DOCUMENT A/1954

20 December 2006

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European Union operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) - reply to the annual report of the Council

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Document A/1954

20 December 2006

European Union operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
- reply to the annual report of the Council

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Ignacio Cosidó Gutiérrez, Rapporteur (Spain, Federated Group)

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RECOMMENDATION 793²

on European Union operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) -
reply to the annual report of the Council

(i) Fully supporting the international input to the process of transition, stabilisation and reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC);

(ii) Fully supporting the pursuit of the process of political transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(iii) Stressing the crucial importance of the presidential, parliamentary, provincial and local election process for putting in place a legitimate, democratic Congolese Government, representative of the will of the people as a whole;

(iv) Welcoming the successful conduct of the elections and the peaceful inauguration of Joseph Kabila as elected President on 6 December 2006;

(v) Considering the electoral process to be but one step in rebuilding the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(vi) Stressing, in the light of other experience of national reconstruction, in south-eastern Europe and other parts of the world, that priority must be given to rebuilding economic and social structures;

(vii) Considering that given the present state of the country's economic networks and national infrastructure, this cannot be done without an effective political and economic commitment on the part of the major international organisations;

(viii) Stressing that the key responsibility for that assistance lies with the United Nations and the European Union which have already given their support to the peace and electoral processes;

(ix) Considering therefore that the Democratic Republic of the Congo should serve as a test for the implementation by the EU of a policy of Euro-African partnership based on common interests, mutual respect and consideration for the specific political and social characteristics of Congolese society as a whole;

(x) Considering that security is a prerequisite for launching sustainable economic reconstruction leading in the medium term to a full assumption of responsibilities by the legitimate authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(xi) Stressing the importance in this connection of providing assistance, advice and training in the fields of internal and external security, in particular through the EUPOL Kinshasa (police) and EUSEC DRC (armed forces) missions;

(xii) Recognising that without the significant presence of MONUC forces on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo it would not have been possible to implement the 2002 Pretoria regional peace agreements;

(xiii) Taking the view that those forces should be kept in place until the democratic Congolese Government can extend its authority to the territory as a whole, thereby guaranteeing the security and justice to which its peoples aspire;

(xiv) Considering that on completion of the electoral process, the inauguration of the new President and the formation by due parliamentary process of a government representative of all the peoples of the DRC, the various militias and armed groups supporting candidates or private interest groups should be disbanded and their members integrated in the DRC armed forces, under the dual supervision of MONUC and EUSEC DRC;

(xv) Considering that the United Nations and European Union have the means to carry out that process with the political, economic and military machinery available to them;

(xvi) Considering, in that case, that the European Union, with the agreement of the new legitimate DRC authorities and in coordination with the United Nations, could envisage strengthening the EUFOR RD Congo mission and extending it for at least one year;

(xvii) Considering that in addition to such action on security the EU has a particular responsibility for economic assistance and the wherewithal to impose greater transparency on the exploitation and management of the country's natural resources, and of its mineral wealth in particular, and to ensure that they are used for the purpose of economic reconstruction in the interests of the Congolese people;

(xviii) Stressing that it is unacceptable for European firms or international companies that have ties with Europe to be involved in economic activities in the DRC that encourage corruption and the creation of armed security groups that fall outside the control of the state;

(xix) Taking the view that when giving thought to the implementation of a strategic partnership with Africa, the Union should evolve coherent medium- and long-term visions for the simultaneous use of economic, legal, civil and military crisis-management instruments;

(xx) Considering, in the light of the experience acquired through EUFOR RD Congo, that it is urgent to review the principles, structures and machinery involved in operational planning, forces generation and the funding of civil-military crisis-management operations;

(xxi) Considering that the ATHENA funding mechanism is no longer satisfactory, particularly for missions in which thousands of soldiers are engaged for indeterminate periods;

(xxii) Underlining the need to confer better visibility on EU-led military crisis-management missions by keeping local and above all European public opinion better informed;

(xxiii) Noting in this context that the CFSP budget for 2007 has been increased to € 159 million, and bearing in mind that approximately € 100 million are likely to be absorbed by the future ESDP civilian mission in Kosovo;

(xxiv) Considering that there should be closer coordination between the governments of the member states and the national parliaments before the decision to launch a military crisis-management operation in the EU or NATO frameworks is taken, in order to better define the objectives of the operation and the conditions in which the forces are to be deployed (rules of engagement), taking into account the different national interests and priorities involved,

1. Propose the preparation of a new EU stabilisation assistance mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo involving, if possible, the European Gendarmerie Force;
2. Actively support the EUPOL and EUSEC missions, increase their resources and extend their mandates to include training of the DRC police and armed forces;
3. Seek to improve forces' efficiency on the ground by harmonising to the greatest possible extent the rules of engagement of the national units being deployed;
4. Ensure that there is better coordination at local level of European Commission and EU Council efforts and initiatives, including by having recourse to Commission assets and capabilities in order to attain objectives which by nature fall under the responsibility of the Council of the European Union;
5. Pursue efforts at national, European and NATO level with a view to developing and strengthening the intervention capabilities of European forces and the capacity to support them in the areas of deployability, mobility, logistics, armaments systems and interoperability in a multinational framework;
6. Keep to the deadlines for declaring the EU Battlegroups 1500 and the NATO Response Force operational;
7. Draw up proposals for the rapid reform of the ATHENA mechanism for the funding of European Union military crisis-management operations;
8. Ensure where possible that in future the national parliaments are consulted before the decision to launch a military crisis-management mission is taken and keep the Assembly informed of the state of play as regards the missions of the national forces of the WEU member states deployed on EU or NATO-led military crisis-management operations.

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Ignacio Cosidó Gutiérrez (Spain, Federated Group)

1. On 27 April 2006 the Official Journal of the European Union published the Council Joint Action "on the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process". This mission marked a return of EU military forces to the Congo for the first time since Operation Artemis (June to September 2003).

2. The Joint Action was adopted following a request from the United Nations Security Council, conveyed to the EU by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations in a letter dated 27 December 2005, in an initiative inspired and supported by the governments of two European states strongly committed to African, and particularly West African affairs: Belgium and France.

3. The UN called on the European Union to strengthen the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the presidential and parliamentary election process launched in July 2006. Since MONUC is deployed mainly in the eastern part of the country, the region hardest hit by the violence of the last ten years, the EU force (EUFOR RD Congo) was stationed in the capital, Kinshasa.

4. EUFOR RD Congo was intended first and foremost as a deterrent force in order to prevent and, where necessary, contain acts of armed violence in the capital. The electoral process − the first to have been launched since the country became the DRC on 17 May 1997 − is designed to consolidate the stabilisation process and pave the way for a social and economic recovery that will benefit the people of the country as a whole.

5. The success of this undertaking, in which both the UN and the EU have invested human, material and financial resources, is crucial for a return to normality not just within the DRC but in the whole surrounding area. It would put an end to one of the longest-lasting African conflicts of the end of the 20^th century, estimated to have claimed the lives of more than 4 million people.

6. At stake here for the European Union as an international organisation is its credibility as an exporter of security, in accordance with the concept of effective multilateralism set out in the European Security Strategy (adopted by the Brussels European Council on 12 December 2003) as a key principle for the Union's external action. Cooperation with the United Nations or the African Union with a view to resolving the crises on the African continent is a practical application of that policy.

7. However, the EU's action in the DRC is not confined to EUFOR RD Congo. The Union has also launched a police training mission (EUPOL Kinshasa) as part of its broader mission in the area of security sector reform (SSR). A number of EU states, Belgium in particular, are also assisting with the process of reform and restructuring of the DRC's armed forces. Hence EUFOR RD Congo was a logical extension of the Union's involvement in the DRC, albeit with a mandate that was more limited in scope and duration.

8. Undeniably this operation was also a political symbol: it was not so much a matter of scale or resources, as of demonstrating Europe's capacity to intervene militarily for the benefit of international security. It also provided a practical exercise for the setting-up of an ad hoc force on the battlegroup model, defined by the Headline Goal 2010 as a key element in the process of improving the Union's military capabilities.

9. EUFOR RD Congo also took Germany a step further in its affirmation of a new type of foreign and security policy increasingly less geared to the dual legacy of World War II and the cold war. The presence of German armed forces in the Balkans, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, the DRC and Lebanon signals Germany's return to the ranks of influential powers in the modern world. Its contribution, together with that of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden and others, is necessary if the European Union is to assume the role to which it aspires as a world power and strategic partner alongside the United States.

10. During the last decade of the 20^th century, Sub-Saharan Africa entered a period of profound and on occasion violent and destabilising upheaval, the causes and effects of which were many and varied. The end of the cold war had positive effects, for example in South Africa, Angola and Mozambique, but West Africa's economic, social and political situation, particularly in the French-speaking countries, continued to deteriorate.
11. The major event of the decade was the Rwandan crisis and the attempted genocide of the Tutsi population by Hutu extremists (with the support of part of the population, who were either manipulated or consenting). Tribal or ethnic civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone further tarnished Africa's image in the eyes of the European countries.
12. Admittedly Europe at the time was in the grips of its own "tribal", ethnic and "religious" war on the territory of former Yugoslavia − a "rich man's war" in the words of former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali of Egypt − which was mobilising the attention and resources of the European states, the EU, WEU and NATO, as well a large part of those of the United Nations.
13. During that period, especially from 1991 to 1994, the continent of Africa gradually dropped lower down the list of European and American strategic priorities (the only exception being the intervention in Somalia from 1991 to 1993). The democratic change that would sweep through Africa once freed of its cold war constraints would, it was believed, help solve the problems of Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, West Africa was ravaged by ten years of extreme violence, leading to the disappearance of a state which had played a pivotal role in the Africa strategies of the cold war − Zaire − and the birth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

1. The DRC in 2006: the role of the United Nations and electoral issues

14. The DRC is a collateral effect of the serious crisis in Rwanda in 1994. France took action along the border between Zaire and Rwanda with a view to establishing a "humanitarian" zone to shelter Tutsi and above all, Hutu refugees fleeing the killing and fighting between the Rwandan army (composed for the majority of Hutus) and extremist Hutu militia (the Interahamwe) on the one hand, and, on the other, the forces of the Rwandan Patriotic Front backed by Uganda and other African states.
15. Operation Turquoise (June to August 1994), which France would have liked to become an EU mission³, was typical of a trend, beginning in the nineties, involving the endorsement by the UN Security Council of military intervention not being conducted under the political control and strategic direction of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).
16. While the operation had a positive effect in terms of protecting the population, it also had major strategic consequences, albeit not those expected by France and the other European states concerned, Belgium in particular. Turquoise was an emergency operation launched pending the reinforcement of the new UN force in Rwanda, UNAMIR II⁴. In the meantime, Rwandan army remnants and Hutu extremist groups had regrouped on the border between Zaire and Rwanda. This concentration of some one million combatants and civilians, for the most part Hutus, represented a clear threat to the existence of the new, mainly Tutsi government.
17. The situation in the Hutu border camps, including those on Zairian territory, deteriorated soon after the departure of the French troops and there were violent clashes between the Rwandan refugees and the Zairian population. In parallel, Zaire's political, economic and security situation continued to worsen. 1996 saw the re-emergence of armed groups that opposed the Mobutu regime; some of them, like the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, were supported by neighbouring states such as Uganda, Rwanda (since 1994) and Tanzania, where they had their bases.
18. The weakening and collapse of the Mobutu regime and ongoing ethnic tensions on the borders with Rwanda and Burundi prompted the new Rwandan government to take direct action (September-October 1996) to eliminate the remains of the former Hutu army and Interahamwe militia in Zaire. The Rwandan forces, however, were not the only ones to operate on the territory of Zaire, where armed Zairian opposition groups were also active.
19. On 25 October a number of those groups joined forces within the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL) coordinated by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. At the end of October, Ugandan forces also entered the territory of Zaire in order to attack Ugandan armed rebel bases there. Although the foreign forces were primarily following their own national agendas, their action supported the anti-Mobutu opposition groups.
20. Abandoned by its protectors from the cold war era, with the notable exception of France, which attempted on several occasions to mediate in the conflict or to get the UN to intervene in order to stabilise the situation on the ground, the Zairian Government collapsed after a conflict which claimed hundreds of thousands, or more than one and half million lives, for the most part civilians. On 17 May 1997, the AFDL forces entered Kinshasa and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of the Congo. President Mobutu went into exile and died in Rabat, Morocco, on 7 September 1997.
21. Laurent-Désiré Kabila became the first President of the DRC. However, in another outbreak of conflict he found himself pitted against his former supporters from Rwanda and Uganda. The biggest African conflict of the 20^th century involving states and armed rebel factions began to rage in the eastern and southern part of the country. DRC allies Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia as well as Uganda, Rwanda and armed groups that opposed the new government in Kinshasa were all involved. For more than two and a half years, the eastern, south-eastern and northern parts of the DRC were transformed by violent fighting into an immense battlefield in which alliances often fell apart and new hostilities were declared. Once again, the dead, wounded and displaced were counted in millions.
22. On 10 July 1999, an initial ceasefire agreement was signed in the Zambian capital Lusaka by the DRC and its three African allies Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, as well as by Uganda and Rwanda. On 1 August the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), a rebel group opposing President Kabila's regime, also signed the agreement. The text, which had the active backing of the United Nations, gave the Organisation for African Unity (the OAU, superseded in July 2002 by the African Union, AU) the role of mediator. Nevertheless, the fighting continued throughout 1999, 2000 and 2001, including between the Rwandan and Ugandan forces operating on the territory of the DRC.
23. On 16 January 2001, Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated. His son, Joseph Kabila Kabange, who had been appointed supreme military commander the previous week, became the new President. He engaged in a step-by-step peace process which lasted until the end of 2002 and led to the signing of a number of ceasefire and peace agreements: on 20 July 2002 in Pretoria, South Africa, between the DRC and Rwanda; on 6 September 2002, in Luanda, Angola, between the DRC and Uganda; and on 17 December 2002, in Pretoria, a global peace agreement designed to settle the conflict in the DRC. Those agreements paved the way for the stabilisation of the DRC, with the active support of the United Nations.

0. The United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)

24. MONUC is a key component of the UN involvement in the DRC. This force, which in 2006 is composed of 16 192 soldiers and officers, 770 observers and 1 132 policemen, is based for the most part in the east of the country, where the situation is the most volatile. It was set up in 1999 in support of the peace process launched by the Lusaka Agreement of 10 July 1999. MONUC has constantly monitored the situation in the DRC, illustrating the importance of that country for the United Nations.
25. The UN presence is very strong in the DRC; in addition to MONUC there are also a whole host of other agencies involved in humanitarian assistance, economic and social development and the health sector, as well as in state, security sector and armed forces reform. On the spot the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador William Lacy Swing (United States) is responsible for civilian matters, while the responsibility for military affairs lies with MONUC Commander General Babacar Gaye (Senegal).
26. This operation, the most costly UN mission to date, has become a matter of credibility for the Organisation:

0. (b) The internal situation in the DRC: the electoral process

27. Having established its military presence, the UN also engaged in a process of actively supporting the 1999 and 2002 peace agreements and the reorganisation of the Congolese state. Since the large-scale war in Africa (1997-2002), the DRC has, de facto, been divided into large regions under the control of local political or military leaders, whose populations also include refugees from other regions or neighbouring states. The country's geography, its lack of roads, waterways and air transport, the dilapidated state of its infrastructure and its security problems are real, though not insurmountable obstacles to the country's reconstruction. Indeed, it has a wealth of natural resources such as diamonds, copper, gold, uranium and a whole range of other minerals in great demand on the international market, such as coal and oil, not to mention its hydraulic resources and timber.
28. Agriculture, forestry and mining account for about half of the DRC's gross domestic product, according to the International Monetary Fund. The mining industry, in spite of its lack of transparency, remains one of the DRC's major strategic assets. Nevertheless, the country is heavily indebted and the majority of the population − although town-dwellers are relatively better off − is not feeling the benefits of the modest degree of economic stabilisation that has been achieved. Wars and massacres have led to a breakdown of social structures in rural communities and displaced thousands of people. In the Katanga province alone, where even this year there was still fighting between government forces and armed Mai Mai groups, 100 000 people have returned to find their villages in ruins and depend to a large extent for their survival on international assistance.
29. In reality, the Congolese Government is unable to rebuild the country. Yet time is a strategic resource and the success of the international (UN and EU) efforts in the DRC depends on achieving swift results. This is why it is so important to establish more legitimate government structures and to achieve broad agreement among the major political (and also armed) players in the DRC. The challenge of the ongoing electoral process is to give genuine nation-wide legitimacy to the government in Kinshasa, as well as to the authorities in Lubumbashi, Bukavu, Bunia, Goma, Kisangani and other conglomerations, and to abolish the system of rule by factions.
30. The 2006 elections are therefore crucial, with the first phase − presidential and parliamentary elections − to be followed by regional and local ones. The timetable has been changed several times in order to reconcile the demands of the main candidates and political movements, and also to avoid opening the door to lengthy quibbling which could spiral into violence.
31. However, while that danger still exists, another major war does not seem likely under the present circumstances. The main personalities and factions involved in the previous conflict have to a large extent been given satisfaction in terms of their local objectives (but not that of controlling the DRC as a whole). The foreign troops have withdrawn and the UN embargoes and inspections for controlling weapons and goods trafficking are in place, while the strong MONUC presence in the east is a considerable deterrent to any large-scale resumption of hostilities.
32. The violence is for the most part the doing of fairly small armed groups (a few hundred to one or two thousand men) which also engage in acts of banditry. Political violence is being contained, in spite of the events of August 2006, when the forces of the incumbent President and candidate Joseph Kabila attacked the headquarters of Vice-President and candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba (Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, MLC).
33. Those clashes⁸, which took place in Kinshasa from 20 to 22 August 2006, left more than thirty dead and dozens of people, many of them civilians, wounded. At least one battle tank together with heavy weaponry was used against Jean-Pierre Bemba's encampment (which at the time of the attack was receiving a visit from a delegation of diplomats representing the International Committee for the Support of the Transition, known as CIAT⁹).
34. However, those events did not jeopardise the electoral process itself. Following the publication of the results of the first round of the election, Mr Kabila and Mr Bemba were the two candidates left in the running for the second round. This took place on 29 October 2006, with a few minor incidents and a lower turnout than for the first round (65%, compared to over 75% for the first round).
35. After the votes had been counted the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) declared Joseph Kabila the winner with 58.01% of votes cast. However, there was a huge split between the east of the country, where Mr Kabila got 90% of the votes, and the west, where 76% voted for Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba¹⁰. The latter contested the election result but opted to follow the legal procedures by lodging an appeal with the DRC Supreme Court.
36. This upset the plans of the EU and other international organisations and also led to violent incidents on 11 and 21 November 2006 in Kinshasa. On the latter date a section of the Supreme Court was set on fire, allegedly by Jean-Pierre Bemba's supporters, during clashes with the police¹¹, and a car belonging to the IPU (the Integrated Police Unit set up with assistance of EUPOL Kinshasa) was burned.
37. The same day, one of the main lawyers representing Mr Bemba, Marie-Thérèse N'Landu Néné, herself a candidate during the first round of the presidential elections, was "conveniently" arrested by the police on charges relating to weapons that had been transported by soldiers loyal to Mr Bemba in a car belonging to her.
38. Following the incidents at the Supreme Court the newly-elected President, Joseph Kabila, speaking through the intermediary of UN and EU representatives in the DRC, demanded the withdrawal of Jean-Pierre Bemba's forces from Kinshasa and their return to their encampment in Maluku. Within three days some 200 soldiers¹² and their families had left Kinshasa.
39. On 24 November 2006 there were false reports in Kinshasa that the Supreme Court had granted Mr Bemba's appeal, which would have reversed the election result. There were spontaneous demonstrations of joy in some parts of the capital with its majority of Bemba supporters. Some main streets were blocked¹³ and the MONUC, EUFOR RD Congo and Congolese police forces were placed on higher alert.
40. On 27 November 2006, the Supreme Court rejected Mr Bemba's appeal, making Joseph Kabila the first democratically elected President of the DRC. The final announcement was made on 29 November and the President is to be officially inaugurated on 10 December 2006.
41. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the legislative elections led to the formation of a "presidential" bloc within the parliament which, despite the "advisory" efforts of the UN, EU and various national representatives, is loathe to share posts of responsibility with members of the opposition. During the vote on the rules of procedure of the Congolese National Assembly, some members of Jean-Pierre Bemba's bloc, the Union Nationale, left the chamber in protest.
42. Negotiations involving representatives of the UN, EU and various other countries (the CIAT group) together with members of the presidential majority and representatives of the MLC and other pro-Bemba groups are currently under way with a view to finding a political solution to the crisis between President Joseph Kabila and former Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba. It may be possible to meet the latter's concerns during the next phases of the electoral process.
43. Indeed, elections to the Senate are scheduled for 29 December 2006 and the provincial governors and vice-governors are to be elected on 16 January 2007. Jean-Pierre Bemba could take his seat in the Senate and have the support of newly elected governors belonging to his political bloc. This local power is important for maintaining political control over the western part of the DRC, for it could act as a counterweight to possible authoritarian or dictatorial leanings on the part of President Kabila and his "presidential majority" in parliament.
44. The investment by the United Nations, the European Union, international donors and non-governmental organisations working to stabilise the country, estimated at more than half a billion dollars, is considerable. Thousands of civilian observers from the Congo and other states, in particular EU countries (including Commission representatives) have been deployed on the ground.

45. To those efforts must be added those of MONUC and EUFOR RD Congo, the support missions to the Congolese police, the various economic and social reconstruction experts and economic actors from both the public and private sectors. The DRC has become a showcase, a "technology demonstrator" of the capacity of the United Nations and European Union to manage the process of national reconstruction (the famous concept of "nation building") from start to finish.

2. The European Union and the DRC

46. The European Union's relationship with the DRC is determined by developments in the relations between the DRC and those EU member states that have traditional ties with Africa. The rise to power of Laurent Désiré Kabila, partly with the support of Rwandan Tutsi forces, was met with suspicion by one such European power strongly engaged in Africa. It was only when Mr Kabila changed his stance towards his Rwandan allies that more constructive relations could develop between the DRC and the EU.

47. The 1997-2002 war in Africa did not give rise to any EU engagement other than political and humanitarian assistance. At the time the Union's focus was more on internal EU matters (entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, introduction of the single currency, for example) and, in the CFSP framework, on managing the civilian aspects of the post-conflict situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania¹⁴ and, as of 1999, also in Kosovo.

48. Moreover, up until 2001 the Union did not have political-military crisis-management structures: following the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties the execution of EU decisions with security and defence implications was the responsibility of WEU (with the agreement of the WEU Council). That year the EU began giving new impetus to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), moving from an initial phase of setting up the requisite structures towards small-scale but practical engagements with the potential for further development.

49. In parallel with the Balkans operations and Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM, March to December 2003), Africa became a new theatre in which to demonstrate those capabilities. When peace returned in 2002 the Union made a remarkable comeback, particularly in the DRC, where the task of Operation Artemis (end of May 2002 to September 2003) was to provide security for the town of Bunia (Ituri province) and the surrounding area¹⁵.

50. It is now the hallmark of EU crisis-management operations that military intervention is but one of a range of instruments at the service of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Union action is designed to be inclusive and comprehensive and from the outset to incorporate civil, security and military components. This coordination of the instruments now available to the EU for its external policy is a process that is constantly being developed, adapted and improved upon.

51. This is true both for the Balkans and Africa, although this does not mean that the priorities are the same. South-eastern Europe, recent and future EU enlargement, the crisis in Lebanon and the more complex crisis in Iran are issues that are currently mobilising more diplomatic, economic, security and defence resources than the DRC (and indeed the rest of Africa).

52. In line with the principle of effective multilateralism set out in the December 2003 European Security Strategy, the Union has established a strategic partnership with Sub-Saharan Africa (represented by the African Union and other regional cooperation bodies). The relevant text, adopted by the Brussels European Council on 19 December 2005, is very general in scope; more than anything it is a list of good intentions that is very limited in terms of actual commitments: peace and security, human rights and governance, development assistance, sustainable economic growth, regional integration and trade and investing in people are listed as the five major areas for that partnership during the initial period until 2015.

53. That document will be followed up in 2007 by the adoption of a common EU strategy for Africa, probably under the Portuguese Presidency, during the EU-Africa Summit to be held in Lisbon during the second half of the year. The 2005 partnership text concludes that "Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa. Our strategy is intended to help Africa achieve this". That statement is best illustrated, precisely, by the intervention in the DRC, where the EU's peace action has both a political and economic, as well as a security and defence dimension.

54. Its political role is embodied by the Special Representative for the African Great Lakes Region (currently the Italian former journalist, deputy and senator turned diplomat, Aldo Ajello¹⁶). Economic aid and the assistance provided during the electoral process fall under the responsibility of the Commission, but aid is also provided by certain EU member states on a bilateral basis. Security is provided through EUPOL Kinshasa, while defence functions are performed by EUSEC RD Congo (and up until the end of November 2006 also by EUFOR RD Congo). Individual member states have also organised training and exercises for the DRC armed forces on a bilateral basis.

55. EUPOL Kinshasa was set up by an EU Council Joint Action on 9 December 2004. The "European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (...) [and] the Integrated Police Unit (EUPOL Kinshasa)" are the practical implementation of the measures defined in Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004 "concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa (...)" and in Council Joint Action 2004/494/CFSP of 17 May 2004 "on European Union support to the establishment of the Integrated Police Unit in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)". Common Position 2004/85/CFSP has an interesting political dimension in that it gives a ranking and division of tasks in the area of crisis management in Africa.

56. The text stipulates that "(1) The primary responsibility for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African continent lies with Africans themselves. (2) The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations". Hence the Union, in accordance with the logic of effective multilateralism, sees itself as a provider of security and defence playing a complementary role to that of the "international community". The Union provides capabilities and expertise but cannot replace those who are directly concerned (in this case the Africans themselves) or the United Nations. In order to ensure that its action has maximum impact, the Union endeavours "to (...) promote coordination between the many actors that may be involved, including a closer coordination of the measures taken by the Community and its Member States (...)" (Article 1).

57. It goes on in Article 2 to define four fields of action:

58. Article 10 of the Common Position sets out a series of measures in the areas of promoting sustainable peace and reconstruction, including two to be implemented in the DRC through the EUPOL Kinshasa police mission and EUSEC RD Congo. It proposes to:

59. Joint Action 2004/494/CFSP of 17 May 2004 is the EU's response to the request submitted by the DRC Government to the EU Special Representative in October 2003 for "European Union assistance in setting up the IPU [Integrated Police Unit], which should contribute to ensuring the protection of the State institutions and reinforce the internal security apparatus".

60. Much of the funding for this project is provided by the European Commission through the European Development Fund. There are also contributions from the CFSP budget (intergovernmental) and individual member states. Only the Council is able, in the CFSP/ESDP framework, to provide weapons and anti-riot equipment. In addition, the Commission's action is supplemented by a "European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) component for monitoring, mentoring and advising".

61. The Commission is responsible for "technical assistance, rehabilitation of the [IPU] training centre¹⁷ and the provision of equipment for the IPU (with the exception of arms and anti-riot equipment), as well as adequate training". Union financial assistance is set at 585 000 euros (the national contributions come on top of this). It takes the form of non-reimbursable aid subject to strict conditions of "auditing, accountability and traceability" and is destined essentially for the purchase and supply of "law enforcement equipment, arms and ammunition".

62. Once the regulatory and financial framework had been established for the EU's support to the IPU, implementation of the project was endorsed by Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004. Prior to that, on 16 November 2004, the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) had approved "the concept of an ESDP mission to follow the [Commission's] EDF project" (paragraph 12). That Joint Action marked the launch of the first EU police mission in Africa. EUPOL Kinshasa thus appears to be a mission for monitoring the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) project.

63. The IPU, established by a DRC decree in December 2003, is a multi-purpose unit capable of conducting various missions ranging from a conventional type of presence and order-keeping activity to riot-control tasks, the protection of state officials and certain key buildings and infrastructure, to special intervention.

64. With its staff of 1 008 (of which 20% women), the IPU is a "police technology demonstrator" which could provide the model for the creation of a genuine DRC national police force (the current police force was set up in 2002 but lacks equipment and training). However, the majority of staff come from the east of the country where support for President Joseph Kabila is the strongest.

65. The IPU became operational in June 2005, with the active support of the EU (Council and Commission) and the EUPOL Kinshasa police mission, with two training courses (basic and specialised) finalised on 30 April 2005 and 25 June 2005 respectively. The EUPOL Kinshasa mission launched in April 2005 has the following mandate:

66. The 2004 Joint Action was amended by Council Joint Action 2005/822/CFSP of 21 November 2005 extending the advisory activities of EUPOL Kinshasa to "other issues complementary to the effective conduct of policing in DRC" and furthermore it "shall enhance liaison with EUSEC RD CONGO in the field of security sector reform".

67. Council Joint Action 2006/300/CFSP of 21 April 2006 extends EUPOL's mandate until December 2006 and announces a temporary strengthening of the mission during the electoral process. It also broadens the mandate to take account of circumstances:

68. EUPOL Kinshasa is also a crisis-management force in the ESDP framework. The PSC provides the political control and strategic direction of the operation and keeps the Council informed of developments. On the spot, Special Representative Aldo Ajello is in charge of providing political guidance to the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner. The latter manages the operation on a day-to-day basis. He submits reports to the PSC and may be invited to attend certain of its meetings. The Special Representative communicates with the Council and receives guidance from it through the intermediary of the Secretary-General/High Representative SG/HR, Javier Solana.

69. Since January 2006, in recognition of its active and constructive role, EUPOL Kinshasa has been a member of the joint working group on the reform and reorganisation of the Congolese national police (French acronym GMRR). On 19 March 2006, in the presence of the EU's SG/HR, EUPOL Kinshasa and MONUC signed a technical arrangement aimed at better cooperation between the two missions. On 23 March 2006 the Council of the Union, following a PSC recommendation, decided to strengthen the EUPOL Kinshasa mission for the duration of the electoral process.

70. EUPOL Kinshasa also accepts contributions from third countries. It currently has a staff of 45 police officers and civilians from seven EU member states (2 Belgians, 1 Dane, 11 French, 4 Italians, 2 Dutch, 6 Portuguese and 1 Briton), two accession candidates (1 Romanian and 1 Turk) and Canada (1 person), as well as from two African countries (13 from Angola and 2 from Mali)¹⁹.

71. EUPOL Kinshasa is directed by Superintendent Adílio Ruivo Custódio from Portugal. Its initial budget of 4.3 million euros was maintained at the same level for the first quarter of 2006 (December 2005 to April 2006). From May to December 2006 EUPOL received funds of 3.5 million euros.

72. This operation has had positive results, at least as regards the Integrated Police Unit and other specialised units²⁰, such as the Rapid Intervention Police (French acronym PIR), set up in the framework of bilateral cooperation projects (in this instance between Angola and France). These units work in a professional fashion and perform a deterrent function on the ground. This is owed in part to the supervision and training provided by EUPOL and to the bilateral cooperation projects, as well as to the extra payment provided in conjunction with the ongoing training being organised for the Congolese police.

73. Pay is a recurring theme in connection with management of security and defence issues in the DRC and the current solutions are not satisfactory for the medium and long term. Without the assistance currently being provided by Europe and the international community, there is a very real risk of these police units (the best ones) disintegrating or becoming divided among the different political factions and ethnic groups. Another problem is the harmonisation of training methods and equipment, because rather than being channelled through a central body they depend on each of the countries participating in the DRC police reform process.

74. The mission is to be extended until March 2007 with a view to achieving the broader objective of reforming the Congolese police forces. The IPU and other specialised units represent the first step in that process. Currently the priority is Kinshasa, the state of the police force in the interior of the country being assessed as very poor. EUPOL's mandate may be adapted and extended until June 2007, depending on results and on developments in the country following the elections.

75. EUSEC RD Congo was launched in parallel to EUPOL Kinshasa in order "to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)". The practical purpose of that mission is to assist the Congolese authorities in setting up a Congolese national army that brings together the different armed factions that fought for the control of the regions during the internal and external strife from 1996 to 2002.

76. That integration process is necessary in order to do away with the armed groups, bring about political, regional and ethnic reconciliation and ensure that the armed forces, rather than being in thrall to one individual or region, adopt the classic principles of loyalty to the democratic institutions and defence of the country's territorial integrity and of national interests.

77. This is a huge undertaking involving individual countries (Belgium and France in particular), the United Nations, MONUC and the European Union. EUSEC RD Congo is the Union's contribution to that project. Its objectives are set out in Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP adopted by the EU Council on 2 May 2005:

78. EUSEC RD Congo, which is directed by General Pierre-Michel Joana²¹ from France, is currently composed of 32 military and civilian experts appointed by the participating member states²². They are present in the various departments of the Congolese Government involved in armed forces reform: "the private office of the Minister of Defence, general military staff, including the Integrated Military Structure (IMS), the staff of the land forces, the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-assignment (CONADER), and the Joint Operational Committee".

79. EUSEC RD Congo's first mandate lasted one year, from May 2005 to May 2006. It was extended until June 2007 by Joint Action 2006/303/CFSP of 25 April 2006. Its initial operating budget was set at 1.6 million euros for the first year, then increased to 4 750 000 euros for the period until 2007. It has the same chain of command as EUPOL Kinshasa, with the PSC providing the political control and strategic direction, the Special Representative providing guidance to the Head of Mission and communicating with the Council through the EU SG/HR. The two operations work in coordination with each other and with the European Commission delegation, and cooperate with MONUC as well as with third states involved in the DRC. The Head of Mission reports to the PSC and may be invited to its meetings.

80. EUSEC RD Congo and the efforts made by the UN and third countries to reform the Congolese armed forces have had fairly mixed results. The 2002 global agreement that was confirmed by an agreement signed in Sun City (South Africa) on 2 April 2003 made provision for a two-step process: the demobilisation of armed groups and then the incorporation of the combatants in mixed, or integrated, units. Reassignment programmes were planned for combatants for whom there was no place or who wished to return to civilian life, the aim being to establish at least 18 integrated brigades by the time of the 2006 elections. At present there are 14 such brigades, and generally speaking they are under-equipped and under-staffed. They have little or no transport and communications capabilities, making it difficult to deploy them to the different provinces.

81. In September 2005, six months after its launch, EUSEC submitted a report on armed forces reform to the DRC authorities. General Pierre-Michel Joana underlined two particularly important aspects:

The issue of strength is important, in view of the hundreds of thousands of combatants involved in the conflicts.

82. An estimated 70 000 combatants have not yet been through the armed forces reorganisation process, according to the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-assignment (CONADER). In the capital Kinshasa the estimates range from 15 000 to 20 000 combatants (or even 30 000, according to some sources). The current strength of the DRC armed forces is estimated by General Joanna at 100 000. To these must be added the 50 000 police officers trained by MONUC. The pace of reorganisation has slowed during the electoral period due to the desire of the main Congolese players to maintain control over their militias pending the new distribution of power that will result from the elections.

83. Armed forces reform also depends for its success on international donors. Although the Congolese Government is theoretically liable for the costs of reform, the various demobilisation and reassignment programmes are in fact being funded through UN and EU aid. As long as the political stabilisation process is delayed, the two organisations will have to keep up the financial effort in order to avoid the failure of the defence sector reform process.

84. Thanks to that assistance it has also been possible to raise the wages of the Congolese soldiers to 25 dollars per month, which is non-negligible but still barely sufficient to feed a family. The integration process involving the deployment of soldiers outside their home regions (in order to create the sense of a Congolese national identity) has meant moving thousands of people (soldiers and their families, with some five to eight people per family unit) and installing them elsewhere in disastrous conditions.

85. In the areas in which the brigades are stationed, the infrastructure, where it exists at all, is too dilapidated to cope with thousands of extra people. There is a shortage of farmland (the basis of subsistence for families) and there are not enough jobs and schools. The local population has to put up with these newcomers who do not speak the same language and who, in some cases, do not share the same beliefs, customs and traditions.

86. However, in the DRC, like in Afghanistan and Iraq, the security sector is the only field which offers hopes of regular pay. This has the perverse effect of increasing the numbers of personnel beyond a level that is really affordable for the state without international assistance.

87. Already, due to a shortage of funds, demobilisation centres have had to be closed, embezzlement and corruption are widespread and there have been cases of soldiers racketeering civilians, while Congolese military units (not militias) have been involved in fighting for the control of an area or of the local population. At the end of November 2006, "dissident" soldiers from the 81^st and 83^rd brigades clashed with troops from the 11^th brigade in the north-east of the country.

88. The soldiers are commanded by self-proclaimed general Laurent Nkunda, a Congolese of Tutsi origin, for whom an arrest warrant has been issued on charges of war crimes. The incidents took place on 25 November 2006, following the killing of a Congolese Tutsi by a policeman. MONUC was obliged to intervene during the clashes, using helicopters against the insurgents' positions. More than 15 000 civilians fled the combat zone. The 11^th brigade, backed by MONUC, regained control of the area on 28 November 2006²⁴.

89. To offset financial shortages EUSEC RD Congo has worked, together with MONUC, on setting up a "technical assistance project on improving the chain of payments of the Ministry of Defence in the DRC" (Joint Action 2005/868/CFSP, 1 December 2005). The idea is to have an administrative chain of payments that is separate from the chain of command. The Congolese paymasters in the different units are assisted (although a more accurate term would be "supervised") by MONUC observers to ensure that "treasurers receive the salaries and pay them out to the different battalions and brigades in conformity with the established norms. MONUC accompanies this process both technically and administratively to ensure that the soldiers are paid in accordance with accepted standards"²⁵.

90. As far as EU action is concerned, however, there are institutional obstacles to more direct intervention on the ground. EUSEC RD Congo, whose budget is funded partly by the European Commission, does not have direct executive authority over programme expenditure, while the Commission does not have a mandate to manage programmes under the ESDP. In order to fund a programme on the spot, EUSEC RD Congo has to work through UN agencies such as the UNPD (UN Programme for Development).

91. The members of the Defence Committee's subcommittee learned in Kinshasa; during their fact-finding visit on EU operations in the DRC, that the costs of working through a UN agency can represent up to 14% of the budget (240 000 euros out of a total of 2 million euros for one specific project involving the creation of a database for the DRC armed forces).

92. EUSEC RD Congo has also engaged in the process of developing a defence culture in the DRC. The DRC armed forces are currently ineffective (for dealing with external aggression). They are ill-equipped and plagued by social and disciplinary problems and low morale. EUSEC RD Congo is participating in an audit of the DRC defence sector which could provide the basis for a white paper on national defence setting out, in traditional fashion, the country's vital interests, the threats it faces and its capabilities.

93. This short and medium-term project also covers air and naval forces, customs and the respective roles of the armed forces and security forces. For the moment, due to the legacy of the past wars, the priority is to successfully reform the land forces, which are the largest.

94. The success of the security sector reform operation in the DRC will also depend on what happens after the elections. If the stabilisation and peacemaking process continues, the problem will be essentially a financial one²⁶, and hence not insurmountable either for the United Nations or the European Union. But if the sharing of power between the new majority and opposition is not to the satisfaction of the main parties concerned, there is a risk of the 14 integrated brigades disintegrating into armed groups and militias, whose action will be all the more lethal for them having had the benefit of better training and new equipment.

95. This possibility of conflict perhaps explains why, in the two Joint Actions on EUSEC RD Congo adopted in 2005, the Council of the European Union expresses the view that:

96. That analysis also led to the decision to strengthen the EU mission in the DRC with a small, but compact and robust military force: EUFOR RD Congo.

97. EUFOR RD Congo is the EU's second military intervention in the DRC. Operation Artemis in 2003 was a test of the EU's capacity for autonomous military crisis-management intervention. "Autonomous" means choosing not to exercise the option of having recourse to the NATO assets and capabilities (including the chain of command) available to the EU for its military missions, the arrangements for which are set out in the "Berlin plus" agreements between the EU and NATO (2002-2003)²⁸. Operation Artemis was conducted in a different framework, whereas the Berlin plus agreements provided the basis for Operations Concordia (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2003) and Althea (launched in 2004 in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

98. From 2003 to 2005, drawing on its experience of Operation Artemis, the EU launched a process of reflection on developing a military rapid reaction capability within the Union. That capability is a core element of the "Headline Goal 2010": the so-called battlegroups.

99. These units composed of some 1 500 men must be rapidly deployable (available within 5 to 10 days from the decision to intervene, deployment within a few hours or up to two days in the case of battlegroups forming the initial phase of larger interventions, by special forces, for example). Their task is to occupy the field for up to 30 days (which can be extended to up to 120 days) pending the arrival of a larger substitution force. The EU so far has 15 national, bi-national and multinational declared battlegroups, but not all of them are operational for the moment.

100. Operation Artemis was the first demonstration of what a battlegroup could do, before such groups officially existed. EUFOR RD Congo could have been the first practical application of the concept: what was actually done resembles the battlegroup concept and could be described as a kind of ad hoc battlegroup, due to the different approaches taken by the EU member states to the UN's request for the EU to provide military assistance to MONUC during the electoral period. Domestic policy and financial considerations also come into play.

101. The letter sent to the EU Presidency on 27 December 2005 by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guehenno, did not come as a surprise. Following EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo, it was logical to deploy a military force to support the EU's engagement in the DRC. It was a matter not only of political coherence, but also of demonstrating the Union's ability to deploy its full range of civil and military crisis-management tools, whether political (the Special Representative) or economic and social (the Commission), pertaining to security (EUPOL Kinshasa) or to armed forces reform (EUSEC), or of a military nature (EUFOR RD Congo).

102. The UN's request to the EU happened to coincide exactly with the change of standby duty rota among the two battlegroups which had already been set up: a French one and a German-French one. However, the latter was bi-national solely to the extent that it comprised a small number of French officers, which meant that had the Council wished to deploy a complete battlegroup, Germany would have had to bear the responsibility (and the costs) on its own.

103. There is no automatic procedure for such decisions within the EU decision-making structures: in the field of security and defence, unanimity and consensus are the rule (although positive abstention is accepted). In order to avoid placing the responsibility for this mission on the shoulders of a single country (which to boot was already highly involved in the Balkans and Afghanistan), a call for contributions was launched among the EU member states. Third countries, accession candidates and partners were also invited to contribute.

104. This search for volunteers and forces in order to form a robust but compact "ad hoc" battlegroup partly explains the time that elapsed between the UN request on the one hand, and the start of the EUFOR RD Congo planning process (23 March 2006) and positive reply to the UN (28 March 2006), on the other. Once those matters had been dealt with the UN was able to formalise the EU's military engagement during the election period in the DRC alongside MONUC, by adopting Security Council Resolution 1671 on 25 April 2006, authorising "for a period ending four months after the date of the first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections, the deployment of EUFOR RD Congo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo". On 27 April 2006, Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP on EUFOR RD Congo was published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

105. The document is a fairly succinct one for an operation of such huge political importance. As for all EU operations under the ESDP, the political control and strategic direction of the operation was exercised by the PSC. It worked under the authority of the Council of the European Union but had considerable powers delegated to it:

106. The military command of the operation was shared between Germany and France. The Operation Commander was a German, General Karlheinz Viereck, while the Force Commander, General Christian Damay²⁹, was French. The EUFOR RD Congo mission was to support MONUC in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1671. The Operation Headquarters was in Potsdam, Germany³⁰, the lead nation. The Force Headquarters was based at N'Dolo airport in Kinshasa.

107. EUFOR RD Congo, involving 21 EU member states and candidate countries, was composed of three pillars: an advance element deployed in Kinshasa, an on-call force stationed in Libreville, Gabon, and a "strategic" reserve in Europe (in France and Germany). A total of some 2 300 soldiers and officers were deployed in the DRC and Gabon. At the end of the mission and mandate on 30 November 2006, just over 1 400 troops were deployed in Kinshasa (there had been 1 200 at the start of the operation). More than two thirds of the force came from France and Germany.

108. The rapid reaction force within EUFOR was composed of the Spanish Legion's Grupo Táctico Valenzuela (130 soldiers and officers, of which 90 combatants), while a Polish military police company was in charge of protecting the EUFOR headquarters and base at N'Dolo airport. The French and German forces had more conventional duties (patrols, contacts with the civilian population) and support tasks. Special forces provided by France (two companies), Sweden (1 company) and Portugal (25 people) considerably strengthened EUFOR's deterrent, reaction and intervention capabilities.

109. The size of the force, viewed against the Congolese environment (the size of the country, the presence of numerous militias and armed groups) and the size of MONUC (more than 16 000 soldiers and officers) was modest in relation to the strategic importance for the Union of stabilising the DRC. The mandate − set to last four months starting from 30 July 2006 − was short in view of the time needed for the electoral process (dogged by delays, problems, crises and violence) and managing its aftermath.

110. However, as stressed by the commanding officers in Potsdam during the visit of the Defence Committee subcommittee on 25 July 2006, what really made the difference was the quality of the force: in terms of its composition, with a large number of special forces and combat troops (of some 800 soldiers, almost 300 were special forces); in terms too of its equipment, logistics chain, transport capabilities and communications. Essentially its role was to provide a deterrent, since it is clear that a force of this nature, even if deployed to its full capacity (with more than a third involved in support activities) could not deal with a large-scale resumption of internal hostilities in the DRC.

111. Generally speaking EUFOR was a good quality force, but it was limited by having to work with different rules of engagement (the problem of caveats). Each unit had its national doctrines, practices and instructions which were more or less adapted to the local requirements. This issue is becoming increasingly important with the growing number of multinational engagements and could lead to friction among the countries involved, with some being more exposed (and having to bear greater responsibilities) than others.

112. EUFOR RD Congo must be seen in a wider context, which includes MONUC, as well as the Integrated Police Unit in Kinshasa supervised by EUPOL Kinshasa. The acquiescence of the most powerful Congolese faction led by President Joseph Kabila, whose Presidential Guard is large (estimated at about 10 000 soldiers) and well-equipped, also facilitated EUFOR RD Congo's task. Furthermore, the other opposition groups and various armed factions refrained from expressing their hostility through acts of violence. The DRC is not like Iraq, Afghanistan or Lebanon, which explains how a small force like EUFOR RD Congo could play such a major role.

113. The force was compact and robust, as any battlegroup should be. It had a relatively clear mandate and − unlike most of the European, transatlantic and coalition operations since 1995 (the NATO intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina) − it had a clear exit strategy, linked partly with the smooth running of the electoral process and the reactions of the main political and military forces in Kinshasa. The conditions for its withdrawal were as follows:

114. The question of maintaining the force, even on a smaller scale, was raised several times by the members of the Defence Committee subcommittee during their fact-finding visit to Kinshasa from 23 to 25 November 2006. The question was particularly relevant, given the outbreaks of violence in the capital during the month of November and the growing tensions between the newly elected President Joseph Kabila and his main rival Jean-Pierre Bemba.

115. Obviously a smaller force would be much less effective, with a role confined to self-defence and possible protection of personalities, but not of the population in general. That task, should the need arise, would fall to MONUC, which is in the process of redeploying part of its forces to Kinshasa to offset the withdrawal of the EUFOR RD forces. The latter's departure also deprives MONUC³¹ of certain capabilities, in particular in the area of intelligence.

116. However, although the European authorities on the spot (national Ambassadors, Special Representative, EUFOR, EUPOL, EUSEC and the European Commission) agree that the timing of the withdrawal process is unfortunate, the military personnel are eagerly awaiting their departure after five months in Kinshasa. Each unit will withdraw under its own steam and at its own pace. The last to leave will be the French (end of December 2006, beginning of January 2007). The only way to maintain the mission would be to relieve the current forces, but no member states have offered to provide fresh forces.

117. EUFOR RD Congo was also open to participation by third countries. Turkey for example contributed a staff officer in Potsdam and a C-130 H transport plane (based in Europe). On 10 August, the Council of the European Union announced that it had reached an agreement with Switzerland on that country's participation (liaison officers).

118. The Achilles heel of the operation was its funding, for which it relied essentially on the member states, with part being financed through the ATHENA Mechanism. The baseline for the common costs of this EU military operation − the part funded through ATHENA − was set at 16 700 000 euros for a period of four months. They related to the headquarters deployment and infrastructure, in particular command, control and communications systems.

119. For airlift between Europe, Gabon (operational reserve in Libreville) and the DRC (Kinshasa), the Union used the SALIS Agreement (Strategic Airlift Interim Solution), which was set up by a memorandum of understanding signed in Istanbul on 28 June 2004 by 15 European NATO member states. The resulting mechanism has been operational since March 2006 and is based at Leipzig airport in Germany. Flights between Europe and Africa were coordinated by the Strategic Airlift Coordination Centre in Eindhoven, the Netherlands, in liaison with the EUFOR RD Congo headquarters in Potsdam. Logistic support and the transport of troops from Gabon to the DRC and within the DRC, were provided where necessary on the spot by tactical airlift capabilities based in Libreville and Kinshasa.

120. On-the-spot airlift capabilities consisted of eight transport aircraft and three transport helicopters in all, which seemed adequate in view of the small number of forces involved (120-130 soldiers at company level). Ground-based air support was provided by French Mirage aircraft stationed in Gabon. The German CH-53 and French Gazelle helicopters based at N'Dolo and N'Djili (Kinshasa international airport) were also equipped with offensive weapons.

121. The officers who briefed the Assembly subcommittee in Potsdam stressed that they were two aircraft short of the air capabilities requested during the planning phase. The limited air capabilities would only have been a problem if EUFOR RD Congo had had to deploy to other parts of the DRC. It was agreed during the planning process, in order to take account of those restrictions, that in the case of MONUC making such a request, there could only be one deployment outside Kinshasa at any given time.

122. EUFOR did in fact deploy certain specific elements outside Kinshasa, to Kananga, Lumumbashi, Gbadolite and Boma. The latter mission was conducted in preparation for withdrawing troops and equipment by sea.

123. The success of EUFOR RD Congo was due above all to making effective use of available resources. The force had air support, special forces and rapid reaction forces at its disposal, as well as electronic observation and intelligence-gathering capabilities, including four B-Hunter drones. These Israeli drones were operated by a 49-strong Belgian unit. However, they were vulnerable, as demonstrated by the fact that one of them was shot down by light weapons during their first flights³². As a result their flight altitude had to be increased, with consequences for the quality of the data gathered. Since they are relatively large (6.9 metres long with a wing-span of 8.9 metres) they are easily detected and, moreover, they are unarmed.

124. A deterrent force more than an intervention force, EUFOR RD Congo also carried out an information campaign to reassure the inhabitants of Kinshasa about its stabilising role and impartiality. The more or less open support that some European countries and by inference therefore the EU, had shown for President Joseph Kabila, prompted various opposition groups to accuse Europe of interfering in favour of that presidential candidate.

125. In order to offset that impression EUFOR RD Congo launched various initiatives for the benefit of the citizens of Kinshasa and published a newspaper called La Paillote giving information about its stabilisation activities during the electoral period. The people of Kinshasa had given the European forces a lukewarm, and in some cases hostile, reception. The European forces' response to the incidents in August considerably improved their image, although the acts of defiance continued.

126. The 20 November 2006 issue published an appeal from EUFOR asking people not to attack its vehicles. The article reported a resurgence of threats against EUFOR military personnel in previous weeks and attacks against their vehicles using stones. It underlined the dangers for peace and for the victims of such acts of violence and warned that EUFOR personnel might be obliged to act in self defence if its military vehicles continued to be blocked or attacked.

127. It is interesting to note the newspaper's answer, in a different register, to a letter from a reader asking whether there might be major problems in the DRC following EUFOR's withdrawal. "No", was the answer, "the recent events [the article was written before the incidents at the Supreme Court] have demonstrated that the Congolese are quite capable of taking action by themselves [this probably refers to the police forces, IPU and other specialised units under EUPOL supervision]. Moreover, MONUC remains in the DRC and can intervene in case of need"³³.

128. In moments of crisis EUFOR RD Congo demonstrated its ability to transform itself very rapidly into a military deterrent force. The events of 20 to 22 August provided the opportunity to demonstrate the rapid deployment of a European force, including the reinforcements that were swiftly brought in from Libreville, Gabon. Together with the MONUC troops the EUFOR RD Congo units engaged in the protection and evacuation of the visiting CIAT diplomats (International Committee for the Support of the Transition) who were blocked at the headquarters of the Vice-President and candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba when it came under attack from Presidential Guard elements (who had already disrupted the announcement of the results of the first round of the presidential election: Joseph Kabila 44.81%, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 20.03%, with a turnout of 17 931 238 out of the 25 420 199 registered voters). The intervention by EUFOR RD Congo alongside the MONUC forces was decisive for containing the violence.

129. It is too soon to take final stock of the results of this mission. Its presence strengthened not only MONUC, but also and above all the EU's global action in the DRC. The United Nations still plays a leading role in preparing and actively supporting the transition in this country. Nevertheless, the authorities in place following the elections also know that the EU's support, its economic assistance in particular, is crucial for their country. Even if the Union has fewer available resources to offer for economic aid, due to enlargement and its internal priorities, and on top of that makes any assistance contingent upon good governance, it is nevertheless a vital economic partner for many African states, including the DRC.

130. EUFOR RD Congo was but one aspect of that relationship. It was a political operation, designed to show the EU flag in the DRC. It was also a demonstration of European know-how and capabilities in the field of civil and military crisis management and a "technology demonstrator" for the battlegroups. Notwithstanding initial reservations about the capacity of this force to influence events and