DOCUMENT A/1936

20 June 2006

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Public opinion and the Althea mission one year on

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Document A/1936

20 June 2006

Public opinion and the Althea mission one year on

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations
by Milos Budin, Rapporteur (Italy, Socialist Group)

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RECOMMENDATION 777²

on public opinion and the Althea mission one year on

(i) Noting that the EUFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the Assembly has monitored from its inception, is in the process of achieving its aim of establishing the necessary conditions for rebuilding the country's democratic institutions;

(ii) Welcoming this ESDP achievement, which illustrates the positive results of a common commitment by the EU member states to create a system for guaranteeing the security of this region as a whole;

(iii) Concerned about European public opinion, which is increasingly preoccupied by socio-economic problems in the countries of the Union and inclined to forget that a common security policy is the foundation for any development,

1. Step up their efforts to raise awareness about the aims and achievements of the ESDP, focusing on the crucial need to put in place a common security and defence system as an essential basis for socio-economic development in Europe;
2. Make information on external military action and about the tangible results achieved in terms of rebuilding the civil institutions of the countries concerned clearer and more accessible to the public at large;
3. Draw the attention of the citizens of candidate countries to the importance of establishing a common security policy in Europe before embarking on future enlargement projects, given that the efforts to build a common area must necessarily apply to a stable and coherent region;
4. Urge the defence ministers to launch an information campaign to promote awareness of and support for armed forces training and the programmes for adapting them to the new tasks that are required for ESDP missions.

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Milos Budin, Rapporteur (Italy, Socialist Group)

1. In the report submitted by Mr Crema on "Parliaments and the Althea mission" in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Assembly Document 1911, Resolution 128 and Order 121 approved by the Assembly on 7 December 2005), the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations drew attention to the gap that exists between political and military decision-making on the mission within the European Union and the poor level of monitoring of operations within national parliaments, despite the fact that it is they that have been and continue to be responsible for the spending and political decisions that are taken. The report underlined that it is not only parliaments which have been kept at one remove from how the mission is going, but also European public opinion, which has shown little interest in it: indeed, there has been a significant communications shortfall and surveys do not even mention this aspect of common action in Europe.
2. This situation prompted the Committee to consider the fact that EU military intervention of this kind still seems remote, managed from the top and imposed from the outside by conditions on the spot and our obligations under international agreements. Indeed, in none of the official documents and declarations or political and military commentaries has there been any analysis of the impact on the local population of Operation Althea, which in addition to being an undoubted military success has been a conclusive test of the ESDP.
3. This first EU presence in the Balkans has been the work of the Union's armed forces, whose peace-enforcement action has paved the way for rebuilding democratic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) within the framework of the regional stabilisation process and with a view to the country's future EU accession. It is the first time that those armed forces have seen action to guarantee the democratic development of a potential future member state. It is interesting to consider what impact Operation Althea has had on the implementation of programmes under the Dayton Agreements and on the policy of the successive High Representatives. Has attention been drawn in the dialogue with civil society to the European presence that is behind the military mission and what has been the reaction of the Bosniacs, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and other minorities? Has the local population truly reached a state of ethnic tolerance and is it ready to live according to the values of the societies which make up the European Union? Or has it not yet moved on from its state of military occupation under Althea: has civil society, in other words, resolved its conflicts?
4. In Europe, we have often seen that common institutions cannot develop if citizens are not convinced of the validity and goals of the Union. This is all the more true for a country which has been torn by divisions amongst its people or rather, peoples. Such a country can never function as long as the conflicts remain latent. Moreover, it would be a constant element of instability in the very heart of the EU and affect neighbouring countries which are also in the process of rebuilding their democratic foundations with a view to joining the Union.
5. In order to better understand the reality of this issue, the Committee went to Sarajevo on 23 and 24 March 2006. It met with members of the Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament on Defence and Security Policy and Oversight of State-Level Defence and Security Structures of BiH, as well as with the Foreign Affairs Committees of both Houses of Parliament, the Joint Committee on European Integration, the Security Minister, Barisa Colak, the EUFOR Commander, General Gian Marco Chiarini, and with representatives from the civil sector and the media.
6. The Bosnian participants expressed little opposition to the international troop presence, emphasising rather EUFOR's achievements and in particular its ability to conduct operations alongside the domestic authorities, as well as to win the confidence and support of the general public. NATO's continuing dominance in security matters was highlighted, as was EUFOR's role in helping BiH shift from stabilisation towards integration, economic reform, investment and a more flexible visa policy. Parliamentarians were, however, opposed to the involvement of the military forces in public order tasks, a point which was also criticised by EU member states and EUPM. Instead they suggested that EUFOR should have a supporting role and closely coordinate missions with the Bosnian authorities, so as to enable the establishment of sound local institutions. All stressed however, that even though the security situation remained stable, EUFOR's presence would remain necessary until BiH was admitted into NATO. Some parliamentarians noted dissatisfaction with the slowness of NATO and EU integration but nonetheless acclaimed that process as the motivating factor behind tri-ethnic cooperation in restructuring the police, army and Constitution. With regard to police reform, members of the Foreign Affairs Committee underlined the importance of settling ongoing border disputes with both Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia, so as to allow effective policing of BiH's territory and cooperation with the State Border Service (SBS). Concerning army restructuring, the Committee on Defence and Security, Police and Oversight of State-Level Defence and Security Structures emphasised the need to resolve the issue of demobilised soldiers, only 25% of whom had been successfully integrated into society through small business opportunities. The Committee on European Integration expressed reservations regarding the method of constitutional reform, claiming that it was undemocratic and lacking transparency and public involvement. Similarly, representatives from the civil sector demanded less bargaining behind the scenes and less bureaucracy, together with improved educational and employment opportunities.

7. The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP)/Dayton Peace Agreement signed on 14 December 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, called on all parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Croatia to "respect each others' sovereignty, maintain the cease-fire, withdraw military forces to prescribed lines of separation, approve a new constitution and hold presidential and legislative elections"³. It unified Sarajevo under a central government and established two separate Entities − the Republika Srpska (RS) composed of Bosnian Serbs and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) composed of Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats − with autonomous political, administrative, defence and constitutional structures. A Prism research project conducted in September 2005, indicated that 47.5% of participants considered that Dayton was essential for ending the conflict but that energy should be invested in altering this constitutional arrangement, an argument supported by 63.2% of Bosniacs, 43.7% of Bosnian Croats and 28.6% of Bosnian Serbs. Nonetheless, 41.5% of Bosnian Serbs viewed Dayton as a positive agreement that should not be changed⁴.
8. In March 1999, the Brcko Arbitration Tribunal announced its Final Award, giving the city the status of an independent self-governing district⁵. This fragmented structure was placed under the authority of the United Nations-mandated Office of the High Representative (OHR), which was created pursuant to the Framework Agreement and began operations in Sarajevo in January 1996. It was tasked, as a priority, with preparing, conducting and supervising elections. The first general elections in BiH were held on 14 September 1996⁶. It assisted in 1996 and 1997 with the establishment of a number of structures, including the Open Broadcast Network (OBN), BiH's primary independent cross-entity television network (7 September 1996), the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina (11 August 1997) and the BiH Constitutional Court (August 1997). In November 1997, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) gave the OHR expanded powers − the highly controversial "Bonn powers" − with the intention of more efficiently implementing elements of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
9. The first EU/World Bank Donors' Conference for BiH held in Brussels on 20-21 December 1995 launched a $5.1 billion Priority Reconstruction Programme. April 1996 marked the second EU/World Bank Donors' Conference, which pledged $1.3 billion. The third and fourth Donors' Conferences in July 1997 and May 1998 each pledged $1.24 billion and the fifth, in May 1999, $1.05 billion⁷. Since the end of the war the EU's assistance to BiH through its PHARE, OBNOVA and CARDS programmes has totalled nearly €2.6 billion. Since 2001, the main source of EU assistance to BiH has been the CARDS Assistance Programme amounting to €375 million, including €49.4 million approved in 2005. BiH has also benefited from a regional CARDS programme with an overall budget of €40.4 million in 2005. In 2006, the European Commission is transferring the responsibility for allocating funds under the CARDS programme to the BiH authorities⁸.
10. In December 1995, the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) replaced UNPROFOR in BiH, with the mandate to implement the military aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) as opposed to merely maintaining a ceasefire. A year later IFOR handed over its duties to the NATO Stabilisation Force, SFOR (Operations Joint Guard and Joint Forge). The first IFOR deployment to BiH consisted of nearly 60 000 troops, while the replacement forces that arrived on 20 December 1996 were only 32 000 strong⁹. The level of military involvement in BiH was again significantly reduced in 2002 to 12 000 and in 2004 to roughly 7 000 troops.
11. On 7 May 1997, the first international war crimes trial since Nuremberg and Tokyo began at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. The defendant was a Bosnian Serb prison camp guard, Dusan Tadic, who was sentenced in January 2000 to 20 years' imprisonment. On 6 October 1997, 10 Bosnian Croats indicted for war crimes were amongst the first wartime suspects to surrender to the ICTY¹⁰. On 30 October 2003, donors raised €15.7 million to establish the War Crimes Chamber in the BiH Court, which began operations on 9 March 2005¹¹.
12. In June 2000, the Feira European Council stated that its objective remained the "fullest possible integration of the countries of the western Balkans" and in April 2002 BiH joined the Council of Europe. In June 2003, the Thessaloniki Declaration reconfirmed that the future of the western Balkans, including BiH, lay within the European Union. At the same time it announced its intention to strengthen the Stabilisation and Association process (SAP) by introducing new instruments to accelerate BiH reform, including European Partnership in June 2004 and the launch of a Feasibility Study in November 2003, as agreed by the European Commission. Six Consultative Task Force (CTF) meetings have been held¹² in order to monitor progress on the Feasibility Study's 12 priorities. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement negotiations with BiH commenced in November 2005 following police reforms.
13. The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) is the first ever EU civilian crisis-management operation under the ESDP. It was launched on 1 January 2003, in BiH, with a three-year mandate to follow on from the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF) that had been in place since December 1995. Although the EUPM does not have an executive mandate or perform operational duties, its principal aim is to achieve sustainable multi-ethnic policing arrangements¹³. Following the decision to wind up SFOR announced at the NATO Istanbul Summit on 28 June 2004, the EU expressed its readiness to supply a second mission to BiH. The EU Military Forces (EUFOR) took over from NATO forces on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1551, adopted on 9 July 2004. The European Council, through its Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP adopted on 12 July 2004, approved the some 7 000-strong military operation in BiH in the framework of its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)¹⁴.
14. In October 2004, following the first municipal elections to be held in accordance with international standards (and which were entirely financed and organised by the BiH authorities) the HR announced his decision to withdraw the international members from the country's Election Commission in April 2005. Nonetheless, the Council of Europe's Venice Commission deemed the elections to the Presidency and House of Peoples to be incompatible with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, an issue that was outlined but unresolved by the 2003 Feasibility Study. In November 2005, the three members of BiH's Presidency agreed in Washington to "start a process of constitutional reform aimed at strengthening the powers of the state authorities, and which should define the work of the parliament and the state Presidency". They pledged to adopt the constitutional reforms by March 2006, ahead of the country's general elections in October 2006 ¹⁵.

1. Relations between the EU and BiH

15. In early 2005, BiH endeavoured to speed up the negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), but the transition was thwarted by its failure to meet two criteria from the EC's November 2003 Feasibility Study: (i) police reform, with Republic Srpska causing a stalemate and (ii) the passing of public broadcasting legislation in line with European standards, due to demands from Bosnian Croats for an exclusive Croatian-language television channel¹⁶. Once sufficient progress had been made with these criteria, in particular political agreement on the three principles of police reform, Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, in a speech entitled BiH: Moving Closer to Europe¹⁷, formally announced on 25 November 2005 − in time for the tenth anniversary of GFAP − the beginning of the SAA negotiations between BiH and the EU.
16. The first round of SAA negotiations between the EU and BiH began in Sarajevo on 25 January 2006 with a discussion about BiH cooperation with the EU and south-eastern Europe, EU financial support for the country and an optimistic deadline of twelve months for the completion of the SAA process. The next round of talks, which focused on the issue of free trade, took place on 17 March 2006¹⁸. BiH is the last former Yugoslav republic to begin establishing an official relationship with the EU: Slovenia became a fully-fledged member of the Union in May 2004, Croatia began entry talks in October 2005, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was granted official EU candidate status in late 2005 and Serbia-Montenegro started its SAA negotiations in November 2005¹⁹. A survey conducted by the Balkan Monitor and International IDEA indicates that although the EU enjoys a high level of support at regional level, with the highest ratings in Kosovo (72.1%), and is the most trusted international institution in Serbia (30.8%), it is least trusted in Republika Srpska (8%)²⁰. However, research conducted by Prism²¹ in August and September 2005 illustrates a tremendous level of trust in EU institutions by the three constituent peoples. When confronted with the statement that "the best solution would be to shut down the government, state and Entity parliaments and introduce experts from the EU", 48.9% of Bosniacs, 44 % of Bosnian Serbs and 37.5% of Bosnian Croats agreed, while 27.8%, 45.6% and 37.4% respectively disagreed. The overwhelming support among Bosniacs for the EU institutions can be linked to two central political aims: less devolution of authority to Republica Srpska and reducing the likelihood of separatist claims on the part of the Bosnian Croats within the Federation.
17. According to the July 2005 Public Opinion Poll in Bosnia and Herzegovina about the European Union²² conducted by the European Commission Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 85.2% of citizens, with the greatest support from Bosniacs, would vote for BiH membership of the EU if there were to be a referendum on the subject. A majority of BiH citizens are not satisfied with the slow pace of EU integration, with roughly 40% describing the process as being at a standstill. While 61.7% of citizens believe that BiH will earn membership through reforms, 31% perceive accession as being determined by the political will of the EU member states. Importantly, the EU is perceived primarily as a means for establishing a brighter future for young people, a statement most strongly supported by Bosniacs but least by Bosnian Croats. Respondents were more sceptical about accession improving the economy or creating jobs. More than 65% of respondents associate EU citizenship with the right to move permanently to or work in any EU member state.
18. According to the December 2005 Eurobarometer 64²³ survey of public opinion in the European Union, 49% of respondents in the 25 member states support further enlargement of the European Union in future years, while 39% are against it. Public opinion on enlargement is volatile and there are considerable variations among member states, with Greece (74%), Slovenia (74%) and Poland (72%) being the strongest supporters and Austria, Luxembourg, Germany and France showing the highest level of opposition. While support for the accession of Croatia (51%) and Bulgaria (48%) is relatively widespread, public opinion is more divided on Romania, Ukraine, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro. In response to a questionnaire by Gallup and Friends of Europe²⁴ in which over 100 leading European decision-makers and opinion-leaders from national governments were asked "should Europe's political leadership concede that further EU enlargement is a key factor amongst voters, and put the idea of (...) Balkan membership on hold?", 33% of leaders agreed that further EU enlargement was a key factor in voting behaviour and that for this reason Balkan accession should be placed on hold. This finding supports the idea that Balkan membership in the European Union does not depend only on domestic policy reform, but also and above all on the political will of the EU and on the level of support among the citizens of the 25 EU member states.

2. The role of the High Representative

19. The 14 December 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) gave the Office of the High Representative (OHR) the mandate to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement on behalf of the international community, embodied by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and consisting of 55 states and international agencies assisting the peace process²⁵. Following a two-year term by High Representative (HR) Carl Bildt, under a fairly restricted mandate, the November 1997 PIC Conference in Bonn granted the OHR wider authority for implementing the GFAP. These expanded "Bonn powers" include; (i) the authority to impose laws or supersede local authorities if the BiH legislative bodies are unsuccessful and (ii) the removal, suspension and/or sanction of public officials who violate legal commitments and the GFAP²⁶. In 2002, the PIC established the Board of Principals under the chairmanship of the HR in order to coordinate international efforts and avoid overlap. Its permanent members are the OHR, EUFOR, the OSCE, UNHCR, the EUPM and the European Commission, along with international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the UNDP²⁷. In February 2002, the European Union's General Affairs Council (GAC) appointed the HR as the EU Special Representative in BiH (EUSR), with the task of providing advice to the EU Secretary General/High Representative and the European Commission²⁸.
20. Under HR Carlos Westendorp (1997-1999) the Bonn powers were used mainly for establishing the elementary foundations of the state, such as identity symbols and integrationist legislation (citizenship law, the flag, the national anthem, currency and licence plates), and for removing local officials who obstructed the return of refugees or various other reforms²⁹. Under HR Wolfgang Petritsch (1999-2002) they were used to establish new state institutions (e.g. the State Border Service), introduce numerous economic reforms (income tax, privatisation and payment systems) and to dismiss certain national politicians (the BiH Finance Minister and a BiH President)³⁰.
21. Under HR Paddy Ashdown (2002-2005) the state-building project with its emphasis on curbing the powers of the Entities became particularly pronounced, leading to frequent confrontations between the OHR and Republica Srpska³¹. In March 2005 the HR removed 59 RS officials due to their failure to support the ICTY, as well as a member of the Presidency due to corruption allegations against him. Public opinion polls have shown that the majority of BiH citizens perceive their politicians to be corrupt and poorly qualified. A UNDP sponsored survey conducted by Prism involving 1 500 respondents suggests this high level of dissatisfaction with "politics as usual". When asked to complete the sentence; "with regard to politics, things in BiH are getting ...," 65.7 % Bosniacs, 54.6% Bosnian Croats and 68.3% Bosnian Serbs answered "worse"³². Moreover, BiH politicians have generally preferred the HR's intrusiveness to losing public support as a result of reforms, while the international community has criticised the protectorate role of the HR, claiming that it "reinforces tendencies of the old Yugoslav political culture − its fondness for the cvrsta ruka (the "strong hand") − while hampering the development of a genuine democratic culture and of local ownership³³. The dismissals of publicly elected officials by the OHR, which has little accountability to the Bosnian public, has been problematic as it has undermined the value of popular suffrage. The newspaper Bosnia Today correctly notes that Paddy Ashdown became very unpopular among the three constituent peoples during his tenure and unified them in opposition. For instance, 600 citizens − including many Bosniac returnees in the RS who depicted their removed Serb mayor as "respectable and trustworthy" - signed a petition to reinstate the local leader who had been removed by HR Paddy Ashdown³⁴.
22. To encourage the launch of Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) negotiations, the HR has taken measures to gradually transfer responsibilities for governance to the national authorities, so as to turn BiH into a "normal" pre-accession state. The number of decisions taken by the OHR by the month of October was reduced from 158 in 2004 to 52 in 2005, while already by February 2006 the HR had taken seven decisions lifting bans imposed on political officials. Moreover, the OHR began downsizing and decreasing programmes in 2003, and there were reductions in its staff and field presence in autumn 2004. With the emphasis shifting to economic reform, the new HR, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, appointed on 14 December 2005, has adopted a conciliatory style of leadership that is more appealing to the general public. In order to ensure a successful exit strategy and enhance BiH's self-sustainability, it has been claimed that the new HR will be a mentor, rather than an enforcer in 2006. This claim is supported by the completion of the Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) and the announcement by the PIC of its intention to phase out the OHR in the three months following the October 2006 elections. This will finalise the transformation of the HR into an EU Special Representative without the Bonn powers³⁵, drastically transforming once again BiH's domestic politics and its relationship with the international community.
23. Although constitutional reform has not been a precondition for SAA, more centralised state institutions are considered essential in order for BiH to bring about much needed reforms and make progress along the road towards Europe. Following the failure of the final round of constitutional reform talks conducted by the eight main political parties on 17 January 2006, it was no longer possible to meet the November 2005 objective of adopting the constitutional reforms by March 2006, ahead of the BiH general elections in October 2006. In addition, although in late March a number of critical amendments were finally agreed, they were subsequently rejected by a narrow margin by the House of Representatives on 27 April. During the talks Bosnian Croat and Serb politicians were unable to agree on measures for replacing the current tripartite presidency. Bosnian Serb politicians stalled by insisting on the introduction of Entity voting in the BiH House of Representatives and the Bosniac politicians pushed for the removal of the minimal threshold for parliamentary votes from the two Entities for the passing of legislation³⁶. Reforms may prove more difficult to implement once the HR's intrusive role has been phased out and the international community's level of involvement decreases. On the other hand, however, the EU membership "carrot'" may serve as an incentive for reform, and help maintain the internal political resolve which has managed to keep constitutional amendments off the backburner. According to research conducted by Prism, an overwhelming majority clearly believes that the current constitutional arrangement − especially the costs of administering the state and the high taxation − is not functional. Hence 10.7% and 50.4% (61.1% in all) of respondents answered that it is totally acceptable or somewhat acceptable to alter the BiH constitutional arrangement in agreement with EU requirements, while 27.3 disapproved. Bosnian Serbs are most sensitive to such transformation as it may weaken or eliminate the Entities; 66.2% of participants perceive Serb sustainability in BiH to be guaranteed only through Republika Srpska. Moreover, Bosnian Croats prefer the creation of "three multinational republics" within BiH and hence further devolution through the new constitutional arrangement.

3. ESDP and BiH

24. The approval of EUFOR/Operation Althea by the European Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP on 12 July 2004 in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) gave the EU a more comprehensive role in BiH's military and civilian arenas during 2005³⁷. In November 2005, the EU Council of Ministers approved the second European Union Military Mission (EUFOR) review and extended its mandate, leaving the force structure unchanged for 2006³⁸. The EUFOR operation involves some 6 200 troops from 22 EU member states and 11 non-EU Troop Contributing Nations, as well as a 500-strong Integrated Police Unit (IPU) based in Sarajevo. EUFOR is composed of three regionally-based multinational task forces deployed throughout the state under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). It acts under the authority of the Council of the European Union and is executively monitored by the EU Military Committee (EUMC). The operation cost of €71.7 million is funded by member states' contributions calculated on the basis of GDP. The operation has recourse to NATO assets and capabilities on the basis of the Berlin plus arrangements.
25. EUFOR's key supporting tasks in 2005 have been to provide support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), including the detention of persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWC), to fulfil responsibilities specified in Annexes 1A and 2 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) and to contribute to a safe and secure environment. It has the mandate required to implement the core tasks of the OHR Mission Implementation Plan and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). In 2005 EUFOR increasingly conducted missions alongside domestic law-enforcement personnel in order to build up their confidence, professionalism and expertise. EUFOR reinforces the EU's holistic approach in BiH and ensures operational efficiency by closely coordinating with the EU Special Representative (EUSR). It also cooperates in the broader ESDP framework with the EU Police Mission (EUPM), which was extended until the end of 2007 but with fewer officers and a refocused mandate. In 2006, in accordance with the second mission review, EUFOR will align its operations even more closely on those of EUPM and on the priorities set by the domestic law-enforcement agencies³⁹.
26. According to the survey on the perceptions of citizens on current security issues undertaken by the Centre for Security Studies⁴⁰ in Sarajevo, 74% of BiH citizens support the replacement of SFOR by EU troops, with 71% of Federation citizens and 78% of Republica Srpska citizens supporting such a changeover. However, when asked by the Centre for Security Studies in March 2004 "who should ideally be responsible for security in BiH?", 42% of the 1 000 respondents felt that municipalities or cantons should bear the burden, 36.7% perceived this to be the responsibility of the state, and a mere 8.3% believed that security would be best ensured by international forces. Although a majority of people consider themselves to be living in "a relatively safe place with improving security", 43.3% of respondents indicated that the security situation would deteriorate if international forces withdrew. The general view expressed by domestic political figures is that future withdrawal depends to a very large extent on BiH's Partnership for Peace (PfP) membership.
27. The December 2005 Standard Eurobarometer 64⁴¹ indicates that the European public remains very receptive to issues relating to ESDP, with 77% in favour of a common security and defence policy and 15% against. This support is even stronger in the 10 new member states (10% higher than the average obtained in the 15 older member states), with the greatest support in Belgium (92%), Cyprus, Latvia, Slovakia (88% each), Germany (87%) and the lowest in Ireland (58%), the United Kingdom (59%) and Finland (60%). Two thirds (68%) of European public opinion is in favour of a common foreign policy, with the strongest support being found in Cyprus (81%), Germany (78%), and Belgium (77%), a result that has remained stable over a two-year period. A study conducted by TSN Opinion and Trends entitled "Transatlantic Trends Topline Data 2005"⁴² reveals that 49% of respondents find it somewhat desirable that the EU should exert strong leadership in world affairs, with Portugal (36%), France (34%), and Italy (35%) perceiving such involvement as very desirable, while Turkey (25%) and UK (11%) view it as very undesirable. When asked if the EU should "help to establish democracy in other countries?" 72% of Europeans agree that the EU should undertake such a role, with the greatest support from Spain (89%) and the lowest support from Turkey (48%). Aside from such general statistics, analyses are lacking as regards public attitudes towards EU involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and/or south-eastern Europe.

28. At the beginning of October 2005, the High Representative managed to broker an agreement on police reform, depoliticise the police forces and reorganise their administrative boundaries along non-ethnic lines. Whilst EUFOR is not as heavily responsible for police reform as the EUPM, whose task is to implement Annex 11 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP)⁴³, it contributes to it by strengthening local capacity-building and supporting the BiH authorities in implementing the conditions set out in the "Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) Feasibility Study", with the ultimate aim of transferring responsibilities to local institutions⁴⁴.
29. EUFOR is directly involved in defence reform through Major General Gian Marco Chiarini's membership of the Defence Reform Commission. These defence reform efforts are also important for achieving PfP membership, defined by Article 80 of the State Law on Defence and in a decision announced by the Presidency in 2002⁴⁵ as the legal and political goal of BiH. Such restructuring has rapidly progressed in comparison to police reform, because "(...) whereas the armed forces were essentially once removed from popular perceptions of day-to-day security, the police, on the other hand, were viewed by many as protectors of the local community"⁴⁶.

1. Police reform

30. The European Commission (EC) officially requested a systematic reform of the Bosnian police structures in its 2003 Report on Bosnia's Readiness to Negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (Feasibility Study Item 7.6)⁴⁷. It saw structural police reform as an essential element for establishing the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina and enabling the state's eventual accession to the European Union (EU). Following the High Representative's decision of 2 July 2004, the Police Restructuring Commission (PRC) was instructed to propose a "single structure of policing under the overall political oversight of a ministry or ministries in the Council of Ministers"⁴⁸. The PRC completed its deliberations on 15 December 2004 and the PRC Chairman, Wilfried Martens, Prime Minister Adnan Terzic and High Representative Paddy Ashdown presented a comprehensive report on 14 January 2005 that endorsed the three requirements for a centralised police force⁴⁹:

31. Given that the SAA negotiations could only commence following a consensus on police restructuring, the Republika Srpska's National Assembly on 5 October 2005 overturned its May 2005 rejection of police restructuring and in particular of joint policing across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), by adopting the Agreement on the Restructuring of Police Structures endorsed by the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the State Parliament⁵⁰. The Directorate for Police Restructuring Implementation was established by 31 December 2005 in order to ensure progress in the implementation process⁵¹.
32. Annex 11 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) guaranteed an international involvement in police reform by establishing the mandate of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) under the auspices of the United Nations Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), which was taken over on 1 January 2003 by the European Union Police Mission (EUPM). Contributions to police reform have been made in coordination with the EUFOR Integrated Police Unit (IPU), including having EUPM liaison officers seconded to various EUFOR command levels, cooperation with local law enforcement authorities, in particular the State Border Service (SBS)⁵², and EUFOR/EUPM involvement in the PRC⁵³. To strengthen the powers of local authorities and law enforcement agencies, EUFOR has launched numerous operations and intelligence gathering activities with a view to collectively developing a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina⁵⁴. "Helping local police and others develop their functionality, trying to focus on higher level crime and training their troops makes a real difference," noted EUFOR Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel de van der Schueren in a bi-monthly debriefing session with local authorities⁵⁵.
33. The results of a survey on the quality of policing conducted on 18 and 19 June 2005 by NGOs and the EUPM among 900 citizens in Canton 10 of the Federation⁵⁶ confirm the objectives of the police reform. 52.6% of citizens claimed that they rarely see the police patrolling and only 16.4% of individuals described themselves as "satisfied" with the performance of the police. 25% of respondents felt that the police were biased towards certain individuals such as politicians, bosses and private company owners. One quarter of participants felt that the integrity and reliability of the police would be improved with regular field patrols and more professional conduct on the part of officers.
34. The July 2005 Public Opinion Poll in Bosnia and Herzegovina about the European Union⁵⁷, conducted by the Delegation of the European Commission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, showed a majority of respondents to be "very much" or "somewhat" in favour of police reform. There were, however, differences amongst the constituent peoples, with the Bosnian Serbs, in contrast to the Bosniacs, being the least likely to encourage police restructuring, the least convinced that police reforms would positively influence the fight against crime and the ones who most strongly rejected the statement that "borders of police regions should go beyond entity borders at some points". The poll also found that Bosnian Croats were the most confident that the fight against crime would be enhanced by reforms. The Survey on the Perceptions of Citizens on Current Security Issues⁵⁸ undertaken in February and March 2004 provides somewhat different results with 67% of people in the Federation (72% Bosniacs, 51% Bosnian Croats, 62.5% Bosnian Serbs) responding that a "unified (state-level) police" would positively affect security in their local areas, 30% of RS respondents agreeing and 22% stating that collective policing would worsen security. Furthermore, results from the public poll conducted in October 2005 by Dnevni Avaz indicate that although citizens are alarmed about the cost of police reform and the resulting loss of jobs, 67% deem that the "five-year timeframe for the police reform implementation (...) should be shortened", while 28% of those polled are against a reduction of the deadlines⁵⁹.

2. Defence reform

35. An intensive phase in the process of defence reform began on 28 January 2003, when Bosnia and Herzegovina pledged to "implement defence reforms that will hasten BiH's integration into the European family, make the country and the wider region more stable in the long term" and to "strengthen those State-level institutions which exercise civilian command and control over the Armed Forces in BiH"⁶⁰. On 9 May 2003 the Defence Reform Commission (DRC) established by the High Representative was tasked with drafting the legal measures necessary to create defence structures in BiH⁶¹. The DRC report "The Path to the Partnership for Peace", with its recommendations, was published in September 2003, and resulted in the enactment of the first ever Law on Defence (BiH Official Gazette 43/2003) and in amendments to the Entity Constitutions. In order to tackle the deficiencies highlighted by the DRC report, in particular unjustifiable personnel numbers, the ceiling for the professional armed forces in BiH⁶² was readjusted by presidential decree in March 2004.
36. In September 2005, the two political Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, reached a consensus on defence reform with a view to creating a NATO-compatible army by transferring all defence responsibilities to state structures and establishing a chain of command going from the State Presidency, via the State Ministry of Defence, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Commanders of Operational and Support Commands and finally to the respective forces within the Entities. The agreement eliminates the conscription system, the Entity Ministries of Defence and the inefficient reserve force of 60 000 (adopting a ceiling of 5 000 reserves or 50% of the active duty force) and sets the aim of achieving a single state defence budget by 1 January 2006. The reformed Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) will consist of 10 000 personnel, with three infantry regiments, each responsible for maintaining the military heritage of the units from which they are descended, and will enable the three constituent peoples to be equally represented at each senior decision-making level. The new brigade headquarters, their assigned infantry battalions, new infantry regiments and the regimental headquarters should be established by 1 July 2007 and the reforms should be finalised by 31 December 2007⁶³. The Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey (SAS) conducted on behalf of the UNDP in July 2004, shows that 65% of participants in the Federation - with relatively equal support amongst the three ethnic groups - believe that a "state level" military would "improve" security, while 39% in Republica Srpska consider that security would be "worse" following such reforms. Furthermore, according to the Survey on the Perception of Citizens on Current Security Issues⁶⁴, 52% of citizens consulted believe that the formation of the Ministry of Defence and of the Intelligence and Security Agency in BiH will enhance domestic security, while 28% believe that domestic security will remain the same and 5.4% consider that it will deteriorate. The greatest pessimism with regard to the effects of reform on improving the security situation was found among the RS population, with the greatest distrust in security institutions at the "state level" being in the western part of Republica Srpska.
37. The UNDP, the OSCE Mission to BiH, EUFOR and the BiH armed forces are jointly involved in the arms destruction programme: Small Arms Control and Reduction Project in BiH (SACBiH) with the aim of eliminating surplus small arms and light weapons, particularly in the wake of the staff reduction and equipment modernisation measures adopted by the FBiH armed forces and RS army. In July 2005, roughly 5 400 weapons were destroyed in Zenica; in September 2005, 2 000 were destroyed in Banja Luka, and 25 000 were eliminated in October 2005, significantly reducing the number of military storage sites from 500 in 2003 to 40 in 2005⁶⁵. Moreover, Defence Industry Facilities (DIF) are inspected by EUFOR on a daily basis since BiH inherited much of former Yugoslavia's defence and security industry⁶⁶. According to EUFOR estimates, the January 2006 defence reform implementation deadline will generate a surplus of roughly 190 000 weapons, giving the newly centralised AFBiH the opportunity to become more involved in this issue⁶⁷. The Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey (SAS) reveals support for these initiatives, with 43% of respondents taking the view that voluntary weapons collections programmes have improved local security and 38% claiming that such programmes have made no difference. When consulted about search and seizure operations, 40.1% of respondents expressed support for such missions, while 39.1% felt that they had not changed the security situation. Importantly, in previous surveys respondents frequently expressed displeasure at the aggressiveness shown by the international forces towards citizens when collecting arms and conducting search and seizure operations. Nonetheless, more than 75% of individuals responded that weapons collections should continue but with greater financial incentives to encourage the voluntary surrender of arms.
38. To achieve the aims of the Mine Action Plan for 2005 (reducing by 181 km² the area suspected of containing landmines) EUFOR deployed eight supervisory demining teams in the south and east of the country⁶⁸. EUFOR also worked to establish a demining coordination section in the AFBiH Ministry of Defence as part of the defence reform process⁶⁹ and on 16 December 2005 it signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Mine Action Plan with representatives of the AFBiH, making provision for the Plan to be carried out by the AFBiH demining units with a gradual reduction of support from EUFOR. The Mine Action Plan for 2006 proposes a demining target for the AFBiH that is 50% higher than in 2005, to be achieved by better coordination of assets and enhanced productivity following reforms⁷⁰. Joint demining operations are especially important for promoting the safe return of refugees and internally displaced people (IDP).

39. One of EUFOR's tasks is to provide support to the ICTY and relevant authorities, including by detaining persons indicted for war crimes, so as to speed up BiH's accession to the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Although BiH, thanks to its defence reform, has become a credible candidate for the PfP, its lack of cooperation with the ICTY for the capture of Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic remains an obstacle to entry. Nonetheless, following an unprecedented surge in the transferral of war crimes indictees by Republika Srpska in 2005, only six − of which only four are connected with the RS − are still being sought by the ICTY, as opposed to 20 in early 2005⁷¹.
40. According to EUFOR Lieutenant Colonel Hans Joachim Lange, it is impossible to determine the political future of BiH and ensure stabilisation without solving the problem of returnees⁷². EUFOR has increasingly emphasised its civilian agenda for promoting sustainable conditions for return. In January 2005, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro signed the Sarajevo Agreement or the "3x3 Initiative" sponsored by the UNHCR, European Union and OSCE, which committed the states concerned to resolving all outstanding refugee and internal displacement issues by the end of 2006⁷³.

1. Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

41. The BiH political scene was dominated in early 2005 by the eight measures adopted by High Representative Lord Ashdown the previous December, which led to the removal of nine officials, the freezing of individuals' bank accounts and demands for a systematic reform of BiH law enforcement and security institutions due to Republica Srpska's failure to cooperate with the ICTY⁷⁴. On the recommendation of the HR and the PIC Steering Board, Prime Minister Adnan Terzic established a Monitoring Group to increase cooperation with The Hague. Its first meeting on 11 February 2005 was chaired by Mr Terzic, attended by the HR and various BiH State and Entity officials with ICTY responsibilities, as well as EUFOR and EUPM representatives⁷⁵.
42. The War Crimes Chamber within the Court of BiH opened on 9 March 2005 and in December 2005, the Court of BiH tried a number of war crimes cases, including cases transferred under Rule 11 bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence⁷⁶. In 2001, under pressure from the UN Security Council to develop a completion strategy, the ICTY drew up a plan for completing investigations by the end of 2004, holding first instance trials by 2008 and dealing with appeals cases by 2010. The strategy involved prosecuting high-ranking indictees only and leaving other war crimes indictees to be tried by domestic courts⁷⁷.
43. On 15 January 2005, the Republica Srpska authorities transferred their first-ever war crimes indictees in nine years, following which there were numerous surrenders in the Entity. Between June and November 2005, the Republica Srpska authorities arrested 16 Bosnian Serb war crimes suspects and mounted an advertising campaign urging the public to aid the authorities to track down indictees, helping to dispel the popular perception of indictees as national heroes⁷⁸. On 17 January 2005, the ICTY sentenced two Bosnian Serb officials, and this was followed by major trials against former Bosniac generals accused of war crimes against Bosnian Croats and Serbs⁷⁹. This surge in the number of trials of Bosniacs slightly eroded the once unanimous support for the ICTY mandate among this ethnic group but increased support for it among Bosnian Croats and Serbs, for whom distrust of the Tribunal had been the predominant stance since the end of the war⁸⁰.
44. EUFOR's inspection in December 2004 of the Han Pijesak military installation suspected of being used by war crimes indictees to escape arrest, demonstrated its commitment to the ICTY mandate⁸¹. In January 2005, the EUFOR Integrated Police Unit (IPU) placed under police surveillance a "category A" war criminal who later voluntarily surrendered to the IPU⁸². EUFOR, together with local forces, has since gathered intelligence on criminal networks supporting war crimes indictees and conducted various search operations and attempts to apprehend fugitives. It has been particularly active along the permeable BiH borders, especially those with Serbia and Montenegro⁸³. In January 2006, EUFOR, together with the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), attempted to arrest a Bosnian Serb war crimes suspect, wounding the suspect and his son and causing the death of the suspect's spouse. Bosnian Serb President Dragan Cavic condemned the operation, saying that "This is a black mark for EUFOR and will destroy the confidence in the force completely," especially among the Bosnian Serb population. EUFOR claims that its troops fired in self-defence and in accordance with a warrant issued by the municipality in 1999⁸⁴. The case remains under investigation.
45. On 27 February 2005, 13 years after BiH filed a claim against Serbia for genocide during the 1992-95 war in former Yugoslavia, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) conducted hearings for the first international case dealing with collective state responsibility for acts of genocide. The case is complicated mainly because only one of the three constituent peoples − the Bosniacs − strongly supports its advancement. Bosnian Croats have proved to be indifferent, while Bosnian Serbs are against the case on the grounds that it will only lead to further polarisation of BiH society and to the "Balkanisation" of the region. The death of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in The Hague, just weeks before a verdict on the charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide could be delivered, has further complicated the international court case. In addition, lawyers at the ICJ have noted that arresting Ratko Mladic will become more difficult once the court case commences.
46. When asked during a Prism survey in September 2005 "if the surrender of Radovan Karadzic was the condition for BiH to join NATO and the EU, would you support his surrender?" 91.5% of Bosniacs, 86.6% of Bosnian Croats and 37.4% of Bosnian Serbs claimed they would not oppose such a surrender. The greatest opposition came from Bosnian Serbs, with 53.8% of participants disagreeing with the statement. In contrast, Le Figaro notes in the article "Les ultranationalistes s'unissent derrière Mladic" published in February 2006, that 53% of the Serbian population is in favour of Ratko Mladic's extradition to The Hague. At regional level, the Balkan Monitor and International IDEA indicate that The Hague is least trusted in Serbia (7.6% in favour) and most strongly backed in Kosovo (83.3 %)⁸⁵.

2. Refugees and internally displaced persons

47. In January 1997, with only 33 837 returns in 1997, the Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF) was established by the HR and UNHCR as an inter-agency body responsible for tackling return and economic reconstruction issues using an integrated approach⁸⁶. The 1999 RRTF Action Plan sought to implement Annex 7 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) which committed Bosnia and Herzegovina to dealing with this long-term humanitarian challenge⁸⁷. The High Representative wound up the mandate of the RRTF on 31 December 2003, leaving the remainder of Annex 7 to be implemented by the BiH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees using a state-level Return Fund established under the Law on Refugees from BiH and Displaced Persons as a single domestic source of funding for reconstruction and refugee return projects⁸⁸.
48. In 2005, the UNHCR announced that in the Balkans as a whole 2.5 million people had returned to their homes, including more than one million in BiH. 500 000 war damaged homes had been rebuilt and 200 000 property disputes peacefully resolved. In mid-2005, roughly 8 000 refugees and 185 000 internally displaced people (IDPs) were reported, a substantial decrease from the 310 000 registered in 2004. While approximately 210 000 persons are registered as having returned to their pre-war residence during 2005, the statistics indicate 120 000 individuals who did not reregister as displaced, in addition to nearly 650 000 refugees who settled abroad and are not being monitored by the UNHCR⁸⁹. Some refugees, such as the 116 000 who accepted Serbian citizenship, settled elsewhere in the region due to fears of reprisals and mistrust of neighbours. Others face local obstruction in the form of delays in restoring electricity and water supplies and problems with the provision of health protection, the return of property and reconstruction (officially declared completed in 2004), as well as a lack of economic opportunities and ethnic discrimination⁹⁰. Although the safety of returnees improved in 2005, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in BiH continues to report numerous cases of assaults on religious monuments, physical injury and the destruction of property⁹¹.
49. In 2004, the unemployment rate dropped by 6% to 48%; however, taking into account the shadow economy, "real" unemployment rates are estimated at 21.4%⁹². According to the latest Living Standard Measurement Survey in BiH, in 2003, 67.8% of households with dependent children and no income from employment were living in poverty. Roughly 25% of the population had no educational qualifications; households in FBiH (Bosniac and Bosnian-Croat Entity) had a higher average income and were less likely to be self-employed than in Republica Srpska (Bosnian Serb Entity)⁹³. Of the 447 000 minority returns reported by UNHCR, by 2004, roughly 268 410 Bosnian Serbs had returned to the FBiH, while only some 155 551 Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats had resettled in Republica Srpska⁹⁴. National minorities, such as Roma, are at a severe disadvantage, with only 1.5% employed and roughly 15% of children who complete primary education⁹⁵. With funds in 2006 of 13.6 million convertible marks devoted to resolving the outstanding problems of refugees and displaced persons in BiH, questions about the feasibility of the "3x3 Initiative" arise⁹⁶.
50. According to a survey entitled "Dialogue on the Constitution of BiH"⁹⁷ conducted by the Centre for Security Studies in September 2004, 44.9% of participants considered the economic situation of their families to be below the norm and 63% noted no improvements in their situation as compared with the previous year. When asked for the reasons for this economic stagnation, 66.1% put it down to irregular or low wages, 37.2% to low pensions and social welfare and 23.2% to the lack of political will to create the conditions for a better standard of living for citizens.
51. Taking into account the increasing needs of returnee children and the discriminatory education system that poses an obstacle to return, on 5 March 2002, the FBiH Minister of Education and Science, Culture and Sports and the RS Minister of Education and Culture signed the Interim Agreement on Accommodation of Special Needs and Rights of Returnee Children, for which an Implementation Plan was approved on 13 November 2002. Its objectives are to:

52. With the implementation of the Interim Agreement, the statistics for 2004-2005 show an increase in returnee students of 17.75% for FBiH and of 12.08% for Republica Srpska, as compared with 2003-2004. An analysis of the ethnic breakdown, however, indicates that a majority of returnee students in the FBiH are Bosniacs, while in RS they are Bosnian Serbs, with statistically insignificant fluctuations in minority returns⁹⁹. Despite the results of a public survey conducted in January 2006 by the OSCE Mission to BiH, in which 68% of respondents expressed support for a state-level Ministry of Education guaranteeing the same educational standards everywhere and 76% expressed the belief that students from different ethnic groups should attend school together, education continues to be organised along ethnic lines with 52 cases of "two schools under one roof" with segregation of both students and teachers¹⁰⁰. Bosnian Croats are the strongest opponents of educational reform and in November 2004 they challenged the implementation of the Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education by taking it to the Constitutional Court¹⁰¹.
53. EUFOR contributes to creating the conditions for sustainable returns through Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), which involves working in liaison with international organisations, the civilian population, government bodies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to organise projects in various sectors such as infrastructure, humanitarian aid, economy and market, culture and education, and administration and public affairs¹⁰². In 2005, EUFOR completed a number of CIMIC projects, including the distribution of school equipment, food and clothing to individuals with special needs and medical supplies to clinics throughout the country¹⁰³. Under the CARDS programme signed on 19 December 2005 by EUFOR and the Delegation of the European Commission to BiH, one million euros will be allocated in 2006 to ten CIMIC assistance projects in order to rebuild schools, kindergartens, health facilities and roads in numerous areas with the support of Austrian and Italian CIMIC units¹⁰⁴. EUFOR's stabilisation role − the aim of which is to establish the conditions for the peaceful coexistence of the different ethnic groups and create an atmosphere conducive to a return to BiH − is also substantially enhanced by its sixteen Liaison and Observation (LOT) Units. According to Lieutenant Colonel Hans Joachim Lange, in order to "feel the pulse of the population" and build a robust situational awareness, LOT units reside among the local population. They produce numerous reports, including surveys on the situation of internally displaced people and immigrants in their region of command¹⁰⁵.

54. In the coming year EUFOR will play a less prominent and less proactive role in conducting operations against organised crime and will instead align its operations even more closely on the priorities set by domestic authorities and EUPM, while also deepening its cooperation with the EUSR¹⁰⁶. According to EUHR Javier Solana, the revised mandate of the EUSR following the proposed closure of the OHR and the more proactive mandate of the EUPM will enable EUFOR to gradually hand over its responsibilities to other EU actors, thereby minimising foreign military involvement in BiH in the near future. This is deemed all the more feasible in the light of the progress made in 2005 with police restructuring, defence reform and with the development of state security institutions by means of which the rule of law should be well entrenched in BiH. This report has highlighted the general public enthusiasm with regard to the modernisation of the BiH security framework − with the greatest scepticism being shown by Republica Srpska citizens − despite the problem of demobilised personnel and the costs associated with reforms. The progress made as regards cooperating with the ICTY − in particular the unprecedented initiatives taken by Republica Srpska in 2005 to bring indicted war criminals to trial and the ICTY's completion strategy that allowed domestic courts to try low-ranking cases − also reflect the gradual transferral of responsibility for the nation-building project to BiH. The improved security situation has enabled EUFOR to begin reducing its force levels in BiH and afforded it greater flexibility for deploying its troops in neighbouring Kosovo with the permission of Serbia and Montenegro. As Kosovo's final status and the future of separatist Montenegro will both be determined in 2006, these sensitive matters may again destabilise the region. Uncertainties about the territorial boundaries of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and potential claims for independence by separatist forces in the RS and the Federation are issues that may arise as a result. Hence it is important that the international security forces should not disengage from the region in the following year in order to maintain a stable and secure atmosphere conducive to continued reconstruction and economic growth.
55. High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling's central priorities when he took up office on 31 January 2006 were firstly, to minimise the High Representative's intrusive role in the political process and secondly, to boost the domestic economy in BiH, in particular by creating conditions in which businesses could flourish. This is relevant for stabilising the economy and creating the conditions for the sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). UNHCR's Udo Janz notes that a "couple of years ago the overriding issue was security, security, security (...) today, it is the economy (...)". This seems increasingly to be a view shared by politicians and BiH citizens. As BiH moves from the phase of nation-building further along the path towards EU accession - an aim widely endorsed by the majority of the population regardless of ethnic identity - the public focus is increasingly shifting away from security and towards privatisation and liberating the economy from political interference. With a 5.6% growth rate, 0.5% inflation, and a jump in industrial production and direct foreign investment of roughly 25% as compared with 2004, BiH is the most progressive country in the western Balkans with the potential resources to become a good candidate for EU membership in the near future¹⁰⁷. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement negotiated in November 2005 is the initial step toward accession, and must be used in a timely fashion by both the EU and BiH authorities in order to promote much-needed reforms. Nonetheless, as this report makes clear, EU membership for BiH will depend not only on domestic reform, but also on the political will of the EU and the level of support from EU citizens. The EU must therefore ensure that BiH membership is maintained as a credible prospect in order to motivate further amendments to BiH's institutional and political structure.
56. On 9 March 2006, Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), welcomed progress in the ongoing talks on BiH's constitutional reform, which he described as "an important step towards a better functioning state and towards Europe". The reform of BiH state structures is especially crucial for reducing the costs of an enormous bureaucracy, currently estimated at some 60% of GDP. Constitutional amendments are also required in order to eliminate or at least diminish ethnically-based politics and party loyalty along ethnic lines, and to restructure the House of Peoples and the Presidency in such a way as to enable political involvement on an equal footing of all constituent peoples and minorities. Finally, it is crucial that constitutional amendments should be democratically adopted and endorsed by the public, which has agreed that BiH should depart from the Dayton era and adopt constitutional arrangements in compliance with EU requirements. This coming year will be decisive for determining whether BiH will set out on the road towards Brussels or continue to remain outside the select EU club.
57. Hence, both political leaders and parliamentarians should endeavour, as a priority, to better inform public opinion in a country which, as emerges clearly from the present report, has rapidly assimilated the rules of democracy and whose sights are now set on integration in the western and international institutions. The success of Althea as a military operation is to be welcomed, but needs to be followed up by efforts to explain in practical terms the part played by this operation in stabilising the country. In so doing, emphasis should be placed on the key role of the ESDP and on the importance of security in Europe as the prerequisite for political and economic progress, and for successful EU enlargement. For our fellow parliamentarians both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the member states of the European Union, this provides a further opportunity to brief the public at large on the progress achieved in ESDP and to provide input for the process of reflection on establishing European institutions conducive to developing a coherent and credible security and defence policy with the full support of the electorate.

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¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 17 May 2006.

² Adopted by the Assembly on 20 June 2006 at the 2^nd sitting.

³ UNHCR News Stories. "Taking Bosnia's temperature, 10 years after Dayton". 21 November 2005.

⁴ Tuathail Gerard Toal Gearóid Ó et al., "Bosnia-Herzegovina Ten Years after Dayton: Constitutional Changes and Public Opinion". Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2006, 47, No. 1, pp. 61-75.

⁵ OHR Fact Sheet: "Key events since Dayton". 2 December 2005.

⁶ OHR Fact Sheet: "Key events since Dayton". 2 December 2005.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ European Commission Delegation to BiH. EU Newsletter. August 2005.

⁹ CRS Report for Congress: "Bosnia and the European Union Military Force: Post-NATO Transition". 14 March 2005.

¹⁰ OHR Fact Sheet: "Key events since Dayton". 2 December 2005.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Assembly Document 1919 adopted on 7 December 2005: "The European Union in the Balkans: Althea and other operations", submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by João Mota Amaral, Rapporteur (Portugal, Federated Group).

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ RFL/RL News line: "Bosnian leaders agree to start a process". 22 November 2004 Volume 9, Number 218.

¹⁶ Report to the European Parliament by the OHR and the EUSR for BiH: June-December 2005 http://www.eusrbih.org

¹⁷ Speech by EU Commissioner Rehn: "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Moving closer to Europe". Sarajevo, November 2005. http://europa-eu-un.org

¹⁸ Southeast European Times. "EU Launches SAA talks with BiH". 26 January 2006.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ "Public Opinion in the Balkans: The Very Same Fears". www.ekonomist.co.yu/en/magazin/perspectives/0302/

²¹ Tuathail Gerard Toal Gearóid Ó et al., "Bosnia-Herzegovina Ten Years after Dayton: Constitutional Changes and Public Opinion". "Eurasian Geography and Economics", 2006, 47, No. 1, pp. 61-75.

²² Delegation of the European Commission to BiH: Public Opinion Poll in Bosnia and Herzegovina about the European Union. July 2005: http://www.delbih.cec.eu.int

²³ Standard Eurobarometer 64. "Public Opinion in the European Union". December, 2005: http://europa.eu.int

²⁴ Friends of Europe. "Europe: The Way Ahead in 2006". http://www.friendsofeurope.org

²⁵ The OHR and EUSR: Board of Principals. July, 2002. http://www.ohr.int

²⁶ Tuathail Gerard Toal Gearóid Ó. "Embedding Bosnia in Euro-Atlantic Structures: From Dayton to Brussels". Eurasian Geography and Economics, Volume 46, Number 1, January 2005, pp. 51-67.

²⁷ The OHR and EUSR: Board of Principals. July 2002. http://www.ohr.int

²⁸ Siw Skjold Lexau. BiH: Advisor to the Political Department Office of the High Representative. NORDEM Report 16/2004. http://www.humanrights.uio.no

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Tuathail Gerard Toal Gearóid Ó. "Embedding Bosnia in Euro-Atlantic Structures: From Dayton to Brussels". Eurasian Geography and Economics, Volume 46, Number 1, January 2005, pp. 51-67.

³² Tuathail Gerard Toal Gearóid Ó et al., "Bosnia-Herzegovina Ten Years after Dayton: Constitutional Changes and Public Opinion". Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2006, 47, No. 1, pp. 61-75.

³³ Tim Judah. World Today. 1 November 2005. "From Dayton to Brussels": http://www.esiweb.org

³⁴ Belloni, Roberto. "Bosnia: The Limits of Neocolonial Rule". Foreign Policy in Focus, Silver City, N.Mex. & Washington, D.C., 5 August 2004.

³⁵ Stefan Wagstyl. The International Herald Tribune, 30 January 2006. "New Bosnia chief makes boosting economy priority".

³⁶ "Constitutional Reform Talks end without agreement on key issues". OHR Morning Media Brief. 18 January 2006.

³⁷ European Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP, 12 July 2004: http://europa.eu.int

³⁸ Report of the European Parliament by the OHR and the EUSR for BiH: June-December 2005 http://www.eusrbih.org

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Centre for Security Studies, Sarajevo: "Perceptions of Citizens on Current Security Issues". http://www.css.ba/

⁴¹ Standard Eurobarometer 64. "Public Opinion in the European Union". December, 2005. http://europa.eu.int

⁴² TSN Opinion and Social. "Transatlantic Trends Topline Data 2005". July 2005 http://www.transatlantictrends.org/doc/TTToplineData2005.pdf

⁴³ EUPM: http://www.eupm.org

⁴⁴ EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: http://ue.eu.int

⁴⁵ Defence Reform Commission 2005 Report. "AFBiH: A single military for the 21^st Century". Sarajevo, September 2005.

⁴⁶ Security Council SC/8558. "Bosnia and Herzegovina Ready to Enter `Post-Dayton' Era Just 10 Years after Brutal War, High Representative Tells Security Council". 15 November 2005 www.un.org

⁴⁷ Final Report on the Work of the Police Restructuring Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Office of the High Representative: Agreement on Restructuring of Police Structures in BiH. October 2005.

⁵¹ Report to the European Parliament by the OHR and the EU Special Representative for OHR: January-June 2005. 22 November 2005.

⁵² Council of the European Union. Operation ALTHEA - Quarterly Report to the United Nations. Brussels, 2 March 2005.

⁵³ Final Report on the Work of the Police Restructuring Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⁵⁴ EUFOR. http://www.euforbih.org (Operation Free Entrance, Harvest Operations, Anti-Dayton Operations, Operation Santa, Anti-Smuggling Operation, Operation in Support of the State Border Service.

⁵⁵ EUFOR: Multinational Task Force North West - One Year On. http://www.euforbih.org

⁵⁶ EUPM News Highlights - August, 2005. http://www.eupm.org/

⁵⁷ Delegation of the European Commission to BiH: Public Opinion Poll in Bosnia and Herzegovina about the European Union. July 2005 (39.1% very much support police reform; 35.2 % support it somewhat; 9.1% were somewhat against; 10% were very much against).

⁵⁸ Centre for Security Studies, Sarajevo: "Perceptions of Citizens on Current Security Issues". http://www.css.ba/

⁵⁹ EUPM PPID Daily Media Summary, 25 October  2005. Dnevni Avaz (Predominantly Bosniac Newspaper)

⁶⁰ Tuathail Gerard Toal Gearóid Ó. "Embedding Bosnia in Euro-Atlantic Structures: From Dayton to Brussels" Eurasian Geography and Economics, Volume 46, Number 1, January 2005, pp. 51-67(17)

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Defence Reform Commission 2005 Report. "AFBiH: A single military for the 21^st Century". Sarajevo, September 2005.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Centre for Security Studies, Sarajevo: "Perceptions of Citizens on Current Security Issues". http://www.css.ba/

⁶⁵ Bruno Taitson Bueno. OneWorld Southeast Europe. "Arms Destruction Program is Making BiH Safer". 10 November 2005.

⁶⁶ Council of the European Union. Operation ALTHEA - Quarterly Report to the United Nations. Brussels, 2 March 2005.

⁶⁷ Bruno Taitson Bueno. OneWorld Southeast Europe. "Arms Destruction Program is Making BiH Safer". 10 November 2005.

⁶⁸ European Commission: Bosnia and Herzegovina 2005 Progress Report. Brussels, 9 November 2005 SEC (2005)1422.

⁶⁹ Council of the European Union. Operation ALTHEA - Quarterly Report to the United Nations. Brussels, 2 March 2005.

⁷⁰ EUFOR.