably most directly in the firing line. Conversely, it would head off bad feeling on the part of Europeans about being the "junior partner", always being left to mop up and rebuild after military offensives. Such a functional dichotomy, even if only a half-truth, would eventually prove destructive of transatlantic relations.
50. Besides, on 16 August 2004²⁷ President Bush announced the redeployment of American forces stationed overseas in order to parry the new threats of the 21^st century. Some 70 000 troops would be brought back home in the ten years ahead. Those units mainly concerned were at present stationed in Germany and South Korea. Roughly 30 000 American soldiers of the 74 000 stationed in Germany would leave. Some higher ranking military personnel²⁸ or independent experts have concluded from this that such plans should persuade the EU member states to integrate further their defences. By 2010, and if possible before that, Europe should prepare itself to act alone militarily, at least on its own borders (the Balkans and Central Asia) and possibly further afield (Africa and the Middle East).

51. The Americans and Europeans have now already made provision to fight terrorism together both within the NATO framework and within that of EU/US relations. While there is agreement that there is an acute terrorist threat, there are still differences in approach on how to combat terrorism and particularly with regard to the issue of the prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay, or in the matter of intelligence.

1. Fighting terrorism

NATO and the fight against terrorism

52. Following the tragic events of September 2001, NATO was also given a new task: dealing with the terrorist threat. NATO remote-sensing aircraft (AWACs) were used to defend against possible new terrorist attacks, particularly in the framework of Operation "Eagle Assist" which involved NATO aircraft patrols overflying the United States over a period of several months.
53. In late 2002, NATO developed a concept for combating terrorism which involved four rafts of measures, 1) defensive measures; 2) antiterrorist measures; 3) measures for managing the consequences of an attack and 4) military cooperation measures.
54. At the Alliance's Istanbul Summit on 28 and 29 June 2004 in regard to combating terrorism NATO agreed the following measures:

The EU combating terrorism in cooperation with the United States

55. Apart from the measures taken under the aegis of NATO, a number of measures were agreed in the framework of EU-US relations. These are in line with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions on counter-terrorist action²⁹. At the EU-US Summit in Dromoland Castle, Ireland, on 26 June 2004, both sides declared their intention to protect and respect human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law and adopted a declaration on combating terrorism that sets out seven shared objectives to be attained "through dialogue and action at all levels". These are:

56. European and US perceptions of the terrorist threat differ to an extent. Geopolitical and also social factors account for the discrepancy. From a geopolitical perspective, on either side of the Atlantic there are differences of geographic location and areas of interest. For Europeans, the Middle East is their "near abroad", with which they share a historical, cultural and religious past. The existence of significant Muslim minorities in EU member states is a reminder of the fact. The United States is geographically remote from the Middle East and Muslim minorities are proportionately far less significant there than on the continent of Europe. The Jewish lobby carries great weight in the United States, a fact reflected in American foreign policy, especially in relation to the Israeli-Palestine conflict.
57. Moreover, Americans and Europeans maintain they share the same values (democracy, human rights, rule of law) but do not always interpret fundamental issues in the same way: for example in their respective attitudes to the death penalty or allowable ways of combating terrorism. Following the classification of terrorist organisations in the wake of 11 September 2001, the European Union was careful to avoid confusion between the Arab and Muslim worlds and terrorist groups. The visits by the EU troika at the end of September 2001 to Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt and meetings with the Arab League demonstrate Europe's willingness to maintain close relations with those countries. Furthermore the lists of terrorist groups drawn up after the 11 September 2001 by American and Europe are not completely identical.

The prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay

58. The arbitrary detention, indefinitely, of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay over the last two and a half years is an infringement of civil liberties criticised by many Europeans and Americans. The Guantanamo Bay prisoners have not been brought to trial and most have not had the assistance of a lawyer. The detainees (originally about 600 in number) are regarded by the United States as "enemy combatants". In the eyes of the US administration the term covers all non-American prisoners captured in Afghanistan. Among them are nationals from 44 different companies, including a number of British, Danish, French, Spanish and Swedish citizens. Prisoners who are American nationals are being held on American soil in military prisons. The United States maintains that because such combatants do not belong to a state that has declared war on the United States, the Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Prisoners of War are not applicable to them. In practice, Europeans and many other nations criticise the arbitrary detention and lack of transparency as regards the treatment of detainees at the base in Guantanamo Bay which contravene international and humanitarian law.
59. On 28 June 2004, the US Supreme Court handed down two decisions giving detainees with enemy combatant status the right to challenge that status, and their detention, in the US courts. The American authorities' argument that the military base at Guantanamo Bay was outside American jurisdiction was rejected by the Court. Despite these decisions, on 7 July, the Pentagon adopted a decision setting up military tribunals with the task of examining prisoners' cases to decide whether their indefinite detention due to their enemy combatant status was justified. The first hearings before the military commissions to try the Guantanamo detainees began in August 2004. The procedures used by these tribunals have been roundly criticised by human rights protection organisations for their lack of transparency and their use of evidence which may have been obtained under duress. Furthermore, there is no provision for an appeal to the Federal Courts. If detention is found by the military authorities to be justified the prisoner stays in detention, otherwise the State Department has responsibility for returning the prisoner to the country of origin. On 8 November 2004, however, a Guantanamo prisoner succeeding in having the hearing of his case before a special military tribunal suspended by a civil court judge. Some 150 prisoners - including some French and some British, in July and August respectively - have already been handed back to the authorities in their own countries. There is still a good deal of uncertainty about the fate of hundreds of prisoners still being held in Guantanamo Bay and about the legal outcome of the actions currently under way in the United States and prisoners' countries of origin. However, the whole issue of Guantanamo Bay has dealt a severe blow to the United States' image and led to the rise of a protest movement by elected representatives and citizens, particularly in Europe, that shows no sign of abating.

Differences in approach in regard to intelligence

60. Intelligence plays a vital part in combating terrorism. Quite different approaches towards intelligence are adopted on either side of the Atlantic. Europe's intelligence services overall cull a higher proportion of their information through human intelligence while the United States possesses extremely sophisticated eavesdropping and surveillance technology³² and tends to underrate "human intelligence"³³ But the new CIA Director, Porter Goss, a former CIA agent, has criticised the prevailing use of such techniques. President Bush's decision to create the post of National Intelligence Director and the appointment of a new CIA Director in July 2004 led to extensive debate about comprehensive reorganisation of US intelligence services³⁴.
61. There is no community-wide European intelligence agency, although a plan to establish one has been mooted in the wake of the Madrid, 11 March 2004 attacks. However, a degree of pooling of the intelligence gathered by the national intelligence services of the member states does occur in the European Union Situation Centre (SITCEN) whose task it is to centralise intelligence and feed it back to the nations' capitals. Moreover, information is exchanged through numerous bilateral or small group meetings between field staff³⁵.
62. There are differences of approach between Europeans and Americans in regard to communication about the war on terror. In general terms, the US authorities tend to give out more information to the public about intelligence findings than their European counterparts. This difference can be explained by the fact that European intelligence services feel that those findings depend inter alia on confidentiality about possible discoveries or arrests. The Americans, on the other hand, publicise the identity of those arrested as a proof of the effectiveness of their fight against terrorism and thus provide reassurance to the public.

2. Guaranteeing the success of post-conflict stabilisation

63. From the very first, the military presence in Afghanistan had the support of the United Nations³⁶ and the two operations currently under way in the country, although separate, are coordinated. Americans and Europeans play a major and constructive part in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan and seeking to bring about stable, democratic government in the country. Although the international community has not yet succeeded in demilitarising the tribal militia on any substantial scale, appreciable efforts have been put into training the Afghan national army and the police.
64. Despite all the efforts of the international community the risk that the policy of political stabilisation and economic reconstruction of the country may fail cannot be ruled out. Enormous difficulties have been encountered in establishing a sovereign and efficient central government. The warlords are the main obstacle to the formation of a central governing authority³⁷, which has to reconcile the interests of different ethnic groups³⁸. In addition, in the southern Pashtun provinces, there is a resurgence of the Taliban movement and a growth in Islamist militia. Humanitarian workers, NGOs and the United Nations are increasingly being targeted by these groups. The general election has been delayed until spring 2005 but presidential elections were held on 9 October 2004. These took place without major incident. Hamid Karzai was the official winner having been elected President of Afghanistan in the first round with 55.4% of the vote.
65. In a country devastated by 20 years of war, health and social conditions are still very poor and women's rights continue to be ignored. Financial aid is still very inadequate. Currently the international community has committed almost a quarter of the level of support per head of the population that it put into Bosnia and Herzegovina or East Timor. At the Tokyo conference (21 and 22 January 2002) long-term commitments (until 2006) stood at US$ 4.5 billion. At the Berlin Conference (31 March-1 April 2004) a commitment over several years of some US$ 8.2 billion was also agreed. But the Afghan Government and experts on the region estimate that Afghanistan needs about US$ 27 billion in financial aid over the next seven years in order to establish the conditions required for sustained economic growth.
66. It is also expected that this year there will be an explosion in the opium poppy harvest (over 5 000 tonnes in 2004) providing 90% of Europe's heroine supply and accounting for a third of Afghanistan's GDP. While the United States is hoping to bring about rapid and total eradication, Europe's approach is more directed towards gradually encouraging the production of alternative crops³⁹. All military efforts to stabilise Afghanistan run the risk of failure if nothing is done to reduce the country's economic dependence on opium production.

The war on terror (Operation Enduring Freedom)

67. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the UN Security Council, issued a condemnation of such acts and called on all nations to fight terrorism. In October 2001, the United States, with the support of other, mainly European countries, launched a military counter-terrorist operation (Enduring Freedom) in Afghanistan. This was intended to hunt down the remnants of al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. The aim in particular was to capture Osama bin Laden and his closest associates. The United States and a group of coalition countries (in autumn 2004 almost 18 000 troops, about 16 000 of them from the US) are carrying out this operation under US Central Command (CENTCOM), mainly in the southern and eastern provinces and along the border with Pakistan. In the early stages⁴⁰, many European nations contributed to these counter-terrorist operations and are continuing to support United States' efforts through the use of Special Forces (particularly France and the United Kingdom).
68. The war in Afghanistan goes on. The Taliban government and al-Qa'ida bases were quickly dispatched by coalition forces barely two months after 11 September 2001. But many Taliban and al-Qa'ida members took refuge across the border in Pakistan. The Taliban and other Islamic extremists are still recruiting and have built up their strength, and are maintaining an ongoing insurgency across the country.

The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF)

69. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1386 issued on 20 December 2001 following a request to the Security Council, further to the Bonn Agreement providing for the early deployment to Afghanistan of an international security assistance force. It was initially designed to support the Afghan Transitional Authority in maintaining security around Kabul.
70. From the outset, this stabilisation operation, though not specifically European, was largely drawn from EU countries. They were and still are the major contributors to ISAF. Even today, EU member and candidate countries provided more than 80% of ISAF troops (4 500 of a total of 6 500 according to NATO figures at 15 June 2004), while the US contribution was around 2%. Countries' individual contributions change on a regular basis because of troop rotation.
71. NATO did not become involved immediately. "Lead" nations first had command of the force, made up of contingents of forces from countries which had volunteered. ISAF was originally led by the UK (December 2001-June 2002) with 19 countries providing troops^41. Turkey then took over (June 2002-February 2003) after which the force was jointly led by Germany and the Netherlands (February-August 2003) who received help from NATO in planning, forces generation, communications and intelligence. On 16 April 2003, the North Atlantic Council decided to take over ISAF command and planning from 11 August 2003. This involvement by NATO overcame the difficulty of setting up a new headquarters every six months in a complex environment. ISAF is now under the responsibility of Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) in Brussnum, Netherlands. Although NATO and the AFNORTH Commander have overall authority, command on the ground in Kabul still rotates between lead nations. Between August 2003 and August 2004, ISAF was under Canadian command. On 9 August 2004, the Eurocorps took over responsibility for ISAF for a period of six months.
72. This is the first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area in NATO's history and it is proving to be a critical test for the Alliance. Initially restricted to providing security in and around Kabul, the Alliance is now in the process of expanding the mission to cover other parts of the country. In October 2003, NATO endorsed a plan to expand ISAF from 6 500 to 8 500/10 000 troops and to cover other cities besides Kabul, a decision also endorsed by the United Nations. At the most recent summit of the Heads of State and Government in Istanbul, on 28 and 29 June 2004, NATO announced that it would deploy further troops to assist with the holding of the forthcoming elections and take command of the new Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).
73. With a view to the presidential elections held on 9 October 2004, ISAF troops on the ground were increased from 6 500 to approximately 9 000 with the arrival of a 1040-strong Spanish battalion and a 450-strong Italian one. At end September 2004 the United States also deployed 1 100 extra troops to prevent violence during the presidential elections. However, NATO members are hard pressed to supply troops and military equipment. For example, the NATO local Commander's request to member states for seven helicopters fell on deaf ears. After the NATO Secretary-General took up the cause with the defence ministers in no uncertain terms in December 2003, the Netherlands undertook to supply NATO with six combat helicopters and Turkey provided three transport helicopters. NATO countries together can muster a fleet of 2 000 helicopters but they could not readily come up with seven of them for a critical operation on which they were all agreed. NATO's credibility as an alliance capable of managing operations outside Europe is at stake here.
74. NATO is also having trouble boosting the strength of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) of which it has already taken charge. The PRTs are composed of groups of military personnel working with non-military personnel to set up "islands of stability" in different parts of Afghanistan. The PRT concept came out of Operation Enduring Freedom. The Allies decided that existing PRTs would gradually be transferred to NATO command. Only the military elements of PRTs are integrated into the ISAF chain of command. In summer 2004, five (Kunduz, Mazar-e-Sharif, Feyzabad, Meymana and Baglan) out of some 15 PRTs had passed to NATO command, and others are to follow shortly (Chagcharan, Farah, Qal-i-nau, Herat). Eventually NATO control will extend to all existing and new PRTs. The Supreme Allied Commander, General James Jones, also foresees a multinational logistics structure instead of each nation providing its own logistics chain.
75. But the PRTs have been criticised for being too small. Teams of as few as 50-100 troops are sometimes expected to make an impact on areas the size of Belgium. Even with the larger PRTs of 300-400 troops, the number seems inadequate to the task. The PRTs also appear for the time being to be avoiding the more problematic parts of Afghanistan. In addition, some NGOs question the appropriateness of having military personnel engage in humanitarian reconstruction⁴². Yet, soldiers who took part in ISAF in the field, reckoned the PRT solution was an effective one⁴³.
76. The ISAF mission is at risk because the Alliance members are not providing adequate resources. A failure to do so could jeopardise the entire mission and all the successes achieved so far⁴⁴. In the fight against drug trafficking, in particular, NATO/ISAF would do better with a clear mandate⁴⁵. At the Alliance's Istanbul Summit on 28 and 29 June 2004 NATO members declared "We will provide appropriate support, within ISAF's mandate, to the Afghan authorities in taking resolute action against the production and trafficking of narcotics". This should be done without delay.
77. At some stage, the question of strengthening NATO's role by consolidating ISAF and Enduring Freedom under a single command will also arise. The two commands are in close contact. NATO Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that he could envisage a double-hatted unified command in the foreseeable future⁴⁶. However, not all the Allied nations share that view.
78. The war in Afghanistan is not over. While it is not particularly spectacular, it will require an extended and strengthened international military presence in the country. Although its cost is high, the price that would have to be paid in the event of failure would be even higher. Successful action by democratic countries to transform a failed state into a stable country with favourable economic and political prospects would be an extremely powerful message to send to the world. A failure to stabilise Afghanistan would be a serious blow to the credibility of the Alliance and the fight against terrorism being conducted jointly in Afghanistan by the United States and its European Allies.

79. When, on 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Allies supported the United Nations' demand for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops. A US-led coalition intervened militarily from January 1991, with the support of the United Nations. Some 10 European allies took part in the military operations during the first Gulf war. On 28 February 1991, the coalition forces liberated Kuwait and forced Iraq to comply with the United Nations resolution on the withdrawal of its forces from Kuwaiti territory. In 2003, the situation was quite different. While recognising that Iraq had not complied with the demands of successive resolutions, the United Nations Security Council refused to back the war in Iraq. During the diplomatic exchanges that preceded the start of the war, a wide difference of views opened up between some European countries and the United States. The European countries were themselves divided. The governments of Belgium, France, Germany and Russia in particular came out strongly against the war. Other European governments, like Italy, Poland, Spain or the United Kingdom, maintained publicly that the Iraqi regime and its weapons of mass destruction represented a clear threat to world security⁴⁷, stating their readiness to contribute to an international US-led military coalition. The EU could not therefore speak with one voice on behalf of all its member states and candidate countries because of their divisions. The Assembly has already discussed those divisions and issued political recommendations at the time of the transfer of power in Iraq⁴⁸.

The international coalition and the issue of NATO's role

80. The military offensives of the US-UK military coalition began on 20 March 2003. From a military viewpoint the operation was a success. Baghdad was occupied from 8 April 2003 but until 18 April fell victim to extensive looting and attack. On 1 May 2003, President Bush announced the end of major operations, stating that the transition from dictatorship to democracy would take time and that the coalition would not leave until its work was complete. The Coalition forces are currently under the overall command of American General George Casey. Iraq is divided up into three zones. Baghdad and the northern zone are under the control of the United States, which at the moment foresees maintaining the level of its forces there at around 138 000 troops⁴⁹. Pending elections in Iraq which are due to be held at the end of January 2005, the United States has decided to boost its presence as of autumn this year with the deployment of 3 000 to 4 000 extra soldiers. Thirty countries and a total of 25 000 troops were involved in the coalition as at April 2004. Alongside the American and European forces are troops from Australia, South Korea and Japan. The south eastern part of the country is under British control⁵⁰. In the central south zone, Poland has command of a multinational division consisting of some 6 200 troops (at 16 June 2004) from 16 countries⁵¹. Spain withdrew its 1 300-strong contingent in April 2004, as a result of the decision by the new Prime Minister, José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, who came to power following the general election in March 2004 held immediately after the appalling 11 March Islamist terrorist attacks in Madrid. At a conference held on 3 September in Warsaw the military representatives of the countries operating in the centre south area undertook to maintain their forces at existing levels, at least until elections were held in Iraq. In early November, the Netherlands and Hungary announced their intention to pull out their troops in March 2005. In a letter annexed to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 adopted on 8 June 2004, the Prime Minister of the new interim government, Iyad Allawi, asked for the international force to remain. The forces' mandate will expire at the end of the envisaged handover period (in principle at the end of 2005) or earlier if the Government of Iraq so requests. The multinational force has the authority to take all the necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in coordination and close consultation with the government of that country.
81. Further to a request from Poland, the North Atlantic Council decided on 21 May that NATO would support the Polish contingent in Iraq, largely in the areas of intelligence, communications and logistics planning. Iraq is a thorny subject in NATO. However, it is universally agreed that the country cannot be left in a state of chaos. At the Alliance's Istanbul Summit on 28 and 29 June 2004, it was agreed to assist the Iraqi government train its security forces. A sensitive compromise has been reached over NATO involvement in Iraq. Some Allies, unwilling for the Alliance as such to be involved there, fear there will be confusion, both in Iraqi eyes and those of the world at large, between NATO and the coalition that waged the war. The United States for its part is anxious to widen international support for its action. The Allies agreed in principle on a mission to train the Iraqi security forces but discussions are continuing on its scale and the arrangements that are to govern it. A NATO preparatory mission of fifty or so officers and junior officers was sent to Iraq in mid-August to define the arrangements for a more extensive training mission. On 22 September 2004, the NATO Council reached agreement on setting up a training centre for Iraqi officers, in the suburbs of Baghdad. Since then SHAPE has been working on forces generation. Each of the 26 Alliance members is willing to make a contribution (to training in or outside Iraq or to the provision of equipment). The mission will be commanded by US General David Petraeus, who already heads the much larger multinational coalition training mission. The NATO mission will focus on the training of army officers while the coalition mission more broadly has control of the army in general and security forces. A pilot scheme for training Iraqi army officers has already taken place in Norway in early November. The first stage in the Alliance mission is to comprise 350 NATO envoys (60% of them instructors and 40% attributed to security) who will cover the training of staff officers in their general headquarters. The second stage will consist of the setting up of the officer training centre near Baghdad.

The reasons for the war and dealing with the post-war aftermath

82. The coalition has not been able to prove to the satisfaction of the international community the existence of any kind of link between the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and al-Qa'ida⁵². In particular, the coalition found no evidence of the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq - even though these were two of the main reasons advanced to show the legitimacy of going to war. Coalition disarmament experts (the Iraq Survey Group) found nothing⁵³. This was in line with the conclusions arrived at by the former head of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Hans Blix.
83. This has led to questions being raised about the reliability of the intelligence services and the use made of them by governments. Investigations have been carried out and reports published in the United States and the United Kingdom. The US Senate Intelligence Committee reported on 7 July 2004⁵⁴. The Committee of Enquiry presided by Lord Butler also reported to the United Kingdom House of Commons on 14 July 2004⁵⁵. These public reports drew attention to serious shortcomings in the intelligence services but rejected any suspicion of governments having deliberately tried to mislead their citizens.
84. The fact remains that the war is perceived by many of Europe's citizens as a mistake. 73% of Europeans think that the war in Iraq has increased the risk of terrorism, as do 49% of Americans. Both Americans and Europeans consider international approval necessary if a similar situation to that in Iraq were to arise in the future⁵⁶. The Americans seem to realise that even in an Alliance where the weighting of military capabilities is disproportionate, the price to be paid for going it alone may be higher than that of consensus⁵⁷. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, for his part remains highly critical of the operation in Iraq (regarded as "illegal", as it was launched without UN approval⁵⁸) and expressed doubts as to whether elections can be held in January 2005 if conditions remain as bad as they are.
85. As far as the Iraqis were concerned, the coalition forces were unable to prevent the chaos that ensued immediately after the fall of Baghdad. In April 2003, the theft of works of art and looting by bands of armed delinquents immediately damaged and badly tarnished the image of the US and of the coalition in the eyes of the Iraqi people. From May 2004 onwards, the scandal surrounding the conditions under which Iraqi prisoners were being held, particularly the revelations of the torture inflicted by American forces in Abu Ghraib prison (and also in the Basra district under British control) magnified that highly damaging impression both in Iraq and throughout the rest of the world, particularly the Arab world. Muslim citizens all over the world are inclined to perceive the war as unfairly directed against the Muslim community in general. The initial policy of "deBaathisation", particularly of the police and armed forces led to a complete disorganisation of the forces of law and order, harmful to security, and strengthened Sunni resistance. The permeability of Iraq's borders (with Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan and Iran) also allowed many Jihad supporters to infiltrate the country. The failure to organise immediate elections produced an enormous sense of frustration among the Iraqi people.

A difficult internal situation: insecurity and the process of political transition

86. Since the war ended, clashes, violent attacks and hostage takings followed by executions of hostages have become increasingly frequent. Saddam Hussein was captured on 13 December 2003 but the war goes on. The coalition forces are having to deal with powerful insurrectionary and urban guerrilla movements far stronger than in any scenario envisaged previously. Terrorist groups like that led by the Jordanian Islamist Abu Mussab Al Zarqawi are throwing their hand in with Iraqi Islamist insurgents and nationalist rebels. Over 1 000 coalition soldiers (mostly American) have been killed since May 2003 and Iraqi victims number between 13 000 and 15 000. The interim government, largely made up of returned Iraqi exiles, and reliant on the coalition forces to secure the country, is having difficulty in establishing its legitimacy. A virulent anti-Americanism prevails among the minority Sunnis (20% of all Iraqis) who had been in charge of the country since the Ba'ath party came to power. The towns of Samara, Fallujah and Ramadi are strongholds of Sunni insurrection. At the end of October, 850 British troops were redeployed from the south of the country to the area around Baghdad to replace American forces mobilised in the offensive launched in early November against the insurgents in Fallujah. Anti-Americanism is less pronounced among the Shi'ite community, which for the time being has not mounted opposition overtly and en masse to the presence of the coalition forces. The Shi'ites are in the majority, (constituting over 60% of the total population) but were long unable to gain power. They now intend to participate to the fullest possible extent in the new institutions of government that are formed following the elections due to be held in January 2005. The towns of Kerbala, Nadjaf or Sadr City (near Baghdad) have nevertheless been, or indeed still are the scene of heavy fighting. The fighting in Nadjaf and Kufa against the Mahdi forces of the radical Shi'ite commander Muqtada al-Sadr ended on 27 August 2004, thanks to mediation by Iraq's most senior Shi'ite spiritual leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani. The political interests of the various religious groups differ. The Kurds in particular are consolidating their position in the north of the country and are hoping to gain wide autonomy within a federal structure, while the Shi'ites are opposed to the idea of a federal state and support universal suffrage and the holding of direct elections immediately.
87. In November 2003, the US Congress adopted a budget for military expenditure and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan of US$ 87.5 billion, most of which was intended for Iraq. US$ 18.4 billion was to be spent on reconstruction in Iraq⁵⁹. Faced with the intensification of the violence, the United States, on the recommendation of its Ambassador in Iraq, John Negroponte, announced its intention of transferring US$ 3.4 billion (€ 2.9 billion) of the US$ 18.4 billions' worth of reconstruction aid to expenditure on security. The transfer was intended to allow recruitment and training of policemen, border-guards and additional military personnel. Most of the experts from think tanks whom the Political Committee met in Washington in early September 2004 supported substantial troop reductions and the holding of early elections. They thought it naïve to suppose that Iraq could become a liberal democracy in the shorter term. Some advocated speeding up elections in order to create a sense of Iraqi "ownership" of the political process.
88. When the war ended in May 2003, political power was not immediately placed in the hands of an interim Iraqi government. In January 2003, a coalition political and administrative body, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), directly answerable to the Pentagon, was set up to direct the work of all the Iraqi ministries. UN Security Council Resolution 1483, adopted on 22 May 2003, took note of the responsibilities of the Authority set up by the occupying powers. The latter set up a Development Fund for Iraq and responsibility for the United Nations "oil for food" programme was given to the coalition provisional Authority⁶⁰. The Authority, led by US Ambassador Paul Bremer, held the reins of power until 28 June 2004, the date of effective transfer of Iraqi sovereignty to a sovereign provisional government of Iraq.
89. UN SC Resolution 1546, adopted on 8 June 2004, approved the formation of that government, which took responsibility for governing Iraq until such time as an elected transitional government took over. In the meantime, it is required to abstain from taking decisions affecting the future of Iraq once the interim period is over. The occupation ended, the coalition ceased to exist and Iraq has supposedly been returned to full sovereignty. The resources of the Development Fund for Iraq will now be used solely on the authority of the Iraq interim government.
90. The United Nations also approved the timetable for the political transition, namely the holding of direct democratic elections by 31 January 2005 by the latest. A transitional national assembly would then have the task of forming a transitional government of Iraq and drafting a permanent constitution, leading to the formation, by no later than 31 December 2005, of a government, duly elected in conformity with that constitution.
91. From 15-18 August 2004, a national conference of 1 300 delegates met to appoint the members of the Iraq National Council, a body made up of one hundred political representatives with the task of supervising the interim government until the elections (passing the budget, scrutinising government decrees, ensuring the law is applied, providing support for the electoral process). But both the interim government itself, headed by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, and the Iraq National Council, which acts as an interim parliament, lack legitimacy and are perceived by Iraqis as linked with the United States as the occupying power.

Reconstruction and debt

92. Since 1992 the European Community has been Iraq's primary source of humanitarian aid after the UN-managed "oil for food" programme. Following a donor's conference in Madrid on 23 and 24 October 2003, over US$ 32 billion was pledged for Iraq's reconstruction. Of the US$ 18.6 billion promised by the United States, less than a billion has in fact been spent to date. The European Union (Commission and member states) has pledged €1.25 billion. The European Commission has for the time being earmarked €200 million in 2004 to assist Iraq and plans to spend the same amount in 2005. An international fund has been set up for the reconstruction of Iraq, managed by the United Nations and the World Bank. United Nations bodies have already programmed projects worth a total of US$ 350 000 million and committed US$ 100 million during the first six months of 2004. A new donor's conference took place in Tokyo from 12-14 October.
93. In addition, in order to fund reconstruction, Iraq will need access to international capital markets. Its creditors must first agree to a reduction in the country's external debt. Besides the US$ 120 billion owing to its creditors, Iraq owes US$ 80 billion by way of war reparations, or nine times its forecast GDP for 2004. The interim Iraqi government is asking for the country's entire debt to be written off. The United States and the United Kingdom in particular both support this solution but some countries like France or Germany, while supporting a substantial lightening of Iraq's debt burden, are against its being written off completely. Iraq has the second-largest oil reserves in the world and they feel a complete debt-write off is disproportionate compared to concessions allowed to poorer, more indebted countries elsewhere in the world.

The role of the United Nations and the European Union

94. Following the adoption of Resolution 1483, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan appointed Sergio Viera de Mello as Special Representative to Iraq. His mission was to coordinate United Nations action and facilitate reconstruction "in coordination with the Authority". He was also to work with the Authority in setting up a process leading to the formation of a representative government in Iraq. Since the suicide bombing that took place on 19 August 2003 against the United Nations headquarters there, resulting in 20 deaths, including that of Mr de Mello, the UN has been in retreat. Subsequently, Lakdar Brahimi, as the UN Secretary-General's Special Adviser, has tried to ease the process of political transition. But the ongoing deterioration in security conditions continues to prevent the United Nations from having as prominent a role in the political stabilisation and economic reconstruction of Iraq as European countries in particular might wish. On 12 July 2004, the Pakistani diplomat Ashaf Jehangir Qazi became the new UN Special Representative to Iraq and the Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). On 12 August 2004, UNAMI's mandate was renewed for a further year. However, since the bomb attack, the UN team, now reduced to some 50 staff, has been based in Jordan. Pursuant to Resolution 1546 of 22 May 2004, "as circumstances permit" the United Nations will "play a leading role" in bringing about the holding of elections, coordinating reconstruction aid and strengthening the rule of law. The UN Electoral Assistance Division, with Carina Pirelli at its head, has established a procedure for appointing the independent Electoral Commission in Iraq that is to supervise the country's general election. The Iraq Governing Council for its part has passed a law on political parties and agreed a form of proportional representation.
95. The European Union spent over € 300 million in Iraq on humanitarian and reconstruction support in 2003-2004. However, the EU feels that security is insufficient to allow it to widen that support and send officials in on the ground (some are already operating out of Jordan). In a Declaration on the relations between the EU and Iraq issued after the EU Council meeting on 5 November 2004, the EU nevertheless made a number of concrete proposals calculated to support the Iraqi interim government. The Union would provide a further € 30 million (for immediate disbursement) to the elections. Initial planning will commence by the end of November on a possible integrated police, rule-of-law and administration mission, expected to start after the January 2005 elections. The EU is also ready to contribute substantially towards funding the UN Protection Force in Iraq.
96. Now that Iraq has regained its sovereignty, the Americans are hoping for higher levels of support from the international community towards guaranteeing the country's security (deployment of troops) and assisting political and economic transition. Towards the end of August and the beginning of September, both the American authorities and think-tank experts asked members of the Assembly's Political Committee whether Europe would now be prepared to help the Americans with the post-conflict phase. Are Europeans prepared to so do? Are they even ready to provide relief to US forces by increasing the numbers of Allied forces present in the country? This was the question, in the form of an appeal, often posed by American contacts during the Political Committee's visit from 30 August to 3 September 2004.
97. For senior European political figures, everything depends on the degree to which Americans are disposed to consultation and genuinely joint action. To allow chaos to take hold in Iraq would be damaging for the wider international community. However, Europeans refuse merely to be the instruments of a strategy decided unilaterally and handed down from on high, dictated by national interests which they do not share. This is why the idea of strengthening political consultation within the transatlantic arena ahead of decisions being taken nationally would seem to be a sensible suggestion.
98. The United States made an erroneous assessment of the weapons of mass destruction Iraq allegedly had in its possession and this will inevitably impact adversely on its credibility when it issues further warnings of other threats to the international community. Close cooperation alone, including between intelligence services, can restore lost confidence and make joint action possible.
99. On 24 September 2004, the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, came out in favour of holding an international conference on Iraq, involving countries in the region. The conference could take place on 22-23 November in Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt, but the agenda and the participants are still being discussed.

100. In the 1990s, the Yugoslav crisis put Europe and transatlantic relations to the test. Following the break-up of former Yugoslavia in 1991, diplomatic efforts were unsuccessful in preventing war. The European nations were slow to come to a unanimous view, both among themselves and with the United States, on the use of force for peacemaking. Despite the presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina of the UN Protection Force (1992-1995) war crimes and "ethnic cleansing" took place and it was only in November 1995, (Dayton/Paris) with the active support of the United States, that the many attempts to reach an overall peace agreement were successful. NATO then set up first an implementation force (IFOR), then a stabilisation force (SFOR).
101. Today, the handover of SFOR's tasks (originally 32 000 troops, 6 900 as of 1 June 2004) from NATO to the EU (also some 7 000 troops) is in progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina⁶¹. At the Alliance's Istanbul Summit on 28 and 29 June 2004 it was agreed to bring Alliance SFOR operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina to a close by the end of the current year. The EU is to deploy a separate mission there under a United Nations mandate pursuant to Article VII of the Charter (see Resolution 1551) under the "Berlin plus" arrangements reached between NATO and the EU. To that end an EU Council Joint Action was adopted on 12 July 2004. The EU's Political and Security Committee will have political control and strategic direction of the operation. The force commander will report only to the EU authorities on the conduct of operations. NATO will be kept informed of developments by the Political and Security Committee and the Chairman of the EU Military Committee. Admiral Rainer Feist, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) is to be the commander-in-chief of the EU's "Althea" mission. The EU's operational headquarters will be at the Supreme Allied Headquarters Europe (SHAPE) in Mons (Belgium). The British General, A. David Leakey, has been appointed EU Force Commander. It is intended that the EU will be highly visible on the ground as mobile information teams made up of military personnel will be deployed throughout the region and will cooperate with civilian society. Military planning for "Althea" has already begun and the EU force is to be deployed in December 2004. 80% of the SFOR forces already in place are citizens of EU member states. The operation is to be open to participation by third countries, particularly the EU candidate countries (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey) and NATO members that are not members of the EU (Iceland, Norway and Canada).
102. NATO is to maintain a residual military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The NATO HQ in Sarajevo, whose main task is to provide guidance in reforming the armed forces will also be responsible for some operational support tasks like fighting terrorism and protecting forces against a terrorist attack, support to the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia), as resources and available capacities permit, in connection with the arrest of those accused of war crimes, and the sharing of intelligence data with the EU. This residual NATO presence, in parallel with that of the EU, was wanted particularly by the United States so that the hunting down and capture of war criminals could continue. This is a sphere in which harmful rivalry in the field between NATO and the EU must be avoided at all costs.
103. The EU's Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Paddy Ashdown, has stressed the need for good communication with the public over the deployment of the "Althea" mission, so that citizens understand that the operation is one undertaken by the European Union, a completely different organisation to NATO, and has said Bosnians should also be made aware of the possibility of EU accession in the longer term. In Javier Solana's view the aim is to set Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly on the road to EU membership.
104. NATO has been involved in Kosovo through KFOR since 1999 (initially 50 000 troops and now over 17 000 from over 30 countries). The large majority of troops are European. The major contributing countries are France (3 800), Germany (3 240) and Italy (3 150). The outbreaks of ethnic violence in March 2004 forced NATO to deploy its reserve forces. Those outbreaks showed the weakness of the stabilisation process established by the international community. In less than three days, 20 or so people died, a thousand were injured, over 500 homes were destroyed, religious sites (Orthodox for the most part) were damaged and roughly 4 000 people (minority Serbs and others) were displaced. At the Alliance's Istanbul Summit on 28 and 29 June 2004, it was agreed that a solid KFOR presence remained essential to enhance security and foster the political process in Kosovo.
105. The essential problem is that of the region's final status⁶². Additionally, the economic situation remains dire, with rampant inflation and the visible presence of powerful armed gangs. The United Nations, NATO and the EU must cooperate in order to ensure lasting peace in Kosovo. Security is the essential precondition for consideration being given to the basic question of the final status of the Kosovo region. Albanians, who make up 90% of the 1.8 million inhabitants of the province of Kosovo are hoping that it will gain independence. Serbia and Montenegro are refusing to countenance this and want to retain sovereignty over the region which is of historical importance to orthodox Serbia and still peopled by Serbs in the enclaves protected by KFOR⁶³. In the parliamentary elections held on 23 October 2004, there was a turnout of less than 1% of Kosovo Serb voters. In any attempt to achieve a balanced solution, there is a need to be careful not to destabilise surrounding countries, particularly the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia where the EU is at present undertaking a police operation (EUPOL Proxima).
106. During the recent visit to the United States by the Political Committee, senior US officials and independent experts all made clear that the United States would become less involved with the Balkans region. American priorities clearly lie elsewhere. The war on terror, the Middle East situation (particularly in Iraq and Iran) and tensions in south-east Asia (especially North Korea) are paramount. They therefore call on Europeans to organise so as to take on the entire responsibility themselves for bringing security and stability to south-eastern Europe, starting now with Bosnia and Herzegovina and extending very shortly to Kosovo as well. The Americans also expect Europe to be ready to intervene in the future, without assistance from the United States, should other crises arise in the EU's immediate neighbourhood⁶⁴.

3. Working for peace in the Middle East

107. The United States is aware that the military dimension is not the only means of fighting terrorism. Lack of freedom and economic growth create a breeding ground for extremism. The US Department of State has an office which manages the "Middle East Partnership Initiative". This was launched two years ago to promote reform in the Arab world. There are currently 80 programmes in 14 Arab countries to promote political and economic reform and improve educational opportunity and the status of women. However, for the moment, the funding the United States devotes to such projects is limited (US$ 150-200 million for 2003-2004). In parallel, since 1995, the EU has undertaken similar action in relation to the countries of the southern Mediterranean rim. For the period 2000-2006, funding under the MEDA II programme has been used to finance the Euro-Mediterranean partnership to the tune of € 5 billion. Coordination of the American and other pre-existing and similar programmes would therefore be desirable. Recent G8 and EU/US summits envisage greater transatlantic cooperation to strengthen partnership with the countries of the Middle East. The time has now come to put such good intentions into practice.
108. In the context of its policy on fighting terrorism, the United States wanted to launch a major new aid and partnership initiative directed at the "Broader Middle East" a region extending from North Africa to south-west Asia (from Mauritania to Pakistan). Reference was first made to the American initiative for the Broader Middle East (originally the "Greater Middle East Initiative") in November 2003. On 20 January 2004, in his address on the state of the Union, President Bush pleaded for rapid democratisation of the Middle East:

109. The goal of the American initiative is to fight terrorism at its source, starting from the premise that the countries of the "Broader Middle East" are characterised, with few exceptions, by an absence of democracy and the rule of law, stagnant economies and a lack of educational or employment opportunities. These facts are also acknowledged by the United Nations in its regular reports on the region. The US government drew the conclusion that a new multilateral approach to the region was needed that would address those issues on a variety of levels: diplomatic, economic and military.
110. However, in the opinion of even some American experts, the idea of creating a model government or a society that would be a beacon in the region is doomed to failure. The "domino effect" strategy (whereby democracy and good governance would take hold by example) falls at the first fence because of the diversity of the situations prevailing in the various countries involved.
111. Furthermore, the initiative was not well received in the countries concerned, fearful of interference, by force, in their internal affairs (witness the trauma of the occupation of Iraq) and also, perhaps, that the authority to govern would be undermined by more extensive direct contact with the representatives of civilian society. America's initial rejection of the link between the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and global reform in the region has been bitterly criticised by the states of the region.
112. In Europe, although the idea of a commitment to wide development across the region is generally seen in a positive light, most governments advocate a more restrained and focused approach. Their preference would be to address issues closer to home in the Mediterranean basin and use the EU's existing Mediterranean dialogue as a logical starting point for deeper engagement with the region.
113. The United States has therefore revised its intentions and plans to take the reservations of the countries involved, and European countries' more guarded positions into account. At Sea Island (United States) on 9 June, in a joint declaration, the G8 members (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) committed themselves to "a Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the governments and peoples of the Broader Middle East and North Africa", based both on cooperation with the region's governments as well as with business and civil society representatives "to strengthen, freedom, democracy and prosperity for all". They also recognised that resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be an important factor for progress in the region, at the same time stressing that regional conflict should not stand in the way of reform. They acknowledged too that change was dependent on the countries of the region and that transformation could and should not be imposed from without. They stressed that each country was unique and that the process must respect their diversity of aims and rhythm of change. They referred to the existence of other complementary initiatives such as the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (Barcelona process), finally noting that supporting the process of reform in the region was a long-term objective which required a "generational commitment" all round.
114. A "Forum for the Future" was set up, this being a framework for discussion at ministerial level bringing together G8 and regional foreign, economic and other ministers. Parallel dialogues would be initiated with business and civil society leaders.
115. The partnership would focus on three areas: the political sphere (in particular democracy and the rule of law), the social and cultural sphere (in particular education, freedom of expression, equality between men and women and access to global information technology) and the economic sphere (including creating firms and jobs, support for financial reform, fighting corruption and promotion of intra-regional trade).
116. This joint G8 declaration is the result of compromises that support the arguments consistently put forward by Europeans, who have always maintained that fighting poverty is the best way of attacking terrorism at the root. Europeans also believe that the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be dealt with apart as this is a decisive factor in stabilisation of the region. They also want to ensure that earlier complementary initiatives are not overshadowed. Aware of reservations on the part of the countries of the region, they are also insisting at all costs that reforms should not be imposed from outside.
117. Since 1995, the EU and the countries along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean (including Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) have been working towards a Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Broad principles and a programme of work have been drawn up in three fields of action (political, economic and social). The goal is the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by 2010. However, the countries of the southern rim are delaying putting the necessary, but often unpopular, reforms into effect and the EU countries are refusing to reduce agricultural subsidies or extend the freedom of movement of the nationals of those countries for the same reasons. The Barcelona process has therefore made little headway politically and socially and the achievement of a free trade area is being delayed.
118. In Brussels, on 17 and 18 June 2004, the European Council approved a report on the EU's strategic partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East. This sets out general principles and objectives for the EU's policies towards the countries concerned and provides a concrete policy agenda under which, through partnership and dialogue, and recognising diversity, the Union will seek to:

119. At their last bilateral summit in Dromoland Castle, Ireland, on 26 June 2004, the European Union and the United States issued a joint declaration "supporting peace, progress and reform in the Broader Middle East and in the Mediterranean". They reaffirmed their commitment to a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and support for the work of the Quartet on the Road Map. They committed themselves to working with each other in concrete areas to support democratic development, economic integration, intra-regional trade and expanded trade opportunities in global markets. To that end they intended to exploit to the full the structures for dialogue and cooperation that exist between the EU and the United States, to ensure that opportunities for synergy between their respective programmes were availed of to the full.
120. Over the last 10 years, NATO has also cultivated relations with the southern Mediterranean countries. However, such relations have tended to be relatively low key. Some of the instruments used with the PfP could be applied to expand partnership with the South. At the Alliance's Istanbul Summit on 28 and 29 June 2004, the decision was take to strengthen the Mediterranean Dialogue and offer cooperation to the broader Middle East region through the "Istanbul Cooperation Initiative". The initiative is offered by NATO to interested countries in the region, starting with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. It is envisaged that the enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative should be complementary, progressive and individualised processes.

The Road Map and the future of the peace process

121. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is monitored by the Political Committee of the WEU Assembly on a regular basis⁶⁵. The peace process ceased to exist in 2001. At present, suicide attacks and attacks on settlements continue, leading to reprisals on the part of the Israeli army, which has stepped up the numbers of incursions into the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. There is no official dialogue between the parties. Implementation of the Quartet (United States, United Nations, Russia and the EU) plan to set the peace process in motion again is deadlocked. The EU nevertheless is of the view that this multilateral peace plan remains the best solution. By contrast, the Americans are less keen. As far as the US is concerned the Road Map is not the only way towards reopening the peace process.
122. The Quartet's Road Map^66, dates back to 20 December 2002 and was published on 30 April 2003. It sets out a timeline for a permanent settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on two coexisting states. Phase I of the Road Map (which was to have been implemented by May 2003) has not yet begun. It involved the parties in parallel commitments. These consisted, for the Palestinians, in an unconditional cessation of violence, a restructuring of the security services and comprehensive political reform in preparation for statehood. For the Israelis they involved immediate dismantling of settlements erected since March 2001 and a freeze on all settlement activity. Transitional Phase II was to begin after the Palestinian elections and would end (theoretically in December 2003) with the creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders, following an international conference. Phase III provided for a second international conference leading to a final comprehensive permanent status agreement (in 2005) including on borders, Jerusalem, refugees and settlements, thus putting an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
123. The Quartet met on 22 September 2004 in New York and could draw no conclusion other than that no substantial progress had been made in implementing the Road Map, which was to lead to two states, Israel and a sovereign, viable and democratic Palestinian State, living side by side in peace. The Palestinian Authority had not taken the necessary steps to carry out its obligations (namely put an end to violence and terrorism, reform the security forces and restore the rule of law). The Quartet nevertheless welcomed the steps that had been taken to prepare for free and fair Palestinian local elections. The Israeli government for its part had not dismantled settlements established since March 2001 and had not frozen further settlement activity.
124. As Israel's closest strategic ally the United States is in a position to exert a decisive influence on Israeli policy. However, it seems that, this summer, for the first time⁶⁷, the United States let it be known that, in areas that had already been built up, it would not oppose the construction of dwellings intended to cater for the organic growth of the Israeli settlements on the West Bank - contrary to the obligations set out in the Road Map.
125. The primary objective is to achieve a ceasefire. While security conditions fail to improve and violence continues it will be impossible for the peace process to move forward again at the diplomatic level. Some American experts think that "coordinated multilateralism" could perhaps be the means of breaking the deadlock⁶⁸. However, as Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and WEU Secretary-General, emphasises, "any viable solution to the conflict will have to include all the parameters stated in the Road Map⁶⁹. The European Council has also stated that a comprehensive peace must include Syria and the Lebanon.

Attitude towards President Arafat and the Palestinian authorities

126. In recent months, the Israelis have continued to pursue their policy of isolating President Arafat and physically removing the leaders of Palestinian armed movements (in particular the assassination by the Israeli Army, in March, of Sheik Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement - Hamas, and in April of Abdel Azis Al-Rantissi in Gaza). Israeli Army incursions into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip take place virtually on a daily basis and preventive arrests are commonplace. Israel is also continuing to close off towns and villages, tear down the homes of activists and destroy crops and orchards. In the last four years the standard of living of the Palestinian people has plummeted and unemployment has risen.
127. The Americans and Europeans have different views, as do the Americans and European countries among themselves, of what attitude to adopt towards the Palestinian leadership. The American authorities, more than Europeans, tended to write Yasser Arafat off, taking the view that he could never be regarded as having any credibility or as acting in good faith, although they did not support the Israelis when they announced, as they did periodically, that they wanted him expelled, or eliminated even. Europeans were more inclined to respect Mr Arafat as a legitimately elected President and thought he could still have a useful part to play. Mr Arafat died on 11 November. As a result, there will soon be a new leadership and no doubt profound change. Elections are due to take place, in principle, on 9 January 2005.
128. Europeans and Americans should together make clear to the Palestinian authorities that they must undertake the reforms necessary to deal with the independent militia and prevent corruption. The Palestinian authorities must guarantee public order and impose their own priorities, through internal political dialogue and by force if necessary, on those groups that favour the use of violent means, particularly Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.

Position on the security barrier

129. The security barrier, built by the Israelis, extends over several hundred kilometres to the east of the "green line" (the line of the 3 April 1949 armistice, separating Israel from the West Bank) and will therefore deprive the West Bank of a part of its territory. The building of 200 kilometres of security fence has already been completed. Because it departs from the green line to take in Jewish settlements, the Palestinians take the view that the Israelis intend de facto to annex areas of Palestinian territory. On 30 January 2004, Israel's Supreme Court required the government to change the route over some 30 kilometres on the grounds that the damage done to the (Palestinian) residents far outweighed any security benefit to Israel. The new route to the south will therefore be closer to the green line.
130. While the EU recognises Israel's right to protect its citizens against terrorist attack, it has repeatedly demanded that Israel stop and reverse construction work on the barrier within occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as it represents a departure from the applicable provisions of international law. The EU stresses the fact that it will refuse to recognise any change to the pre-1967 borders on which no agreement has been reached between the parties.
131. There are differences in attitude, both within the United States itself and between European nations, towards the security barrier being built in the West Bank The Americans nevertheless seem much more tolerant of it than Europeans. The US view is that the barrier can be justified by the policies of terror being conducted by the armed Palestinian movements. It poses no problem, providing it stays close to the green line which has effectively constituted the border between Israel and the Palestinian lands since 1967. Besides, some American commentators⁷⁰ feel it is likely to be of a transitory nature and therefore "moveable".
132. On 9 July 2004, the International Court of Justice gave an adverse advisory opinion on the on-going construction of the security barrier⁷¹. Replying to the United Nations General Assembly, the Court took the view that "The construction of the wall being built by Israel, the Occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (...) and its associated regime [is] contrary to international law", that Israel "is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated" and "to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory".
133. The International Court of Justice added that this construction must be placed in a more general context of acts of indiscriminate violence and repressive measures. It emphasised that both Israel and Palestine were under an obligation scrupulously to observe the rules of international humanitarian law, one of the paramount purposes of which was to protect civilian life. Illegal actions and unilateral decisions had been taken on all sides, whereas, in the Court's view, this tragic situation could be brought to an end only through implementation in good faith of all Security Council Resolutions, in particular Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). The Road Map approved by Security Council Resolution 1515 (2003) represents the most recent of efforts to initiate negotiations to this end. There was a need to encourage such efforts with a view to achieving as soon as possible, on the basis of international law, a negotiated solution to the outstanding problems and the establishment of a Palestinian State, existing side by side with Israel and its other neighbours, with peace and security for all in the region.
134. On 20 July 2004 the vote in the UN General Assembly went in favour of the Resolution approving the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion by a very large majority. Only six countries voted against it, including the United States, while the European Union countries approved it unanimously.
135. In its declaration of 22 September the Quartet reaffirmed its concerns with respect to the routing of the Israeli separation barrier and took note of the ICJ advisory opinion on the subject. The routing of the barrier is still a problem and the Quartet stresses the fact that no party should take unilateral actions that could prejudge issues that can only be resolved through negotiations and agreement between the parties. In actual fact, the two peoples need not a wall but "bridges" in order to live together in a peace that will last.

The Israeli Prime Minister's plan for unilateral withdrawal from Gaza

136. In December 2003, Israel's Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, announced his intention of evacuating the Gaza Strip completely by end 2005⁷². The plan envisages both the dismantling of the 21 settlements there and the evacuation of the 8 000 settlers. In an internal referendum held in May 2004, militants from the Prime Minister's own Likud party voted (by 60%) against the evacuation. Despite strong resistance within the government, Mr Sharon managed to gain the Knesset's approval for the plan on 26 October 2004. Even after having secured the vote, it is not certain that the Prime Minister will succeed in carrying through his highly controversial solution since the settlers and the extreme nationalist parties are universally firmly opposed to Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
137. In its declaration of 22 September, the Quartet welcomed Mr Sharon's intentions of pulling out of the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank, noting however that this should form part of the overall peace process "as a step toward an end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967, through direct negotiation between the sides ...".
138. The Israeli decision to leave Gaza could change the whole picture and require increased cooperation from the United States in order to facilitate the transfer of power. A closely targeted aid strategy might also be implemented on withdrawal. In particular, Europeans and Americans could inject funds into reform of the administration, encouraging judicial reform, financing infrastructural work in order to make a Palestinian state more viable and provide aid to replace the social assistance provided by Hamas to the inhabitants of Gaza. They could also support the emergence of a new generation of Palestinian politicians and contribute to the training of Palestinian security forces, in cooperation with Egypt. In the short term the EU envisages a series of practical measures to help the Palestininan Authority with policing and political and economic reform, and in support of the electoral process.

139. The construction of nuclear installations in Iran which had not been declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency was revealed by a group of opponents to the regime in summer 2002. The installations cover the whole range of activities required for a military programme, ranging from uranium extraction (Iran has naturally-occurring uranium deposits) to construction of a heavy water plant for a plutonium breeder reactor to be built in Arak, including experimental methods of processing plutonium and research into uranium enrichment using laser techniques. Moreover, with the help of the Pakistani scientist, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Iranians have acquired the technique of uranium enrichment by centrifugation. Iran currently has a plant, in Isphahan, for converting uranium into uranium hexafluoride, the gaseous component which is an enrichment feedstock. A plant close to Tehran produces centrifuges and the centrifugation plant is located at Natanz.
140. In late 2003, Iran admitted under international pressure that it had been concealing a highly ambitious nuclear programme (half of the 24 installations either built or planned were only declared in 2003) and that it had been carrying out uranium enrichment programmes for the past 18 years without notifying the Agency (as it was obliged to do under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement, which Iran signed back in 1970). The United States insisted that this violation should be immediately designated as such so that the matter could be laid before the United Nations Security Council. Europeans, on the other hand, wanted negotiations to take place first. In October 2003, France, Germany and the United Kingdom succeeded in getting Iran to suspend its enrichment activities, as a confidence-building measure⁷³. However, in the course of summer 2004, Iran announced it was to start them again. On 21 September, a senior Iranian official confirmed to the IAEA that Iran had started to convert 37 tons of yellowcake (concentrated natural uranium powder) into uranium hexafluoride, a gas producing enriched uranium by molecular separation in a centrifuge⁷⁴, possibly providing it with enough material subsequently to manufacture several nuclear weapons at least. Additionally, on 11 August 2004, Iran announced it had carried out successful tests on the latest version of its medium-range ballistic missile, the Shahab-3.
141. Senior American officials have long had a policy of isolating Iran, which they criticise for actively supporting armed terrorist groups like Hamas or Hezbollah, for its virulent opposition to the state of Israel and for its attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. They are ready to adopt a strategy of confrontation if Iran does not abandon its programme for the production of enriched uranium which could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. While having the same objectives, Europeans are more inclined to negotiate and engage in critical dialogue. However, they do not rule out recourse to the United Nations Security Council or the use of force. For the time being, the EU is ready to follow a carrot and stick policy (of trade incentives coupled with conditions, including suspension of the uranium enrichment programme).
142. In a report dated early September 2004, the IAEA stated that it was not yet in a position to draw definite conclusions about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. For the moment the IAEA is leaving Tehran the benefit of the doubt about some matters that are still to be investigated and which require more information from Iran and also from Pakistan, Iran's main undeclared supplier. However, in a Resolution adopted on 18 September 2004⁷⁵, the IAEA Board of Governors requested Iran immediately to suspend all enrichment-related activities, including the manufacture or import of centrifuges and the production of uranium hexafluoride feed material. It also requested it, as a further confidence-building measure, voluntarily to reconsider its decision to start construction of a heavy-water moderated research reactor. Between the present time and the next Board of Governors meeting on 25 November 2004, Iran is asked to clarify the outstanding issues, specifically including the sources and reasons for enriched uranium contamination and the import, manufacture and use of centrifuges. The Director of the Agency, Dr Mohamed ElBaradei has been asked to submit in advance of the November Board a report on Iran's response to these requests. The 18 September 2004 Resolution was put forward by France, Germany and the United Kingdom and supported by the United States. However, the latter, was hoping for more robust action, and in particular for a clause automatically referring the matter to the United Nations Security Council and requesting international sanctions against Iran.
143. The Pentagon is hoping for an agreement with Europeans on a firm policy, a referral to the Security Council and European support for "rigorous" sanctions against Iran, perceived as a country "hostile" to the United States. The US Department of State wants the formation of an international consensus against Iran but feels that inaction would be the worst of all worlds and does not rule out military action should the need arise. The Israeli authorities also emphasise the danger of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, which they estimate could happen between now and 2007, and refuses to exclude the possibility of Israeli preventive strikes of the kind Israel carried out against nuclear installations at Osirak, Iraq, in 1981. During the Political Committee's visit to Washington in early September, Assembly members pointed out to the American authorities the importance of having substantial and reliable supporting intelligence before accusing Iran or envisaging the use of force against it. Care should be taken not to make the same mistakes as with intelligence over Iraq and to ensure effective cooperation between US and European intelligence services.
144. Although Iran does not seem to have as clear cut a nuclear military programme as Iraq did in the 1980s or Israel in the 1960s, it is likely that it intends to acquire a nuclear weapons production capability, in case the government decides to produce weapons in the future. The Iranians would prefer to achieve their objective while remaining on the right side of the law. Acquiring nuclear weapons is a longstanding national ambition, present even before the Islamist revolution. Some American experts, however, do not believe the danger is imminent because Iran would need several more years (between three and five) in order to be able to manufacture a nuclear device. America's policy of isolation would not only not be effective to prevent the threat but would be likely to push Iran further in the wrong direction⁷⁶. There is a need to look at the reasons why Iran is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Within its region, Israel and Pakistan have them. Furthermore, Iran was included by President Bush in 2002 among the countries making up the "axis of evil" and feels it is in the firing-line, due to its location at the heart of the region the United States is hoping to transform. The Iranian regime also feels "surrounded" because the United States is currently involved in operations on either side of it (in Afghanistan and Iraq) and also has a presence in Turkey, Georgia and possibly soon in Azerbaijan. Some American experts wonder about the possibility of offering Iran guarantees of non-aggression and ending US sanctions against it in exchange for the partial abandonment by Iran of its (until recently) secret nuclear programme. They feel too that an open debate needs to take place on the consequences of any use of military force in Iran, a country the size of Alaska, with a population the size of that of Germany, and a major world oil producer. How would the post-conflict situation there be managed? In view of present difficulties in Iraq and the American people's preference for using the United Nations, a war against Iran would be a difficult undertaking.
145. The debate on Iran's nuclear programme will influence the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) whose five-yearly review conference opens in New York in May 2005. For the present, the NPT allows its signatory states to produce enriched uranium for civilian purposes. However, that right might be abused by countries tempted, like Iran, to gain control over the complete nuclear cycle for both civilian and military purposes. If Iran were to manage to manufacture a nuclear bomb, it might be feared that this could have a destabilising effect on all the countries of the region and create a nuclear arms race between it and its neighbours, particularly Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt and even Turkey. Israel and Pakistan are regional players that already have a nuclear bomb. Israel remains vague about its nuclear potential and is not party to the NPT. This state of affairs discredits non-proliferation efforts, especially in the eyes of the states of the Arab world which accuse the United States and Europeans of "double standards" and bitterly resent the fact. Pakistan and India, both openly declared nuclear powers, are also not party to the NPT.
146. Libya on the other hand has already renounced its nuclear ambitions, but North Korea is continuing with a nuclear programme with military objectives and withdrew from the Treaty in January 2003. If Iran is forced to give up its nuclear weapons projects, this may perhaps dissuade other countries from going down that road. However, the rules must apply to all alike and be combined with searching verification machinery and sanctions. Americans and Europeans, tackling global non-proliferation and disarmament issues together, could prove a very powerful driving force towards obtaining credible and effective multilateral agreements.

4. Combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their use for terrorist purposes

147. How can the danger of terrorist groups getting hold of weapons of mass destruction, and using them, be prevented?⁷⁷ How can proliferation of such weapons be halted? These are issues of concern as much to Europeans as Americans and both must therefore seek an effective multilateral response to these common threats.
148. Some American experts have observed a basic change in US policy⁷⁸. In November 1998, President Clinton described "the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the means of delivering such weapons" as an "unusual and extraordinary threat" to United States national security, whereas, in January 2003, President Bush described "outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical and biological weapons" as "the gravest danger facing America and the world". This shift in analysis was to lead from then on to a policy not so much of opposition to proliferation of the weapons themselves but to the regimes that possessed them or sought to. The upshot has consequently been a form of classification of states into "good" and "evil". However that classification cannot be a fixed one as such "states of concern" are constantly changing. Proceeding thus therefore runs the risk of becoming a policy of double standards. For engaging in similar acts of proliferation some countries will be severely censured (for example Iran) while others will be exempted from any pressure at all (for example Israel or Pakistan) or from any immediate adverse effects (for example North Korea). Such policies of discrimination could weaken the legitimacy of the international non-proliferation treaties in place for different categories of weapons of mass destruction. The same rules therefore must apply to all.
149. The EU, for its part adopted a "Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" in December 2003. For the EU, "Political and diplomatic preventive measures (multilateral treaties and export control regimes) and resort to the competent international organisations form the first line of defence against proliferation. When these measures (including political dialogue and diplomatic pressure) have failed, coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law (sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of shipments and, as appropriate, the use of force) could be envisioned. The UN Security Council should play a central role". (Paragraph 15 of the Strategy). A unit operating as a surveillance centre responsible for ensuring coherent application of the EU Strategy and for information and intelligence gathering in liaison with the Situation Centre has been set up within the EU Council General Secretariat.
150. On 28 April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whereby all states are required to refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. It was also decided that states should take and enforce effective measures to establish controls to prevent the proliferation of such weapons, and also controls over related material, and it was recognised that some states might require assistance in implementing such measures.
151. At the recent US/EU Summit in Dromoland Castle, Ireland on 25 June 2004, the US and the EU adopted a joint declaration on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, similar in content to the plan of action adopted by the G8 at the Sea Island Summit on 8-10 June 2004. G8 members agreed to work to establish new measures so that sensitive nuclear items with proliferation potential would not be exported to states that might seek to use them for weapons purposes or allow them to fall into terrorist hands. On 26 June, the EU and the United States also reaffirmed their willingness to work together to strengthen and universalise the disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and regimes that ban the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (in particular the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention).
152. With regard to nuclear weapons, the fact that there are states outside the NPT treaty holding nuclear weapons, together with the failure of states parties to abide by its provisions, is threatening to undermine non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. Currently five states "legally" hold nuclear weapons (i.e. are recognised as nuclear weapons states under the NPT). They are: China (410 nuclear warheads), the United States (approximately 10 000), France (350), the United Kingdom (185) and Russia (approximately 17 000). Three states that refused to sign the NPT have developed nuclear weapons: India (thought to have 50-90 warheads), Israel (thought to have 100) and Pakistan (thought to have some 30-50). For the moment, two other countries, North Korea and Iran, are suspected of carrying out ambitious nuclear weapons manufacturing programmes. It has recently been discovered that uranium enrichment experiments may also have been conducted in South Korea. A referral has been made to the IAEA, which is to seek clarification.
153. The proliferation of the means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction is also giving cause for anxiety. The countries where proliferation is an issue also possess missiles in the over 1 000 kilometre range include: North Korea (No Dong, Taepo Dong I and II), India (Agni II), Iran (Shahab III), Israel (Jericho), Pakistan (Ghauri I and II/No Dong) and even Saudi Arabia (CDD-2)⁷⁹.
154. Pursuant to the Biological Weapons Convention, most countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the states of the former Soviet Union and South Africa have abandoned their biological weapons programmes and destroyed their stockpiles. It is possible however that some traces of these remain. China, North Korea and Israel are also possibly in possession of such weapons. States suspected of carrying out research into such substances are Egypt, Syria, Iran, Pakistan and India⁸⁰. Verification and export control regimes encounter particular hurdles stemming from the fact that the materials and the know-how involved are often dual use.
155. Like biological weapons chemical weapons have a potential attraction for terrorists. The possibilities of diverting dual-use technologies and know-how to such use is growing because of the rapid progress being made in life sciences. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, 166 countries have abandoned their programmes in this area. They include: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union, South Africa, South Korea, Serbia and Montenegro and now Iraq and Libya. The United States is currently destroying some 30 000 tons of chemical weapons. Russia is in the process of destroying some 40 000 tons. However, Egypt, Israel, North Korea, South Korea and Syria in particular have not signed the Convention. The assumption is that some of those countries, and China as well, are in possession of some undeclared chemical weapons. India has given a commitment to end its chemical weapons programmes and destroy its stockpiles, but has not yet quite completed the task. Pakistan is suspected of having a production capability for weapons-grade chemical agents but does not as yet seem to have gone ahead with it. Sudan seems interested by research in this field, even though it ratified the Convention in May 1999⁸¹.
156. A common transatlantic programme to combat proliferation might consist of such objectives as:

157. Non-proliferation and disarmament go hand in hand⁸³. Many states are currently tempted to try and make or procure nuclear weapons. At the same time there is a growing risk of terrorist groups attacking nuclear installations or trying to get hold of and use weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical and biological weapons. To date, more effective work has been done on preventing proliferation in the nuclear than in the chemical or biological spheres⁸⁴. Thus, setting up an independent agency for control in those areas⁸⁵, along the lines of the IAEA, could be the way forward.
158. Finally, as the EU proliferation Strategy points out, the best solution to the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is that countries should no longer feel they need them: "disarmament measures can lead to a virtuous circle just as weapons programmes lead to an arms race" (paragraph 20). Some US experts see things in the same light. Fighting proliferation is closely dependent on resolving crises and regional tension. It is essential to reassure countries that might be tempted to procure weapons of mass destruction because they see that their neighbours have them. There is a need to apply the sensible maxim: no incitement, no weapons, no weapons use.
159. As the EU sees it, "positive and negative security assurances can play an important role: they can serve both as an incentive to forego the acquisition of WMD and as a deterrent. The EU will promote further consideration of security assurances" (paragraph 23). Lastly, "as security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean, we should pay particular attention to the issue of proliferation in the Mediterranean area" (paragraph 24).

160. For most American and European specialists in the field of transatlantic relations, the tensions that have surfaced since the end of the cold war are structural rather than circumstantial. It is likely therefore that they will continue indefinitely regardless of who holds power on either side of the Atlantic. Changes in "style" will not smooth out the underlying disagreements. To some, the transatlantic partnership seems under far greater threat today than at any time previously during the past half century. Account should also be taken of the passing of a generation of politicians and the arrival of a new one, which, with no memory of the two world wars or the cold war, is less inclined to give priority to transatlantic ties. Besides, the war on terror is bringing out more extremist attitudes and leading to more radical stances. Finally, demographic trends in the United States are now in favour of those segments of the population of Asiatic and Hispanic, rather than European origin (which now accounts for less than 50% of the total). At the same time in Europe, if the integration process goes ahead successfully, and in particular if the EU Constitutional Treaty is ratified, European countries will be likely increasingly to adopt common positions reflecting essentially European interests, which will not necessarily always be identical to those of the United States.
161. However, the United States and Europe will continue to have a mutual interest in working together in dealing with all manner of international crises and promoting the values of democracy and economic development worldwide. Although the economic prosperity of both is closely linked, recourse to the death penalty in the United States or the illegal detentions in Guantanamo Bay are basic issues on which the United States and Europe take a different line. The same holds true for the establishment of the International Criminal Court or the application of the Kyoto Protocol - although on these last issues the American public is often much more multilateralist in outlook than the US administration⁸⁶. Moreover, there is agreement on both sides of the Atlantic on the fact that Europe and the United States form part of the same community of values (liberal democracy) and must face common security challenges. The fact of being at one and the same time partners and competitors or advocating different solutions for resolving conflict is not incompatible with the fact that transatlantic ties are beneficial and necessary.
162. Looking to the medium term, by 2040 a multipolar world will have come into being, made up of such new world powers as China or India. Europe too will probably emerge as a world power, while the United States will continue to retain its great power status.
163. In the future, consolidated transatlantic ties, adapted to the new security challenges, could be a powerful driving force in world security. Those ties can only be forged through concerted policies and actions based on a common strategy.
164. NATO must be retained as the main forum for security and defence bringing together Americans and Europeans. But the Allies must make sure that NATO has the resources to do that job properly. Conversely, the United States must come to terms with a strategically autonomous Europe, capable of acting with, and at times without it.
165. Therefore, a "new deal"⁸⁷ now seems necessary between the United States and Europeans, for urgent and practical testing in relation to Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran, but applying also to such crucial issues as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, terrorism and the fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

(i) Recognising that the United States and Europe have in common vital interests such as safeguarding democratic values and combating threats to security and prosperity;

(ii) Noting that the United States National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy both have a fairly similar analysis of the security threats their respective continents face but that the United States and the European Union are often at variance over methods and ways of dealing with common threats;

(iii) Expressing their deep concern over the danger of terrorist attacks such as occurred, on both American and European soil, in the appalling events of 11 September 2001 in the United States and of 11 March 2004 in Madrid;

(iv) Recalling Europe's solidarity with the United States in the fight against terrorism, but concerned nonetheless about respect for fundamental rights and due judicial processes, particularly in regard to the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay;

(v) Aware of the importance of better consultation between both sides of the Atlantic, particularly in the NATO framework, and stressing that dialogue can be usefully conducted only when undertaken in a spirit of openness and mutual understanding;

(vi) Considering the common interest the United States and Europe have in promoting the benefit of political systems that are transparent and respectful of human rights, and of healthy and prosperous economies;

(vii) Bearing in mind change within NATO and in particular efforts to adapt its military capabilities to the new security challenges and extend the geographic limits of NATO action;

(viii) Regarding it essential for the transatlantic allies to continue to be able to operate alongside one another, while recognising that high-technology arms and equipment are not a universal remedy against all threats;

(ix) Regretting that some US authorities are highly critical of European security and defence policy and that even many political analysts have mistaken views about where Europeans stand on issues, and vice versa;

(x) Recalling the European Council's determination that the European Union have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces in order to respond to international crises;

(xi) Stressing that by reinforcing solidarity between European Union member states so that Europe can have more influence in world affairs, EU countries can contribute to the vitality of a renewed Atlantic Alliance and to strengthening the authority of the United Nations;

(xii) Recalling the predominant and constructive role being played in Afghanistan by the United States and European allies, particularly through NATO, but concerned nevertheless at the worrying upsurge in the powers of the warlords and the further extension of opium production;

(xiii) Considering European-American cooperation to be necessary for rebuilding Iraq's economy and improving security conditions in the country, in particular by strengthening the Iraqi army through NATO's training mission;

(xiv) Considering that any viable solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must include all the parameters of the Road Map and concerned too about the route taken by the security barrier currently under construction, but welcoming the adoption by the Knesset of the plan for Israel to withdraw from the Gaza Strip;

(xv) Considering that Iran has admitted concealment of an ambitious nuclear programme and having engaged in enriched uranium production without notifying the International Atomic Energy Agency, and taking account of recent demands made of Iran by the IAEA Governing Council in connection with the country's nuclear programme;

(xvi) Hoping earnestly that Americans and Europeans will combine their political offices to secure compliance with, and a strengthening of the existing treaties, in order to prevent proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction;

(xvii) Stressing that transatlantic cooperation is the more justified as the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is further amplified by the risk that terrorist groups may try and produce such weapons themselves or procure them illicitly for their own ends,

1. Undertake, following the recent presidential elections in the United States, to work closely with President Bush and the new administration, including in multilateral institutions, to promote the rule of law and create a just, democratic and secure world;
2. Deepen the dialogue in NATO which continues to be the main forum for transatlantic consultation;
3. Ensure that the efforts the EU and NATO make towards securing the new military capabilities that both genuinely require for dealing with new security challenges complement one another, and endeavour to make good shortcomings and eliminate duplication in this sphere;
4. Undertake to explain more clearly to the US authorities the mutual advantage to be had from the development of the European Security and Defence Policy and of that policy being complementary to NATO policy;
5. Strengthen cooperation between the United States and Europe over intelligence;
6. Make serious efforts to ensure American public opinion is better informed about major developments in Europe, and vice versa;
7. Deploy within the ISAF framework the requisite peacekeeping forces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams needed on the ground in Afghanistan, and provide Afghans with additional funding towards economic reconstruction;
8. Give an undivided commitment to setting up a robust NATO mission for training Iraqi security forces and act together in the EU and UN frameworks to contribute both to political stability in Iraq and to the reconstruction of its economy;
9. Urge the parties to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to apply all the measures contained in the Road Map, with the aim of achieving permanent settlement of the conflict on the basis of two states, Israel and a sovereign Palestine, living side by side in peace and security;
10. Draw up, with immediate effect, a closely targeted strategy to assist the Palestinian Authority with policing and political and economic reform and to support the electoral process;
11. Put pressure on Iran to conform to demands made of it by the International Atomic Energy Agency and ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol providing for a stricter inspection regime at nuclear sites;
12. Convince the United States to support the establishment of a permanent, independent international agency for verifying disarmament, able to come rapidly to the assistance of the United Nations Security Council and urge the US authorities to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;
13. Reach agreement with the United States on giving priority to the fight against the causes of terrorism, in particular by working for greater political openness and economic development in the Islamic world.

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AMENDMENTS⁸⁸

Amendments 1 and 2

tabled by Mrs Papadimitriou, Rapporteur

Signed: Papadimitriou

Amendment 3

tabled by MM Manzella and Zacchera

Signed: Manzella, Zacchera

Amendment 4

tabled by Mrs Papadimitriou, Rapporteur

Signed: Papadimitriou

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¹ Adopted by the Assembly on 1 December 2004, at the 10^th sitting, on the basis of the draft amended recommendation.

² On the matter of readiness or otherwise to use force, refer to the provocative views of the American neo-conservative political analyst Robert Kagan: " (...) on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: they agree on little and understand one another less and less. And this state of affairs is not transitory (...)". Robert Kagan, "Power and weakness" Policy Review No. 113 (June/July 2002) www.policyreview.org; also R. Kagan, "Of Paradise and Power", New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.

³ See "Transatlantic Trends 2004" - a survey of American and European public opinion; a project of the German Marshall Fund, published on 9 September 2004; www.transatlantictrends.org

⁴ The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been signed and ratified by all the EU member states. It was signed by the United States on 24 September 1996 but has still to be ratified.

⁵ The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Treaty of Ottawa), was signed and ratified by all EU member states, but not signed by the United States.

⁶ The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was ratified by the United States on 3 August 1972, but on 14 December 2001, President Bush announced the US's intention to withdraw.

⁷ On 12 July 2002 the United States also secured the passage of Security Council Resolution 1422 conferring a year's immunity on members of its staff taking part in UN peacekeeping operations. In 2003, that immunity was renewed for a further year (See Resolution 1487, 12 June 2003).

⁸ None of the 25 EU Member States has signed a bilateral agreement with the United States. By 1 September 2004 four other European states had signed such an agreement. They are: Albania (agreement signed on 20 September 2002 and ratified), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (signed 30 June 2003 and ratified), Bosnia and Herzegovina (signed 16 May 2003 and ratified) and Romania (signed 1 August 2002 but not ratified).

⁹ The European Parliament has however on a number of occasions voted against lifting the embargo, on grounds of continuing human rights violations in China.

¹⁰ See: "Renewing the Atlantic Partnership", Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Affairs, United States, 2004. www.cfr.org .

¹¹ "An Alliance for prosperity". Bertie Ahern, Prime Minister of Ireland, in The Herald Tribune, 26 May 2004.

¹² Figures for 2001 - excluding intra-community trade. Source: WTO April 2003.

¹³ Source: WTO, April 2003.

¹⁴ "Partners in prosperity: The changing geography of the transatlantic economy", Daniel Hamilton and Joseph Quinlan, Centre for Transatlantic Relations, SAIS, Washington, 2004.

¹⁵ The Foreign Sales Corporations regulations to encourage American exports provide for the profits of the overseas affiliates of US firms to be exempt from taxation, a practice condemned by the WTO which authorised the EU to levy surtaxes against US products. In mid-October 2004, the American Congress adopted new fiscal legislation to suppress the regime but nevertheless provided for a transitional phase for some exporters extending to 2006.

¹⁶ The Byrd Amendment allows the distribution of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties to the companies that take their case to the authorities. The EU takes the view that such redistribution is an illegal and hidden subsidy to American producers. On 31 August 2004, the WTO authorised the EU and seven other countries to apply countermeasures against the United States which until now has refused to amend its anti-dumping legislation. President Bush has already suggested withdrawal of the Byrd Amendment but has met with opposition from the US Congress.

¹⁷ The EU Transport Council has rejected the most recent US proposals which it regards as inadequate to guarantee free access to the American market by European airlines. New transatlantic negotiations in this sphere are scheduled to take place from January 2005.

¹⁸ For more details on Galileo, see recent reports by the Assembly's Technological and Aerospace Committee: Document 1823, 4 June 2003 and Document 1853, 3 June 2004.

¹⁹ Figures: European Patent Office, Ecodef, French Ministry of Defence, No. 33, May 2004, Paris.

²⁰ See in particular, "Britain warns US of arms retaliation". The Financial Times, 30 July 2004.

²¹ All EU countries are NATO members apart from Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden, and the three applicant countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, are also NATO members.

²² During the Kosovo crisis the bombardment of Belgrade, for example, gave rise to disagreement between the United States and the European Allies.

²³ See "Europe and the new United States National Security Strategy", report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr de Puig, Rapporteur, Document 1819 and Addendum, 4 June 2003.

²⁴ Europeans certainly spend a lot less on defence than the United States - roughly 40% of the amount allocated by the US: US$ 160 billion shared among 25 member states, as against the United States' US$ 442 billion. See "L'Amérique et l'Europe: une mésentente cordiale", Pierre Melandri, Sociétal, 3ème Trimestre 2004, pp 96-101.

²⁵ Interview with NATO Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Defense News, 21 June 2004, page 30.

²⁶ Major-General Jean-Pierre Herreweghe of the EU Military Staff maintains, on the contrary, that NATO and the EU do communicate and inform one another and that this was especially the case during Operation Artemis. Comments at the conference on "Cooperation on defence systems procurement in Europe", Assembly of WEU,
16-17 September 2004, Enschede, Netherlands.

²⁷ President Bush's remarks to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention in Cincinnati, Ohio, 16 August 2004.

²⁸ "Why Europe must integrate its defence" by Joseph Ralston and Klaus Naumann, Financial Times, 17 August 2004.

²⁹ Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1368 and 1373 (2001), 1438 and 1450 (2002) 1456 and 1516 (2003), 1526 and 1540 (2004) condemning terrorism and dealing with measures for fighting it.

³⁰ Eurojust was set up under the Framework Decision of 28 February 2002. It is composed of one national member seconded by each member state, being either a prosecutor, magistrate or police officer. Its task is to stimulate and improve the coordination, between the competent authorities of the Member States, of investigations and prosecutions.

³¹ Notwithstanding the nomination of an Anti-Terrorism Coordinator, Gijs de Vries (Netherlands), EU member states have nevertheless fallen behind in implementing decisions on combating terrorism and judicial and police cooperation, particularly in regard to the European arrest warrant and joint investigation teams.

³² The USS Patriot Act, adopted by the American Congress on 24 October 2001 in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, gives federal officials greater authority to track and intercept communications for foreign intelligence-gathering purposes.

³³ See in particular Conclusion 6 to the "Report on the US Intelligence Community's prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq". Select Committee on Intelligence, US Senate, 7 July 2004. www.senate.gov.

³⁴ In the United States there are at present some 15 intelligence services. The report by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11Commission) put forward recommendations for a comprehensive reorganisation of the intelligence services and in particular for the creation of the post of National Intelligence Director : see Part 13 of the Commission's Final Report published on 22 July 2004. www.9-11commission.gov.

³⁵ See "The new challenges facing European intelligence - reply to the annual report of the Council", report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Lemoine, Assembly Document 1775, 4 June 2002, paragraphs 42-51.

³⁶ The United Nations has been heavily involved in the country's political transition, by supporting the Bonn process in 2001, establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in 2002 and providing support to the electoral process since 2003. See UN Security Council Resolutions 1401 (28/03/02), 1471 (28/03/03) and 1536 (26/03/04).

³⁷ See the NATO Parliamentary Assembly "Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development: The challenge in Iraq and Afghanistan". Report by Jos van Gennip, Economics and Security Committee, 26 April 2004, www.nato-pa.int.

³⁸ Particularly Pashtuns: 37%, Tajdiks: 23% and Hazaras: 11% of the total population.

³⁹ See International Crisis Group. www.icg.org.

⁴⁰ See Appendix II, "European military capabilities in the context of the fight against international terrorism", Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Wilkinson, Rapporteur, Assembly Document 1783, 3 June 2003.

⁴¹ See Appendix I, Document 1783, 3 June 2003.

⁴² See NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "Operations in Afghanistan and the expanding NATO role", Draft Report by Pierre Lellouche, Defence and Security Committee, 28 April 2004, www.nato-pa.int .

⁴³ Cf. Briefings by the Netherlands-German Corps, Münster, conference on "Cooperation on defence systems procurement in Europe", Assembly of WEU, 16-17 September 2004, Enschede, Netherlands.

⁴⁴ Cf. NATO Parliamentary Assembly Visit to Afghanistan - 22-24 May 2004.

⁴⁵ Cf. Testimony by Mark L. Schneider, Sr. Vice President, International Crisis Group, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on "Afghanistan - Continuing Challenges", Washington DC, 12 May 2004, www.icg.org/

⁴⁶ Interview, Defense News, 21 June 2004, page 30.

⁴⁷ See "Europe and America must stand united" The Times, 30 January 2003 and Le Monde, 31 January 2003. So-called letter from the "Eight" (Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom), also the Declaration of the Vilnius Group of Countries on Iraq, in response to the presentation by the United States Secretary of State to the United Nations Security Council concerning Iraq. So-called letter from the "Ten" (Albania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia, FYROM, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) and the Declaration made at the Azores Summit by the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain and Portugal on 16 March 2003.

⁴⁸ See in particular Assembly Recommendation 720 on the Iraq Question and Resolution 121 on the transfer of power in Iraq, adopted unanimously on 2 June 2004.

⁴⁹ The national guard and reserve forces today account for 40% of US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan (See Le Monde, 10 July 2004).

⁵⁰ From early July 2004 that presence consisted of 9 200 British troops and 5 750 from other countries, including 2 500 Italians, 1 200 Dutch, 750 Romanians, 400 Danes, 100 Lithuanians, 100 Czechs and 100 Portuguese.

⁵¹ The following countries are involved in providing troops to the multinational division: Poland (2350), Ukraine (1550), Bulgaria (420), Hungary (290), Latvia (110) and Slovakia (110). See: Iraq political and security issues at the handover". House of Commons Research Paper No. 04/58, 19 July 2004.

⁵² The report by the US Commission on the 9/11 terror attacks, in particular, notes that there is no proof of a link between al-Qa'ida and Saddam Hussein. See "Final Report of the National Commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States", 22 July 2004, www.9-11commission.gov

⁵³ The Iraq Survey Group, set up by the Coalition in Iraq, initially consisted of 1 400 US, UK and Australian experts. Its task was to look for proof of the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The Group has published two reports which found there were no such weapons ("Iraq Survey Group Interim Progress Report", 3 October 2003, followed by the "Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction", 30 September 2004, http://www.cia.gov. Since the resignation of the former head of the mission, David Kay, in January 2003, the group has been led by the US inspector Charles Duelfer.

⁵⁴ Report on the US Intelligence community's pre-war intelligence assessments on Iraq, Select Committee on Intelligence, US Senate, 7 July 2004; www.senate.gov.

⁵⁵ Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction. Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors chaired by the Rt. Hon The Lord Butler of Brockwell KG GCB CVO ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 14 July 2004, HC 898, The Stationery Office, London.

⁵⁶ See "Tendances transatlantiques 2004" - a survey of public opinion in Europe and America carried out by the German Marshall Fund, published on 9 September 2004; www.transatlantictrends.org.

⁵⁷ See "Renewing the Atlantic Partnership", Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, United States, 2004; www.cfr.org.

⁵⁸ BBC Interview, 15 September 2004, Discussion reported in Le Monde, 17 September 2004.

⁵⁹ Of the US$ 18.4 billion reconstruction aid approved last year by Congress less than 1 billion has so far been used for that purpose (See the Financial Times, 15 September 2004).

⁶⁰ Nearly US$ 20 billions' worth of funding - a combination of oil revenues and existing monies - were made over the Development Fund for Iraq to finance government activity (education, health, water, improvement of electricity and oil infrastructure) and reconstruction projects. By the end of the year the fund should be swelled by a further 8 billions' worth of oil revenues. See: The Road Map For A Sovereign Iraq by US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, See Le Monde 27-28 June 2004.

⁶¹ See also "The deployment of European forces in the Balkans", report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur, Assembly Document 1882, 9 November 2004.

⁶² For a more detailed analysis see "The European Union's stabilisation missions in south-east Europe" submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr Wilkinson, Rapporteur, Recommendation 744, Assembly Document 1859, 2 June 2004.

⁶³ In spring 1999, NATO intervened militarily in Kosovo, to put an end to serious human rights violations perpetrated against the ethnic Albanian population. 1 300 000 Albanian-speaking Kosovars displaced within the province or who had taken refuge in the surrounding countries returned to Kosovo. In addition, some 200 000 people, most of them minority Serbs, were forced to leave. In 2003 it was estimated that there are some 80 000 Serbs still living in Kosovo.

⁶⁴ This would not rule out joint diplomatic action or pressure. In February 2003 and August 2004 for example, the EU and the United States acted in concert to apply visa restrictions on Transnistrian leaders imposing closure of Moldovan schools. Moldova is also an area of tension where the EU should undoubtedly take more vigorous action.

⁶⁵ See in particular "Security in Europe and stabilisation in the Middle East", report submitted by Mrs Durrieu, Rapporteur, Recommendation 737, 3 December 2003.

⁶⁶ See Document 1847, Appendix I.

⁶⁷ Le Monde, 25 August 2004.

⁶⁸ Exchange of views with Dennis Ross of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Visit to Washington by the Political Committee, 30 August-1 September 2004.

⁶⁹ Speech by the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 9-10 September 2004, Paris.

⁷⁰ Exchange of views with Dennis Ross in Washington on 30 August 2004.

⁷¹ Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestine Territory. Advisory opinion given by the International Court of Justice on 9 July 2004, www.icj-cij.org.

⁷² The Israelis currently still control 40% of the Gaza Strip, an area of 360 square km, with 1.3 million inhabitants.

⁷³ Iran, as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, is not legally bound to suspend enrichment. It has also signed, but not yet ratified (and now threatens not to ratify) the additional Protocol extending the powers of IAEA inspectors and allowing spot inspections of nuclear sites.

⁷⁴ "La Prolifération dans une économie en voie de mondialisation", Georges Le Guelte, Politique étrangère, 3/2004 (Autumn) pp 625-636.

⁷⁵ "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran", Resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 18 September 2004, GOV/2004/79.

⁷⁶ See "The IAEA's report on Iran: No slam dunk" by Miriam Rajkuma and Joseph Cirincione, 2 September 2004, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, www.ceip.org.

⁷⁷ See in particular "Chemical, biological and radiological terrorism", Report submitted by Mr Le Guen, Rapporteur, on behalf of the Defence Committee, Assembly Document 1858, Recommendation No. 746, adopted on 3 June 2004.

⁷⁸ Address by Joseph Cirincione: "Can we stop proliferation?" Political Committee visit to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, on 31 August 2004.

⁷⁹ See: "Universal Compliance: a strategy for nuclear security". Draft dated June 2004. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, www.ceip.org and presentation by Joseph Cirincione to the Political Committee of the WEU Assembly, Washington, 31 August 2004.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² NB: This Treaty has been ratified by all EU member states but not the United States.

⁸³ "Non Proliferation and Disarmament go hand in hand". Article signed by seven Foreign Ministers (South Africa, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden), the Herald Tribune, 22 September 2004.

⁸⁴ See presentation on weapons of mass destruction by experts at the US General Accounting Office. Visit by the Political Committee to Washington, 31 August 2004.

⁸⁵ Under pressure from Germany, France and Russia, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in Iraq (UNMOVIC) has not been dissolved. Some experts suggest that it might form the basis for the establishment of a new agency, with a permanent inspectorate which could be deployed quickly into countries to carry out spot checks.

⁸⁶ Americans think that the United States should sign the Kyoto Protocol (71% in favour), the Mine Ban Treaty (80%) and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (87%). Moreover, 76% of Americans would agree to American subjects being tried by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity, if their own country were not able to try them. Lastly, 69% favour compliance with WTO decisions given against the US. Cf: Public Opinion Study: "Global views 2004: American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy" by The Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs Relations, 28 September 2004; www.ccfr.org.

⁸⁷ See Article by Philip H. Gordon, Director of the Centre on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC: "Letter to Europe" in Prospect, July 2004.

⁸⁸ See 10^th sitting, 1 December 2004 (amendments adopted).