DOCUMENT A/1932

21 June 2006

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Weapons in space

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Document A/1932

21 June 2006

Weapons in space

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee
by Alan Meale, Rapporteur (United Kingdom, Socialist Group)

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RECOMMENDATION 783²

on weapons in space

(i) Noting that for military operations - both in peace and war time − the armed forces have become so dependent on space-enabled systems that it is inconceivable to work without them;

(ii) Recalling in that respect that satellites are used primarily for mapping and geodesy, strategic optical and electronic reconnaissance, communications relay, navigation and meteorological observation and that, although none of these missions are new to warfare, what makes satellites more important today than in the past is the extraordinary increase in the number of military systems that depend partly or entirely on them;

(iii) Considering that this ever-growing dependence on satellites to conduct military operations has brought to light the fact that they are extremely vulnerable to enemy attack;

(iv) Stressing that the current United States Administration has decided in this context to make the protection of US satellites a key plank of its defence policy;

(v) Noting that the question of whether the United States should go ahead and open Pandora's box by placing such weapons in space has stimulated a wide-ranging debate within US military, political and academic circles;

(vi) Recalling that the idea of placing weapons in orbit was envisaged several times during the cold war and that the clear danger represented by such a space-based arms race led to consistent efforts by the US and the USSR alike to regulate their space activities and nuclear tests in particular;

(vii) Considering nevertheless that even though all agreements signed in this area constitute a formidable precedent for the case against space weaponisation, they do not explicitly forbid it and that only the deployment of WMD is forbidden under the Outer Space Treaty (OST);

(viii) Noting as regards the nature, deployment and use of space weapons currently under development for the US arsenal, that these weapons can be divided from the technical point of view into directed-energy weapons − which include electronic jamming devices, space-based lasers, microwave and electromagnetic pulse weapons − and mass-to-target weapons, which include kinetic energy munitions and conventional ones delivered from orbit, and that satellites when used aggressively can also be added to the list of potential space weapons;

(ix) Noting that small satellites are a source of particular concern to the US officials, who are alarmed by recent Chinese and Indian projects in this field, as they are convinced that the low cost of such systems places them within reach of major terrorist networks;

(x) Considering also that high-altitude nuclear detonations (HAND) also worry the United States, since such a threat is increasing rapidly and is connected to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology;

(xi) Recalling in that regard the report of the Rumsfeld Commission, which concluded among other things that the US Government was not prepared to deal with a possible space aggression and that the expansion of conflicts into space was historically inevitable;

(xii) Stressing that the idea of effectively controlling space is not a new one, since space superiority has been deemed by every National Space Policy Doctrine adopted by the United States since the 1950s to constitute a major US national security interest;

(xiii) Noting that the Rumsfeld Commission went a step further by insinuating that the US should expand the notion of space control to include the task of force application, which means deploying space weapons designed to seek out actively and destroy any threat to US satellites from either earth or space before it has the chance to reach its target;

(xiv) Considering that this implies the use of armed satellites not only against incoming anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), but also against their launch sites on the planet's surface and that this therefore includes weapons that have inherent offensive and first-strike capabilities, thus going from the notion of space supremacy to that of space dominance and creating a new strategic environment;

(xv) Stressing that Russia and China seem determined to avert weaponisation through legal and political means and by promoting multilateral understanding on this issue, but that this could easily change after the deployment of the first US weapons;

(xvi) Considering that space weaponisation will not create an arms race in orbit, but on earth, for these ASAT weapons will become recognised as a legitimate means of defence against aggressive US satellites;

(xvii) Noting that ASAT weapons proliferation will become a major international problem comparable to nuclear proliferation today, for countries that currently have rudimentary ASATs will engage in developing more sophisticated ones, while others that never before imagined acquiring them will begin to think about it;

(xviii) Considering that if weapons are deployed in space, near space will become a more hostile environment than ever before and that consequently, space armaments will create exactly the opposite effect to their declared objectives;

(xix) Noting that satellites will therefore become more complicated and expensive, as their design will have to incorporate measures to protect against ASAT attacks, that space insurance prices will soar and that suspicion among space powers will reach unprecedented levels, to the detriment of international cooperation on peaceful space exploration;

(xx) Stressing that the space industry worldwide, and in Europe in particular, will be severely affected by the disastrous affects of space weaponisation and that the resulting decline in private investment will confront the industry with serious financial difficulties;

(xxi) Considering that the European Union has every interest in averting such a catastrophic outcome and that it cannot remain indifferent to such risks,

1. Create a European Space Surveillance Network to provide constant, near real-time data on the position of all European and non-European satellites. Such a system for both civilian and military purposes should on the one hand, keep track of satellites and help to avert collisions in space, and on the other, verify the proper functioning of assets, identify approaching hostile satellites and monitor the deployment of weapons in space. In the future and as a last resort it might also provide targeting coordinates for earth-based ASATs;
2. Take account of the fact, in this respect, that:

3. Take complementary measures to enable EU space assets to withstand the consequences of attacks, such as:

4. Take into account the fact that it is entirely up to the public sector to assume the responsibility for securing the survivability of dual-use satellites against ASATs, since Europe − unlike the US − will be relying entirely on dual-use systems to meet its military and security requirements;
5. Increase space budgets at national and European level;
6. Step up cooperation between the EU security institutions and the European Space Agency.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Alan Meale, Rapporteur, (United Kingdom, Socialist Group)

1. Today, space is more important to developed countries than ever before. As our societies become more heavily dependent on a constant flow of information, protecting the instruments which acquire, process and distribute it has become a matter of considerable importance to all nations. Among these instruments, earth-orbiting satellites are the most effective and their use is growing rapidly for both civil and military purposes. Especially in relation to military operations - both in peace and war time − our armed forces have become so dependent on space-enabled systems that it is inconceivable to work without them³.
2. Satellites are currently primarily used for mapping and geodesy, strategic optical and electronic reconnaissance, communications relay, navigation and meteorological observation⁴. None of these missions are new to warfare. What makes satellites more important today than in the past is the extraordinary increase in the number of military systems that depend partly or entirely on them⁵. Two typical examples of this are precision-guided munitions and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which are both heavily dependent on satellites, the first in order to navigate and locate their targets and the second to communicate with their ground control stations⁶.
3. In addition to this, satellite communications (SATCOM) also play an essential role in the fielding of the new concept of network-centric warfare, as they are the most secure and far-reaching means of communication available⁷. In short, recent years have seen an ever-increasing migration of military capabilities to space, both quantitatively and qualitatively, through the development of weapons systems that are not simply enhanced, but directly enabled by space support. This trend has gradually led military planners to similarly treat space as a conventional operational medium, as with the air, sea or land.
4. On the other hand, our ever-growing dependence on satellites to conduct military operations has brought to light the fact that they are extremely vulnerable to enemy attack and/or damage. They are, after all, extremely expensive, sophisticated and sensitive pieces of equipment that can nevertheless be easily obstructed or destroyed. Even though this deficiency has always existed, the increasingly important role of satellites dictates that it can be no longer ignored.
5. It was in this context that the current US Administration decided to make the protection of US satellites a key plank of its defence policy. One of the possible means envisaged to reduce their vulnerability was to arm them, and/or to deploy separate armed satellites dedicated to protecting them⁸. Over the last five years this prospect has stimulated a wide-ranging debate within US military, political and academic circles on the question of whether the US should go ahead and open Pandora's box by placing such weapons in space. Such a deployment would demonstrate the United States' determination to extend its overwhelming terrestrial military superiority into near space, in order to effectively control it for defensive purposes, protect US assets in it and deny its use to potential adversaries. Even though the issue is far from being decided, the Pentagon has already allocated considerable funds to the development of space-based anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), indicating that space weaponisation is considered an option⁹.
6. This latest development and its consequences will be the subject of this report. The report will focus primarily on the possible operational use of space weapons, the strategic scope of space control and the political implications for international and transatlantic relations of a unilateral US decision to weaponise space. Its purpose will be to provide:

7. In order to achieve this we must first clarify the terms "space" and "space weapon" in order to put their deployment and use into perspective. For the purposes of this report we will consider a "weapon" to be any instrument designed and intended to cause harm. As for "space", we will adopt the generally accepted use of the term, which defines it as the area that extends above an altitude of 100 km over the earth's surface. This is of course a conventional definition, based on the fact that the earth's atmosphere around this altitude becomes so thin that the laws of aerodynamics cease to apply and one is therefore obliged to consider it as a medium different from air. Furthermore, we should consider a weapon to be based in space only if it can operate in and from space, and not if it only passes through it. This restriction is important, as it excludes earth-based weapons that simply cross the 100 km threshold, such as ICBMs and MIRVs during their intermediate flight phase, or experimental aircraft such as the USAF's X-43 project. Consequently, a SW is defined as any weapon placed in a permanent orbit higher than 100 km.
8. A further distinction must also be made between "weaponising" and "militarising" space, as space militarisation has already occurred, with a large number of satellites already dedicated to military purposes in use today¹⁰, these satellites being used not only to facilitate operations through early warning, information, communications and control support, but also to directly enable precision-guided munitions to find their targets. Those satellites (such as the GPS or perhaps the future Galileo constellations) form an integral and crucial part of the weapons system they support, and in that sense they already take active part in terrestrial operations. However, since they do not themselves deliver weapons, they cannot be considered as such¹¹. Hence, it is precisely the deployment of weapons in permanent orbit with the intention to launch strikes from that orbit against space- or earth-based targets that constitutes space weaponisation.
9. The idea of placing weapons in orbit is far from new. Indeed, this possibility was envisaged several times during the cold war, for instance in the mid-1950s. US military circles came up with the idea immediately after the Soviet Union's successful launch of Sputnik on 4 October 1957. During the great scare that took hold of US public opinion immediately after the Soviet success, United States Air Force officials began to consider the possibility that the other side might exploit its technological edge by deploying nuclear-armed bombardment satellites to deliver nuclear weapons from orbit. It was at this time that the first reports calling for a US response in kind and a possible arms race in space made their appearance¹². Even though these projects never materialised, they gave birth to the first concepts of earth-based ASAT weapons.
10. Such developments also led to a series of top secret High Altitude Nuclear Detonation (HAND) tests (Project Swordfish) conducted almost simultaneously by the US and USSR in the early 1960s. Their purpose was to confirm the usefulness of weapons like ASATs, and their results were alarming, for they indicated that even a single HAND could cause the progressive degradation or even destruction of virtually every satellite in low earth orbit (LEO). Indeed, as a result of the entrapment of the radiation caused by the explosion in the earth's magnetic field (the Van Allen belts) there would be a rise in radiation levels in the upper layers of the atmosphere lasting several years, or even decades. This would inflict considerable damage on any satellites moving through those layers and cause them to malfunction, within a few months at most¹³.
11. The clear danger that such effects of a space-based arms race represented for humanity in the cold war context led to consistent efforts by the US and the USSR alike to regulate their space activities and weapons testing in particular. A first step in this direction was the international Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (NTB), signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963, which effectively halted any further nuclear space tests. This was soon followed by the signing of a number of international space-related treaties within the UN institutional framework. The most important of these was the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (OST), which regulated the peaceful exploration of space and forbade the deployment of any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in it¹⁴.
12. Later agreements include the 1972 Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (LIAB), the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (REG) and the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (MOON). In addition, since 1981− almost on an annual basis − the United Nations General Assembly has voted a number of resolutions calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space and inviting all nations with space capabilities to avoid its weaponisation¹⁵.
13. Nevertheless, even though these agreements constitute a formidable precedent for the case against space weaponisation, they do not explicitly forbid it. Only the deployment of WMD is forbidden under the Outer Space Treaty (OST). One could also argue that a country whose space assets were attacked from space could raise liability claims against the aggressor in accordance with the provisions of the LIAB. But the existing legal provisions do not prevent a country from deploying such weapons; at the most they might hold it accountable for using them. On the other hand, the US Government has repeatedly made it clear that it reserves the right to proceed with space weaponisation for the purpose of self-defence and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the UN Charter. Characteristically, the US is among the few nations (only four in all) that traditionally have chosen to abstain from the abovementioned annual vote on the UN resolution.
14. The only international legal document to have directly addressed the issue and categorically excluded the possibility of space weaponisation was the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABMT), signed between the US and USSR. The fifth article of the treaty prohibited the development or deployment of ABM systems in space, a provision that covered almost every type of space-based weapon. It is true that neither signatory state ever fully abided by the letter of the treaty, as both secretly continued to develop and test ASAT weapons. In the early 1970s the USSR continued testing its "space mines", or "killer satellites" on a regular basis. These were small satellites laden with explosives that were meant to rendezvous with enemy assets in orbit and destroy them by blowing themselves up¹⁶.
15. On the US side, the ABMT obligations did not prevent the Reagan Administration from developing its Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) project, commonly known as "Star Wars". This was an ambitious plan to develop an ABM system with space-based elements as soon as possible¹⁷. Alongside this main objective, USAF also began to develop a weapons system that would fire conventional non-nuclear munitions from space against targets on earth, for tactical use (Brilliant Pebbles concept). Nevertheless, as we all now know, in June 2002 the current US administration government chose to exercise its rights of withdrawal from this treaty. In spite of the latter's flaws, the unilateral US decision to withdraw from it entirely clearly opened the way for its weaponisation plans, and was a clear indication of its intention to speed up its research projects and move on to their full operational deployment.

16. A brief discussion of what space operations are and how they are conducted is essential to understand whether space weapons could be useful or not. Space operations (SPACEOPS) are divided into four major mission areas: support, enhancement, control and force application¹⁸. Space support includes operations that launch, deploy and maintain space assets and their terrestrial communications, command and control systems. Space enhancement refers to missions that augment tactical awareness of the battlefield and provide support to forces fighting on earth, such as intelligence and reconnaissance, early warning, weather monitoring and navigation or position determination. Space control means maintaining space superiority and space situational awareness, allowing freedom of action to friendly space assets and denying it to enemy ones. Finally, space force application involves engaging terrestrial targets from orbit¹⁹.
17. Of the mission areas mentioned above, the first two address traditional military space operations. It is the second two that are of particular interest for this report, as they involve space armaments. Indeed, space control operations today are conducted only by earth-based ASAT weapons, whereas force application missions are non-existent. These are precisely the mission areas that may demand the deployment of weapons in space and might one day be revolutionised by it.
18. As an operating medium, space is entirely different from the terrestrial mediums of sea, air and land. It therefore requires specific operational means and doctrines that take into account its unique physical characteristics. One major consideration, for instance, is that space assets are obliged to follow pre-determined orbital trajectories to remain close to earth. On the other hand, motion in space is not affected by the earth's surface and it knows no geographic boundaries²⁰.
19. Consequently, the use of space assets for military purposes must take account of those specific characteristics that may constitute drawbacks or advantages. On the one hand, space assets offer global access, unrestricted by any form of boundaries or limitations. Furthermore they are long-lasting, inasmuch as once deployed their lifetime is measured in years, and their use is continuous. On the other hand, their orbital motion severely limits their manoeuvrability and makes them very predictable; making them virtually "sitting ducks" for any one who wishes to attack them. It also makes it very difficult to maintain their concentrated presence over a particular area of interest for a prolonged time period and makes the amassing of space forces practically impossible. As a result, their operational use depends entirely on the availability of an asset over the desired area and it cannot be commanded. In addition to this, the entire space operations support complex composed of launch sites, command and control facilities and ground-to-satellite links is fixed and extremely vulnerable to attack. Finally, once launched, space assets cannot be refuelled or repaired, a fact which further limits their manoeuvrability, as each manoeuvre they perform proportionally diminishes their operational life time²¹.
20. Obviously, all of the above characteristics will determine the future nature, deployment and use of space weapons currently under development for the US arsenal. From a technical point of view, these are divided into directed-energy and mass-to-target weapons. Directed-energy weapons include electronic jamming devices, space-based lasers, microwave and electromagnetic pulse weapons. Mass-to-target weapons include kinetic energy munitions and conventional ones delivered from orbit²². As far as ASAT operations are concerned, satellites when used aggressively could also be added to the list of potential space weapons²³.
21. Electronic jamming consists in blocking a satellite's communication with its control station, through the transmission of a very powerful electronic signal to either end of its data link. An interference of this kind is not only critical for SATCOMS, but for any asset that needs to transmit data to earth, such as surveillance satellites²⁴. Space-based lasers are primarily being developed as part of a multilayer anti-ballistic missile defence system to protect the United States from a nuclear attack, but they can also be used to destroy enemy satellites. In principle, they can instantaneously propagate energy concentrated over a narrow area and at very long distances. Their destructive force varies from blowing up satellites by heating up their fuel tanks, to simply disabling them by overcharging their solar panels or blinding their optical instruments²⁵.
22. Microwave and electromagnetic pulse weapons work on the same principle as lasers, but on a different wavelength. Their frequencies are tuned so as to destroy electronic circuits and other conductive materials within the satellite by overloading them. This results in the loss of the asset's critical functions and its permanent degradation or destruction²⁶. All categories of directed-energy weapons can also be used to hit "soft" targets on the planet's surface, such as aircraft, light armoured vehicles and fuel depots, but with one major restriction: they cannot penetrate clouds²⁷.
23. Kinetic energy weapons are also being developed as part of the US missile defence shield. These are known as kinetic kill vehicles (KKVs). They are small metal objects designed to be deployed from satellites and hit ICBMs during the initial boost phase of their flight, before they can deploy their multiple warheads and decoys. They work simply by using their velocity to penetrate the missiles' fuel tanks, causing them to explode²⁸. They can be used in the same way against satellites, in which case their task is simpler, because satellites move much more slowly and are infinitely more vulnerable than ICBMs. In fact, the weapon does not even need to propel itself towards its target, it can simply be placed in the latter's orbital path by another satellite. As a space asset is moving at high orbital velocity speeds, collision with an object as small as a bullet would wreck its communication antennas and solar panels or destroy some of its critical subsystems²⁹.
24. Kinetic energy weapons could also be used for orbital bombardment, according to the same principle as the natural phenomenon of meteoroid falls. Delivered from orbit, these vehicles simply fall on their targets and destroy them by the force of their mass accelerated by gravity. For that purpose the KKVs need to be made of an extremely dense material, such as tungsten. With an aerodynamic design that favours their freefall, they quickly achieve hypervelocity, enabling them to devastate their targets on impact, with results equivalent to those of an explosion of several tens of tons of TNT. Such weapons have deep penetrating abilities and could be used against "hard" targets such as heavily armoured vehicles, tall buildings and especially underground bunkers³⁰. Of course, mass-to-target weapons also include less "exotic" solutions, such as conventional bombs delivered from space.
25. Recent progress in electronic engineering and nanotechnologies has made it possible to produce very small satellites, with a mass inferior to 500 kg. These in turn are divided into mini- (100-500 kg), micro- (10-100 kg), nano- (1-10 kg) and picosatellites (<1 kg)³¹. These space vehicles are affordable, relatively easy to build and inherently difficult to track. These unique characteristics make them ideal space weapons. They can be used in two ways: as parasite satellites or space mines.
26. In the first case, the small satellite itself acts as a weapon. It uses its small, stealthy shape to attach itself to enemy assets in orbit without being detected. On the opening of hostilities it begins attacking its host satellite and either destroys it or obstructs its function. In the second case, the small satellite is used to carry either a conventional or a nuclear explosive device. Again, it is deployed secretly and remains unseen, shadowing its targets. It can be launched in advance in peacetime, thus pre-empting any countermeasures against its deployment, and ordered to explode at the most convenient time. In the case of a nuclear charge in particular its consequences would be devastating, given the cumulative effect of nuclear radiation in near space³². Even more important, however, is the element of strategic surprise that its use entails.

27. Some of the weapons mentioned above are already in use as earth-based ASATs. These include, for instance, the lasers and KKVs that are available in the United States, Russia, and probably to a smaller extent, in China and Israel. However, the deployment of those same weapons in space poses significant technological challenges and involves operational constraints that make it difficult to decide whether the results are worth the effort.
28. The main problem that any notion of space warfare has to overcome is that of the orbital debris (OD) that it may create. Orbital debris according to the NASA definition is "any man-made object in orbit about the Earth which no longer serves a useful purpose"³³. This includes used launcher stages, satellites that have passed their life limit and the many fragments of material produced by explosions or collisions among those objects. During the cold war for instance, the Soviet military routinely blew up their satellites after they had exceeded their useful life. Today, NASA keeps track of some 9 000 orbiting objects larger than 10 cm. This large amount of space junk is likely, according to estimates, to increase to at least 11 000 pieces over the next couple of hundred years as objects collide with each other. Currently 17% consist of used rocket bodies from previous launches, 31% are operational or retired satellites, 38% are large fragments from previous collisions and 13% are mission-related debris. There are also an estimated 100 000 or more objects from 1 to 10 cm in size³⁴. Travelling at speeds of some 27 000 km per hour, any one of these can wreck a space asset if it hits it. Such problems have already been recognised by NASA's own Johnson Space Centre in Houston, Texas, which has calculated that even without space militarisation the current levels of debris are likely to result in many further collisions.
29. The problem is that space does not have the ability to "repair" itself. The combination of almost non-existent drag and low gravity holds any man-made object in orbit almost indefinitely. The theory of attaching structures that would increase drag and cause debris to re-enter the atmosphere more quickly is financially prohibitive, which means in practical terms that any confrontation in space, with satellites firing at each other and exploding into pieces, would create so much debris that it would be sheer lunacy, the remaining pieces of destroyed enemy satellites being a much more severe threat to friendly assets than enemy satellites ever were. Furthermore, causing such large-scale satellite fragmentation would almost certainly start off a chain reaction of collisions in orbit, thereby risking a geometric increase in OD and eventually destroying a great number of assets³⁵. From the military standpoint, the resulting "space fratricide" would clearly nullify any short-term advantages of using space weapons. From a scientific point of view it would be risking an unprecedented catastrophe that could obstruct space exploration for ever³⁶.
30. Nevertheless, the use of most of the space weapons mentioned above for ASAT purposes implies the physical destruction of their targets. This is the case in particular for mass-to-target weapons. Consequently, since the US today is in control of the world's largest satellite fleet by far, it has the most to lose from such an outcome. One can only wonder why its leadership would want to start a chain of events that may inescapably cause its strategic superiority in space assets to evaporate into a halo of OD of its own making.
31. Even without considering the OD problem, one would have to study which particular US space vulnerabilities would be mitigated by the deployment of weapons. Today, with the exception of small satellites, which are widely available to most space-enabled nations, only the US is capable of developing and deploying space weapons. Consequently, any threat to US space assets would have to come from the earth. The possible threats that are routinely evoked by weaponisation advocates include:

32. Small satellites are a source of particular concern to US officials, who are alarmed by recent Chinese and Indian progress in this field, believing that the low cost of such systems might also put them within reach of major terrorist networks. In general, they also consider wide-scale technological progress as an asymmetric threat to their space supremacy, as it would allow less developed nations to acquire space capabilities similar to theirs, at a much lower cost. Finally, they are worried about the inherent difficulty of keeping track of such satellites, and fear that they might be used for a surprise attack on them³⁷.
33. That said, the deployment of weapons in orbit does not seem to be the only way to deal with this threat. Another possibility would be to combine several approaches: increasing space surveillance capabilities, equipping satellites with self-protection systems and improving earth-based non-destructive ASATs. The first would make it possible to track even the smallest satellites and provide early warning of attack; the second would allow satellites themselves to detect and eliminate any foreign objects attached to them; and a third would provide the means to destroy attacking satellites once identified.
34. High-altitude nuclear detonations (HAND) also worry the US military. Such a threat is increasing rapidly, and is connected to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology. Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) being capable of lifting a small nuclear warhead to high altitudes detonating a low-yield nuclear device at high altitude is feasible not only for the major nuclear powers, but also for India, Pakistan and so-called "rogue states" such as Iran or North Korea³⁸.
35. For the latter countries in particular such an option may be very tempting, as it would greatly disrupt the United States' overwhelming information superiority and considerably complicate any attempt to attack them. One cannot rule out either the possibility of an accident which may, for example, come in the form of an unauthorised launch of a Russian missile, a prospect that is possible, given the current status of maintenance of that country's nuclear arsenal. The same result might also occur, for instance, if a terrorist group tried to hijack a Russian missile silo. HAND could also occur due to a malfunction and premature detonation of an Indian or Pakistani warhead, during a conflict between the two states, or more formally it could happen deliberately as the first step of a nuclear confrontation³⁹.
36. The problem with HAND is that it could not be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation, as such a response would be entirely disproportionate from the point of view of its victim. It is therefore possible for any country possessing even a single warhead and missile to credibly threaten to use it in such a way. Space weapons however, are not the only way to counter such a scenario. It is true that orbital bombardment satellites - especially those equipped with lasers − could provide a swift response to such a threat by attacking the missiles on their launch sites or before they reach the desired altitude. But this task could be equally well performed by conventional air strikes and the theatre ABM systems already in place, provided that there is time to deploy them close enough. And if deterrence is difficult with military means, it can always be attained through political measures. Given the fact that HAND will destroy almost all LEO satellites indiscriminately, the country that perpetrates it will have to face the justified outcry of the entire international community. Such a course of action could not be very tempting, even for a "rogue state".
37. Finally, the use of earth-based ASAT weapons is also considered to be a threat that might justify space weaponisation. These weapons are available to several countries, but again US officials seem particularly anxious about China's progress in the field of the relevant laser technologies. Nevertheless, weaponisation is not unavoidable in this case either. Indeed there are a number of solutions that could be proposed before weaponisation. These include shielding and hardening satellites enough to survive an attack; equipping them with self-defence electronic countermeasure systems, similar to those used on aircraft; improving their stealth characteristics; enabling them to perform sustained evasive manoeuvres against incoming threats; and as a last resort, attack against ASAT installations with conventional means⁴⁰.
38. In conclusion, countering any of the existing or near future ASAT threats does not necessarily demand the use of space weapons. On the contrary, there are much cheaper, technologically less risky and operationally equally effective ways to deal with them.

39. The latest debate on US space weaponisation plans began in 2001 with the publication of the Rumsfeld Commission Report on US space security policy⁴¹. This Commission was chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, who was soon to become US Defense Secretary, and included an overwhelming majority of retired high-ranking USAF officers, its purpose being to investigate the United States' overall space security structure, report on its deficiencies and propose ways to rectify them. In its findings the Commission concluded that space interests should be recognised as a top US national security priority, that the US Government was not militarily prepared to deal with a possible space aggression and that the expansion of conflicts into space was historically inevitable⁴².
40. According to the Commission's findings, the fact that the United States is more heavily dependent on its inherently vulnerable space assets than any other nation makes it a lucrative target for a potential aggressor, to whom it gives an asymmetric military advantage. One of its most publicised comments was that the US was so unprepared to deal with this threat that it faced a possible "space Pearl Harbour"⁴³. Consequently, while recognising that the peaceful use of space remained a national interest, the Commission called for the development of "the means to defer and defend against hostile acts directed at US space assets and against the uses of space hostile to US interests"⁴⁴. This statement, coupled with its recommendation to boost weapons development for "power projection in, from and through space" was clearly tantamount to a call for the deployment of weapons in space.
41. The idea that the US should effectively control space is not a new one. Indeed, space superiority has been deemed by every National Space Policy Doctrine issued by every President since Eisenhower to constitute a major US national security interest. The argument on the American side has always been that the deployment of ASAT weapons either on earth or in space serves purely defensive purposes and is not intended for offensive use. The idea that the US alone should dominate near space was based on the fact that it had - and continues to have − by far the largest number of assets in orbit, and hence a greater strategic interest in protecting them than any other nation in the world. Indeed, the official US Government position on the subject is that any attack or even interference with US satellites will be considered as an attack on American soil, and hence as a casus belli⁴⁵.
42. However, the Rumsfeld Commission went a step further by insinuating that the US should expand the notion of space control to include the task of force application. This means in practical terms deploying space weapons that would seek out actively and destroy any threat to US satellites from either earth or space before it had the chance to reach its targets. This in itself implies the use of armed satellites not only against incoming ASATs, but also against their launch sites on the planet's surface. It therefore includes weapons that have inherent offensive and first-strike capabilities, thus qualitatively changing the notion of space supremacy to space dominance, and creating a new strategic environment.
43. The Rumsfeld report triggered a heated public debate within the US political, defence, industrial and academic establishment, on whether the US should proceed with such weaponisation plans. This debate strongly resembles that of the mid-1980s on President Reagan's SDI. In fact, we find the same opinion groupings now as then, often with the same advocates. One could say that the current debate is considered by weaponisation supporters to be a second chance to convince people of the merits of their case.
44. Opinions are currently divided into four camps that transcend the American establishment horizontally and find supporters across the whole professional and political spectrum. Each camp is characterised by its answer not only to the question of whether space should be weaponised, but also to what extent and for what purpose, and under what conditions. These camps could be described as the Space Hawks, Inevitable Weaponisers, Weaponisation Realists and Space Doves. The first two agree on weaponisation, whereas the other two do not; but all four do so for different reasons and see things from different perspectives⁴⁶.
45. Space Hawks treat weaponisation as inevitable. They see it as the perfect means for the US to assert its global economic and political influence and become a kind of space regulator for the protection of its allies and to the detriment of its enemies⁴⁷. They refuse to treat space any differently to the other warfighting mediums of sea, air and land. On the contrary, they believe that all the classic geopolitical principles should apply to it. As a result, they draw on existing political science theories to strengthen their case for weaponisation. They are particularly attracted by Wallerstein's neo-Marxist concept of a circular motion in the rise and fall of hegemonic powers that have historically dominated the capitalist system⁴⁸. They argue that if the US is to maintain its present omnipotent "hyperpower" status, it will be obliged to aggressively dominate space and keep that privilege for itself, patronising all other nations that wish to operate in it⁴⁹.
46. Space Hawks frequently compare the importance of near space for world trade and economy with that of the earth's oceans⁵⁰. And they naturally want to see the US playing the same role in space as on Earth, with its powerful "deep water" Navy: regulating and securing economic activities on its own, but for the benefit of the entire capitalist system. In their eyes, America's hegemonic status today obliges it to assume responsibility for weaponising space. Understandably, they ferociously oppose any measures that would restrict US freedom to use its space weapons whenever it deems necessary.
47. Inevitable Weaponisers share the pragmatic and slightly cynical views of Space Hawks. The difference is that they feel that weaponisation will occur, not because the US has some greater historical responsibility, but simply because it would be operationally profitable to do so. They believe that space as a medium in itself is perfect for achieving global power projection and control⁵¹. They feel that the US should seize the opportunity to dominate it now that it has a technological and economic advantage over its strategic adversaries such as the EU, Russia and China. They warn that failure to weaponise will only invite other nations to do so, as soon as they catch up with the US in technological capabilities⁵². The Rumsfeld Commission is considered to adhere to this line of thought.
48. Inevitable Weaponisers also acknowledge the operational sense of placing weapons in orbit. They see them in particular as a panacea for dealing with today's major ASAT threats, such as accidental or intentional high altitude nuclear detonations. They underline the ABM role of space weapons and claim that their deployment will render all other strategic armaments obsolete. They are particularly concerned about the increasing US dependence on space assets and feel that for this reason they could be the ideal target of an asymmetric attack. In other words, weaponisation is seen as the only possible way to prevent US space dominance from being turned from a tactical military advantage into a strategic liability⁵³.
49. Contrary to Space Hawks, Inevitable Weaponisers do not reject the possibility of space arms control and cooperation⁵⁴. They are not opposed to confidence-building measures in space to promote strategic stability. However, they prefer to examine such measures on a bilateral, rather than multilateral basis. They favour arrangements that would slow down and channel military space competition, but not entirely halt it. They are particularly suspicious of disarmament agreements, which they think are designed only to prevent the US from exploiting its present military space advantage. On the contrary, they support the use of space weapons for force application and wish to see them eventually replacing their terrestrial counterparts. In short, they seek to turn such use into common military practice and relieve it of any political taboos attached to it⁵⁵.
50. Militarisation Realists do not criticise the pragmatism of the previous points of view. They simply claim that the best way to serve US national space interests is to maintain the status quo that is extremely favourable to them. In this respect, they stress that any US effort to weaponise space will probably trigger an arms race in space⁵⁶. They claim that by exploring the relevant technologies, the US will eventually make space weapons available to their adversaries and that by demonstrating their usefulness they will encourage other states to develop their own. They say that by depending on them, they will invite rather than deter a surprise attack in space⁵⁷. In conclusion, they believe that the US has the most to lose from weaponisation, and that it should therefore avoid and discourage it.
51. Militarisation Realists also doubt the overall operational usefulness of space weapons by comparison with existing terrestrial ones. They do not deny the advantages that could be derived from their deployment, but believe rather that there are easier and − more importantly − cheaper ways to reduce the vulnerability of space assets. They claim that there are many passive and politically less provocative defensive measures that should be considered before weaponisation⁵⁸. These are already discussed to some extent in this report, as they constitute the most consistent anti-weaponisation arguments.
52. Furthermore, Militarisation Realists do not believe that space force application has anything to offer either. Their view is that offensive operations against earth-based ASATs can be adequately carried out by the air force and that deep-strike missions can be conducted with conventionally armed ICBMs or IRBMs. In conclusion, they feel that only the deployment of enemy space weapons would necessitate a US response in kind. But they believe that such a possibility seems fairly remote at the moment, and that in any case it could again be countered by existing earth-based ASATs⁵⁹.
53. Finally, Space Doves include a wide range of scientists and non-governmental organisations which are not only opposed to any form of weaponisation, but are also vigilant about keeping existing space capabilities as little militarised as possible. Their stand on the subject is that any attempt to weaponise space will have profound destabilising consequences. They insist on the fact that - unlike nuclear armaments − space weapons will create a strategic imbalance that will encourage first-strike thoughts. They also underline that it would be irrational to overthrow the strategic logic of the peaceful use of space, now that the cold war is over. As one might expect, they are particularly attached to the notion of a comprehensive and complete ban on any weapons in space, through international agreements⁶⁰.
54. No matter which point of view on space weaponisation proves to be right, one thing is certain: if they are deployed, the world will not be the same. Having examined the different views on the subject, we find that the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Weaponisation is far from being unavoidable; in fact, as we have seen, it is the least practical way of dealing with space vulnerabilities. But neither is it likely to cause a response in kind from other major powers. The space capabilities gap between the US and the rest of the world is so great that an arms race in space seems unlikely. The precedent of nuclear armaments testifies to this effect: several countries that are technologically capable of acquiring nuclear weapons have chosen, for strategic reasons, not to. What is more, the Soviet Union, which directly competed with the US in this field for ideological purposes, is now financially ruined.
55. It is also clear that Russia and China will avoid making that same mistake. These two countries have already taken a clear stand in favour of a comprehensive international treaty that will ban space weapons for ever. They seem determined to avert weaponisation through legal and political means and by promoting multilateral understanding on this issue⁶¹. This could easily change, however, if US weapons are deployed. Strategic realities and military considerations will call for some kind of measured response from their part.
56. One foreseeable reaction would be to upgrade their existing earth-based ASAT capabilities. Russia has made considerable progress in the development of EMP Weapons, and China in laser and micro satellite-related projects⁶². One could imagine that they might even cooperate in this area by exchanging technologies, so that each of them acquires full spectrum ASAT capabilities. Understandably, the development of Chinese ASATs will not leave India or Japan indifferent. These two countries also will be induced to acquire their own ASATs. Any Indian acquisition will automatically provoke a Pakistani response in kind, which in its turn will give birth to Iranian suspicions. In short, any developing nation that has, or aspires to have, space assets will be forced to think about procuring ASATs as well.
57. All the evidence therefore seems to indicate that space weaponisation will not create an arms race in orbit, but on earth. Within the next decade ASAT weapons will begin to come out of the closet and become recognised as a legitimate means of defence against aggressive US satellites. In fact, one can foresee that ASAT weapons proliferation will become a major international problem, similar to nuclear proliferation today. Ever increasing space activities will render even the modest ASATs strategically important, in the same way as nuclear weapons are. Countries that currently have rudimentary ASATs, such as nuclear armed IRBMs, will engage in developing more sophisticated ones. Others that never imagined acquiring them will begin to think about it. Subsequently, the development and use of ASATs will be trivialised.
58. Consequently, space armaments will create exactly the opposite of their declared objectives. With weapons deployed in it, near space will become more hostile as an operating environment than ever before. Satellites will become more complicated and expensive, as their design will have to incorporate measures to protect against ASAT attacks; space insurance prices will soar⁶³; and because ASAT use is easily deniable by its perpetrators, suspicion among space powers will reach unprecedented levels, to the detriment of international cooperation on peaceful space exploration. The space industry will inevitably suffer and, ironically, since the US has the biggest space industrial sector in the world, it will be the hardest hit⁶⁴.
59. The European Union has every interest in averting such a catastrophic outcome. Its space industry is the second most highly developed in the world, and it too will be severely affected by the grim conditions that weaponisation will create. It might even suffer the most, because it is even more dependent on commercial space activities than its US counterpart. The American industry is currently widely supported by huge government contracts. In the absence of such a policy in Europe, European industries are counting increasingly for their survival on dual-purpose commercial contracts. If private investors are scared off by weaponisation, the entire space industrial sector, and even the European Space Agency itself, will be confronted with serious financial difficulties⁶⁵.
60. Furthermore, the EU could unwittingly be caught in the crossfire of any space confrontation. We should recall that China recently joined the Galileo Constellation satellite positioning programme and has gained full access to its use⁶⁶. If, in a time of crisis, China chooses to use it for military purposes, it would automatically make it a legitimate target for US space weapons. Consequently, even a skirmish in space, triggered by a minor incident in the Taiwan straits, might very well lead to the loss of several Galileo satellites and endanger multibillion euro investments.

61. The EU cannot remain indifferent in the face of such risks. It is obliged to take measures that will anticipate the deployment of US space weapons. One major step in this direction would be to increase its own space control capabilities and improve the survivability of its satellites.
62. Increasing space control capabilities would not necessarily mean deploying its own weapons. But it does involve considerably upgrading space surveillance and situational awareness apparatus which today is very limited. The considerable efforts made in that direction by EU member states and ESA will have to be coordinated and accelerated⁶⁷. The goal should be to create an integrated European Space Surveillance Network that will provide constant, near real time data on the position of all satellites - ours and theirs. Such a system would be dual purpose: for civilian purposes it could keep track of satellites and help to avert collisions in space; for military purposes it could verify the proper functioning of its assets, identify approaching hostile satellites and monitor the deployment of space weapons. In the future and as a last resort it might also provide targeting coordinates for earth-based ASATs.
63. Today the EU has recognised the importance of earth surveillance satellites for security and is actively searching to acquire them with its GMES project⁶⁸. What is less well understood, however, is that its control over these valuable assets will be nominal for as long as it cannot monitor them from earth. A space surveillance system should normally be the prerequisite for the deployment of any space asset in the security field. The US realised this a long time ago and is the only country in the world to operate and constantly upgrade such a system. In short, surveillance of space is at least as important for security reasons as surveillance from it.
64. It must be made clear that the acquisition of such a system by the EU would in no way be intended to compete with the US in this area. On the contrary, the EU space surveillance system should be seen as complementary to its American counterpart, in very much the same way as the Galileo Constellation will be operating alongside the existing GPS, the idea being that two systems are better than one, and in this sense even the US Government would support its creation. On the other hand, having an alternative source of information on near space will work in favour of international cooperation. It will probably also allay Russian and Chinese fears that the US might take advantage of its current monopolistic position in order to discriminate against them when it comes to disseminating the relevant information. Indeed, those two countries might even be invited to participate in the European programme from the outset.
65. In any event, such a system would demonstrate the EU's determination to protect its space assets in the face of rising new threats. Without such a system, a potential aggressor would feel able to tamper with, or even effectively destroy EU satellites and get away with it. In the presence of such a system, it would be aware of the risk of being caught red-handed and having to face the consequences of its actions. Clearly, the very existence of a space surveillance system constitutes a major step for deterring any potential aggressor.
66. In addition to this, simpler, complementary measures could be taken to enable EU space assets to withstand the consequences of attacks. These have been mentioned above⁶⁹ and include:

67. One cannot over-emphasise the importance of these precautionary measures. It is unquestionable that any satellite launched in the future that is not invested with such capabilities will not be dependable. It is true that they are costly and that their development will involve an unprecedented level of industrial and operational cooperation among European countries. But their costs are minor compared with the overall costs of deploying and using space assets.
68. Making satellites that can survive the hostile operating environment that space weaponisation will create requires a change of policy on the part of European nations. They can no longer maintain space assets development and acquisition based solely on the market. Building expensive counter-measures with no commercial value is not something a businessman would easily agree to. It is entirely up to the public sector to assume the responsibility for securing the survivability of dual-use satellites against ASATs. This is particularly the case for the EU, since − contrary to the US − it will be relying entirely on dual-use systems to meet its military and security requirements. An increase of EU member states' space budgets and closer cooperation between the EU security institutions and the European Space Agency would be the first steps in the right direction.

69. Space weaponisation advocates base their arguments on one major technical assumption: that space is the ultimate high ground and that consequently any weapons placed in it will be undefeatable from earth⁷¹. No matter how tempting this assumption may seem, it is fundamentally flawed. Yes, space weapons could use gravity to their advantage; since they could strike down at their adversaries which may struggle to overcome the effects of gravity⁷². However, whether we like it or not, weapons placed in orbit will have to abide by the same laws of physics as any satellite. This means they will have to follow fixed, predetermined orbital paths, which are highly predictable. A determined adversary could use such an advantage. As a result, even the most advanced space weapons will resemble old-fashioned fixed fortifications⁷³. Weaponisation advocates would have us think that this makes them perfect for force projection, as they could hold the entire planet under siege indefinitely⁷⁴. But if we look at history, we realise that enemies seldom do us the favour of attacking strongly fortified positions head on. An intelligent opponent would choose to bypass them.
70. This will inevitably be the case with space weapons. Adversaries will most likely resort to indirect approaches and asymmetric measures to counterbalance the United States' overwhelming space superiority. This will involve migrating key installations underground; applying concealment and deception techniques; improving space surveillance capabilities; and creating more robust and mobile earth-based ASATs⁷⁵. Such relatively cheap countermeasures can render multibillion dollar space weapons investments irrelevant.
71. Finally, advocates of space weaponisation like to present it as the inescapable course of history. They claim that just as the 20^th century saw the rise of air power, the 21^st will witness the rise of space power⁷⁶. Nothing can be more deceptive than this assumption. At the beginning of the previous century the aeroplane was nothing more than an experimental scientific rarity. The first world war forged it into a weapon. At the beginning of the aecond world war, it was primarily used for air supremacy but by the end it had developed into a truly strategic armament. Throughout history, the development of air power has been driven by necessity. Its purpose each time has been to put a swift end to a long and bloody war. Space power, on the contrary, is inherently offensive and is developed during peacetime. Air power was clearly conceived as a means for finishing wars; in contrast, space power's main consequence may be its capacity to start them.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Sources

II. Official Reports and Documents

III. Books and Publications

IV. Articles

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¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 16 May 2006.

² Adopted by the Assembly on 21 June 2006 at the 4^th sitting.

³ SCOTT William B, War games Underscore Value of Space Assets for Military Ops, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 28 April 1997, p.60.

⁴ FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, Ensuring America's Space Security: Report of the FAS panel on Weapons in Space, Washington DC, FAS, September 2004, p.11.

⁵ LAMBETH Benjamin S, Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space, Santa Monica, RAND Corp, 2003, p.97.

⁶ Ibid, p.120.

LEWIS Jeffrey, What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios, Center for Defence Information, Washington DC, July 2004, p.15.

⁷ ISSLER Gordon D, Space Warfare meets Information Warfare, Joint Force Quarterly, autumn 2000, p.100.

⁸ SCOTT William B, CINCSPACE Wants Attack Detectors on Satellites, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 28 April 1997.

⁹ For an exhaustive account of all US space weapons officially under development, see: LEWIS Jeffrey, Lift-Off for Space Weapons? Implications of the Department of Defence's 2004 Budget Request for Space Weaponization, Center for International and Security Studies, Maryland, University of Maryland, July 2003.

¹⁰ For a history of space militarisation, see: STARES Paul B, The Militarization of Space: US Policy, 1945-1984, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1985.

¹¹ Federation of American Scientists, Ensuring America's Security... p.9.

¹² PRESTON Bob, JOHNSON Dana, EDWARDS Sean, MILLER Michael and SHIPBAUGH Calvin, Space Weapons Earth Wars, Santa Monica, RAND Corp, 2002, p.9.

¹³ For a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon see: FAS, Ensuring America's Security, Appendix C, pp.82-92.

¹⁴ Article 4 of the Treaty.

¹⁵ For the text of the latest Resolution (59/65), and all relevant UNGA resolutions since 1948 can be found on the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs internet site www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/gares/index.html.

For a detailed presentation of the space treaties see: DEAN Jonathan, Defences in Space: Treaty Issues, in MOLTZ James Clay ed., Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military and Arms Control Trade-Offs, Occasional Paper No. 10, Monterey Institute for International Studies, Center for Non-proliferation Studies, Monterey.

¹⁶ The first of these satellites, the Polyot Interceptor was tested as early as 1963.

See: PRESTON..., Space Weapons Earth Wars, p.12.

¹⁷ For a detailed description of the Reagan Administration's space policy see:

FITZGERALD Frances, Way out there in the blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the end of the Cold War, New York, Simon and Schuster, 2000

¹⁸ UNITED STATES JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, Washington DC, 2002, p.ix.

¹⁹ Ibid, p.x.

²⁰ Ibid, p.I-2.

²¹ UNITED STATES JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Joint Doctrine, p.I-3 and I-4.

LAMBETH Benjamin S, Mastering..., pp.43-46.

²² PRESTON Bob, Space Weapons Earth Wars, pp.23-24.

²³ FAS, Ensuring America's Security, pp.15-19.

²⁴ Ibid, p.29.

²⁵ PRESTON Bob, Space Weapons Earth Wars, pp.24-21 and also Appendix A, pp.109-129. FAS, Ensuring America's Security, Appendix B, pp.75-81.

DEBLOIS Bruce M, GARVIN Richard L, KEMP Scott and MARWELL Jeremy C, Space Weapons: Crossing the US Rubicon, International Security Vol.29 No.2, MIT Press, Fall 2004, pp.72-74.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ PRESTON Bob, Space Weapons Earth Wars, pp.36-49 and also Appendix B, pp.131-171. FAS, Ensuring America's Security..., Appendix G, pp.141-168.

²⁹ PRESTON Bob, Space Weapons Earth Wars, pp.36-49.

DEBLOIS Bruce M, Space Weapons: Crossing the US Rubicon..., pp.70-71.

³⁰ PRESTON Bob, Space Weapons Earth Wars, pp. 53-54. LAMBETH Benjamin S, Mastering, pp.112-117.

³¹ FAS, Ensuring America's Security pp.15-19.

³² Ibid, Appendix C, pp.82-92.

³³ MOLTZ James Clay ed., Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military and Arms Control Trade-Offs, Occasional Paper No.10, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Non-proliferation Studies, Monterey, p.41.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ MOLTZ James Clay ed., Future Security in Space, pp.18-22.

³⁶ FAS, Ensuring America's Security ..., pp.30-34 and also Appendix E, pp.96-114.

MOLTZ James Clay ed., Future Security in Space, p.30 and pp.41-43.

³⁷ FAS, Ensuring America's Security ..., pp.15-19 and also Appendix F, p.123.

PENA Charles V and HUDGINS Edward L, Should the United States "Weaponize" Space? Military and Commercial Implications, Policy Analysis No. 427, 18 March 2002, pp.8-9.

³⁸ FAS, Ensuring America's Security..., pp.23-29 and Appendix C, pp.81-91.

UNITED STATES DEFENCE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, High Altitude Nuclear Detonations against Low Earth Orbit Satellites, DTRA Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Washington DC, April 2001.

³⁹ LEWIS Jeffrey, What if Space Were Weaponized?...pp.15-16 and 21-31.

⁴⁰ DEBLOIS Bruce M..., Space Weapons: Crossing the US Rubicon..., pp.77-81. LEWIS, James A, China as a Military Space Competitor, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2004, pp.10-11.

⁴¹ Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Executive Summary, Washington DC, January 2001.

⁴² Report of the Commission ..., pp. 9-10.

⁴³ Ibid, p.13.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p.15-16.

⁴⁵ DONNELLY John, Cohen: Attack on US Satellite is Attack on United States, Defence Week, 26 July, 1999.

⁴⁶ MOLTZ James Clay ed., Future Security in Space..., pp.32-34.

⁴⁷ DOLMAN Everett Carl, Space Power and US Hegemony: Maintaining a Liberal World Order in the 21^st

⁴⁸ DOLMAN Everett Carl, Space Power and US Hegemony..., pp.16-23.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ PENA Charles V and HUDGINS Edward L, Should United States "Weaponize" Space?...p.4.

⁵¹ MOLTZ James Clay ed., Future Security in Space..., pp.23-27 and 32-34.

⁵² LOGSDON John M, Reflections on Space as a vital National Interest, Astropolitics Is.No.1, 2003, pp.12-18.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ MOLTZ James Clay ed., Future Security in Space..., pp.23-27 and 32-34.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ MOLTZ James Clay ed., Future Security in Space..., pp.23-27 and 32-34..

⁵⁷ FAS, Ensuring America's Security..., pp.5-6 and 41-44.

For an excellent essay of this point of view, see: O'HANLON Michael, Preserving US Dominance While Slowing the Weaponization of Space, The Brookings Institution, Maryland, May 2003.

⁵⁸ For a comprehensive presentation of such steps, see: COYLE Philip E and RHINELANDER John B, Drawing the Line: the Path to Controlling Weapons in Space, Disarmament Diplomacy Issue No.66, September 2002.

RUHM Brian C, Finding the Middle Ground: the US Air Force, Space Weaponization and Arms Control, USAF Air University, Alabama, April 2003.

⁵⁹ FAS, Ensuring America's Security..., pp.5-6

LAMBETH also makes the same argument, but with considerable ambiguity; see: LAMBETH Benjamin S, Mastering..., pp.117-120.

⁶⁰ MOLTZ James Clay ed., Future Security in Space..., pp.28-31.

JOHNSON Rebecca, Multilateral Approaches to Preventing the Weaponisation of Space, Disarmament Diplomacy Issue No.56, April 2001.

HITCHENS Theresa, US Space Policy: Time to Stop and Think, Disarmament Diplomacy Issue No. 67, October-November 2002.

⁶¹ MOLTZ James Clay ed., Future Security in Space..., pp.44-50 and 54-57.

⁶² UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, China's Space Program: an Overview,

⁶³ MOLTZ James Clay ed., Future Security in Space..., p.31.

⁶⁴ Ibid, pp.9-10.

⁶⁵ MOLTZ James Clay ed., Future Security in Space..., pp.58-60.

⁶⁶ LEWIS, James A, China as a Military Space Competitor..., p.2.

⁶⁷ KLINKRAD H, Monitoring Space-Efforts Made by European Countries, European Space Agency, ESOC, Darmstadt.

⁶⁸ EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Communication of the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament, European Space Policy: Preliminary findings, Brussels, 23 May 2005, p.8.

⁶⁹ See part IV.

⁷⁰ MOLTZ James Clay ed., Future Security in Space, p.12.

⁷¹ E.g. this view is repeated constantly in: LAMBETH Benjamin S, Mastering...

⁷² DOLMAN Everett Carl, Space Power and US Hegemony..., pp.7-8.

⁷³ MOLTZ James Clay ed., Future Security in Space, p.29.

⁷⁴ DOLMAN Everett Carl, Space Power and US Hegemony, p.7.

⁷⁵ PRESTON Bob, Space Weapons Earth Wars, pp.81-82.

⁷⁶ LAMBETH Benjamin S, Mastering, pp.164-166.