DOCUMENT A/1894

15 June 2005

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Developments in the Broader Middle East

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Document A/1894

15 June 2005

Developments in the Broader Middle East

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee
by Josette Durrieu, Rapporteur (France, Socialist Group)

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¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 11 May 2005.

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RECOMMENDATION 765¹

The Assembly,

(i) Considering that the Middle East and North Africa is a vast region, the majority of which is Arab-Muslim, in which a number of conflicts are unresolved and where stability and security are under threat, while noting that it is also has the most extensive energy sources in the world;

(ii) Noting that in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa almost 40% of the population is under the age of 16 and does not have access to a proper education; that power remains in the hands of an unelected elite which also controls the economy; that the countries in question are suffering from a lack of democracy and transparency, economic stagnation, poverty, unemployment, inequality and injustice all of which are conducive to terrorism;

(iii) Noting that recent developments have resulted in a change of mindset and the increased attraction of extremist groups which exploit religion and manipulate thinking while having recourse to terrorism to pursue their goals;

(iv) Aware that since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in particular, the Western world has come to understand that far greater efforts need to be made at all levels to improve communication and cooperation with the Arab and Muslim world and to promote political, economic and social reform in the regions concerned;

(v) Noting, however, that the governments of most of the countries concerned now seem to have realised that reforms are necessary in order to meet the needs of their citizens and respond to changes in society with a view to ensuring peace and stability in the region, but that the reform process which has started is highly inadequate;

(vi) Stressing that in recent years and as part of its Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the European Union has embarked on comprehensive programmes and concluded specific agreements with countries of the Middle East and North Africa to help them guarantee peace, stability and prosperity for their peoples;

(vii) Noting that the action plans which the EU is drawing up with Middle Eastern countries as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy contain a set of conditions that must be met by the country concerned in order to make further progress, but also aware that in the past the EU has not always been strict enough with partners which have not met certain conditions;

(viii) Aware that the EU member states are sceptical about the likelihood of all-encompassing plans leading to the establishment of a new order in the Middle East and North Africa, and that they prefer cooperation agreements and complementary activities on a bilateral and multilateral level, tailored to the needs and capabilities of each partner or group of partners;

(ix) Taking account of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENAI) launched by the United States at the G-8 Summit in June 2004 with the aim of promoting economic, political and social liberalisation in a large number of Muslim countries;

(x) Considering that the G-8 initiative supports the regional reforms proposed by independent intellectuals, civil society and governments and that they are superimposed on EU initiatives or are complementary to them, while aware that achieving these reforms in the Middle East will require an overall long-term and sustained commitment;

(xi) Considering that if the West wishes to pursue a strategy of far-reaching reforms to help promote democratic change in the Broader Middle East and North Africa, the way to go about achieving that objective is to engage in dialogue, partnership and cooperation;

(xii) Considering that the West must in the first instance step up its efforts to help resolve the region's major geopolitical conflicts and crises − in particular the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the problem of instability in Iraq and Lebanon, the nuclear threat from Iran, the isolation of Syria and the precarious situation in Afghanistan − and that in order to create a secure and stable environment it is necessary to establish a system of mutual protection and cooperative security;

(xiii) Aware that if the European Union and the United States are serious about implementing their policies for the purpose of stimulating reform in the Broader Middle East and North Africa, they will have to strike a balance between their relations with authoritarian regimes in the region on the one hand and opposition reform movements on the other hand;

(xiv) Considering that "freedom", as propagated by new Western initiatives and especially the United States initiative, includes not only civil and political liberties and therefore freedom from oppression, but also individual freedom and thus deliverance from anything that constitutes human subjugation and is incompatible with human dignity such as poverty, hunger, disease, ignorance, torture, the death sentence and a lack of work;

(xv) Considering that in the Arab world such freedom is threatened by undemocratic regimes which may sometimes find support in tribal culture and in ancestral or religious traditions;

(xvi) Considering that, with all the respect due to Islam, certain interpretations of Koranic law cannot be the lasting pretext for the oppression of women and non-respect of their individual and social freedom, and that the deprivation of recognised rights of the individual and citizen, and of sexual equality in particular, is contrary to the democratic process;

(xvii) Considering that in their efforts to engage in dialogue and partnership with a view to appropriate and acceptable reforms in the Broader Middle East and North Africa, both the United States and the European Union must take into account the place of Islam as a religion, a political force and a social force, and recognise that there is no inherent contradiction between Islam and democracy;

(xviii) Considering that in a democratic State religious beliefs and traditions may be a source of legislation provided they are not incompatible with the measures that are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;

(xix) Disagreeing with the categorical statement by some regimes in the region according to which democratisation will bring radical Islamists to power, but considering that in an environment where freedom of speech, association and assembly are heavily restricted, Islamist movements enjoy the important advantage of being the only groups able to organise and express themselves in mosques and other religious institutions;

(xx) Taking note of the progress made in Iraq where the forthcoming adoption of a Constitution will pave the way for the establishment of a democratically elected parliament to which the government will be accountable;

(xxi) Welcoming the fact that free elections will shortly be held in Lebanon following the withdrawal of the Syrians, which should be complete;

(xxii) Considering it essential in the interests of future peace and stability in Iraq for the transitional government, with the help of the United States and the international community, to restore law and order, re-establish security and control terrorism;

(xxiii) Expressing the hope that the Iraqi economy will pick up and that the Constitution that is to be drawn up will give the country the most appropriate institutional framework and will accord every respect to ethnic and religious groups on the territory of Iraq;

(xxiv) Considering that the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is now an absolute priority and that it cannot be the result of a unilateral action on the part of Israel but that it must be achieved by a renewed initiative from the Quartet on the basis of the roadmap;

(xxv) Considering that the United States, the European Union and the Arab League states which have already taken initiatives (the Saudi Arabia Plan − Beirut 2002) together have the capacity to achieve common objectives for the region, which should rest on three pillars, namely, security, stability and prosperity;

(xxvi) Considering that in the immediate term the mutual ceasefire agreed at Sharm el-Sheikh must be complied with and violence kept under control; that terrorist acts against the civil population must cease; that Israel is committed to withdrawing from the Gaza Strip and certain settlements in the West Bank; that Israeli checkpoints in the West Bank should be opened to allow access to cultivated land and water sources; that prisoners must be freed when terrorist acts have ceased; and that the Palestinian Authority must continue to prove that it will not tolerate terrorist acts;

(xxvii) Considering that the Gaza Strip should be linked to the West Bank by a secure passage and that the administrative reorganisation of this area and its economic activity will not be viable unless access to the sea is assured and the port and airport in Gaza are free and operational;

(xxviii) Considering that peace between Israel and Palestine in this region will not be possible without a specific, comprehensive and lasting settlement that builds on all the various earlier commitments, namely: Israel's right of existence, the creation of a viable Palestinian State in one area lying within the 1967 confines and with East Jerusalem as its capital; the end of illegal settlements and the gradual dismantling of those settlements and the separation walls in the West Bank; the principle of the right of return for the refugees or financial compensation;

(xxix) Considering that the international community should take the initiative to organise an international conference in order to plan for phase 2 (the transition phase involving the creation of a Palestinian State with provisional borders) and then phase 3 (leading to a final agreement putting an end to the conflict) of the roadmap;

(xxx) Considering that lasting peace and stability in the region and the world as a whole depend on a solution to the existence of weapons of mass destruction, and in particular of Israel's nuclear weapons, and mindful of the disturbing possibility that Iran might possess such weapons in the near future;

(xxxi) Considering that it will never be possible to draw up rules to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction if a policy of double standards is applied, and that it is preferable to continue with negotiations to persuade Iran to put a stop once and for all to its uranium enrichment activities and to other nuclear activities liable to lead to the acquisition of nuclear weapons;

(xxxii) Considering that under these circumstances and in the interest of a lasting peace in the region, it is necessary to envisage the full denuclearisation of the area by decreeing that the Middle East is a zone free of weapons of mass destruction;

(xxxiii) Considering that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is unfair and should be revised so as to put an end to a selective approach and to varying degrees of stringency according to the country concerned, and that a new definition of nuclear proliferation is necessary to draw a distinction between civil and military nuclear programmes, the various technologies, fissile material, and legal and illegal traffic;

(xxxiv) Considering the danger inherent in strikes against nuclear sites in Iran if the negotiations being conducted by France, Germany and the United Kingdom were to fail, unless the UN Security Council were to find a solution to this problem;

(xxxv) Considering that it is in the interests of peace in the region not to isolate Syria, a "country on the axis of evil", which is being threatened by the United States;

(xxxvi) Considering finally that the fight against corruption, organised crime, fundamentalism and terrorism is part of the same combat to ensure stability in the region, and that the disarmament of radical Islamic movements and their integration in the political process should be an objective of immediate priority,

As regards the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East

1. To pursue dialogue, cooperation and the development of economic and trade relations in partnership and complementarity with the United States and the specific initiatives undertaken by the G-8 in the Arab-Muslim region in order to prevent a clash between civilisations;
2. To continue its specific financial transfers whose aim is to improve the situation of the populations; to accompany economic and social progress and to develop education, especially for girls;
3. To promote social and economic reforms and to initiate the process of democratisation of the states and regimes in the region;
4. To participate in the full emancipation of women and the repeal of the laws which subjugate them, especially in certain countries;
5. To improve control over the use of donated funds and to assess regularly the results of the programmes undertaken, which should lead to more security, stability and prosperity;

As regards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

6. To take a fresh initiative within the Quartet and possibly to extend it to Egypt and Jordan;
7. To decide to hold an international conference in order to move on to phases 2 and 3 of the roadmap and arrive at a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the conflict;
8. To ensure that the organisations and states concerned implement the agreement that is concluded and decide in particular to denuclearise the region and guarantee its security, perhaps by establishing an international force there;

As regards the other threats in the Middle East

9. To actively pursue negotiations with Iran with a view to halting the development of nuclear facilities which may have a military application;
10. To work for a revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is no longer fair and requires a new definition of proliferation and a distinction to be drawn between civil and military nuclear programmes;
11. To prevent Syria from being isolated as this will do nothing to promote either peace or stability in the region;
12. To take steps to achieve the disarmament of radical Islamic groups and their integration in the political process.

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1. The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENAI) is a Bush Administration initiative which was launched at the G-8 Summit meeting which took place from 8-10 June 2004 in Sea Island, Georgia. It is a multilateral development and reform plan aimed at fostering economic and political liberalisation in a wide area of Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries.
2. In November 2003, President Bush had publicly acknowledged that the US and the West had made mistakes in the past, noting that "60 years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe, because in the long run stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty".
3. Inspiration for the initiative was also drawn from two UN Arab Human Development Reports published in 2002 and 2003. These reports were well-known in the United Nations and underlined a number of worrying development shortfalls in the Arab world and the disastrous consequences that might ensue if no action was taken.
4. The Sea Island Declaration established a "Partnership for Progress and a Common Future" to support political, economic and social reform in the Middle East. It created a "Forum for the Future" bringing together G-8 and regional foreign, economic and other ministers for regular discussions on reform with business and civil society leaders participating in parallel discussions.
5. The region in question is composed of 22 Arab League nations (Bahrain, the Comores, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Algeria, Djibouti, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia and the PLO) plus Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and Turkey.
6. The area in question therefore stretches from Mauritania to Afghanistan. The fact that it includes Maghreb countries had led to a change in its denomination. Instead of being referred to as the Greater Middle East, it is now called the Broader Middle East and North Africa. It is mainly, but not exclusively, an Arab-Muslim area − Turkey and Iran are not Arab nations and Israel is not a Muslim state.
7. President Bush recently set out his vision of the Broader Middle East (and of the BMENAI) and of US interest in the region. What the Americans want to do is combine a guarantee of secure oil supplies with a political vision of a region that is in the process of democratisation. This is an essential complement to the war on terrorism, which is at the core of their initiative.
8. At its summit meeting the G-8 also adopted a plan of support which included the following initiatives:

9. In December 2004, foreign affairs and finance ministers from some 20 Arab and Islamic countries in the Middle East and North Africa met with members of the G-8 and representatives of business and NGOs at what was called the Forum for the Future. Despite severe criticism from some Arab representatives, especially about the lack of progress towards a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Forum adopted a number of measures. One of them concerned the creation of a region-specific enterprise development fund at the International Finance Corporation (IFC), designed to provide technical support and financial assistance to small private enterprises. Another measure concerned the establishment of a "Democracy Assistance Dialogue" to allow civil society groups to engage regional governments in discussions on reform. In addition, the G-8 decided to set up a Microfinance Training Centre in Jordan to allow NGOs to provide small loans to entrepreneurs able to obtain bank loans.
10. Washington has increasingly been concluding free-trade and bilateral agreements with countries in the region such as Morocco (March 2004), Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (2005).
11. Discussions are under way with Qatar and Kuwait (without these interfering with the process in the Gulf Cooperation Council according to those countries).
12. According to an OECD study, US financial aid for the Broader Middle East has been estimated at US$ 2.6 billion out of a grand total of US$ 11 billion (the Americans are contributing less than the Europeans). Of this amount, US$ 919 million has been earmarked for Egypt and US$ 529 million for Israel, two countries to which Washington gives preference.
13. In terms of reforms the United States has embarked on its own programme. It takes the form of US Bilateral Economic Assistance via the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which is operating in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Yemen and the Palestinian territories. The objective is to promote economic development and modernisation through the improvement of existing infrastructure, access to water, education, good governance and socio-economic reform. Substantial aid and assistance also goes to Pakistan and Afghanistan.
14. According to the Americans the official purpose of all these political and economic measures is to "change the world" and "the environment".
15. This "transformational diplomacy" was defined by Condoleeza Rice in her new role as US Secretary of State, when she gave an address in Paris in February 2005. She referred to the example set by Harry Truman, who had not been content to accept the world as it was and thought it could be changed. The Secretary of State also explained that what the US wanted to do was to become involved with people in other countries with a view to giving them the wherewithal to make progress towards democracy and prosperity.
16. The US Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) was announced in December 2002 by the then US Secretary of State, Colin Powell. This programme places more emphasis on aspects of reform, including regime evolution, good governance and capacity-building in civil society. MEPI's funding amounts to only 2% of total US aid to the region. For 2006, a US$ 120 million funding budget has been requested.
17. Europeans have stressed that the BMENAI has little chance of success unless the US is prepared to step up its efforts to help solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The EU is not prepared to give up its autonomy as defined under the Barcelona Process or to abandon the programmes it has been pursuing since 1995, which have earned it much credit in the Arab world.
18. It should be noted that whereas the BMENAI includes Afghanistan and Pakistan, the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East does not.
19. The Forum for the Future, which took place in Morocco on 11 December 2004, was attended by the foreign affairs and finance ministers of some 20 countries in the Middle East and North Africa, the G-8 and by the outgoing US Secretary of State, Colin Powell. It merely recognised that the region faced common challenges and that there was a need for a global response to them through dialogue and cooperation.
20. The final resolution placed the emphasis on projects to promote political, economic and social reforms in the Arab world, and on the freedom each country should have to make progress according to its own particular situation and at its own pace.
21. In the final communiqué the participants stated, moreover, that their support for reforms in the region would go hand in hand with their support for a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
22. Other reservations were expressed on behalf of the Arab League by its Secretary-General, Amr Moussa, who said that although he was in favour of the proposed "partnership" with the G-8 countries, it would have to be based on "an equal footing".
23. While this initiative, which was inspired by the United States, was not rejected outright, many people have strong reservations and doubts about it. The main reason is that people in the Arab-Muslim region in question are sceptical about any new initiatives, given that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is continuing and the United States is supporting Israel's approach.
24. Furthermore, the Arab world wants to see reforms which it considers to be necessary and which it believes must be adopted as part of an overall solution. It does not want reforms to be imposed from outside.
25. In contrast, it supports the idea of cooperation and partnership with Europe and would like this discussed in the framework of a "dialogue of civilisations" which it believes should be engaged without further ado. According to Amr Moussa, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, there has to be reference to an Arab world but Islam must be left alone.

1. The EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East (SPMM)

26. In response to initiatives taken by the US Administration, which led to the G-8 Summit Declaration, the European Council adopted, in June 2004, a Final Report on an EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East² based on its own internal analysis and on consultations with its partners. Some of the key priorities in the report are the following:

27. The EU recognises that different countries face different challenges, but it also identifies a number of challenges common to the majority of the countries involved. These can only be met through political, social and economic reform. Many of them derive from one overarching concern: a predominantly young population creating an ever-increasing demand for education and full employment.
28. The prime objective of the EU's Strategic Partnership is to promote the development of a common zone of peace, prosperity and progress in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The EU agenda for action should address the following major issues by pursuing clearly stated objectives:

29. To develop its relations with a large group of Mediterranean and Middle East countries, the EU has at its disposal the Barcelona Process, enhanced by the European Neighbourhood Policy. Taken together, they allow for a multilateral but also a country-by-country approach.
30. For the countries east of Jordan the EU has contractual relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council and Yemen, but such a framework is still lacking for Iran and Iraq. It is aware that the economic and social characteristics of these two countries call for instruments which differ from those used in the Barcelona Process.
31. In pursuit of the goals set out in the SPMM, the EU will also work closely with the UN and seek opportunities for coherent action in conjunction with initiatives put forward by other parties under schemes such as the G-8 Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative. Progress on implementing the SPMM will be reviewed for the first time in June 2005 and every six months thereafter.
32. In this context it is important to consider the relevance of the European Security Strategy which the European Council adopted in December 2003. The Strategy document evaluates global challenges and key threats, defines the EU's strategic objectives and assesses the policy implications for Europe of the principles of action it lays down, including the use of military force.
33. As key threats the document identifies terrorism, in particular global terrorism which is linked to violent religious extremism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts with a direct and indirect impact on European interests such as those in the Middle East, state failure and organised crime. It emphasises the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a strategic priority, without which there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. It also recommends a broader engagement with the Arab world.

2. The Barcelona Process (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership)

34. The Barcelona Process was launched in November 1995, when a Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs created a wide framework of relations between the EU member states and their partner states of the Southern Mediterranean. At present these Mediterranean partners are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey, while Libya has had observer status since 1999. Turkey is currently an official candidate for accession to the European Union and negotiations are due to start before the end of 2005.
35. As defined in the Barcelona Declaration, this process has three main sections :

36. The Barcelona Process comprises two complementary dimensions:

37. The main financial instrument for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is the MEDA programme, which has earmarked 5 458 million euros for cooperation programmes and other activities. At the same time, the European Investment Bank is providing loans for development activities in partner countries. From 1974 to 2003 it provided loans totalling 14 billion euros.
38. The EU recognises that the three chapters of the Barcelona Process do not carry equal weight. The economic and trade pillar has proved solid, but the others, covering political and security issues on the one hand, and social, cultural and human aspects on the other, have turned out to be much weaker.
39. On 12 April 2005, the European Commission therefore presented a wide-ranging work programme to reinforce the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership over the period 2005-10. The Commission has outlined proposals for tangible progress in three areas which it considers critical for the future of the region: education, economic growth and human rights and democracy.
40. The Commission's proposals will be the basis for decisions that are to be taken later this year at a meeting to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process.

3. The European Union and the Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability

41. At the second Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers in Malta (15-16 April 1997), the 27 partners decided to draw up a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability to institutionalise the mechanisms for promoting and maintaining stability in the region. Unfortunately, several years later, despite the very considerable political will shown by the French Presidency, this initiative was severely hampered by the lack of any prospect of progress in the peace process and by the fresh outbreaks of violence in the Middle East in September 2000.
42. Work on the Charter has continued nonetheless. Once approved, it will have the same value as the Barcelona Declaration, that is to say it will be a political declaration agreed by the 27 Euro-Mediterranean countries, representing a political and moral but not a legal commitment to prevent tensions and crises and help keep the peace. The Charter could be described as an unfulfilled wish to establish a system of collective security in the Mediterranean basin.

4. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

43. At its meeting in Luxembourg on 14 June 2004, the European Council adopted the European Neighbourhood Policy, confirming that its objective was to share the benefits of an enlarged EU with neighbouring countries in order to contribute to the increased stability, security and prosperity of the European Union and its neighbours. The ENP offers the prospect of an increasingly close relationship, in the spirit of the Council's conclusions of 16 June 2003, involving a significant degree of economic integration and a deepening of political cooperation, with the aim of preventing the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours.
44. When it was launched, the reaction to the ENP was surprise, questions and even concern among the EU's Mediterranean partners. The EU has pointed out that the Barcelona Process and the ENP are complementary rather than contradictory. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership encompasses countries which are naturally and geographically drawn together by the Mediterranean Sea. It is of key importance for relations between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean countries.
45. Although the ENP is based on a bedrock of shared values and objectives which are deemed indispensable, it allows for a bilateral approach and differentiation among the partners. This helps to attenuate diverging developments. But the Barcelona Process will continue to be an indispensable multilateral framework for exchanges between Mediterranean countries.
46. The ENP will be pursued through Action Plans to be agreed jointly by the EU and the countries concerned. These should have a minimum duration of three years and may be subject to renewal. They will clearly identify a limited number of key priorities and offer real incentives for reform.
47. Countries in the Mediterranean and the Middle East covered by the ENP are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia. It also concerns the Palestinian Authority.
48. EU Action Plans have already been negotiated with Israel, Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia. Jordan and Morocco have committed themselves to far-reaching reforms. Tunisia has undertaken to carry out major human rights reforms. The Palestinian Authority has also given firm commitments to reform. In return, the EU has undertaken to continue its support, much of which is now being channelled through the World Bank Trust Fund.
49. In March 2005, the European Commission adopted Country Reports for Egypt, whose Association Agreement has entered into force, and for Lebanon, where entry into force of the Association Agreement is imminent. These Country Reports provide an analysis of political, economic and institutional reforms.
50. The Commission has now started work jointly with Egypt and Lebanon to prepare Action Plans for these countries as well. Progress in consultations with Lebanon will depend on how the internal political situation in that country develops, but the Commission hopes to agree all the Actions Plans by the end of 2005.
51. The Algerian Parliament recently ratified Algeria's Association Agreement with the EU and the European Commission now intends to prepare a Country Report.
52. The EU has concluded an Association Agreement with Syria, but the European Parliament has made it clear that it will not give its approval until the autumn of 2005 at the earliest, and that its agreement is subject to the implementation of reforms in the fields of political freedom and human rights which have been announced by the Syrian authorities.

5. The EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council

53. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established as a regional organisation in May 1981 by the Arab Gulf States − Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. They took this step as a first response to a perceived vulnerability arising from their limited military capabilities and their relatively small populations dispersed over a vast territory with considerable resources in oil and gas.
54. In 1989 the EC and the GCC concluded a Cooperation Agreement under which the EU and GCC Foreign Ministers meet once a year at a Joint Council/Ministerial Meeting³. The objective of this agreement is to facilitate trade relations, as well as more generally to contribute to strengthening stability in a strategic part of the world.
55. At its May 2004 meeting, the Joint Council agreed to incorporate clauses on human rights and migration in the Free Trade Agreement. The Joint Council agenda also includes cooperation on counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, economic integration, education and judicial cooperation, as well as political reforms.
56. The 15^th EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting took place in Manama (Bahrain), on 5 April 2005. Political reform and a free trade area were among the many issues discussed. The parties expressed their willingness to reinforce their dialogue and develop cooperation on human rights, and invited officials to make proposals. Since the last meeting of the Joint Council, NGOs responsible for human rights have been established in most GCC countries and are responsible for overseeing the implementation of relevant UN conventions and the laws of the respective countries.
57. Finally, the Joint Council recalled its objective of establishing an effectively verifiable zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East including the Gulf Region.

6. The EU-Yemen Cooperation Agreement

58. After the unification of North and South Yemen in 1990, the civil war in 1994 was short but violent. The government has made considerable progress in improving security but the situation is still worrying on account of a culture of tribal loyalties, widespread poverty and an armed civil population. Previous regimes were too tolerant of Islamic terrorist groups who used the country as a safe haven and a base for training and logistic support. According to Rashad Mohammed Al-Alimi, the Minister of the Interior, Yemen did not wait for the 11 September 2001 attacks to wage war on terrorism. It had been one of the most active proponents of the 1998 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and had had to work hard to persuade some of its neighbours to accept that there was an international dimension to terrorism and that increased inter-state cooperation was therefore essential. Prior to 11 September, Yemen's neighbours would certainly not have been inclined to conclude the bilateral agreements which, today, bind them all to Sana'a. Mr Al-Alimi stressed the importance of this regional cooperation which has made it possible to score major successes against terrorism. Furthermore, he pointed out that jurisdiction in the fight against terrorism was a priority.
59. The Minister stressed that the Americans were to a large extent to blame for the fact that the arguments put forward by al-Qa'ida continued to attract interest:

60. Mr Al-Alimi also underlined the need for appropriate religious education, i.e. relaying the "real message" of Islam and improved training for Imams. At a more general level there should be a thorough reform of the education system and the school curriculum as this was the only way to counter the teachings of radical Islamic movements in the long term.
61. Following the terrorist attacks against the American destroyer, the USS Cole, in 2000, the 11 September 2001 attacks, and the bombing of the French Limbourg oil tanker in 2002, the Yemeni authorities changed their methods. They are now cooperating closely with the US and the international coalition. The Yemeni Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mustapha Nowman, considers that cooperation with the United States was an absolute necessity as the government in Sana'a had been informed of a semi-secret plan under which there was to have been a US strike against Yemen a few weeks after military intervention against the Taliban in Afghanistan. "Yemen was number 2 on the list" according to Mr Nowman, who also points out that the Americans had not been overly concerned by the presence of radical Islamic groups in Yemen prior to the attacks against the USS Cole and the Limbourg. Efforts are being made to flush out any members of the al-Q'aida network and uproot other components of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism.
62. Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the world and by far the poorest country in the Middle East. The government is implementing the economic and administrative reforms launched in the mid-1990s with the support of the World Bank and the IMF.
63. In 2000, Yemen and Saudi Arabia at long last concluded an agreement on the border between the two countries, opening the way to a normalisation of their relations and the gradual reintegration of Yemen in the region. In 2001, Yemen was admitted as a member of some technical cooperation committees of the Gulf Cooperation Council, but full membership of the GCC does not seem to be an option at this stage.
64. Yemen is making progress in the field of democracy and respect for human rights. The third parliamentary elections, judged to be "free and fair", took place in April 2003. Presidential elections are scheduled to be held shortly, at the same time as local council elections. Life in Yemen is still largely determined by the tribal structure of society and clan allegiances. The Ministry of Human Rights, headed by a courageous woman minister, is particularly active.
65. Yemen's cooperation with the EU began in 1978. A Development Cooperation Agreement was concluded in 1984 with the then Yemen Arab Republic (Northern Yemen). In 1995 this agreement was extended to cover the entire territory of unified Yemen. An advanced and expanded framework cooperation agreement was approved in 1997. It is part of the EU's overall strategy towards the region and focuses on democracy, human rights and cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

1. The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul cooperation initiative

66. NATO is strengthening cooperation with the Mediterranean countries that do not belong to the Alliance within the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD).
67. The MD was launched in 1994⁴ with a view to building confidence and establishing cooperation between the Organisation and its seven partners in the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia. NATO is also anxious to enhance security and stability in the region. The dialogue concentrates on practical cooperation in security and defence matters and on exchanges of information covering two dimensions.

(a) The political dimension

68. The political dialogue consists of regular bilateral (26 + 1) and multilateral (26 + 7) meetings at ambassadorial and working level. These meetings provide opportunities for exchanging views on a range of issues relevant to the security situation in the Mediterranean.

(b) The practical dimension

69. The overall aim is to build confidence through cooperation.
70. Since NATO's Istanbul Summit (28-29 June 2004), the Mediterranean Dialogue has included four objectives:

71. But the development of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue has always been thwarted by a number of problems. Europe and the United States take the view that political dialogue will lead to a climate of trust and constructive cooperation. However, the Arab countries maintain that the first priority is to settle matters connected with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They believe that Confidence Building Measures (CBM) will only work if a strategic balance is struck between the various players and if all disputes are resolved
72. The Arab countries' somewhat lukewarm commitment to the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue is their response to Israel's attitude to the Middle East peace process⁵. Furthermore, they suspect that the United States is planning to transform the region in line with its national interests. The settlement of the Palestinian question is essential for the future development of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue⁶.

2. The OSCE Mediterranean Dialogue

73. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is active in promoting stability in the Mediterranean basin because of the cultural, economic and political interests that historically link the OSCE region with the countries south of the Mediterranean.
74. As early as 1975, the participant countries recognised that "security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean as a whole"⁷. It was in 1994 at the Budapest Conference that the OSCE heads of state and government decided to step up their contacts with the Mediterranean countries. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia were invited to attend meetings of the Organisation.
75. The OSCE established a network of special relationships with these six Mediterranean countries. They are known as Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation (MPCs).
76. At the 1999 Istanbul summit, the OSCE heads of state and government reiterated the need to strengthen the Organisation's relationship with its Mediterranean partners.
77. In 2002, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly established a Forum on the Mediterranean in order to develop stronger links with the parliamentarians of the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation.
78. Despite all these efforts, the OSCE initiative in the Mediterranean has stalled. The interests of the OSCE countries are different from those of the Mediterranean partners, which have a deeply rooted distrust of northern countries. Indeed, when the idea of a security concept on CSCE lines for the whole of the Mediterranean basin was first mooted, most of the countries to the south of the Mediterranean were strongly opposed to it.

79. A number of Arab governments, worried that the Western world might impose reform policies from outside without taking account of specific elements of Arab culture and civilisation, have started to take their own initiatives for reform.
80. In January 2004, a regional conference in Yemen on democracy, human rights and related issues resulted in the Sana'a Declaration, supporting the principles of democracy, calling for an end to the occupation of Arab territories and suggesting the establishment of an "Arab Democratic Dialogue Forum" to foster communication on human rights and democracy between governments and civil society groups.
81. A mostly non-governmental Arab conference on reform in the Arab world, held in Alexandria in March 2004, adopted the Alexandria Declaration, calling on individual Arab countries to push forward with their own reforms within a general framework agreed by all Arab countries.
82. This statement further called for modern constitutions to be drafted that would include clear-cut separation of legislative and executive powers; the abolition of emergency laws and extraordinary courts; independent ownership of the media; the granting of political rights to students to allow peaceful demonstrations. Apart from political reform issues, the document called for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, respect for the territorial integrity of Iraq, and the transformation of the Middle East into an area free of weapons of mass destruction.
83. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which from the outset has been a somewhat ineffective organisation, partly because of differences between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara, has not taken any steps to respond to the American initiative on the Broader Middle East and North Africa. The same is true of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), an organisation grouping 56 states which held its last summit in Malaysia in October 2003 without any noticeable results to report.
84. The Arab League held a summit meeting in Tunis on 22-23 May 2004 with a view to agreeing general statements on reform prior to the G-8 Sea Island Summit so as to avoid the impression that the West was driving the reform agenda in the Middle East. The Tunis Declaration that was finally adopted, however, was very general, providing no specific details as to how change and reform in the Middle East were to be brought about.
85. The 17^th summit of the Arab League, held in Algiers on 22-23 March 2005, was a clear demonstration of its member states' inability to join forces in order to tackle at least some of the many problems they face, both within and outside their territories.
86. Only 13 of 22 leaders attended the summit. Arab political reforms and divisions were only mentioned in passing and leaders recorded their support for Syria against "foreign intervention" when discussing UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for Syria to pull out of Lebanon and for Hezbollah to disarm.
87. A resolution was adopted to reactivate the 2002 Beirut peace initiative in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, based on Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and the creation of a Palestinian State. Israel immediately rejected this peace proposal and the Algerian Foreign Minister recognised the Arab League's inability to take joint action on this issue when he concluded that normalisation of relations with Israel was a sovereign act - member states were free to do as they wished and joint action could not be taken in this connection.

88. This vast Arab-Muslim region stretching from Mauritania to Afghanistan, the cradle of the greatest and most ancient civilisations of the Mediterranean region and site of the world's richest oil reserves is also plagued by many problems: political instability and unresolved armed conflicts; tribal and religious dictatorships; non-recognition of human rights; lack of progress on the condition of women; illiteracy; economic imbalance between the oil states (Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Iran) and those states living below the poverty line (such as Yemen).
89. This misery provides a breeding-ground for terrorism. However, there is a consensus on a number of important points and on certain issues that have to be addressed:

1. Iraq

90. The Americans' position at the end of 2004 before President Bush's re-election was that the US had been "right" to wage war against Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The only point on which they admit having gone wrong and misjudging the situation is as regards the vacuum that arose after Saddam's fall, and which was conducive to the development of insecurity, violence and insurgent attacks.
91. However, although fighting and attacks continue on the ground, it is to be noted that the process launched by the 30 January 2005 elections is moving forward and that a government has been in place since 28 April 2005.
92. The Parliament − or rather the transitional Iraqi National Assembly − elected in January, shows some distortion in its representation due to abstentions by some groups. It has 275 members. Ayatollah Sistani's list, a coalition of political and religious Shi'ite movements, is the largest group with more than 48% of the vote, but it does not have an absolute majority.
93. The Kurds, who hold a quarter of the seats, represent the country's second largest force. Their support is necessary and they have expressed ambitious demands, for example for the post of President of the country. But they have other demands concerning the town of Kirkuk, oil reserves and a federal state system which will have to wait.
94. The Iraqi List, a secular liberal democrat grouping headed by the party of outgoing Prime Minister Iyad Allawi lost ground with 13.8% of the votes, or 40 seats. That grouping had supported the Bush Administration.
95. The vast majority of Sunnis chose to abstain, and with no seats at all in the National Assembly they are the big losers. Nevertheless, Hajem al-Hassani, who was elected Speaker of the National Assembly by 215 of the 241 members present, is a Sunni and has been the spokesman for the Iraqi Islamic Party and close to the Muslim Brotherhood since 1990.
96. The two Vice-Speakers of the new Parliament are a Shi'ite (Shahristani) and a Kurd (a member of the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan).
97. The transitional Iraqi National Assembly is to draft a new Constitution by 15 August 2005 which is then to be approved by referendum before 15 October 2005.
98. Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who was appointed Prime Minister on 7 April 2005, is a moderate Islamist Shi'ite and a member of the United Iraqi Alliance. He is head of the Dawa Party and is supported by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. In his oath of office he claimed allegiance to an Islamist movement and stated that "Islam must be the State religion, since three quarters of our people are Muslims. But we are working to establish a democratic and pluralist system (...) in which Islam will be one source of our law, but not the only one (...) There is no question of imposing Sharia law (...) We want a democracy which will respect human rights and the rights of women (...)".
99. Referring to the government which has now been formed, the Prime Minister explained that it reflected the ethnic and religious diversity of Iraqi society. It has 35 members (18 Shi'ites, 8 Kurds, and 9 Sunnis) including 7 women. The new government must be approved by Parliament, which must express a vote of confidence by a simple majority. The Prime Minister described the appointment of the new government as a first step towards the construction of a new Iraq, adding that no effort would be spared to put a smile back on the face of the country's children.
100. The President of the Republic of Iraq is a non-religious Kurd. Jalal Talabani was elected on 6 April 2005. He will be assisted by two Vice-Presidents, a Shi'ite (Abdel Mahdi) and another Sunni (Ghazi al-Yawar).
101. Thus the system is now in place. Clearly it has strong religious connotations and may appear to be close to the Islamic regime of neighbouring Iran. However, it is difficult for the moment to say where the dividing line between the religious Shi'ite identity and the Iraqi national identity lies. In fact, the situation is a compromise between religious forces, Shi'ite hegemony and Kurdish demands. We are far from the "democratic, federal and pluralist" state that Prime Minister Allawi called for in his statements prior to the elections.
102. Iraq, then, is confronted with the two-fold challenge of national reconciliation and the withdrawal of foreign forces. The Prime Minister has stated in that regard that "no Iraqi wishes to see the multinational force remaining in Iraq", but that "a state may accept the presence of foreign forces on its territory when it is unable to guarantee its own security. Once we are able to do that the multinational force will no longer be necessary".
103. A new Constitution is to be drawn up and put to a referendum in October 2005. The transitional Government will administer the country until the next elections, which are scheduled for the end of 2005. "Learning democracy takes time and patience, especially after 35 years of dictatorship".

2. Lebanon

104. This small country (10 452 km²) is located between Israel to the south and Syria to the east and north. It has a population of some three millions, of which 250 000 Palestinians and 500 000 to 700 000 Syrians. It became a French protectorate following the end of the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It became an independent "parliamentary republic" in 1943. The national pact of 22 November 1943 is an unwritten agreement − a compromise between the Christian and Muslim communities − designed to supplement the 1926 Constitution.
105. Lebanese society is a patchwork composed of four main groups:

106. The compromise between the Christians and Muslims: the Christians renounced all foreign protection, in other words the dominant influence of a western power over the country, while the Muslims recognised the existence of Greater Lebanon and gave up all ideas of Lebanon becoming part of a Syrian or Arab entity. This balance between the two communities reflects the fact that Lebanon belongs to the Arab nation but has indissoluble ties with the West:

107. Unlike other Arab countries, Lebanon has no state religion, but the different religions are protected by the State. The 1975 civil war in which Christian militia fought against Palestinian movements led to a situation of chaos in which 300 000 people lost their lives. Peace was only properly restored in Lebanon following the signing of the Taef Agreements in 1989.
108. Those agreements, which are essential for national unity, made provision for the gradual disarming of the militia groups and a revision of the 1943 Constitution in order to adapt the Lebanese political system to the current breakdown among the different population groups. That constitutional reform led to three changes:

109. The remaining key state positions would be allocated among the different communities as before, namely: the post of President of the Republic would go to a Maronite Christian; the post of Prime Minister would go to a Sunni Muslim; the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies would be a Shi'ite Muslim.
110. The Taef Agreements led to a revision of the Lebanese Constitution promulgated on 21 September 1991. Paragraph 4 of the new Preamble makes provision for the gradual disappearance of the confessional political system. Nevertheless, the confessional system continues to exist in Lebanon and a new political imbalance has arisen with the emergence of the Shi'ite Islamist Hezbollah movement, the "Party of God", which forms the backbone of the anti-Israeli resistance in southern Lebanon. The Israelis pulled out of Lebanon on 24 May 2000. It was a defeat for the Israelis, a "day of national liberation" for the Lebanese and a victory for Hezbollah which is in total control of the southern part of the country, where the Lebanese army never goes.

(a) The events of 2005 and the death of Rafic Hariri

111. The assassination of Rafic Hariri on 14 February led to demonstrations and protests in the streets of Beirut. The majority of Lebanese, Christians and Muslims (Druze and Sunnis) alike, for the first time joined forces to express their anger and call for the withdrawal of Syria which they accused of having perverted the country's political and judicial system and ruined its economy.
112. On 28 February the pro-Syrian Prime Minister, Omar Karamé , stepped down. According to the White House spokesman, freedom "was on the march". President Bush claimed that the toppling of the government by public protest was proof that the strategy of promoting democracy in the Middle East could work. It was certainly one of the greatest demonstrations of popular power in the modern history of the Arab world, but whether it was really the result of a "domino effect" following the Iraqi elections is another matter. Another noteworthy point is that there was no division of the Lebanese army along political lines and that it did not intervene.
113. On 8 March 2005, Beirut was submerged by a Shi'ite tidal wave when several hundred thousand people, including the Hezbollah − which had abandoned their famous flag with the kalashnikov on it − poor people from Beirut's southern quarters, farmers from Bekaa and Syrian workers marched under the Lebanese flag and banners proclaiming "Syria, yes. United States get out!"
114. The Lebanon that will emerge from this crisis will certainly be different, but we do not know what the balance of power will be between a popular majority which aspires to become a political majority and the minority that is currently in power and which is opposed to change. Neither do we know what the new relations will be with Syria, which was obliged to withdraw its forces, and for which Lebanon remains a vital economic force and provides an opening to the Mediterranean Sea. Constructive relations are important to both sides. Above all, we do not know what will become of the resistance movement, in other words,

(b) The Hezbollah

115. This Shi'ite Islamic resistance movement is supported by Iran and is the country's major organised political force under its leader Hassan Nasrallah. Since 1985 it has been behind numerous spectacular acts of terrorism including kidnappings, suicide attacks, executions and plane hijackings.
116. In 1992 Hezbollah entered the Lebanese Parliament with 12 out of 128 seats. It has its own television station, al-Manar, which broadcasts messages in support of the jihad against Israel. It has its own weapons arsenal, including over 12 000 missiles with no less than 180 targets in Israel, and for which the order to fire does not depend on the Lebanese Government. It has some 1 000 to 1 500 full-time combatants but can mobilise a further 10 000. It has financial resources and can pay up to 100 000 dollars for each suicide attack.
117. Hezbollah is an armed movement, a "state within a state". It is independent of the official state institutions. However, it is financially dependent on Iran and had ties essentially with Syria for its military action against Israel. It has been on the United States' list of terrorist movements since 1997.
118. Recent declarations by Secretary-General Nasrallah have been geared to seeking a "genuine national consensus around the Lebanese army" and respecting "civil peace". He wishes to achieve coordination between the resistance movement and the army in order to deter Israel from all forms of aggression and claims that if resistance were to depend on orders from the government it would be totally ineffective on the ground.
119. UN Security Resolution 1559 calls, precisely, for the disarmament of the Hezbollah. The problem, however, is whether now is the right time. Depending on the political situation and the democratic process in Lebanon, Hezbollah could be transformed into a political party, but the first step would be for it to lay down its arms.

(c) UN Security Resolution 1559

120. This Resolution, which was voted at the request of the United States and France in particular:

121. It should be noted that the Resolution concerns Syria, the "occupying country", and that it in no way differs from Resolutions 242 and 338 calling on Israel to withdraw from the occupied Palestinian territories. Syria was present in Lebanon "at the request" of the Lebanese Government and by virtue of the Taef Agreements. The United States for its part went to Iraq to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. This policy of double standards is often criticised and weakens our credibility vis-à-vis the Arab world.
122. Furthermore, the disarmament of the Hezbollah is being called for, in particular by the United States (but not France).
123. A thorny issue is whether this Resolution is a further destabilising factor for Lebanon and the region as a whole. Hezbollah's presence in southern Lebanon is a "deterrent" to attacks and penetration of Lebanese airspace by Israel. The Hezbollah, according to the UNIFUL soldiers, "handle the systematic reprisals in a masterful and professional manner". On 6 April 2005 the UN Special Envoy in Beirut, Terje Roed Larsen, declared that disarmament of the Hezbollah was not for the moment on his agenda.
124. The withdrawal of Syrian troops took place on 30 April after 29 years of military presence (starting in 1976). There was no mass popular movement to hail that historic development. Syria's withdrawal was clearly an unwilling one, but it notified the UN of the military evacuation of Lebanon in accordance with President Bashar Al-Assad's undertaking of 5 March 2005. A team of experts will remain on the ground to verify its withdrawal.
125. Its withdrawal signified the departure of 14 000 soldiers and thousands of intelligence agents and the removal of equipment. The head of general security who was at the centre of the security system controlled from Damas has resigned. And yet, in his report of 28 April 2008, Kofi Annan expressed doubts concerning the completion of Syria's withdrawal and noted the presence of agents from the Syrian intelligence services in the South of Beirut.
126. Moreover, the Lebanese army has not been deployed over the whole of the country and the militias have not been disarmed. Yet the Lebanese Government has recalled that the resistance movement is seeking to recuperate farms on the Bekaa Plain close to the Syrian-Lebanese border and which are claimed by Lebanon, since they have been occupied by Israel since 1967.
127. Does the end of the Syrian occupation mark the beginning of independence for Lebanon? The political process is beginning now, but we do not yet know what the outcome of the crisis will be.
128. Parliamentary elections are to take place in Lebanon in four stages from May to June 2005. The investigation into Rafic Hariri's assassination is under way. A government of national unity has been formed and a Prime Minister appointed. The government has maintained the electoral law of 2000, a decision criticised by the opposition. The most recent development is the return from exile of General Michel Aoun.
129. How can this country create lasting political stability? Is the system based on religion which has been in place for so many years still viable? Is secularism a principle that can be adapted to this country?
130. The Islamists are influential and armed. It would be better to incorporate them in a democratic process (following Turkey's example) once they have laid down their arms. It would be better to avoid divisions within the country along religious lines (as in Iraq).
131. Another question which is inseparably linked Lebanon's stability is that of the creation of a Palestinian state and the return of the 400 000 Palestinian refugees living on Lebanese soil.
132. A possible sequence of events would be:

133. Is there any hope of a "Beirut spring"?

1. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict

(a) Developments in the peace process from 1967 to 2005

134. Following the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel seized Sinai, the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The peace process is gradually moving forward on the basis of a number of basic principles:

135. Following the Yom Kippur War in 1973 numerous successive attempts were made to re-launch the peace process. The most notable were the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, Oslo in 1993 (assassination of Yitzhak Rabin - 1995), Taba in 1996, Sharm el-Sheikh in 1999, Camp David in 2000 (failure and second Intifada). All these efforts ended in failure. And yet the international community continued to call for a negotiated settlement leading to the co-existence of two states whose borders were defined with reference to those of 1967. Moreover, it insisted that a solution that was just and fair for both parties should be found regarding the status of Jerusalem and of refugees.
136. Hopes were raised again in March 2002 with the Beirut peace initiative and the plan put forward by Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Under the proposals Israel would gain recognition if it withdrew to the 1967 borders in line with UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Jerusalem would be the capital of a Palestinian State and refugees would have the right to return home.
137. With a view to moving the peace process forward, the EU, the United States, the UN and Russia came together to create the "Quartet" on 20 December 2002. The group adopted a three-phase plan known as the "roadmap". The aim of the roadmap was to set the peace process in motion again and to set objectives, draw up a timetable for the implementation of concrete measures in the area of security, as well as in the political, economic and humanitarian fields. The end goal was to achieve a global settlement by 2005 which would include the creation of a Palestinian State and the implementation of appropriate solutions.
138. The roadmap remained a dead letter despite the good intentions of the international community. Palestinian activist groups continued their suicide bombings and attacks in spite of the ceasefire that had been declared. The Israelis continued their policy of extending their settlements and building so-called security fences, although Israel had been condemned in 2004 by the International Court of Justice for violations of international law and human rights.
139. The President of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, was perceived as an obstacle to the peace process and was not accepted as a negotiating partner either by the Israelis or the Americans, who wanted the Palestinians to elect a new leader.
140. On 1 December 2003, the Geneva Pact was signed. The initiators on the Israeli side were Yosso Beillin and Amram Mitzna. Yasser Abed Rabo, a close colleague of Yasser Arafat, represented the Palestinians. The pact was intended to supplement the roadmap but it never amounted to much. The main points it addressed were: the recognition of Israel as a State for the Jewish people; the creation of a Palestinian State along the 1967 "green line"; a corridor linking the Gaza strip to the West Bank; a divided Jerusalem as the capital city of two states; partial evacuation of the Jewish settlements; the right of return or financial compensation for refugees.
141. In 2004 Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon launched his own four-step plan unilaterally and quite independently of the roadmap. In so doing he had the tacit approval of the United States and President Bush who had just begun his presidential campaign. The international community and the Quartet in particular were powerless spectators of this initiative whose final overall objective is unknown.

(b) The Sharon Plan for 2004-05

142. The plan consists of Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and certain settlements on the West Bank with settlers receiving compensation.
143. The first stage, Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, is to be implemented in 2005, following 14 months of tough negotiations within the Government and the Knesset. The Gaza withdrawal plan was launched on 2 February 2004 by Ariel Sharon, who once again showed his skill at overcoming all the obstacles. The final steps in the process were the approval of the 26 March 2004 budget followed by the Knesset's rejection on 28 March of the bill for a national referendum on the subject.
144. This fully empowered Ariel Sharon to set in motion his plan for withdrawing the army from Gaza and for evacuating the 21 settlements there, as well as four isolated settlements in the north of the West Bank, Judea and Samaria. Indeed, Israeli nationalists perceive domination over these biblical provinces as a historic challenge. "The Jewish people will never be able to fulfil its mission if one of its legs is amputated by taking away half of Israel's land. One day or the other the whole country will be in our hands".
145. The hard part remains to be done, because the furious settlers have vowed that they will take the fight to the streets and wage a violent civil war. The army is being mobilised for the date in question which has been set at 20 July 2005.

(c) Population of the Gaza Strip

146. 1 200 000 Palestinians are concentrated in 232 000 km² of desert in conditions likened by some to those of a concentration camp: 70% of the area has been destroyed. (A total of 3 800 000 Palestinians live in the occupied territories, including 2 500 000 in the West Bank).
147. There are only 7-8 000 Jewish settlers in the Gaza Strip, out of a total of 450 000, of which 195 000 live in East Jerusalem and 245 000 in the West Bank.
148. The settlement process has been going for the past 35 years. Under the so-called "evacuation/compensation" law adopted on 16 February 2005, each family evacuated from Gaza and the northern part of the West Bank is to receive on average 1 700 000 shekels (306 000 euros). The total estimated amount paid out so far by the Israeli Government by way of compensation for settlers and companies is reported to be 7 billion shekels or 1.26 billion euros.
149. The ratio of the Palestinian and Israeli populations to the surface area is an essential statistic. The Israelis want to recuperate as much land as possible (preferably fertile land rather than desert) with the fewest possible number of people on it (Palestinians in particular). It is a simple calculation: more land (83% at the present time for Israel) and fewer people. 85% of the population (Palestinians) are now living on 17.2% of the land in the West Bank.
150. The process of building so-called security walls is also a process of gnawing away at Palestinian territory and illegally occupying land on the pretext of "legitimate self defence", according to the theory put forward by a Palestinian lawyer born in the United States.
151. Ariel Sharon's Gaza evacuation operation boils down to giving up a strip of land which will not even have access to the sea. Will Sharon agree to a re-opening of the Gaza port and airport? Will he guarantee safe passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank? And above all, what about the 1 200 000 Palestinians there? And all the while, as though in exchange for Gaza, he will be penetrating each day a bit more deeply into the West Bank.

(d) Settlements and the construction of walls

152. There are also settlements on the other bank of the Jordan. Hebron (city of the Patriarchs), Naplus and Jericho are "biblical" sites, but they are in the West Bank. As of 1970, the settlers who were "reclaiming their heritage" (the Mitnah'lin) were treated differently from the pioneers who had come to settle (the Mityashvim) and obtained a pledge from the Labour government of the time to maintain a permanent Jewish presence in Hebron and to build a new Jewish town − Kyriat Arba − beside it.
153. Some one hundred illegal settlements will be given official recognition. The settlement process began more than 30 years ago, thus well before Ariel Sharon's time.
154. The Palestinian territories that have been occupied since 1967 now have 450 000 Jewish settlers on them. 245 000 Israelis are living in 138 settlements in the West Bank.
155. In East Jerusalem, which has been de facto annexed by Israel, 15 suburbs house 195 000 Jews. Originally the "hard core" of the settlements was composed of ultra-nationalist (both religious and non-religious) militant Jews, mainly Ashkenazi.
156. However, as of the 1980s, with the state investing massively in the process of settlements to populate the area, more and more Israelis crossed the "green line" to take advantage of the social and economic advantages being offered to settlers. A five-member family of settlers renting a 125 m² apartment for ten years with two monthly salaries amounting to 9 000 shekels net gets about 900 000 shekels, or US$ 200 000 dollars.
157. The socio-cultural profile of settlers has changed drastically. The majority of settlers, in particular in East Jerusalem and certain other towns (Maale Adumim, Ariel and Alfei Menasheh), are young people from the working classes (70% of settlers are under the age of 21), "orientals" and ultra-orthodox (some 55 000 or 14%).
158. Under the Sharon Plan approved by the K