DOCUMENT A/1939

June 2006

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Security and stability in the Mediterranean Region

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Document A/1939

20 June 2006

Security and stability in the Mediterranean Region

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee
by Elsa Papadimitriou, Rapporteur (Greece, Federated Group)

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RECOMMENDATION 779²

on security and stability in the Mediterranean region

(i) Considering that security and stability in the Mediterranean region is a strategic priority for the European Union;

(ii) Aware that, in the 10 years and more of its existence, the Barcelona Process has not been able to achieve the breakthrough in creating a common area of peace and prosperity that many of its supporters hoped for in 1995;

(iii) Recognising that the goals set at the start of the process may have been too ambitious, given the huge political, social, economic and cultural differences between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean;

(iv) Convinced that when it comes to security cooperation with the southern Mediterranean partners, a policy of small incremental steps may yield better results than high-flown, overly ambitious projects;

(v) Recognising that the security situation in the Middle East and north Africa has been severely affected by a number of negative trends, in particular, the emergence of violent international terrorism, manifestly linked to radical and fundamentalist Islam;

(vi) Aware that the governments of southern Mediterranean countries have readily exploited the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States to legitimise their struggle against political challenges from Islamic political parties by assimilating the latter with the fight against radical international Islamic terrorism instigated by the United States;

(vii) Noting that repression appears to have acquired new legitimacy, allowing traditionally authoritarian state structures to be consolidated and slowing down the transition to political pluralism advocated by the EU;

(viii) Noting that in many instances the EU and its member states have supported stability and the political status quo rather than the development of political pluralism which, in periods of transition, could easily lead to political upheaval and instability;

(ix) Noting that, following the failure of the EU's efforts to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, the Euro-Mediterranean security agenda has concentrated on more pragmatic issues such as conflict prevention and crisis management, the ESDP dialogue, the fight against drugs, organised crime and terrorism and cooperation in matters related to Justice and Home Affairs;

(x) Regretting that security cooperation on a number of the issues referred to has resulted in lower levels of accountability and human rights compliance on the part of security forces in southern Mediterranean countries;

(xi) Welcoming the strengthened cooperation between law enforcement agencies across the Mediterranean, but insistent that in such cooperation, the EU should also address the serious problems of governance affecting most, if not all, internal security forces in the southern Mediterranean countries;

(xii) Recognising that the 5+5 process is demonstrating that a less ambitious security agenda, established by common agreement and focused on practical cooperation, is more likely to yield satisfactory results and that in the longer term, it may help revitalise the political and security chapter of the Barcelona Process;

(xiii) Considering that the EU and the various interparliamentary bodies established for the purpose of Mediterranean dialogue, must stress the need for parliamentary oversight of the defence and security sector, focusing particularly on supervision of the areas of budget control, defence reform, democratic policing and defence resource management;

(xiv) Aware of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue activity, the aims of which are to contribute to regional security and stability, achieve better mutual understanding and mutual confidence building and to reinforce and complement other international initiatives in the region;

(xv) Considering that both the EU and NATO have roughly the same security concerns in the region and are developing and conducting similar activities in a number of fields;

(xvi) Noting that it seems appropriate for the EU and NATO to make a sincere and committed effort to coordinate, if not combine their efforts, in order to prevent duplication which is not only inefficient but is creating confusion in southern Mediterranean countries where the same partners are having to respond to different programmes in the same fields;

(xvii) Recognising that the slowing down of economic growth in the EU combined with the lack of social and cultural integration of certain groups of immigrants from the southern Mediterranean countries have led to a reappraisal of the legislation on migration and related issues;

(xviii) Welcoming the efforts of EU member states increasingly to coordinate their policies on migrant entry, residence, labour market access and illegal immigration and cooperation with countries of origin;

(xix) Emphasising however, that an EU approach based exclusively on security considerations leaves aside the reality of migration issues today and that relying on Euro-Mediterranean Partnership member countries in the south to serve as a protective barrier against migratory flows could lead to the incidence of major human rights violations and reinforce the poor perception of migrants in both northern and southern countries;

(xx) Considering that as problems relating to immigration from the southern Mediterranean partners have strong cultural connotations, there is an urgent need to step up efforts directed towards implementing the objectives of the Barcelona Process third basket, envisaging the "creation of closer links between peoples in the region through a social, cultural and human partnership", while being aware that meaningful results will be obtained only if southern Mediterranean governments are prepared to loosen their grip on the economy and civil society in their respective countries;

(xxi) Considering that the different objectives of the Barcelona Process, as formulated in its three chapters, are complementary and that only by their simultaneous implementation will structural stability be achieved in the region in the medium to long term;

(xxii) Considering that if the EU wishes to make progress towards an all-encompassing security dialogue with its Mediterranean partners, it must take serious account of the expectations of the southern Mediterranean, and make more sustained efforts to help resolve existing conflicts - particularly in Iraq, the Western Sahara, between Israel and the Palestinians and over Cyprus - all of which are having a highly detrimental influence on its project for establishing a zone of peace, security and prosperity in the Mediterranean;

(xxiii) Welcoming the European initiative within the Quartet to establish a temporary financial structure allowing aid to reach the Palestinians without being channelled through the Palestinian Authority;

(xxiv) Insisting however, that a more lasting solution to the financial problems of the Palestinians is needed if the donor countries, including the EU and its member states, want to prevent the Palestinian territories falling into severe economic depression likely to produce further radicalisation of the population;

(xxv) Considering that isolating the Hamas Government could drive Hamas into the arms of Iran and Syria and further aggravate the present downward spiral in Israeli-Palestinian relations;

(xxvi) Considering that the EU and other Quartet members must be prepared to acknowledge the fact that the Palestinian leadership is failing to stop terrorist activities and provide effective security and to recognise that Israel must do everything in its power to overcome the present stalemate and improve the political situation and economic plight of the Palestinian territories, occupied by Israel for nearly 40 years;

(xxvii) Considering that a just and viable settlement still needs to be reached for the Cyprus issue, particularly in view of the fact that lack of progress in the search for a solution contributes to a climate of uncertainty that is undermining stability in the politically volatile eastern Mediterranean area;

(xxviii) Noting that such a settlement should be sought within the framework of the Good Offices Mission of the United Nations Secretary-General and be based on the relevant United Nations Council Resolutions and on the founding principles of the EU;

(xxix) Recalling that implementation of the UN peace plan for the Western Sahara, dating back three years, is now completely deadlocked;

(xxx) Considering that the EU has a real interest in promoting a solution to that conflict as this is vitally important in bringing about an improvement in interstate relations in the region, further integration of the Maghreb countries and for the further development of their relations with the Union;

(xxxi) Considering that the relations between all the countries of the region must be regulated by the existing international treaties and conventions, which should at all times be complied with, and based on mutual respect, respect for international law and for the principle of peaceful resolution of conflict, thus promoting good neighbourliness,

1. Concentrate for the moment on a policy of small incremental steps and pragmatic security cooperation which may yield improved results, as the 5+5 Process would appear to demonstrate;
2. Urge the need for parliamentary oversight of the defence and security sector in the southern Mediterranean partner countries, with particular focus on supervision of the areas of budget control, defence reform, democratic policing and defence resource management;
3. Make a sincere and committed effort to coordinate, or even combine, its cooperation activities with Mediterranean partners in the defence and security sector with similar activities being conducted by NATO, in order to prevent duplication which is not only inefficient but liable to create confusion among the southern Mediterranean partners.

1. Seek a lasting structural solution for transferring aid to the Palestinians, bearing in mind that it cannot ignore one of the few democratically elected Arab governments in the region, and pursue its efforts to convince that government that it must commit to the principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel and the acceptance of earlier agreements and obligations;
2. Convince the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority that a negotiated settlement is the best solution to the conflict and could pave the way to lasting peace between two states: Israel and a future Palestinian State;
3. Actively pursue a just and viable settlement of the Cyprus issue in order to put an end to the present climate of uncertainty that is contributing to undermine stability in an already volatile area;
4. Promote a solution to the conflict in the Western Sahara to break the deadlock in the implementation of the UN peace plan as this of vital importance to the further development and integration of the region and its relations with the EU.

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Elsa Papadimitriou, Rapporteur (Greece, Federated Group)

1. The European Union has long been convinced that it has a vital interest in maintaining good relations with its neighbours in the Mediterranean region. Over time, it has established agreements intended to facilitate ever better cooperation.
2. The Barcelona Declaration of 1995 established the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) whose holistic approach sought to involve all the Mediterranean partners in cooperating in the construction of a common area of peace, prosperity and stability.
3. The main objectives of this policy as formulated in the declaration were:

4. In order to realise these objectives, a comprehensive range of institutional instruments was created. These involved ministers and senior officials from all 35 partner states and the European Commission meeting in different forums to monitor developments and take new initiatives. At the same time, financial support for the EMP was secured through the MEDA programme, European Investment Bank (EIB) loans and other lesser instruments.
5. Although the EMP remains unique in its wide-ranging scope and the amount of financial support it offers, it has by no means met the original expectations of it, for a number of different reasons to be discussed in the present report.
6. It was a clear indication of the EMP's limited success that the Heads of State and Government of the non-EU partners, with the exception of the Turkish Prime Minister and the President of the Palestinian Authority, did not attend the 10^th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit in Barcelona on 27-28 November 2005.
7. Indeed, in 10 years, the EMP has not progressed very far towards the establishment of a common area of peace and prosperity, and despite € 3 billion a year of community investment through the MEDA programme and EIB loans, differences in income between the northern and southern rim of the Mediterranean are widening to an extent that gives cause for concern. Trade relations are still very one-sided and demographic growth in the southern Mediterranean is in no way offset by economic development: 35 million jobs need to be created by 2015 in order to maintain current - already too high - unemployment rates.
8. A continuing unstable political and social environment is hampering private investment and unresolved conflicts stand in the way of much needed regional integration. At the same time, little progress has been made towards accountable and transparent government and human rights compliance, both important conditions for improving social cohesion and citizens' confidence in pursuing and sharing in their country's development.
9. The problems are piling up fast and the EU has to inject a greater dose of urgency into its Euro-Mediterranean policy if it really wants to achieve its original objective of creating an area of common security and solidarity, open markets and open societies across the Mediterranean.

10. A major problem in the southern Mediterranean remains the lack of transparency in governance and of active popular engagement in political structures. Remaining in power is a priority for all the existing regimes reluctant to transform political structures and ideologies which were established after, and legitimised by, their fight for decolonialisation and independence. This lack of adaptation and transformation is an important obstacle preventing their countries, under conditions of free and fair competition, from keeping pace with internal developments and changes in the world economy. It can also easily be seen from what follows that in virtually all the countries concerned, promising developments towards more democratic government have been reversed, using the fight against the terrorist threat as a pretext³.

11. At the end of the 1980s, Algeria started to transform its political system by allowing forms of political pluralism and introducing certain democratic rights.
12. Soon however, the electoral success of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) Islamic Salvation Front in the 1992 legislative elections, followed by the cancelling of the result by the armed forces, led to a violent internal strife which lasted until 1998 and caused 150 000 deaths. The Army fought to annihilate the armed Islamic factions while confirming its dominant position in politics.
13. After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the Algerian regime quickly began to justify the civil war of the 1990s as an early phase in the fight against radical Islamic terrorism which had tried to overturn the existing order in the country. At the same time, the authorities started cooperating intensively with the United States in the war on terror. Since then, the United States has regarded Algeria as an indispensable regional player and ally.
14. Algeria now has a cooperation programme with NATO and has already participated in joint NATO naval exercises.
15. Although botched economic reforms and the disengagement of the state from many sectors have resulted in further social deterioration and the pauperisation of large sectors of the population, with continuing high levels of unemployment, the Front de Libération Nationale (FNL) (National Liberation Front) continues to be the dominant political force in a system based on clientelism and corruption.
16. The press, which since 1989 had become fairly liberal, is now increasingly under pressure and journalists are being prosecuted and put behind bars. The authoritarian power of the government is again, in this area at least, being consolidated with the fight against international terrorism as a convenient excuse.
17. In recent years, some 20 journalists have received prison sentences and fines for insult, slander or other offences. The most widely known of them, Mohamed Benchichou, has been serving a two-year prison sentence since June 2004. He was condemned for fraud a few months after having published a book critical of President Bouteflika. On 3 May, International Day for Liberty of the Press, the President of Algeria announced that all condemned journalists except Mohamed Benchichou would be reprieved⁴.
18. Important reforms began several years ago in the energy sector. After a struggle with unions and other vested interests − including the military − the government succeeded in passing a new hydrocarbon law and depoliticising the energy sector. It established a special independent regulatory commission for the energy sector, separate from Sonatrach, the national company, forcing the company to compete with international firms for the exploration of domestic energy sources and production. Pressure has also been put on Sonatrach to expand its international operations significantly. Energy Minister Chekib Khelil has moreover attracted significant international investment into Algeria's energy sector⁵.
19. On 10 March, Russia and Algeria announced they had concluded an agreement on Russian deliveries of military equipment to Algeria for a total amount of US$ 7.5 billion, including combat, fighter and training aircraft, tanks and anti-missile systems.
20. With this new equipment, the Algerian armed forces will be far superior to those of Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Analysts have noted that Algeria's objective is clearly to confirm its leadership of the Maghreb and that it has the financial resources to achieve it.

21. Morocco is a highly active participant in both the Barcelona Process and the ENP. A Euro-Med Association Agreement between the EU and Morocco has been in force since March 2000 and the country is committed to far-reaching reforms, as formulated in the agreed ENP Action Plan.
22. In the 1990s, the Moroccan monarchy decided to reform political life by legalising an Islamist party, the Justice and Development Party (PJD) and at the same time took steps to bring together the opposition and the government to create a kind of controlled alternative, thereby giving the appearance of a constitutional monarchy while in reality the king remained the ultimate power and arbiter in political issues.
23. At the last legislative elections, in 2002, the PJD was the third party in terms of the number of seats held and continues to fulfil a role as an officially recognised rallying point for Islamic voters and a link between them and the monarch. Nevertheless, the authorities readily associate it with radical Islamic elements and even with national and international radical Islamic terrorism.
24. Of all the North African countries, Morocco has shown the greatest willingness to promote a multi-party system and in particular to include Islamist parties in the political spectrum. An important reason for this attitude was the Algerian experience and the need to provide an outlet for popular discontent with the social and economic situation.
25. At the 2002 legislative elections, the PJD, which won 42 seats in the parliament, was said to have negotiated its representation with the Palace. The PJD is a political movement which accommodates different ideologies and competing leaders and positions and this naturally is leading to growing internal tension. A larger Islamist movement, al-Adl wal Ihsan (Justice and Charity) has not been allowed into the official political system because it disputes the legitimacy of the monarchy.
26. Despite progress, many Moroccans remain dissatisfied with political developments in their country. According to some, the country is democratising too fast, which could lead to the imposition of a reactionary moral order by Islamist parties. Others agree that the King and his advisors will continue to control the country and that democratic reform is only a smokescreen. It is a fact that most recent important reforms in the country have been initiated by the Palace, and that politicians have been unwilling or unable to undertake reform without the king leading the way.
27. After the May 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca, the Moroccan Government introduced anti-terrorist legislation allowing considerably increased leeway for the security forces.
28. Many problems with Morocco's economy remain to be solved. In 2005, it faced a 63% rise in the cost of its oil imports. Asian competition has caused its exports to fall sharply and demand growth in the EU has slowed. In order to protect the population from economic disaster, the government spent over twice the amount budgeted for food subsidies in 2005.
29. The United States has for a long time considered Morocco a trusted ally and, following the political reforms of the early 1990s, a model for other countries in the region. Mutual cooperation between the two intensified considerably after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States.
30. In 2004, Morocco was granted the status of a preferred non-member ally of the Atlantic Alliance, which allows for narrow defence cooperation. In 2005, it concluded a free trade agreement with the United States with the ultimate objective of establishing a customs union in 2014.

31. In July 1995, Tunisia was the first country to sign a Euro-Med Association Agreement. This came into force in March 1998. As with other, similar agreements, both parties are committed to strengthening political dialogue and trade, to the development of an economic and financial partnership and closer social and cultural ties. Of all the Euro-Med partners, Tunisia has made the most progress in preparation for the establishment of a free trade area with the EU by 2010.
32. Tunisia has been quite successful in managing to absorb higher energy costs. Although its agricultural output has declined, the economy continues growing at a reasonable pace as a result of a burgeoning tourist trade, foreign investment and migrant workers' remittances. The country is also reducing its foreign debt.
33. There is considerable progress in key social issues, which has led to the consolidation of a large and well-educated middle class. An economic reform programme, supported by the European Union, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has yielded positive results. It is also worth mentioning that gender equality programmes have opened up significant opportunities to Tunisian women who are active, highly productive and effective in society and are also securing a fair share of the positions available in all centres of decision-making.
34. However, the government's progress in the fields of political freedom and human rights remains largely negative. Several human rights organisations, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other organisations, have highlighted the worsening of the situation there and the human rights abuses consistently practised by the Tunisian authorities: these include the growing repression of human rights defenders; torture, continuing restrictions on the Tunisian media and on civil society; unfair trials of opposition figures and the increasing use of military tribunals. The government also imposes severe restrictions on freedom of expression and association.
35. After its earlier cautious overtures towards political pluralism, the government banned Al Nahdha (Renaissance), the political party of the Islamic faction, when it became clear that the latter could become a serious challenger to the regime. The highly effective machinery of state repression in Tunisia at present targets not only Islamic and other opponents, many of whose leaders are living in exile, but also controls the media and the national trade union.
36. President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and his governing party remain the sole and dominant power in the country. Like its neighbours, Tunisia has exploited its position as a bulwark against radical Islamic forces, and reinforced its importance in the fight against radical Islamic terrorism.
37. The EU has given manifest priority to the economic chapter of the Euro-Med process, but human rights organisations are calling for it also to be consistent with the terms of the Association Agreement which contains a legally binding human rights clause.

38. In 1999, the third Euro-Med Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Stuttgart, with Libya as a special guest of the Presidency, agreed that Libya could become a full member of the Barcelona Process after the lifting of the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, provided that the country committed itself fully to the acquis of the Barcelona Process.
39. Since then, an agreement has been concluded, finally resolving the Lockerbie affair. Libya has renounced weapons of mass destruction and agreed to provide full transparency in that respect. It has renounced its support for terrorists and is cooperating in the fight against international terrorism.
40. UN sanctions were lifted in 2003 following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1503. However, Libya is still reluctant to commit itself to the acquis of the Barcelona Process, because it is worried that by adhering to this process, it will wheel in the Trojan horse of economic and political reform that it is unwilling to introduce. Furthermore, Colonel Gadaffi profoundly disagrees with the EU's policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and also wants to play the role of indispensable mediator between the EU and the African world.
41. As a consequence, the EU and Libya have not yet started negotiating an Association Agreement and Libya is not part of the European Neighbourhood Policy. It is an observer in the Euro-Med Partnership and attends the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Ministers, the high-level political dialogue and the Euro-Med Committee.
42. Although the country does not yet meet international human rights standards and, while significant steps have still to be taken towards a more liberal civil society, it has to be admitted that Libya has indeed made some progress. In January 2005, the government abolished the People's Courts, which condemned political opponents to imprisonment or even death without due process. Some political prisoners have been released and others have been granted new trials. The government has also said it is prosecuting a number of security officials on charges of torture as well as pursuing reform of its penal code to minimise the use of the death penalty. Recently, the Libyan Supreme Court decided to refer the case involving Bulgarian and Palestinian hospital staff back for a new trial.
43. Nevertheless, the radical Islamic opposition has been severely repressed by the killing or imprisonment of its leaders. As is the case with its neighbours, Libya's cooperation in the fight against international terrorism is being used to its advantage by categorising its political opposition as part of the international terrorist movement.
44. Libya, victim of its own independence or isolation, despite its having vast fossil fuel resources, is facing major structural hurdles in meeting its optimistic production target of 3 million barrels per day by 2015. It has missed out on a generation of knowledge and technology and faces human resource constraints. Every step forward is also accompanied by a battle between the old and the new guard over the pace and extent of reforms.

45. Egypt is a leading Arab country and an essential partner in shaping political events in the Middle East - not only because of its demographic weight, but also because of its position as a historic centre of Arab learning and culture and the well deserved levels of development it has achieved.
46. Rapid growth in its population, however, has led to a serious economic and social crisis and increasing dissatisfaction among the population. Economic reforms were at first postponed because of resistance from certain vested interests but, since autumn 2004, the government has been engaged in implementing drastic economic reform.
47. Egypt concluded a tripartite agreement with Israel and the US on "Qualified Industrial Zones" in December 2004. This envisages the opening of the US market, without quotas or customs duties for Egyptian products under certain conditions, especially to support the Egyptian textile industry. The government further introduced an antitrust law, lower customs duties and fiscal reform. Reforms are also being introduced in the banking sector and in some sectors of industry.
48. All these reforms have certainly improved economic growth, but not sufficiently to meet an increased demand for jobs and the need to bring down the official unemployment rate which stands at around 10%. The institutional structure of the state and administrative red tape continue to be major obstacles.
49. The government remains under the control of an authoritarian and militarised regime. Nevertheless, interesting political developments have recently taken place. Because of Egypt's demographic and cultural importance, such developments do not go unnoticed in the rest of the Arab world.
50. In May 2005, a referendum supported a constitutional amendment which allowed several candidates − under specific conditions − to stand in presidential elections. While in the past a single candidate was confirmed by a form of national referendum, voters were on this occasion allowed to choose between 10 candidates. In the presidential elections held on 7 September 2005, President Mubarak was re-elected for a fifth consecutive term with 88% of the votes cast and a turnout of 23%. Parliamentary elections took place in December 2005. They were preceded by police harassment of opposition candidates and other clear cases of electoral fraud. 71% of the vote went to the governing National Democratic Party but supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, officially banned from political activity, gained 23% of the votes cast and, standing as independent candidates, won 88 seats, becoming an opposition party to be reckoned with in the people's Assembly.
51. At the same time, other political movements have recently emerged, such as Kifaya ("Enough") and the media are relatively free to express political criticism. However, press law allows for prosecution for libel and "insult".
52. Analysts have noted that in Egypt − as in other Muslim countries - the Islamists who are active in politics are not a single, monolithic group. Many of them are engaged in serious discussion and examination of the renewal and adaptation of Islamic thought and political practice, including the latter's relationship with democratic government. Unlike the fundamentalist movements, they are forward looking, preferring practical solutions to a strictly doctrinal approach. Authenticity and modernity are not incompatible in their view and they insist that the Koran can be interpreted in the light of reason.
53. They recognise diversity among Muslims as a historic reality and reject fundamentalist one-party rule, advocating multi-partyism. According to these neo-Islamists, Islam does not exclude democracy. Adaptation and accommodation are possible, as long as the basic pillars of religion are respected and obedience to Sharia law is observed. In their view, rightful interpretation of the Koran must indicate the limits of accommodation and compromise.
54. It is far too early to speak of an Islamist political spring in Cairo, but there are signs of an intellectual debate which may have some influence on political thinking amongst Islamists in the rest of the Arab world⁶ .
55. It is clear, however, that the attempt to liberalise Islamist pluralism has curtailed opportunities for the development of other secular parties, which could help establish a political balance and lead to further democratisation and modernisation.
56. There can be little doubt that President Mubarak is determined to keep the country under his control. After the relative success of the Muslim Brotherhood in the parliamentary elections, he decided to delay municipal elections, due in April 2006, for two years, seemingly in order to preserve the dominant position of the ruling National Democratic Party.
57. The Muslim Brotherhood has alleged that the postponement of elections was calculated to ensure that Gamal Mubarak, the President's son, would not face a strong challenger if he runs for president in 2011. Control of local councils and parliamentary seats are vital for an independent (Muslim Brotherhood) candidate for the presidency. The government has defended its decision by arguing that it forms part of the President's promised reforms decentralising and granting more power to local authorities⁷.
58. President Mubarak's pre-election promise to amend the Constitution further to allow a widening of the spectrum of political parties has not been fulfilled. The creation of new opposition parties has been restricted, and judges who questioned the integrity of parliamentary elections have become the focus of criminal investigations.
59. At present, the opposition parties are still weak and divided. The regime has not yet succeeded in finding a way to meet Islamists' demand for full participation in the political process. The logical response to this situation is pressure from the streets, often culminating in repression on the part of the security forces, and continuing confusion between religion and politics. Together, the two are a recipe for unrest and instability.
60. A serious obstacle to full enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms is the Emergency Law, which has been applied without interruption since 1981. The state of emergency allows for arbitrary arrest, detention without trial and restriction of freedom of assembly. Court rulings under the Emergency Law often circumvent constitutional and international safeguards such as the guarantee of a fair and impartial trial.
61. Military courts normally try cases involving the armed forces, but during a state of emergency, as at present, the President may transfer cases, including political cases, to these courts, and he has made use of this prerogative. Decisions by the military courts are not subject to review by the Court of Cassation (or final appeal).
62. The government owns and operates all ground-based television stations and has extensive control over printing and distribution of newspapers, including those that support the opposition.
63. There have, however, been some advances in terms of human rights. Police officers have been convicted of torture, and long-term detainees held without being brought to trial and sentencing have been released. Mention should also be made of the banning of the practice of flogging in prisons, a new Personal Status Law improving the status of women, the creation of a National Council for Human Rights, the abolition of penal sentencing to hard labour and of the State Security Courts (but not the Security Courts established under the Emergency Law, which are still operational) and the creation of a Human Rights Committee within the People's Assembly.

64. The "coalition" against terrorism across the southern Mediterranean countries has yet to prove effective, both in legitimising this worldwide goal and as an instrument for driving forward democratic progress and addressing the challenges of political modernisation of Islamic parties.
65. Instead, repression has acquired new legitimacy, allowing traditionally authoritarian state structures to be consolidated and slowing down the transition to political pluralism on which some governments had reluctantly embarked.
66. In that context, it should be mentioned that in February 2006, US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld visited Tunisia, Algiers and Rabat to reinforce US military links with those allied nations in the fight against international terrorism. His view was that they made a great deal of progress by showing that they were able to manage the problem of terrorism on their own soil.
67. Together with the United States, these countries have growing and serious concerns over the grey area of the Sahel, a lawless region not properly controlled by any state authority, and readily used by terrorist groups as a sanctuary. Morocco is worried that the Polisario Front is making use of the area, while Algeria is concerned that residual elements of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) are using it to hide out in.
68. However, this concern for their vital participation in the global war on terror does not address other, equally urgent, problems of those countries and of this important region. There is a need to look into the future and consider what is likely to occur - even if the war on terror ends successfully - if our southern partners have fallen into still deeper economic recession, with the same, or even worse, rates of economic, social and political development as today. They cannot, nor can Europe afford them to be, the victims of an uncertain victory.
69. The anticipated causal link between economic and political liberalisation, a central element in the EU philosophy underlying the Barcelona Process, has not materialised in practice⁸. The slow, incremental transformation of regimes in the southern Mediterranean has not diminished the latter's capacities for holding on to power, reproducing themselves or pursuing policies of their choice within the given international and material constraints.
70. In most cases, political reform, coinciding with or in the wake of economic reform, has been held below the threshold that would indicate regime change. Sometimes, economic liberalisation has contributed directly to further restrictions on liberties. It should be noted here, that, historically, economic liberalisation has only had an impact on political liberalisation and democratisation when and where it favoured or prompted the emergence of new power centres capable of and ready to challenge the ruling regime.
71. Part of the strategy of the Barcelona Process was also to achieve economic development through foreign investment and private sector activities based on a free market model. In fact, foreign investment in southern Mediterranean states has failed to increase. Rather, on the contrary, much potential domestic investment has leaked away through the flight of capital into more profitable environments abroad.
72. The EU has always considered good governance and transparency as key drivers of investment. Recently many experts have emphasised the importance of other factors, such as appropriate physical infrastructure and the human resource base, as important considerations in determining investment direction. Recent Arab Human Development Reports have clearly indicated the serious lack of these two factors in the Arab world.
73. Of course, no one can or wishes to force the direction of investment movements. However, governments could consider injecting state-funded investment while promoting social and political change and implementing confidence building policies.
74. In your Rapporteur's view, it is obvious that all these factors are closely related and cannot be separated in any strategy to improve the living conditions of the peoples in the southern Mediterranean, and in Europe's ongoing dialogue with creative partners. Partnership has to be based on trust, solidarity, respect and recognition of the dignity of the other and mainly − the thing most wanted by our Arab friends − an equal footing.

75. The political situation in Lebanon has been one of considerable turmoil over the last 15 months. The assassination of ex-Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on 14 February 2005 called into question the occupation by Syria that has dominated Lebanon's political life since 1976. It triggered a profound political crisis, bringing hundreds of thousands of Lebanese out onto the streets in massive demonstrations that called for free and fair elections and a sovereign Lebanon freed from the Syrian presence.
76. Legislative elections were held in June 2005 but did not result in the political renewal which many, especially the younger sections of the electorate had hoped for. Many of the political leaders who played a part in the civil war are still in key positions and the country remains divided between regional and religious factions and leaders along traditional lines.
77. To investigate the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the United Nations set up an International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) headed by German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1595, adopted on 7 April 2005. An initial UN fact finding mission found that Syria, with its troop presence, was primarily responsible for the political tension that preceded the assassination. The UNIIIC has not yet been able to finish its investigation and draw final conclusions. Following UN Security Council Resolution 1559, and after being subjected to heavy pressure to do so, Syria withdrew its last military units from Lebanese territory on 26 April 2005.
78. The security situation in south Lebanon remains fragile for another reason: the fact that the Lebanese government has failed to respond to international appeals to deploy its army at the border, allowing Hezbollah to fill the vacuum with its armed militia. Hezbollah justifies its continuing military presence in that border area on the basis of the occupation by Israel, since the 1967 war, of 12 square kilometres of land known as the Shebaa farms, which Israel regards as Syrian, and therefore part of the occupied Golan Heights, whereas Lebanon claims the farms as part of its territory.
79. Another serious problem remains the continuing presence of some 370 000 Palestinians on Lebanese territory, living mostly in one of 12 overpopulated refugee camps run by UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East). The resettlement of these Palestinian refugees, whose presence is considered to be potentially destabilising to the country's delicate demographic balance, is a priority issue for Lebanon.
80. The EU, through the European Council, has repeatedly reiterated its support for Lebanon's unity, stability and independence, and reminded its neighbours - particularly Syria - of their obligations to respect the country's sovereignty. It has condemned the violence perpetrated against ordinary citizens, journalists and politicians in Lebanon and has expressed grave concern at the continuing intimidation and attacks against freedom of expression - particularly the recent offensives following criticism of Syrian presence in Lebanon.
81. The European Council has reaffirmed its full support for the Government of Lebanon and is urging it to extend its authority throughout the country and to tackle economic and political reform urgently, as agreed at the Core Group meeting held in New York in September 2005. It has also reminded all concerned of their obligation to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1559 in its entirety, including the disbanding and disarmament of all militias.
82. The EU is Lebanon's principal trading partner (accounting for 50% of Lebanese imports and 20% of the country's total exports), followed by the United States, China and Syria. Lebanon and the European Community first established contractual relations in 1977 by signing a Cooperation Agreement that entered into force in November 1978.
83. Lebanon is one of the EU's long-standing partners in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The EU-Lebanon Association Agreement was signed on 17 June 2002 and ratified by Lebanon in December 2002 and by the European Parliament in January 2003. It entered into force on 1 April 2006. In the meantime, an Interim Agreement which entered into force on 1 March 2003, made it possible to implement the economic and commercial provisions of the Association Agreement.
84. Cooperation to counter terrorism is covered in a separate exchange of letters between Lebanon and the EU.
85. EU-Lebanon relations are likely to enter upon a renewed and more intense phase covering a much wider spectrum of fields of cooperation with the inclusion of Lebanon in the European Neighbourhood Policy. In its Decree of 27 January 2005, the Lebanese Government welcomed the European Neighbourhood Policy initiative. As a first step towards Lebanon's inclusion in this policy, the Commission adopted a Country Report on Lebanon in March 2005 providing an assessment of bilateral relations between the EU and Lebanon. Negotiations on a joint Action Plan have not yet been concluded.

86. Jordan's objective is to become a modern Arab Islamic state and reconcile Islam and modernity. In this context, it is firmly opposed to the radicalisation of Islam and has been at the forefront of leading Arab countries fighting extremism through the Amman Message which seeks to propagate the idea of a moderate Islam compatible with human rights and democracy. Following the terrorist attacks on 9 November 2005, the Jordanian Government is determined actively to promote the Amman Message in the country and in the region. It is also fully committed to cooperation in the fight against international terrorism.
87. The government's priorities for political development lie in four main areas: equality for women in the political and economic fields, development of an independent and effective judiciary, drafting advanced democratic laws governing elections and political parties and to encourage a free media.
88. Freedom of the media is not yet fully guaranteed in Jordan. The government has developed an agenda for moving towards freedom of the media, which includes the creation of an institution to supervise that there is a suitable environment in which the media can operate.
89. In recent years, a number of measures have been taken to improve management of Jordan's public sector. The country's ranking in the 2005 Transparency International Index is 37 (one of the best performances in the region). The government has shown a commitment to increasing transparency and accountability with the recent creation of an audit bureau and an anti-corruption department.
90. Several organisations have reported a worsening of the human rights situation in Jordan after 2001, particularly in the field of freedom of expression and association. A 2001 temporary law, endorsed by parliament in 2004, requires organisers of public rallies to obtain permission from the local governor three days before calling a public assembly. Numerous detentions of political demonstrators have been reported on grounds of public order, involvement with Islamist groups or terrorist activities.
91. The EU is playing an increasingly important role in the promotion of democracy and human rights in Jordan, through its support to NGOs and community-based organisations. The EU's Sharaka Programme, implemented in coordination with the Ministry of Planning, is the first of its kind, providing comprehensive financial and technical support to human rights NGOs throughout the kingdom.
92. EU-Jordanian relations are regulated by an Association Agreement signed on 24 November, 1997 which entered into force on 1 May 2002. The EU-Jordan Association Agreement replaces the former Cooperation Agreement dating back to 1977.
93. Jordan has traditionally shown an interest in upgrading its relationship with the EU. After the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) initiative, Jordan began negotiations with the EU on an Action Plan and, in 2005, was among five countries to adopt such a plan - covering a new and ambitious agenda in the political, social and economic fields directed towards sharing common values with the EU - for the next three to five years.
94. In the economic sphere, the EU has supported private sector development in Jordan through direct services to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and SME support institutions, financial support schemes to SMEs, vocational training and human resources development, institutional strengthening and policy support. Within the MEDA framework, the EU has also provided Jordan with € 458 million over the period 1995-2004.
95. Jordan has made considerable efforts in past years to liberalise its economy, notably in investment and trade legislation, and is making progress on a programme of privatisation. The country is relatively open to foreign investment and conditions in Jordan are considered generally favourable to this, by comparison with those in the rest of the region. Foreign investment levels have increased substantially over the last few years.
96. Despite a relatively good economic performance, Jordan has failed to extend the benefits of economic growth to the poor. More than 14% of Jordanians still live below the poverty line. On the other hand, it is one of the better performers in the region in terms of life expectancy at birth (72 years), adult literacy (91%), access to basic services and education (enrolments stand respectively at 91%, 80%, and 31% for primary, secondary and tertiary levels).
97. Jordan currently suffers from a structural trade deficit, with imports almost twice as high as exports. The deficit is partially covered by a surplus in services, mainly remittances and tourism.
98. The EU is Jordan's main source of imports, accounting for around one third of the total - consisting mainly of machinery, transport material and chemical and agricultural products. On the other hand, the EU is Jordan's fourth export market. Jordanian exports are concentrated in mineral products (25 %), chemicals (50 %), and oils (12 %).
99. In recent years, Jordan has embarked on the process of integrating into the world and regional economy becoming a member of the World Trade Organisation in April 2000 and concluding Free Trade Agreements with the USA (2001), EFTA (2002) and the Agadir Agreement with Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia.
100. The EU considers Jordan to be a responsible and positive contributor to stability and modernisation in the region.
101. The country's active role in promoting political reform through the Arab League and constructive and balanced attitude to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict makes Jordan a highly valued partner in the Middle East peace process and in the economic and political modernisation of the Middle East.
102. Jordan has intensified its attempts to increase cooperation with its neighbours. This includes the Trade and Partnership Cooperation Agreement signed with Israel, cooperation with Egypt to bring peace to the Middle East including an offer to play a part in training and advising the Palestinian security services in the event of an Israeli disengagement from Gaza and the West Bank and cooperation with other Arab countries to support the normalisation of Iraq. International cooperation and cooperation with other neighbouring countries has also increased.
103. Analysts have argued that Jordan enjoyed a wider range of political rights, before the launch of the Barcelona Process than in the period after 1995. Since 11 September 2001 especially, democratic conditions in Jordan have worsened. There has been no condemnation from the EU⁹ of the imposition of strict measures to regulate freedom of speech and human rights. Europe's Mediterranean Partnership remains important to Jordan because it provides the financial and technical assistance the country needs for further integration into the global economy. The objectives of the Barcelona Process are still far from having been achieved in Jordan and it is hoped that the more specific approach of the ENP will yield better results.

104. Negotiations for an Association Agreement between the European Union and Syria started in 1998, but little progress was made in the first four years. Negotiators from the Commission and the Syrian Government finally initialled the texts of the agreement on 19 October 2004. This has since been submitted to the political authorities of both sides (the Council in the case of the EU) for final approval and signature. Signature of the agreement by the European Council is dependent on Syria's cooperating with the independent UN Commission established to investigate the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and on its willingness to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions 1559, 1636 and 1644 on Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon and other related issues.
105. Syria has been part of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) since 1995, although it has not been heavily involved in the process in view of its differences with the EU over the Middle East peace process and the latter's relationship with Israel. Syria, along with Lebanon, boycotted the Euro-Med foreign ministers' meeting in Marseille in 2000 in order to show solidarity with the second Intifada. It only signed the Framework Convention, a necessary condition for the implementation of cooperation under the MEDA programme, in 2000. Since then, there has been economic cooperation under MEDA conditions and projects focusing on economic and administrative reform in both the private and public sector have been launched. Syria is gradually improving its take-up of MEDA cooperation funds.
106. The EU-Syria Association Agreement is similar to other Euro-Mediterranean Agreements. However, given EU concern with Syria's heavily protected economy, this agreement has more far-reaching and substantial provisions in a number of areas: dismantling tariffs on agricultural products, technical barriers to trade, trade in services, government procurement, intellectual property rights and trade dispute settlement machinery.
107. Following the succession, in 2000, of President Hafez al-Assad by his son, Bashar Al-Assad, progress in delivering the openings and reforms which were hoped for by many was slow. Economic reforms had started in some areas - primarily banking - but the economy, buoyed up by the petroleum and gas sector, continued to be heavily regulated. After government reforms in late 2001 which led to the appointment of a number of reform-minded ministers in the technical and industry ministries, progressing the negotiations with the EU and related economic and legal reforms acquired a higher priority. More recently, greater emphasis has been placed on this policy by Prime Minister Al-Otri's government which came to power in September 2003. Syria has started gradually to open up its centrally-planned economy to market-oriented reforms. The most important of these to date are the revision of Law No.10 (1991) creating more advantageous terms for foreign investment, and the new banking law, which, since 2003, has permitted the establishment of private banks with some foreign ownership. The exchange rate mechanism has also been simplified, although there is still a system of multiple, overvalued exchange rates.
108. The aim of the EU's institutionalised relationship with Syria is to support and encourage reforms emanating from within Syria rather than imposing a European model from without. With this approach, civil society is intended to play a key role, both as actor in and target of the reform process.
109. The central instrument for promoting economic reform in Syria has been the Syrian-European Business Centre (SEBC), created in 1996, which should help enhance the international competitiveness of Syria's private sector and the effectiveness of its business support institutions. Since 1996, the SEBC has provided support to over 3 500 companies and training for some 2 500 managers.
110. The human rights situation in Syria has not progressed to the extent that it was hoped when Bashar Al-Assad took over in 2000. In the first six months of his Presidency, a number of civil society organisations started holding "democracy forums" to discuss Syria's political future, calling for political freedoms. The following year, the authorities put an end to these activities and arrested and convicted leading opposition figures and human rights activists, provoking international protests and complaints from the EU.
111. Syria's international position deteriorated in 2005 after the investigation ordered by the United Nations into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on 14 February 2005. The investigation, which points to Syrian involvement, has regained momentum in recent weeks and Syria has reluctantly agreed to cooperate more constructively.
112. The Syrian regime recently took a number of steps in an effort to shore up support at home and satisfy critics abroad. In October 2005, it announced it would finally address the citizenship claims of thousands of its Kurdish residents. In early 2006, the government released five political prisoners, but still left hundreds of others behind bars. Legislation was also be passed allowing political parties to challenge the Ba'ath Party's monopoly on power.
113. For many years, Iran has been Syria's most important ally in the Middle East. Both actively support Hezbollah in Lebanon, not only as an effective tool to keep up pressure on Israel from the North, but also as an instrument for wielding power in Lebanese politics.
114. Political analysts have argued that Syria has exploited the uproar over cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed, published by a Danish newspaper, in order to create the impression that the downfall of the present regime could usher in a radical Islamist government, with negative consequences for the entire region.
115. Although it has officially withdrawn all its troops and intelligence forces from Lebanon, Syria continues to try to wield influence in Lebanon, if only through its close relations with Hezbollah, and is constantly seeking to generate instability in that country.
116. Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt have been trying to keep Iran's influence on Syria and the region in check, arguing that Syria's interests are best served by a partnership with those Arab states.

117. Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation has not been very successful. Although the 1995 Barcelona Declaration clearly recognised that the northern and southern Mediterranean countries were facing political, economic and social challenges calling for a "coordinated overall response", it has become obvious over the past 10 years that the Barcelona Process did not provide the appropriate framework to cope with the security challenges of the region¹⁰.
118. Since then, there have been developments with an important impact on the security situation in the region and on the methods of dealing with it. In that respect, mention should be made of:

119. The EU's objective to draw up a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, institutionalising mechanisms for promoting and maintaining stability in the region and with the potential to become a collective security system was rejected by a number of Arab states. In November 2000, the Marseilles ministerial meeting removed the Charter from the cooperation agenda.
120. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 certainly provided the impetus needed to overcome the failure of the efforts to establish the Charter for Peace and Stability. In April 2002, the Valencia Action Plan¹¹ brought new issues to the security agenda, in particular conflict prevention and crisis management, the ESDP dialogue, the fight against drugs, organised crime and terrorism and cooperation in matters related to Justice and Home Affairs. Association Agreements and institutional dialogues under the European Neighbourhood Policy also play an important part in the implementation of a common security agenda in the Mediterranean region.
121. Still, there were difficulties in finding common ground. The southern Mediterranean countries did not agree with being classified as "risk" countries and could not therefore be included in the geographic area marked out for possible intervention. The use of pro-active means of conflict prevention and crisis management was not acceptable either. Lack of agreement on basic elements led to the conclusion that a common policy on these matters could not be achieved. No agreement could be reached on a common definition of terrorism either, but here joint assessment of the threat made pragmatic cooperation possible.
122. The original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership security dialogue has now been replaced by the ESDP dialogue with the EU's Mediterranean partners, with the objective of sharing information and exploring the possibility for cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management. This dialogue also provides an opportunity for cooperation in EU peacekeeping missions.
123. In time, the ESDP dialogue might lead to ESDP involvement in activities to reform defence and armed forces in southern Mediterranean countries. The EU is well aware of the fact that at present, security policy in most of those countries is largely in the hands of the military, with very little involvement of civilian authorities. In general, there is also little separation between internal and external security forces, with the military playing a decisive role in protecting the regimes in power against any internal or external threat. Moreover, high levels of defence spending go hand in hand with a serious lack of transparency and public accountability.
124. The priorities on the EU security agenda for the southern Mediterranean are now clearly focused on the fight against illegal migration, trafficking and terrorism, apparently to the relief of the countries concerned. Judicial and police reforms, and also the strengthening of border management capabilities are an important part of this cooperation, and the EU is providing considerable financial resources to its southern partners to accomplish these goals. Recent Association Agreements with Mediterranean partners include specific articles on security cooperation related to combating the new security threats, and these issues are also included in the institutional dialogues under the European Neighbourhood Policy.
125. However, although the EU argues that this new security cooperation is consistent with and supportive of its objective of promoting democracy and good governance in the region, it has actually resulted in less accountability and respect for human rights on the part of security forces in southern Mediterranean countries.
126. The European Security Strategy, adopted in December 2003, confirmed that the "Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe", arguing that without this, there would be little chance of dealing with other problems in the region.
127. It also stated that the EU's interests demanded "continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process", while "a broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered". The document also clearly linked security with development and democratic governance.
128. Later, in June 2004, the European Council adopted a final report on an "EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East" with the objective of establishing appropriate consultation and cooperation mechanisms for enhanced political dialogue on conflict prevention and crisis management, counterterrorism and non-proliferation. Here again, the volatile situation in the region itself and the impact of the war in Iraq, on developments in the Middle East and on its immediate neighbours made it virtually impossible to initiate a meaningful dialogue.
129. If the EU really wishes to make progress towards a serious security dialogue with its Mediterranean partners it will have to;

130. Two important questions then remain which also demonstrate the problems of a common security policy among governments that adhere to completely different concepts of governance. Most southern Mediterranean governments are autocratic regimes with an outward appearance of possessing democratic structures. They regard the fight against the common threat of radical Islamic terrorism as an opportunity also to neutralise any political opposition with religious connotations in their own countries.
131. The same governments are reluctant to accept the EU's insistence on democratisation of state structures as part of an agenda to establish security, stability and prosperity in the region. They are aware that any significant democratisation or modernisation of such structures would ultimately lead to the collapse of the existing regime and the loss of both political and economic power by the elite.

132. The reasons for the lack of progress in security cooperation under the Barcelona Process have already been discussed. The continuing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is one, although it is less important than some would argue. Other contributing factors are a lack of determination on the part of a number of EU countries, lack of clarity about the aims of that cooperation and lack of agreement among the different partners about common interests. Moreover, southern partners often complain that there is no real partnership because the EU, for the most part, puts forward proposals it has prepared without their involvement.
133. A number of countries therefore decided on a less ambitious initiative, with fewer countries involved, limited to a smaller geographical area where there are no major tensions and calculated, in the longer term, to revitalise the political and security chapter of the Barcelona Process.
134. This resulted in a meeting of Defence Ministers of the 5 + 5 (Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia) in December 2004, who signed a declaration of intent and an Action Plan for 2005. They decided to create a "light" structure with one ministerial meeting a year, two steering committees and ad-hoc committees for expert meetings, if needed. In the 2005 Action Plan, drafted by common agreement, they decided to cooperate on defence ministry contributions to maritime surveillance in the western Mediterranean and to civil protection and airspace security across the Mediterranean region.
135. Both sides have shown a definite interest in migration issues. The southern Mediterranean countries have to deal with migrants in transit, immigration, in particular from West African countries, and emigration. Such movements may also give rise to criminal activities such as trafficking in drugs and human beings.
136. In the 2006 Action Plan, more specific fields for attention have been identified connected with the three areas of the 2005 Action Plan which have been renewed. The 5 + 5 Process has also made it possible to organise seminars and exchange information. All the southern participants have expressed their satisfaction over what they regard as a real partnership. It has provided a forum of choice for meetings between the military, helping create a climate of mutual confidence where partners listen to one another.

137. The ENP has its origins in an initiative taken early in 2002 and originally aimed at Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. In further preparatory discussions that same year, the southern Mediterranean countries were included and the initiative was extended to the three South Caucasus states in 2004. Russia did not wish to participate, preferring to cooperate with the EU on a different basis.
138. The main aim of the ENP is to work together with countries that are or will become neighbours of the EU, trying to bring them ever closer to European values and standards to help them become more prosperous and stable and develop into reliable partners. A wide variety of cooperation programmes and projects are intended to ensure that any existing dividing lines disappear and no new ones emerge. The EU emphasises that, as far as the Mediterranean region is concerned, the ENP is additional and complementary to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.
139. Countries in the Mediterranean and the Middle East covered by the ENP are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia. It also concerns the Palestinian Authority.
140. Euro-Med agreements are to remain the basis of the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean partners. However, ENP Action Plans, to be negotiated and agreed with each individual partner, will be adapted to the various neighbours' specific circumstances. They identify a limited number of key priorities and are supposed to offer real incentives for reform. There will be EU aid to support implementation and progress in implementation is subject to joint monitoring. The European Commission will issue regular progress reports which, in time, could lead to the EU offering a wide-ranging European Neighbourhood Agreement, whose content and scope still have to be specified.
141. The Action Plans emphasise political objectives such as respect for specific human rights and democratic principles far more clearly than has hitherto been the case in the EU's relations with its southern Mediterranean neighbours. They also specifically mention cooperation over the fight against terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ensuring international justice through support for the International Criminal Court.
142. In its efforts to intensify its relations with neighbours and prevent new dividing lines emerging, the EU is adopting a specific policy of including them whenever possible in a variety of European networks. It is also stepping up cross-border cooperation with neighbouring regions. Such cooperation, however, invariably goes hand in hand with pressure on those neighbours to improve control over their borders and implement customs reforms.
143. EU Action Plans have already been negotiated with Israel, Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia. Jordan and Morocco have committed themselves to far reaching reforms. Tunisia has undertaken to carry out major human rights reforms. The Palestinian Authority has also given firm commitments to reform.
144. In March 2005, the European Commission adopted country reports for Egypt, whose Association Agreement has entered into force, and for Lebanon, where entry into force of the Association Agreement is imminent. These country reports provide an analysis of political, economic and institutional reforms.
145. The Commission has now started work jointly with Egypt and Lebanon to prepare Action Plans for these countries as well. Progress in consultations with Lebanon will depend on how the internal political situation in that country develops.
146. The Algerian Parliament recently ratified Algeria's Association Agreement with the EU and the European Commission now intends to prepare a country report. At present, the Algerian Government is reluctant to take the next step which would be the negotiations on an Action Plan. This is because the political leadership does not want to be too closely linked to the EU.
147. In October 2004, the EU signed an Association Agreement with Syria, but the European Parliament has made it clear that its agreement is subject to the implementation of reforms in the fields of political freedom and human rights which have been announced by the Syrian authorities.
148. The wide range of different programmes in support of the EU's external action is now being replaced by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), although recent Council decisions to curtail the proposed growth of the EU budget have also led to a scaling down of ENPI commitments.
149. The establishment of an ENP encompassing all neighbouring and near neighbour countries may in fact be the most efficient way of dealing with a widely divergent group of states, but such an approach could also give rise to problems.
150. The ENP includes both potential EU members and countries likely to remain outside the EU. However, if in the future southern Mediterranean states achieve a high level of commonality of values and standards with the EU, including in regard to democratic government, the EU might have problems maintaining good relations were it to continue to refuse them membership status¹².
151. Another real challenge is that a number of the ENP partners are still governed by authoritarian regimes, are embroiled in unsolved conflicts with their neighbours or even continuing conflicts on their own territory. How much energy is the EU prepared to put into the solution of such conflicts? Does it prefer to remain hostage to those who have an interest in the continued existence of such conflicts, which have a negative influence on government authority and are a serious obstacle to foreign investment and economic growth.
152. Regional integration in the southern Mediterranean, an important factor in order to establish prosperity and stability in that region, is not a priority of the ENP, which is more specifically bilateral. This remains a role for the Barcelona Process. But it should be noted that the past 10 years of that Process have demonstrated how little can be achieved when no attractive incentives are available to push partners into action.
153. At present, it is too early to say whether the ENP will strengthen or weaken the Barcelona Process. There is general agreement that the latter, when it was established in 1995, was far too ambitious in its objectives. Imposing the same rhythm of progress on a group of countries with widely divergent capacities and ambitions was in fact a recipe for failure.
154. Its pragmatic and tailor-made approach may be an advantage to the ENP, but those same characteristics could also result in the further weakening of the original Barcelona objective to achieve greater cooperation with and integration of the southern Mediterranean partners.

155. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue was initiated in 1994, and, along with the Atlantic Alliance, involves seven countries of the Mediterranean region: Algeria (since 2000), Egypt, Israel, Jordan (since 1995), Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.
156. The aims of the Dialogue are to contribute to regional security and stability, and achieve better mutual understanding and mutual confidence-building. Obviously, NATO's intention is to work with its Mediterranean partners on its own greatest security concerns, in particular, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failing states and the dangers associated with uncontrolled movements of people, arms and drugs.
157. In principle, the Dialogue is not limited to its current participants or contents. If required, both can be subject to change and expansion. Although it has a predominantly bilateral NATO + 1 structure, it also allows for multilateral NATO + 7 meetings.
158. Each of the partners is offered the same basis for cooperation and discussion, but is free to choose the extent and intensity of its participation, which can also be done through the establishment of an Individual Cooperation Programme.
159. The Dialogue is intended to reinforce and complement other international initiatives in the region. The Mediterranean Dialogue foreign ministers met for the first time 10 years after the Dialogue was first established. The first meeting at defence minister level took place in February 2006, when the discussion revolved around the possibilities of expanding cooperation on defence reform, training and the response to natural and man-made disasters.
160. There is an annual programme of work containing practical cooperation measures such as the organisation of seminars and workshops and other practical activities in defence related fields. Members of the military from Dialogue partner countries are also invited to observe and at times to participate in NATO exercises and attend NATO courses.
161. A first meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staffs took place in November 2004. Since then, such meetings have become a regular part of the Mediterranean Dialogue. Conscious that 10 years of Dialogue had yielded no more results than friendly consultations and exchanges of view between the partners, the NATO Istanbul Summit in June 2004 set up the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) to broaden the Dialogue by including a further four objectives:

162. Although the ICI is open to countries in the region that subscribe to its aims and content, no further countries have as yet become part of the ICI or the Mediterranean Dialogue. It remains to be seen whether the ICI has provided sufficient impetus for a quantitative leap from limited contact to far more extensive political and practical cooperation, or, in the words of NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, from dialogue to genuine partnership.
163. NATO emphasises that the Mediterranean Dialogue is based on joint ownership, non-discrimination, self-differentiation and complementarity. In regard to the last of these principles, the Alliance maintains that it wants to complement the efforts of other organisations and individual countries in the region rather than duplicate or complicate them, while making the point that it has the comparative advantage of practical cooperation.
164. Through the ICI, NATO is seeking to build new ties with countries in the Broader Middle East outside the more established Mediterranean Dialogue. Several Gulf states have shown an interest in cooperating with NATO on defence and security matters and progress has been made towards the development of individual work programmes with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
165. Over the past two years, the number of practical cooperation initiatives has more than doubled, ranging from military-to-military activities to cooperation on border security, airspace management, civil emergency planning and other areas.
166. Since October 2001, NATO has been conducting a maritime operation - Operation Active Endeavour − in the Mediterranean Sea, to prevent this vital sea lane from being used as a transit route for terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. It is now expected that Russia will participate in this operation as from 2006, and Algeria, Israel and Morocco have also expressed an interest in doing so.

167. As the EU and NATO now have an established working relationship, it seems logical that they should coordinate their Mediterranean activities.
168. Both organisations officially state that their activities in the Mediterranean are complementary but each is in fact conducting its own political dialogue with the southern Mediterranean partners and both have also established cooperation activities in the field of border security.
169. The 5 + 5 process and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue are involved with different programmes or activities in regard to airspace management, maritime surveillance and civil protection/emergency planning.
170. Yet while professing to be complementary, the EU and NATO and their member states are developing and conducting similar activities in a number of fields. This is hardly surprising, given that both have roughly the same security concerns, but it seems appropriate that they should make a dedicated and concerted effort to coordinate, if not to combine their efforts, in order to prevent duplication which is not only inefficient but is also leading to confusion among the southern Mediterranean countries, where the same partners are having to respond to different programmes in the same fields.
171. It is not satisfactory for both dialogues to continue in parallel, as is proposed in some circles, with coordination through information exchange and participation. This would be an acceptable solution if all partners saw the various dialogues they were engaged in as a process of building confidence by means of communication.
172. If, however, the objective is to achieve tangible results by means of practical cooperation on such vital issues as the fight against terrorism, illegal migration and trafficking of various kinds, only combined efforts will be effective. In that case, institutional pride and competition must give way to efficiency in the interests of guaranteeing citizens' security.

173. Migration is clearly one of the more thorny issues in relations between the northern and southern Mediterranean. Managing this growing challenge has been recognised as central to the next phase of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In recent years, the revision of EU member states' migration policies has generally resulted in more restrictions being imposed. Such measures, however, have not deterred migrants, but rather accelerated illegal immigration and encouraged the activities of traffickers in human beings.

174. A recent study on Mediterranean migration¹³ has suggested that statistics on migration invariably lend themselves to an interpretation that is ambiguous. There is no universal definition of what constitutes a migrant, and statistics on migration are regarded as notoriously unreliable. The study in question nevertheless provides a useful picture of levels of and trends in migration away from and towards the southern Mediterranean.
175. Europe is the single largest destination for emigrants from the Mediterranean countries of the Middle East and north Africa (Med-MENA). Statistics gathered by EU member states report the presence in Europe of 5.8 million first generation migrants of Med-MENA origin, not including an unknown number of illegal immigrants. Germany and France together host almost three quarters, with the Netherlands, Spain and Italy next in line. The total number of first and second generation incomers of Med-MENA origin legally resident in the EU is estimated to be 10.6 million.
176. Turkey is one of the Med-MENA countries from which large numbers of people migrated to EU countries. The flow of emigrants continues, but at a slower pace than in the 1960s and 1970s. The pattern is similar for Algeria, which also had high emigration rates in the 1960s. Morocco is now emerging as a key "exporting" country. The number of Moroccans registered with their Consulates worldwide doubled between 1993 and 2004 to reach a total of 3 089 million. 1 339 million (87% of the 1 540 million increase) are to be found in the European Union and the pace of migration is accelerating.
177. In recent years, traditional migrants - semi-skilled and unskilled workers - have been replaced by new categories of migrant labour. The new migrants have had the benefit of higher education and are drawn from many different disciplines. They include academics, doctors of medicine and engineers and also intermediate and less skilled healthcare and education workers.
178. Emigrants from Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are generally speaking less qualified, but this is also likely to change, given the fact that emigrants will increasingly originate from younger generations, with progressively higher levels of education than their earlier counterparts.
179. Significantly, of a total of 720 000 first generation migrants with university degrees, 54% are resident in Canada and the United States, while 87% of those of secondary, primary or lower levels of education live in Europe.
180. Variations in economic development across the Euro-Mediterranean region have always been an important cause of migration. Med-MENA countries, although they would never admit to it publicly, have always regarded migration as a way of alleviating pressure on the domestic labour market, and preventing rates of unemployment reaching levels that are even more unacceptable. A number of them therefore began at an early stage to facilitate international mobility among their citizens.
181. Very soon also, migrants came to be regarded by their countries of origin as potential foreign income earners whose remittances could contribute to foreign direct investment and private sector expansion, an activity which in its turn could attract foreign capital. These were considerations taken account of by those countries when they began developing policies of economic and political reform. However, up until now, migrant investment has been concentrated more in real estate rather than in business activities.
182. All of them are faced with the problem of "brain drain" which is not only the result of wage differences but also of other factors such as the political situation in a country or limited prospects of professional advancement and social mobility.
183. It should also be noted that other developments, in particular the establishment of a free trade area in the Mediterranean, as envisaged in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Association Agreements, and the phasing out in 2005 of the Multi-Fibre Agreements and the quota system for the textiles and garment trade, have had a detrimental impact on the economies and labour markets of the southern Mediterranean countries.
184. These last factors need to be given due consideration by the EU when trying to draw up a migration management agenda jointly with its southern Mediterranean partners who argue that ad hoc solutions need to be found to secure labour mobility and allow for circulation of legal migrants during a transitional period of development and economic liberalisation.

185. Statistical information on illegal immigrants from Med-MENA countries is almost inexistent, and too partial to be of any value as an estimate. On the other hand, the efforts EU member states are making to regularise their position suggest that there must be significant numbers within the territory of the EU. Italy's "regularisation" campaign in 2003 triggered 705 000 applications (all nationalities taken together). In Spain, a campaign in 2005 resulted in 690 000 applications (all nationalities taken together) and the UK estimated the number of its illegal immigrants at 570 000 in 2001 and 310 000 in 2005¹⁴.
186. Since the early 1990s, the Straits of Otranto between Albania and Italy and the Straits of Gibraltar between Morocco and Spain have been the most frequently used illegal immigration routes. Apart from being a source of illegal migration for its own citizens, Albania has also become a major transit point for migrants from countries such as Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and China. Albanian gangs involved in human trafficking are a central link in an international network and are also closely tied in with trafficking in drugs, arms and other commodities.
187. The flow of would be immigrants from Morocco to Spain is likewise largely controlled by networks of smugglers, operating from both sides of the Straits, which were previously mainly involved in narcotics trafficking. Here too, the links between the organisation of illegal immigration, drug trafficking and other types of cross-border crime are close. Immigration from Morocco has recently become associated with radical Islamic terrorism.
188. Generally speaking, illegal migration is also increasingly a humanitarian problem, as many migrants suffer drowning. The International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) has estimated the number of deaths among people trying to cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe at least 10 000 over the past decade¹⁵.
189. Many Europeans regard illegal immigration a threat to the stability and welfare of European states and societies and therefore try to deter and prevent it as much as possible. Others tend to emphasise the human security aspects, concluding that efforts are needed to prevent loss of life, protect migrants against human traffickers and safeguard the rights of refugees.

190. In recent years, the European Council took a number of initiatives aimed at curbing the flow of migration. They include an Action Plan on administrative cooperation in matters of borders, visas, asylum and immigration¹⁶, a policy for the repatriation of illegal immigrants voluntarily or by force¹⁷, the creation of a European Agency for the Management of Operational cooperation (between the member states) at the External Borders of the EU¹⁸ and a visa information system together with a proposal for the exchange of data between member states regarding short stay visas, aimed at improving external border controls¹⁹. At the same time, individual member states have introduced more restrictive legislation on immigration.
191. While most EU member states are aware that downward demographic trends and the aging of their populations are leading to an increased demand for migrant workers, they are still continuing to introduce restrictive legislation on account of other concerns.
192. Radical international terrorism is one. Many countries also have concerns about the social and cultural instability and disorientation that could result from a massive inflow of people from very different social, cultural or religious backgrounds. There is also the problem of increased pressure on social protection schemes and, initially, of increased competition and undercutting in the labour market.
193. The introduction of the Schengen system led the EU to recognise that member states would need to coordinate their policies in regard to entry, residence, labour market access, illegal immigration and cooperation with countries of origin. At the 1999 summit in Tampere, a Europeanisation programme was adopted, which focused on control of new migratory flows and integration policies. Member states have now agreed on a joint EU visa and on a list of third countries whose nationals require such a visa. Although this new coordinated effort brought down legal immigration levels and the number of asylum applications, illegal immigration increased, encouraged by the continuing need for unskilled labour in all sectors of the economy.
194. Due to the continuing existence of large differences in prosperity and per capita income between the northern and southern Mediterranean, it is highly unlikely that the incentive for people to migrate from south to north will become any less in the short- to medium-term.
195. In some of the EU's Association Agreements with Mediterranean countries, specific rules have been included regarding repatriation of illegal immigrants, reintegration of repatriated people or their readmission to their countries of origin. Some EU member states have concluded additional readmission agreements with these Mediterranean partners.
196. In November 2003, the European Council adopted a programme setting out guidelines for combating illegal immigration across the EU's maritime borders. Joint maritime operations involving several European countries have taken place. However, the task of enforcing the EU's external land and sea borders still rests with each individual EU country's border control forces.
197. Italy and Spain in particular have expanded the size and extensively upgraded the equipment of their paramilitary police forces (respectively the Guardia di Finanza and the Guardia Civil) to enable them to step up the fight against illegal immigration and related criminal activities at their maritime borders.
198. At the same time, southern European navies especially have intensified the deployment of warships and other military equipment for similar activities²⁰. At the multilateral level, Operation Ulysses, in which the navies of France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK took part in 2003, patrolled the Straits of Gibraltar and the waters between the Western Sahara and the Canary Islands. NATO has been involved in a maritime Operation Active Endeavour to combat terrorism and prevent illegal migration and human trafficking since 2001. It has not always been clear with such operations whether priority is given to action to stop and divert suspected vessels or to humanitarian and rescue operations, although logically much depends on the type of encounter at sea.
199. As well as discouraging a number of would-be migrants from crossing the Mediterranean, these maritime patrols have also led to an increase in people smuggling and greater risks to migrants.
200. If cooperation between northern and southern Mediterranean countries on external security and defence issues has remained very limited, in the areas of illegal migration, organised crime and the fight against terrorism it has considerably increased.
201. Intensive bilateral law-enforcement cooperation has been established between Italy and Albania, Italy and Libya and between Spain and Morocco. A proposal by Italy and Germany to set up migration and refugee detention camps in southern Mediterranean countries to allow for extra-territorial processing of asylum applications was rejected by the EU when a number of member states argued that such activity would be incompatible with the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention.
202. There has been criticism that the EU is trying to use the southern Mediterranean states as a buffer zone against illegal migration in exchange for more financial support and/or a closer relationship, while, owing to the poor human rights record of those countries, there are no guarantees for the proper treatment of illegal migrants stopped on their way to Europe or repatriated to their point of departure.
203. Analysts have pointed out that increased cooperation between northern and southern Mediterranean countries in Justice and Home Affairs and heavier patrolling of migrants' maritime routes have not produced a fall in the number of illegal migrants intercepted on course for Italy and Spain. They also point to growing involvement by people smugglers and a diversion of migratory flows to other routes²¹.
204. The flow of migrants is unlikely to diminish significantly while the migratory pressures leading to emigration continue to exist in the countries of origin.
205. In recent years, successive European Summits²² have favoured strengthening control machinery at Europe's borders in order to enhance security on European soil. On the other hand, this restrictive admission policy is not applied consistently as a number of EU member states have gone on to regularise illegal entrants.
206. Your Rapporteur agrees with the conclusions regarding migrants and immigration movements arrived at by the meeting of the Euromed Non-Governmental Platform held on 1-3 April 2005. These emphasise that "an EU approach exclusively based on security considerations leaves aside the reality of migration issues today and that relying on the EMP member countries of the South to serve as a protective barrier against migration flows will be conducive to situations resulting in major human rights violations and will reinforce the negative perception of migrants in both the South and the North".
207. Altogether, it seems that problems relating to immigration from southern Mediterranean partners also have a strong cultural connotation. As a consequence, there is a need to enhance efforts towards implementing the objectives of the third basket of the Barcelona Process, which envisages the "creation of closer links between peoples in the region through a social, cultural and human partnership".
208. Unfortunately, such efforts can only yield meaningful results if southern Mediterranean governments are prepared to loosen their grip on the economy and civil society in their respective countries. There is little chance of this happening in the near future.

209. The Western Sahara has not hit the headlines for some time, but the conflict over its future has still not been solved. And yet, there are a number of reasons why the EU should devote more energy to its resolution.
210. The first is that it constitutes a major obstacle to the regional cooperation that the EU deems necessary for further political and economic development and integration of the region and to more successful cooperation between the north and south Mediterranean.
211. Secondly, according to some experts, the Sahel has become a refuge for radical Islamic terrorists − a place where they can hide out easily, enlist new supporters and activists and organise themselves for future action.
212. Thirdly, beginning last year, a new wave of demonstrations has taken place in Western Sahara and southern Morocco, accompanied by more radical political demands for independence from the population. Such demands are not necessarily inspired by the Polisario Front.
213. For a long time, the positions of the various parties directly involved have remained unchanged. Morocco is in favour of wide though somewhat ill defined autonomy which would require changes to its Constitution, possibly with unwanted consequences for other regions in the country. Algeria and the Polisario Front are in favour of self-determination, which Morocco interprets as independence.
214. The governments of both Morocco and Algeria have staked their future on acceptance of their proposal.
215. In Morocco, the issue is in fact being handled by the King and the political elite that surrounds him. The debate among the political parties on the Western Sahara is quite confused and hardly likely to contribute to a solution.
216. The Algerian Government is also maintaining its stance and continuing to support the Polisario Front. High prices on the world energy market have boosted its ambitions to be the leading country in the region and its improved relations with the United States, especially through intensive cooperation in the fight against terrorism, have given it the confidence to stick to its guns as regards the Western Sahara.
217. At present, UN efforts to find a solution have reached a stalemate and the only positive development in 2005 was the release by the Polisario Front of the last 400 or so Moroccan prisoners of war.
218. On 28 April 2006, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to extend the mandate of the UN mission for a referendum in the Western Sahara for another six months. Secretary General Kofi Anan's proposal for direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front, with the involvement of Algeria and Mauritania, to try and find a "just, lasting and mutually acceptable solution" was not adopted. As a result, the present deadlock over the implementation of the three year old UN peace plan, including the referendum, will continue if no new initiatives are taken.
219. Spain, the former colonial power in the Western Sahara, is necessarily concerned about the future of its only remaining former colonial territory still on the UN decolonialisation agenda.
220. Many democratic Spanish politicians never accepted the validity of the tripartite Madrid Accords of 1975, whereby a dictatorship in its dying throes allowed the Western Sahara to be divided between Morocco and Mauritania in order to protect its substantive interests in its relationship with Algeria and, in particular, with Morocco. Even today, Spain still feels it bears responsibility for the fate of the Western Sahara and its people.
221. In the late 1970s and early 1980s Spain was subject to pressures from Morocco, the Polisario Front and Algeria that were highly instrumental in shaping its policy towards North Africa. The first democratically elected, centre-right Spanish Governments adopted a strategy of aligning themselves with either Algeria or Morocco. From 1982 onwards, social democratic governments tried to develop a global approach in which good relations with all parties, and in particular with Algeria and Morocco, took priority.
222. Morocco can exert pressure on Spain over two issues: fishing rights and sovereignty claims (Ceuta and Melilla).That pressure has always been strong enough to prevent Spain from denouncing the tripartite Madrid Accords and championing the case for the independence of Western Sahara, but not to make Spanish Governments support the official Moroccan line. The Spanish people is largely supportive of the Polisario Front and independence, and any Spanish Government supporting Morocco's claims to the Western Sahara would face public disapproval.
223. France is the other member state with a strong interest in the matter. It supported Morocco and Mauritania in their invasion of the Western Sahara, not only by diplomatic means, using its privileged position in the UN Security Council, but also through arms sales and, between November 1977 and June 1978, by providing troops.
224. After Mauritania withdrew from the conflict in 1979, President Giscard d'Estaing declared it a decolonialisation issue and recognised the right of Western Saharans to self-determination.
225. France, with its strong links with both Morocco and Algeria, is in the strongest position to mediate in the conflict. However, that would mean putting its good relations with them, particularly with the former, at risk. Unlike in Spain, and notwithstanding France's heavy involvement in the matter, French civil society is not greatly interested in the conflict and pro-Saharawi groups are relatively weak. It should be noted, however, that France has in recent years provided generous levels of humanitarian aid to Western Saharan refugees in Tindouf.
226. Compared to the pressure it has exerted for resolution of other conflicts in the Mediterranean region, the European Union has maintained a very low profile in the search for a solution to the Western Sahara conflict, the main reason being the fact that opinion amongst member states is divided and that two of them have historically been directly involved and even now still have strong interests in the area. Their positions in the UN and the EU have often diverged.
227. During the initial years of the conflict the European Community remained on the sidelines. The then nine-member EC declared its neutrality in what it regarded as an African conflict, and by and large ignored the matter for the 10 years that followed. No other declaration referred to the issue until 1988, when an initial peace agreement was reached between Morocco and the Polisario Front under United Nations aegis.
228. The 1991 Luxembourg Declaration confirmed the position of the Twelve, welcoming the UN's achievements and confirming "their firm support for the Secretary-General's efforts to implement the final stages of his plan". Support to UN efforts and calls upon the parties to cooperate fully with the UN remained the basis of all subsequent declarations.
229. In 1999, a first specific EU content was introduced in the form of a request for confidence building measures and humanitarian concern over prisoners of war, disappearances and family visits. These preoccupations were to become a constant for the EU and some of the member states.
230. In discussions at both UN and EU level, the member states reflect either France's support of Morocco or Spain's dissenting views. Ireland has recently been the most ardent advocate of self-determination and countries like Sweden, Portugal, Finland, and others remain active in the discussions.
231. The European Commission has studiously avoided getting involved in the Western Sahara dispute and refrained from adopting any initiatives that might appear to favour one or other party to the conflict.
232. The Commission has very many links with Morocco, dating back to before 1975, and affecting several areas of EU activity: trade, development cooperation, agriculture, fisheries, etc. It claims that cooperation and the generous amounts of aid granted to Morocco, and the various agreements signed since 1975, should not be interpreted as a sign of political support for that country.
233. The Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office has been providing this form of aid to Western Saharan refugees since it was set up in 1993, in collaboration with the World Food Programme and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
234. The part played by the European Union as a whole has therefore been, relatively limited. Owing to disagreement between the member states, the Union has been unable to adopt any meaningful action. It has, however, avoided two important risks to date. First, it has succeeded in agreeing on a number of issues (support for the UN, humanitarian aid, not taking sides) and its members also agree on the formal aspects of the question.
235. Given the importance of a solution to the conflict for the whole region and for the further development of its relations with the EU, it would seem that the EU should have a real interest in making a serious effort to end a conflict that has been simmering for far too long. Yet possibly it really prefers to leave it to the United States, better placed than the Arab or African countries to act as a catalyst in resolving the dispute.

236. Since the last report by the Political Committee on the Middle East²³, many new developments have again changed the equation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. What follows is a synopsis of developments since April 2005, an assessment of the present state of affairs and an opinion on what Europe should do next to give new impetus to peace efforts.

237. Shortly after the Israeli Government announced the construction of 3 500 new homes in Ma'ale Adumim, the largest West Bank settlement, US President George W. Bush, in a meeting on 11 April 2005 with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, endorsed the latter's plan for an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and urged Israel to stop settlement expansion in the West Bank, at the same time stating that any final settlement of the conflict should take into account the "new realities on the ground". In other words, President Bush did not expect Israel to give up all West Bank settlements in future negotiations. Meeting the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on May 2005, President Bush reiterated his commitment to the Road Map and the creation of a Palestinian state, and gave a different opinion on the future borders, insisting that any modification of the 1967 borders should be subject to a mutual agreement between both partners.
238. A summit on 21 June between President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ended in failure when both sides failed to build on earlier progress over coordination of Israel's planned withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. As part of an earlier agreement, Israel released 398 Palestinian prisoners, but the ceasefire, which had also been agreed then, began increasingly to be violated by both sides.
239. In August 2005, Israeli settlers pulled out of 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip while construction of a new settlement east of Jerusalem was started. The last Israeli troops withdrew from the Gaza Strip on 12 September, and the pull-out from four West Bank settlements was completed on 21 September.
240. Several months after the conclusion, in November 2005, of Israeli-Egyptian negotiations over the control, by Egyptian forces of the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, the United States brokered a deal to reopen that border under Palestinian control with EU monitors.
241. Hamas won the December 2005 local elections and came to power in major West Bank cities. The 25 January 2006 legislative elections in the Palestinian territory gave Hamas 74 out of 132 seats in the Palestinian Parliament, leaving Fatah with 45 seats.
242. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon remained incapacitated after a major stroke and Ehud Olmert, who took over as acting Prime Minister, ruled out negotiations with a government led by Hamas for as long as it did not renounce violence. The Quartet, (the EU, Russia, the UN and the US) called on Hamas to do so and recognise Israel, or face future cuts in aid.
243. On 28 March 2006, the new Palestinian, Hamas-led Government, under Prime Minister Ismaïl Haniyeh received a vote of confidence from parliament with 71 votes in favour, 36 against and 2 abstentions.
244. Also on 28 March 2006 legislative elections in Israel, with a historically low turnout of 63.2%, resulted in a victory for Kadima, the party created by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and currently led by his successor Ehud Olmert. In the 120-seat parliament, the Knesset, Kadima won 29 seats, Labour 20, Shas (ultraorthodox Sefardim) 13, Likud 12, Israel Beitenou (Russian immigrants) 11, Arab parties together 9, Gil Pensioners Party 7, Unified Torah Judaism (ultraorthodox Ashkenazim) 6, National Religions Party (ultranationalist) 9 and Meretz (left) 5.
245. A coalition government under Prime Minister Ehud Olmert won a vote of confidence in the Knesset on 4 May 2006. The coalition consists of Kadima, the Labour Party, Shas and the Pensioners' Party. Prime Minister Olmert has named 2010 the target date to set the borders of Israel for which the West Bank separation barrier would be the basis. These would take in the large settlements on the Israeli side of the barrier. The tens of thousands of settlers living in West Bank settlements beyond the barrier would very likely be evacuated.

246. The Palestinian territories have been mainly dependent on foreign donors for their survival. The new government maintains that each month, it needs US$ 170 million in order to pay salaries. In 2005, all donors together contributed around US$ 1.3 billion, broken down as follows: US$ 350 million budget support or cash, US$ 500 million humanitarian or emergency aid and US$ 450 million development aid. Apart from that, Israel transferred a total of US$ 740 million in tax and customs receipts collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority.
247. Donor money is also used to pay some 150 000 civil servants, of which some 73 000 are security forces staff, while others work in hospitals, schools and public administration. Altogether, they support around 1 million people.
248. At the request of the main donors, the World Bank has carried out a four-scenario study to demonstrate what could happen if Israel withholds Palestinian revenues and major donors reduce their budget support and development aid²⁴.
249. The most likely scenario, if Israel fails to transfer Palestinian tax and customs receipts, thus restricting trade and Palestinian workers' access to Israel by and leading to a reduction in donor support, the Palestinian territories would fall into a deep depression.
250. In that case, in 2006, the Palestinian economy would shrink by 27%, while the unemployment rate would double to 39.6% and the percentage of people living below the poverty line increase by 50% to 67% of the population. Real gross domestic product per capita would fall 49.4% compared with the 1999 level, before the start of the second Intifada.
251. Experts have also pointed out that Israeli restrictions on trade and access to Israel by Palestinian workers have a greater influence on the Palestine economy than foreign aid and estimate that the lifting of Israeli road blocks in the West Bank would reduce poverty by 15-20%, while doubling foreign aid would produce only 8% less poverty²⁵.
252. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recently published a report on the security measures imposed by the Israeli army in the occupied territories²⁶. It mentions the security fence, the 12 big fortified roadblocks, the 470 checkpoints, the roads closed to Palestinians, the closed military zones in 35% of the West Bank territory, the isolation of the Jordan valley and the forced expropriations. All these measures have considerably eroded Palestinian territory on the West Bank and broken up what remained into many small pieces.
253. The situation in the Gaza Strip, where more than 1 million people are living on some 6% of Palestinian territory, is even more desperate. This strip of land lacks the most basic infrastructure required for its economy, including a suitable harbour and airport. It is disconnected from the West Bank and movement of goods and persons into and out of the territory is heavily controlled by Israel.
254. Apart from the problems of a bankrupt treasury and diplomatic isolation, the Hamas Government is facing intense rivalry from Fatah over control of the heavily armed security agencies. It also complains of Fatah attempts to create parallel frameworks to certain government ministries.
255. In fact, Fatah is set to become a major problem for another reason, since many of its members will no longer have salaries and access to privileges. They will therefore try to embarrass the Hamas Government and bring it down. This is likely to be unproductive since Hamas won the election because people were tired of over 10 years of corruption and failure to deliver on promises. Efforts by Fatah to regain power prematurely will almost certainly lead to even more upheaval.
256. If Israel is now refusing to negotiate with the Hamas Government, it will certainly not negotiate with a Fatah Government either - witness its attitude towards Mahmoud Abbas since he took power, first as Prime Minister and then as President.

257. Reactions by the Quartet and the Israeli Government to Hamas's victory in the legislative elections were negative. They took the view that Hamas was a terrorist organisation, responsible for many deadly attacks and intent on the destruction of the state of Israel, pointing also to the 1988 Hamas Covenant, in particular Articles 11 and 13, which read as follows:

258. Shortly after the elections, the head of Hamas's political bureau, Khaled Mechaal, declared that his organisation would agree to negotiations with Israel as soon as that country "recognised the rights" of the Palestinians and withdrew from their territories. He also stated that "the Israeli Government limits itself to unilateral acts in order to guarantee the security interests of Israel without taking into account the interests of the Palestinians. As a consequence, to negotiate with Israel on that basis is a waste of time".
259. Later, when in the Gulf area to drum up financial and moral support for the new Palestinian Government, Mechaal stated that, in exchange for Arab support, his government was prepared to be flexible: "We have said to our collocutors that we support the existing peace plans: the Oslo Agreements, the Road Map and Arab countries' recognition of Israel in exchange for a withdrawal to the 1967 borders in line with the conclusion of the 2002 Beirut Arab Summit, which Ariel Sharon rejected".
260. According to Mechaal, the problem was not that Hamas had not recognised Israel, but that Israel was occupying the Palestinian territories. The Hamas Government would therefore never arrest a resistant or condemn groups that were fighting the Israeli occupation²⁸.
261. Recently, the Palestinian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Alzahar refused to rule out acceptance of a two-state solution, raising the prospect that his government could put the issue to the Palestinian people in a referendum, but making clear that it would demand to know what Israel and the international community would offer in return²⁹.
262. In an immediate reaction to Ehud Olmert's election victory speech, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said that nothing would change if Mr Olmert did not stop trying to draw Israel's borders unilaterally. He is supported in that view by the new Palestinian Prime Minister Ismaïl Haniyeh and by the Arab league.
263. In an appeal to the Quartet on the eve of its 9 May meeting, Mahmoud Abbas said that a failure to pay public sector salaries in the Palestinian territories "could jeopardise the very foundation of the institutions of the Palestinian Authority and the future Palestinian state". He further called for the "immediate resumption of permanent status negotiations between the PLO and Israel on the basis of the Road Map" and made clear that "No imposed solution will be acceptable to the Palestinian people, especially if it is based on creating facts on the ground that prejudice the outcome of permanent status negotiations"³⁰.
264. It should be recalled that the election victory of Hamas is partly the result of mistakes made by successive Israeli Governments and of Fatah's complete incapability to administer the Palestinian territories, combined with its rampant corruption. However, the Palestinians have been frustrated and radicalised by 38 years of Israeli occupation, during which they have mostly been treated with arrogance and disdain. The vote for Hamas is also evidence of the determination of many Palestinians to adopt a more self-reliant approach towards the establishment of a Palestinian state. They have lost confidence in the present state of affairs and in waiting for the West to accord them justice.

265. The overwhelming popular support in Israel for unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza strip in 2005 and the electoral success of Kadima have shown that many Israelis no longer agree with a heavily repressive and military policy towards the Palestinian territories. At present, 75% of Israelis are in favour of a clear separation between Israel and the Palestinian territories and the creation of two states.
266. Ehud Olmert articulated this mood by saying: "If the question is to make a choice between all the lands without having a Jewish state or having a Jewish state without all the lands, we choose the Jewish state without all the lands"³¹.
267. After his election victory, Mr Olmert said publicly that he was prepared to renounce the dream of a "Greater Israel" stating that "We are ready to evacuate Jews living in settlements in order to allow Palestinians to realise [their] dream to have a state. If the Palestinians accept to act in that sense we will sit down with them at the negotiation table in order to create a new reality in the region. If they don't do that, we will take our fate in our own hands".
268. Mr Olmert intends to withdraw partially from the West Bank, give up the many small isolated settlements in that region and accommodate the people from them in the large colonies he wants to include in Israeli territory. Among the colonies earmarked for annexation are Goush Etzion (between Bethlehem and Hebron), Ariel (in the central West Bank) and Maalé Adoumin (next to East Jerusalem).
269. Finally, he intends to maintain an Israeli presence in the Jordan valley to ensure a "security border". During his election campaign, Mr Olmert promised to grant Hamas a "reasonable time limit" to recognise Israel, disarm and endorse earlier agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Once it expired, he would act³². These events have yet to come about, and, to date, Israel has been more adamant than ever in its refusal to have anything to do with the Hamas Government.
270. In an official statement on 9 April, the Israeli Government said: "Israel will have no contact with the Palestinian Authority, which is a hostile entity, and will work toward preventing any entrenchment of the Hamas Government's rule". The statement did not rule out "personal" contacts with President Mahmoud Abbas³³.
271. Israel complains that it has "no partner" now with whom to negotiate, but it should be recalled that it has done little to support Mahmoud Abbas from the moment he became President and has undermined his authority by its policy of unilateral action.
272. It has taken Israel several decades to recognise that it would never be at peace with its Palestinian neighbours if it did not withdraw from the occupied territories. Also, many Israeli political leaders of an earlier generation were active in Irgun, the Stern Gang and Hanagah, all of which committed terrorist acts, including against the Palestinian Arab population. Israel's pre-1967 borders were established by force of arms.
273. The reasons for the majority of Israelis' change of heart have to do with the reality of recent developments. The second Intifada is a measure of the level of Palestinian frustration over the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and the growing feeling of international isolation over Israel's repressive policy in those territories. There is also an awareness that the demographic balance is due to tip in favour of the Palestinians in the foreseeable future, making a one-state solution no longer feasible. And finally, a change in priorities has occurred where fighting spirit and hunger for more land have given way to pragmatism and material concerns.
274. Some Israeli peace movement supporters have suggested that Israel negotiate with leading countries of the Arab League, in particular Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to discuss the global peace plan proposed by the League at its Beirut Summit in 2002. They argue that practically all the Arab governments of the region are as deeply concerned over Hamas's electoral victory as is Israel and may be equally desirous to see an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict³⁴.

275. After the elections that brought victory to Hamas, EU High Representative Javier Solana observed that even democratic elections were not enough to give legitimacy to a terrorist organisation³⁵. However, it was the EU and its Quartet partners which had insisted that free and fair democratic elections were an indispensable step towards a solution of the Israeli-Palestine conflict.
276. This raises two questions: how can the West ignore one of the few democratically-elected Arab governments in the region while making sustained efforts to bring democracy to the Middle East, and how should the West assist and consolidate the process of democratisation when there is no obvious means of effecting an automatic transition from a terrorist organisation or one on a war footing to an effective political party? The solutions to both involve firmness, but also allowing enough time, offering solidarity and support measures that are respectful of the dignity of the Palestinian people and their elected representatives.
277. The Quartet has enjoined the new Palestinian Government to commit to the principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel and acceptance of earlier agreements and obligations, including the Road Map. A rejection of those principles at this stage would inevitably have an impact on the provision of direct aid to that government and its ministries. In its 30 March 2006 statement, the Quartet supported continuing humanitarian assistance to meet the basic needs of the Palestinian people. It also noted the importance of improved movement and access.
278. There is genuine uncertainty over whether Hamas will ultimately be able to meet the Quartet's demands, but a decision by Western donors to stop aid to the Palestinian Authority is likely only to help to push the Palestinian Government in the wrong direction.
279. What should foreign donors, in particular the EU and its Western partners, do to prevent a downward spiral in relations with the Palestinian leadership and further deterioration in the conditions of the Palestinian people?
280. As is so often the case in such situations, there is a need for a pragmatic approach and attention should therefore be paid to what the Hamas Government in fact does, rather than to its public declarations³⁶. Hamas's Charter has to change, but this will be the outcome of a process, not a precondition to it³⁷. If it can sustain a ceasefire and restore law and order in the Gaza Strip, it will have achieved more than its predecessors.
281. To isolate the Hamas Government - by denying it the financial aid vital for preventing the Palestinian economy from deteriorating further and even greater impoverishment and radicalisation of the Palestinian population - can only lead to disaster. It would drive Hamas into the arms of Iran and Syria, both on the lookout for just such an opportunity, and further aggravate the downward spiral in Israeli-Palestinian relations.
282. The EU and Western donors should consider giving the Hamas Government a three-month trial period during which donor aid, channelled through a World Bank Trust Fund, would continue to flow. At the same time, Israel should continue transferring vital Palestinian tax and customs revenues and allow free movement and access to people and goods.
283. This would give the new Palestinian Government an opportunity to learn how to manage the duties and responsibilities of a democratically elected government. After the trial period, donors would be in a position to assess the government's ability to guarantee security, control the militias and other armed factions, fight corruption and commit itself to normalisation of relations with Israel, starting with the endorsement of the Arab League's Beirut Declaration.
284. At this crucial time, the West has to decide whether it wants the Islamists to change or fail, remembering that the PLO took a long time to change its attitude towards Israel and totally failed to govern the Palestinian territories - one important reason why Hamas was elected to power.
285. There can be little doubt that some elements of Hamas will continue to pursue violence, as was the case with Fatah. Through the discharge of their responsibilities in government, others may come to the conclusion that negotiations could, in the end, lead to a more satisfactory solution. In time, that could result in a split between radicals and moderates in both parties and open up the prospect of a new coalition with sufficient strength and authority to negotiate with Israel and convince a large majority of the Palestinian population to accept the result.
286. It is early days for any critical assessment of the recent history of this conflict but the fact that Israel's pre-1967 borders outside UN agreed territory were established by force of arms is still fresh in many memories. There is a widespread, deep-rooted conviction that Israeli forces defend their country by committing "harsh" acts that, even when provoked by the most preposterous and inhuman attacks, carry the risk of providing a justification for utterly condemnable actions by the Palestinians. Part of the problem is Israel's admittedly taking several decades to recognise that there could never be peace without its withdrawing from the occupied territories.
287. Finally, the EU and other Quartet members will have to talk to Israel as well if they want an end to the present stalemate. Israel is undoubtedly partly responsible for the desperate economic and political situation in the Palestinian territories which it has occupied for nearly 40 years. Reference has already been made in the present report to the consequences of Israel's security measures in the occupied territories. Moreover, the Israeli Government clearly gives the impression that it prefers to proceed by fait accompli, altering the situation on the ground unilaterally or possibly through interminable ad hoc negotiations with no clear light at the end of the tunnel, rather than engaging in comprehensive negotiations with the end prospect of a peace agreement in view.
288. Another point to remember is that modern day radical Islamic terrorism is undeniably tied in with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and is an expression of deep frustration and desperation on the part of a people that has been ignored or treated in a humiliating and disrespectful fashion for decades. There is no justification for terrorism under any circumstances, but neither can the pauperisation of a people, made to move as a result of a UN Security Council resolution, find any justification.
289. Israel, the West and the Arab world all bear responsibility for not implementing UN Security Council resolutions, some of which were adopted as long ago as the late 1940s. It is time to take the bull by the horns and act, and all the parties involved will need to cooperate in doing so. It is not too late to avoid the abyss, but immediate action must be taken. Any agreement to settle the conflict will also have to include a satisfactory solution to the massive refugee problem, Jerusalem and the borders.
290. The Quartet, meeting in New York on 9 May 2006, has now agreed to an EU proposal to establish a temporary financial structure which would allow aid to go to Palestinians without being channelled through the Palestinian Authority. Another vote of approval will be required once the mechanism has been designed and the system will be evaluated three months after its establishment. Implementation of the Quartet's decision may help alleviate the worst shortages but will not solve all the financial problems of the Palestinians.

291. Despite consistent efforts deployed by the international community, for more than 30 years, to effectively address the Cyprus issue, the island remains forcibly divided and the problems unresolved. Lack of progress in the search for a solution contributes to a climate of uncertainty which undermines regional stability in the politically volatile area of the eastern Mediterranean.
292. Cyprus's accession to the EU as a full member, in conjunction with the prospective accession of Turkey to the Union, has put more emphasis on the need for a just and viable settlement to be reached. Such a settlement should be sought within the framework of the Mission of Good Offices of the United Nations Secretary-General. It should be based on the relevant United Nations resolutions, as well as the principles on which the EU is founded.
293. It would also need to take account of the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the people of Cyprus as a whole and provide the context for stability and economic development on the island. This development carries with it the potential for positive repercussions in terms of welfare, development and security for the wider Middle East region.
294. The last attempt to solve the problem failed to rally support in the April 2004 referendum. Greek Cypriots were not convinced that the specific blueprint of the UN plan could guarantee the functionality or smooth economic operation of the new federal state. In addition, provisions allowing for the presence of Turkish troops on the island largely contributed to exacerbate long standing Greek Cypriot security concerns. At the same time, the plan failed to provide adequate safeguards for its own implementation.
295. All the above was coupled by the widespread conviction, among the Greek Cypriot electorate at the time of the referendum, that the plan was by no means carefully balanced or fair. Whatever the reasons, the outcome of the referendum will have to be respected as an expression of a free political will within a democratically structured UN process.
296. Any future initiative will now have to be guided by lessons learned the hard way. There is no room for failure. All parties concerned would need to focus their efforts on creating common ground on which to build a new vision. The meeting between the President of the Republic of Cyprus and the UN Secretary General, in Paris, last February, constitutes a new starting point in that direction. The momentum gained in Paris will have to be used to serve the purposes of mutual understanding and confidence building between the two communities. Such developments are considered by all as a necessary component in paving the way for a comprehensive settlement.
297. At the European level, on the other hand, the recent adoption by the Council of the regulation on financial aid to Turkish Cypriots marks the EU's determination to support development for them and bring them closer to the Union as a step towards reunification. Renewed efforts to continue work to support the Turkish community should also encompass improvement of the "Green Line" regulation and the proposal by the Cyprus Government for the port of Famagusta, an approach which could go a long way in effectively addressing the economic needs of the Turkish Cypriot community.

298. One important development in the eastern Mediterranean deserving mention in this report is the improvement of relations between Greece and Turkey from the second half of the 1990s onwards. A decisive turning point was the Greek Government's decision, at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, to support Turkey's candidacy for EU membership.
299. Improved relations and dedicated efforts by both countries to pay more attention to crisis management and confidence building have considerably improved security and stability in the region. Energy and resources in both countries are now being devoted to other issues. Turkey has to deal with growing instability on its south-eastern flank, while Greece can concentrate on the Balkans.
300. Greece and Turkey will now be able to cooperate on regional issues of mutual concern such as illegal migration, transnational crime and terrorism. They also share a number of interests in the Black Sea region and are able to cooperate more closely on maritime safety and security and energy security and environment risks.
301. The improvement in the climate of relations, however, should not stop short at progressing Turkey's membership negotiations with the EU. Turkish military activity continues, the casus belli was recently reconfirmed (by the National Security Council on 24 October 2005) and ratified by the Turkish Government in March (according to Hurriet, 20 March 2006) and political goodwill statements are in contradiction to the military establishment's behaviour. Both countries have a strategic interest in a fair solution to the outstanding questions on Cyprus. In this context, Turkey should make an effort to meet its contractual obligations vis-à-vis the EU and its full member state, the Republic of Cyprus.

302. The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) was established in December 2003 as the parliamentary dimension of the Barcelona Process. Since then, it has held two annual plenary sessions, one in Cairo, in March 2005, and one in Brussels, in February 2006. It held an extraordinary session in Rabat in November 2005 on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the EuroMed partnership.
303. EMPA is made up of representatives of three delegations: from the European Parliament, the EU national parliaments and the parliaments of the 10 Mediterranean partner countries. However, as a joint assembly, EMPA consists formally of two groups: 120 MPs from national parliaments of the 10 Mediterranean partner countries and 120 from the European Union (of whom 75 are appointed by national parliaments and 45 by the European Parliament). Each parliament designates its representatives to EMPA.
304. Three 80-strong parliamentary committees prepare the work of the plenary in the partnership's main policy areas. They are the Committee on Political Affairs, Security and Human Rights; the Committee on Economic, Financial and Social Affairs and Education and the Committee on the Promotion of the Quality of Life, Human Exchanges and Culture.

305. Having held seven Inter-Parliamentary Conferences on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1973-1991), the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) decided to establish a similar process for the Mediterranean.
306. The first Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) was held in June 1992, in Malaga (Spain). On the basis of its conclusions and recommendations, the IPU then set up a permanent mechanism for dialogue and negotiation among all the Mediterranean partners in the form of twice-yearly meetings held during statutory IPU Assemblies (known as Inter-Parliamentary Conferences until 2000).
307. As elsewhere, discussions in the CSCM are focused around the tried and tested system of three different "baskets":

308. Since 1992, three more CSCMs have been held in Valletta (Malta) in 1995, in Marseilles (France) in 2000 and in Nafplion (Greece) in 2005.
309. In the CSCM, the Mediterranean parliaments participate, on an equal footing, in seeking solutions to the problems of the region. All participants agree on the need to respect this basic premise and to work steadily towards the institutionalisation and transformation of the CSCM process into a Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean.
310. They argue that the transformation of the CSCM process into an Assembly will give more stature to parliamentary diplomacy in the Mediterranean region. It will provide the region with a unique parliamentary forum of its own, unattached to any ongoing process, where the members of the Assembly will be able to draw up and examine their own agenda. It will enhance the participation of Mediterranean states, thus enabling them to proceed beyond conceptual analyses to the drawing up of recommendations and opinions on questions of direct concern to them and to the Mediterranean "space".
311. At the fourth CSCM, in Nafplion (Greece), it was decided to establish a Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, whose inaugural meeting would be held in Jordan early in 2006. However, the President of the European Parliament, taking the view that the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly already largely filled the need, asked national parliaments in EU member states not to support this initiative, and requested the IPU, through its President Pier Ferdinando Cassini, to find a compromise solution for a new cooperation status between the two organisations.
312. The formation of a Mediterranean Council reporting to the EMPA was envisaged, but after six months of deliberation all the member states of the IPU's Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM) again decided, at the beginning of May 2006, in Nairobi, to go ahead as they had originally agreed. The inaugural meeting of this Assembly will now take place in Jordan on 10-11 September 2006, with IPU President Cassini in attendance. He has fully endorsed members' opinion that today, more than ever, this specifically Mediterranean instrument is needed and will prove effective.

313. Since 2003, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has been organising an annual Parliamentary Forum on the Mediterranean with parliamentarians from Mediterranean partner countries to discuss issues relating to security and stability in the Mediterranean.
314. During its regular annual session it also organises specific meetings on the Mediterranean with parliamentarians and experts from partner countries.
315. The Assembly is furthermore intensifying contacts and exchanges with parliamentarians from the partner countries through visits and by the inclusion of representatives from partner states in many of its activities, such as election monitoring projects and visits to OSCE field missions.

316. The third chapter of the Barcelona Agreement on social, cultural and human partnership, was based on the idea that encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies is a necessary component of any programme aimed at promoting democracy in neighbouring Mediterranean countries.
317. Indeed, since full membership of the EU is restricted to European countries, the special relationship which is offered to non-EU Mediterranean countries will need to be based on much more than a free trade area.
318. The inclusion of the third basket implicitly rejected the idea that Western and Islamic societies would not be able to co-exist in a peaceful and collaborative environment and were inevitably heading towards a clash of civilisations.
319. Still, 10 years after the start of the Barcelona Process, social and cultural cooperation between the northern and southern Mediterranean has never really taken off. Among the numerous reasons for this failure, critics cite the fact that the relevant stipulations of the Barcelona Declaration and its follow-up work programme are too vague and inexplicit. They contain principles and declarations, but lack implementation machinery. Moreover, the objectives of the third basket are not linked to those of the other two (political and security dialogue and economic and financial partnership).
320. Furthermore, the third basket is not a coherent entity. On the one hand, it is directed towards closer cooperation to bring both sides of the Mediterranean together, having regard to the existing socio-economic situation on the southern rim and the cultural differences between societies on either shore. On the other, it aims at cooperation in very different fields, in particular the fight against illegal migration, terrorism, corruption, drug trafficking and international crime, all of which in fact belong within the political and security cooperation of the first chapter where they are now being dealt with in practice. The ambiguity of the third chapter has therefore hindered real progress in this area.
321. The language used in the Barcelona Declaration and its follow-up agreements is inevitably interpreted in different ways by the different partners. Also because it is the result of compromise over the different positions taken by the participating governments, its definitions and operational criteria are necessarily vague.
322. There is no unambiguous and universally acceptable definition of dialogue and civil society which are highly value-laden concepts subject to different normative interpretations. In 10 years, nothing has been done to agree on a common vocabulary in order to enable implementation of the third basket, despite an awareness on both sides of the problem that exists.

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on security and stability in the Mediterranean region

(i) Considering that security and stability in the Mediterranean region is a strategic priority for the European Union;

(ii) Aware that, in the 10 years and more of its existence, the Barcelona Process has not been able to achieve the breakthrough in creating a common area of peace and prosperity that many of its supporters hoped for in 1995;

(iii) Recognising that the goals set at the start of the process may have been too ambitious, given the huge political, social, economic and cultural differences between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean;

(iv) Convinced that when it comes to security cooperation with the southern Mediterranean partners, a policy of small incremental steps may yield better results than high-flown, overly ambitious projects;

(v) Recognising that the security situation in the Middle East and north Africa has been severely affected by a number of negative trends, in particular, the emergence of violent international terrorism, manifestly linked to radical and fundamentalist Islam;

(vi) Aware that the governments of southern Mediterranean countries have readily exploited the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States to legitimise their struggle against political challenges from Islamic political parties by assimilating the latter with the fight against radical international Islamic terrorism instigated by the United States;

(vii) Noting that repression appears to have acquired new legitimacy, allowing traditionally authoritarian state structures to be consolidated and slowing down the transition to political pluralism advocated by the EU;

(viii) Noting that in many instances the EU and its member states have supported stability and the political status quo rather than the development of political pluralism which, in periods of transition, could easily lead to political upheaval and instability;

(ix) Noting that, following the failure of the EU's efforts to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, the Euro-Mediterranean security agenda has concentrated on more pragmatic issues such as conflict prevention and crisis management, the ESDP dialogue, the fight against drugs, organised crime and terrorism and cooperation in matters related to Justice and Home Affairs;

(x) Regretting that security cooperation on a number of the issues referred to has resulted in lower levels of accountability and human rights compliance on the part of security forces in southern Mediterranean countries;

(xi) Welcoming the strengthened cooperation between law enforcement agencies across the Mediterranean, but insistent that in such cooperation, the EU should also address the serious problems of governance affecting most, if not all, internal security forces in the southern Mediterranean countries;

(xii) Recognising that the 5+5 process is demonstrating that a less ambitious security agenda, established by common agreement and focused on practical cooperation, is more likely to yield satisfactory results and that in the longer term, it may help revitalise the political and security chapter of the Barcelona Process;

(xiii) Considering that the EU and the various interparliamentary bodies established for the purpose of Mediterranean dialogue, must stress the need for parliamentary oversight of the defence and security sector, focusing particularly on supervision of the areas of budget control, defence reform, democratic policing and defence resource management;

(xiv) Aware of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue activity, the aims of which are to contribute to regional security and stability, achieve better mutual understanding and mutual confidence building and to reinforce and complement other international initiatives in the region;

(xv) Considering that both the EU and NATO have roughly the same security concerns in the region and are developing and conducting similar activities in a number of fields;

(xvi) Noting that it seems appropriate for the EU and NATO to make a sincere and committed effort to coordinate, if not combine their efforts, in order to prevent duplication which is not only inefficient but is creating confusion in southern Mediterranean countries where the same partners are having to respond to different programmes in the same fields;

(xvii) Recognising that the slowing down of economic growth in the EU combined with the lack of social and cultural integration of certain groups of immigrants from the southern Mediterranean countries have led to a reappraisal of the legislation on migration and related issues;

(xviii) Welcoming the efforts of EU member states increasingly to coordinate their policies on migrant entry, residence, labour market access and illegal immigration and cooperation with countries of origin;

(xix) Emphasising however, that an EU approach based exclusively on security considerations leaves aside the reality of migration issues today and that relying on Euro-Mediterranean Partnership member countries in the south to serve as a protective barrier against migratory flows could lead to the incidence of major human rights violations and reinforce the poor perception of migrants in both northern and southern countries;

(xx) Considering that as problems relating to immigration from the southern Mediterranean partners have strong cultural connotations, there is an urgent need to step up efforts directed towards implementing the objectives of the Barcelona Process third basket, envisaging the "creation of closer links between peoples in the region through a social, cultural and human partnership", while being aware that meaningful results will be obtained only if southern Mediterranean governments are prepared to loosen their grip on the economy and civil society in their respective countries;

(xxi) Considering that the different objectives of the Barcelona Process, as formulated in its three chapters, are complementary and that only by their simultaneous implementation will structural stability be achieved in the region in the medium to long term;

(xxii) Considering that if the EU wishes to make progress towards an all-encompassing security dialogue with its Mediterranean partners, it must take serious account of the expectations of the southern Mediterranean, and make more sustained efforts to help resolve existing conflicts - particularly in Iraq, the Western Sahara, between Israel and the Palestinians and over Cyprus - all of which are having a highly detrimental influence on its project for establishing a zone of peace, security and prosperity in the Mediterranean;

(xxiii) Welcoming the European initiative within the Quartet to establish a temporary financial structure allowing aid to reach the Palestinians without being channelled through the Palestinian Authority;

(xxiv) Insisting however, that a more lasting solution to the financial problems of the Palestinians is needed if the donor countries, including the EU and its member states, want to prevent the Palestinian territories falling into severe economic depression likely to produce further radicalisation of the population;

(xxv) Considering that isolating the Hamas Government could drive Hamas into the arms of Iran and Syria and further aggravate the present downward spiral in Israeli-Palestinian relations;

(xxvi) Considering that the EU and other Quartet members must also be prepared to acknowledge Israel's responsibility for the present stalemate and for the desperate political situation and economic plight of the Palestinian territories which Israel has occupied for nearly 40 years;

(xxvii) Considering that a just and viable settlement still needs to be reached for the Cyprus issue, particularly in view of the fact that lack of progress in the search for a solution contributes to a climate of uncertainty that is undermining stability in the politically volatile eastern Mediterranean area;

(xxviii) Noting that such a settlement should be sought within the framework of the Good Offices Mission of the United Nations Secretary-General and be based on the relevant United Nations Council Resolutions and on the founding principles of the EU;

(xxix) Recalling that implementation of the UN peace plan for the Western Sahara, dating back three years, is now completely deadlocked;

(xxx) Considering that the EU has a real interest in promoting a solution to that conflict as this is vitally important in bringing about an improvement in interstate relations in the region, further integration of the Maghreb countries and for the further development of their relations with the Union,

1. Concentrate for the moment on a policy of small incremental steps and pragmatic security cooperation which may yield improved results, as the 5+5 Process would appear to demonstrate;
2. Urge the need for parliamentary oversight of the defence and security sector in the southern Mediterranean partner countries, with particular focus on supervision of the areas of budget control, defence reform, democratic policing and defence resource management;
3. Make a sincere and committed effort to coordinate, or even combine, its cooperation activities with Mediterranean partners in the defence and security sector with similar activities being conducted by NATO, in order to prevent duplication which is not only inefficient but liable to create confusion among the southern Mediterranean partners.

1. Seek a lasting structural solution for transferring aid to the Palestinians, bearing in mind that it cannot ignore one of the few democratically elected Arab governments in the region, and pursue its efforts to convince that government that it must commit to the principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel and the acceptance of earlier agreements and obligations;
2. Convince Israel that lasting peace can be established only if the borders of Israel and a future Palestinian state are the result of negotiations and if Israel withdraws from Palestinian territories in the West Bank;
3. Actively pursue a just and viable settlement of the Cyprus issue in order to put an end to the present climate of uncertainty that is contributing to undermine stability in an already volatile area;
4. Promote a solution to the conflict in the Western Sahara to break the deadlock in the implementation of the UN peace plan as this of vital importance to the further development and integration of the region and its relations with the EU.

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AMENDMENT 1³⁸

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tabled by Mrs Papadimitriou, Rapporteur,

(Greece, Federated Group)

______

1. After recital (xxx) of the preamble to the draft recommendation insert a new recital as follows:

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AMENDMENTs 2-4³⁹

______

tabled by Mrs Barnett

(Germany, Socialist Group)

______

2. After recital (xxii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new recital as follows:

3. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, delete recital (xxvi) and replace by:

4. Delete paragraph II.2 of the draft recommendation proper and replace by:

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¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 17 May 2006.

² Adopted by the Assembly on 20 June 2006 at the 3^rd sitting on the basis of the amended draft recommendation.

³ On this subject see also Khadija Mohsen-Finan, "Le Maghreb entre ouverture nécessaires et autoritarismes possibles", in Ramses 2006, Ifri.

⁴ Le Monde, 6 May 2006.

⁵ Ed Morse at the fifth session of the CSIS's Maghreb Roundtable on the politics of North African energy, Washington, 15 March 2006.

⁶ Baghat Korany, "Egypt's Overdue Reform: a Prototype of the Middle East to come?" in Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 11, N°1, March 2006.

⁷ The Herald Tribune, 14 February 2006.

⁸ Eberhard Kienle: "Political Reform through Economic Reform" in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade, eds. Haizan Amirah Fernández and Richard Young, Real Instituto Elcano, 2005.

⁹ Walid Abu-Dalbouh: "Jordan and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership" in The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade eds. Haizan Amirah Fernández and Richard Young, Real Instituto Elcano, 2005.

¹⁰ On this subject see also the Seminar on ESDP and the Mediterranean, organised by the EU Institute for Security Studies, on 10 May 2005, "Prospects for the security and defence dialogue of the Barcelona Process", by Martin Ortega.

¹¹ http://www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/archive/ministerial/v-valencia-ap.pdf

¹² Karen E. Smith: "The outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy", in International Affairs 81, 4 (2005).

¹³ Mediterranean Migration: 2005 report edited by Philippe Fargues, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.

¹⁴ The International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) has estimated that some 100 000 to 120 000 irregular migrants cross the Mediterranean each year, with about 35 000 coming from sub-Saharan Africa, 55 000 from the south and east Mediterranean and 30 000 from other (mainly Asian and Middle Eastern) countries.

¹⁵ "Irregular transit migration in the Mediterranean - some facts, figures and insights", ICMPD, Vienna 2004.

¹⁶ 13 June 2002.

¹⁷ Commission Communication 564.

¹⁸ European Council Regulation EC/2007/2004, 26 October 2004.

¹⁹ European Commission, Document Com (2004) 835 final.

²⁰ The Italian Navy, for example, devoted one quarter of its total hours of navigation in 2002 to immigration control. From 2002 onwards, the French Navy has been conducting Operation Amarante in the eastern Mediterranean, to prevent irregular migration and people smuggling in that area. See: Derek Lutterbeck, "Policing Migration in the Mediterranean", in Mediterranean Politics, Vol.11, No 1, March 2006.

²¹ Lutterbeck, D. op. cit. see note 16.

²² See the Valencia Action Plan (April 2002), the recommendations of the Interim Summit in Crete (May 2003) and the Naples Euro-Mediterranean Summit (December 2003).

²³ Assembly Document 1894, adopted on 15 June 2005: "Developments in the Broader Middle East", submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Josette Durrieu, Rapporteur (France, Socialist Group).

²⁴ International Herald Tribune, 16 March 2006.

²⁵ Le Monde, 1 April 2006.

²⁶ Bilan et analyse des bouclages de la Cisjordanie, January 2006.

²⁷ It should be noted that certain orthodox Jewish political parties have always adhered to similar beliefs regarding their rights to live in the same territories.

²⁸ Le Figaro, 29 March 2006.

²⁹ The Times, 7 April 2006.

³⁰ The Financial Times, 10 May 2006.

³¹ Le Monde, 30 March 2006.

³² International Herald Tribune, 10 April 2006.

³³ Le Monde, 11 March 2006.

³⁴ Amos Oz in Liberation, 3 April 2006.

³⁵ Le Monde, 22 February 2006.

³⁶ Robert Malley: "Avoiding failure with Hamas".

³⁷ John B. Alterman: "Hamas, what next?", CSIS, 29 January 2006.

³⁸ See 3^rd sitting, 20 June 2006 (Amendment adopted).

³⁹ See 3^rd sitting, 20 June 2006 (Amendment 2: not adopted; Amendments 3,4: adopted).