DOCUMENT A/1954

20 December 2006

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European Union operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) - reply to the annual report of the Council

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Document A/1954

20 December 2006

European Union operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
- reply to the annual report of the Council

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Ignacio Cosidó Gutiérrez, Rapporteur (Spain, Federated Group)

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RECOMMENDATION 793²

on European Union operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) -
reply to the annual report of the Council

(i) Fully supporting the international input to the process of transition, stabilisation and reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC);

(ii) Fully supporting the pursuit of the process of political transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(iii) Stressing the crucial importance of the presidential, parliamentary, provincial and local election process for putting in place a legitimate, democratic Congolese Government, representative of the will of the people as a whole;

(iv) Welcoming the successful conduct of the elections and the peaceful inauguration of Joseph Kabila as elected President on 6 December 2006;

(v) Considering the electoral process to be but one step in rebuilding the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(vi) Stressing, in the light of other experience of national reconstruction, in south-eastern Europe and other parts of the world, that priority must be given to rebuilding economic and social structures;

(vii) Considering that given the present state of the country's economic networks and national infrastructure, this cannot be done without an effective political and economic commitment on the part of the major international organisations;

(viii) Stressing that the key responsibility for that assistance lies with the United Nations and the European Union which have already given their support to the peace and electoral processes;

(ix) Considering therefore that the Democratic Republic of the Congo should serve as a test for the implementation by the EU of a policy of Euro-African partnership based on common interests, mutual respect and consideration for the specific political and social characteristics of Congolese society as a whole;

(x) Considering that security is a prerequisite for launching sustainable economic reconstruction leading in the medium term to a full assumption of responsibilities by the legitimate authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(xi) Stressing the importance in this connection of providing assistance, advice and training in the fields of internal and external security, in particular through the EUPOL Kinshasa (police) and EUSEC DRC (armed forces) missions;

(xii) Recognising that without the significant presence of MONUC forces on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo it would not have been possible to implement the 2002 Pretoria regional peace agreements;

(xiii) Taking the view that those forces should be kept in place until the democratic Congolese Government can extend its authority to the territory as a whole, thereby guaranteeing the security and justice to which its peoples aspire;

(xiv) Considering that on completion of the electoral process, the inauguration of the new President and the formation by due parliamentary process of a government representative of all the peoples of the DRC, the various militias and armed groups supporting candidates or private interest groups should be disbanded and their members integrated in the DRC armed forces, under the dual supervision of MONUC and EUSEC DRC;

(xv) Considering that the United Nations and European Union have the means to carry out that process with the political, economic and military machinery available to them;

(xvi) Considering, in that case, that the European Union, with the agreement of the new legitimate DRC authorities and in coordination with the United Nations, could envisage strengthening the EUFOR RD Congo mission and extending it for at least one year;

(xvii) Considering that in addition to such action on security the EU has a particular responsibility for economic assistance and the wherewithal to impose greater transparency on the exploitation and management of the country's natural resources, and of its mineral wealth in particular, and to ensure that they are used for the purpose of economic reconstruction in the interests of the Congolese people;

(xviii) Stressing that it is unacceptable for European firms or international companies that have ties with Europe to be involved in economic activities in the DRC that encourage corruption and the creation of armed security groups that fall outside the control of the state;

(xix) Taking the view that when giving thought to the implementation of a strategic partnership with Africa, the Union should evolve coherent medium- and long-term visions for the simultaneous use of economic, legal, civil and military crisis-management instruments;

(xx) Considering, in the light of the experience acquired through EUFOR RD Congo, that it is urgent to review the principles, structures and machinery involved in operational planning, forces generation and the funding of civil-military crisis-management operations;

(xxi) Considering that the ATHENA funding mechanism is no longer satisfactory, particularly for missions in which thousands of soldiers are engaged for indeterminate periods;

(xxii) Underlining the need to confer better visibility on EU-led military crisis-management missions by keeping local and above all European public opinion better informed;

(xxiii) Noting in this context that the CFSP budget for 2007 has been increased to € 159 million, and bearing in mind that approximately € 100 million are likely to be absorbed by the future ESDP civilian mission in Kosovo;

(xxiv) Considering that there should be closer coordination between the governments of the member states and the national parliaments before the decision to launch a military crisis-management operation in the EU or NATO frameworks is taken, in order to better define the objectives of the operation and the conditions in which the forces are to be deployed (rules of engagement), taking into account the different national interests and priorities involved,

1. Propose the preparation of a new EU stabilisation assistance mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo involving, if possible, the European Gendarmerie Force;
2. Actively support the EUPOL and EUSEC missions, increase their resources and extend their mandates to include training of the DRC police and armed forces;
3. Seek to improve forces' efficiency on the ground by harmonising to the greatest possible extent the rules of engagement of the national units being deployed;
4. Ensure that there is better coordination at local level of European Commission and EU Council efforts and initiatives, including by having recourse to Commission assets and capabilities in order to attain objectives which by nature fall under the responsibility of the Council of the European Union;
5. Pursue efforts at national, European and NATO level with a view to developing and strengthening the intervention capabilities of European forces and the capacity to support them in the areas of deployability, mobility, logistics, armaments systems and interoperability in a multinational framework;
6. Keep to the deadlines for declaring the EU Battlegroups 1500 and the NATO Response Force operational;
7. Draw up proposals for the rapid reform of the ATHENA mechanism for the funding of European Union military crisis-management operations;
8. Ensure where possible that in future the national parliaments are consulted before the decision to launch a military crisis-management mission is taken and keep the Assembly informed of the state of play as regards the missions of the national forces of the WEU member states deployed on EU or NATO-led military crisis-management operations.

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Ignacio Cosidó Gutiérrez (Spain, Federated Group)

1. On 27 April 2006 the Official Journal of the European Union published the Council Joint Action "on the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process". This mission marked a return of EU military forces to the Congo for the first time since Operation Artemis (June to September 2003).

2. The Joint Action was adopted following a request from the United Nations Security Council, conveyed to the EU by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations in a letter dated 27 December 2005, in an initiative inspired and supported by the governments of two European states strongly committed to African, and particularly West African affairs: Belgium and France.

3. The UN called on the European Union to strengthen the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the presidential and parliamentary election process launched in July 2006. Since MONUC is deployed mainly in the eastern part of the country, the region hardest hit by the violence of the last ten years, the EU force (EUFOR RD Congo) was stationed in the capital, Kinshasa.

4. EUFOR RD Congo was intended first and foremost as a deterrent force in order to prevent and, where necessary, contain acts of armed violence in the capital. The electoral process − the first to have been launched since the country became the DRC on 17 May 1997 − is designed to consolidate the stabilisation process and pave the way for a social and economic recovery that will benefit the people of the country as a whole.

5. The success of this undertaking, in which both the UN and the EU have invested human, material and financial resources, is crucial for a return to normality not just within the DRC but in the whole surrounding area. It would put an end to one of the longest-lasting African conflicts of the end of the 20^th century, estimated to have claimed the lives of more than 4 million people.

6. At stake here for the European Union as an international organisation is its credibility as an exporter of security, in accordance with the concept of effective multilateralism set out in the European Security Strategy (adopted by the Brussels European Council on 12 December 2003) as a key principle for the Union's external action. Cooperation with the United Nations or the African Union with a view to resolving the crises on the African continent is a practical application of that policy.

7. However, the EU's action in the DRC is not confined to EUFOR RD Congo. The Union has also launched a police training mission (EUPOL Kinshasa) as part of its broader mission in the area of security sector reform (SSR). A number of EU states, Belgium in particular, are also assisting with the process of reform and restructuring of the DRC's armed forces. Hence EUFOR RD Congo was a logical extension of the Union's involvement in the DRC, albeit with a mandate that was more limited in scope and duration.

8. Undeniably this operation was also a political symbol: it was not so much a matter of scale or resources, as of demonstrating Europe's capacity to intervene militarily for the benefit of international security. It also provided a practical exercise for the setting-up of an ad hoc force on the battlegroup model, defined by the Headline Goal 2010 as a key element in the process of improving the Union's military capabilities.

9. EUFOR RD Congo also took Germany a step further in its affirmation of a new type of foreign and security policy increasingly less geared to the dual legacy of World War II and the cold war. The presence of German armed forces in the Balkans, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, the DRC and Lebanon signals Germany's return to the ranks of influential powers in the modern world. Its contribution, together with that of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden and others, is necessary if the European Union is to assume the role to which it aspires as a world power and strategic partner alongside the United States.

10. During the last decade of the 20^th century, Sub-Saharan Africa entered a period of profound and on occasion violent and destabilising upheaval, the causes and effects of which were many and varied. The end of the cold war had positive effects, for example in South Africa, Angola and Mozambique, but West Africa's economic, social and political situation, particularly in the French-speaking countries, continued to deteriorate.
11. The major event of the decade was the Rwandan crisis and the attempted genocide of the Tutsi population by Hutu extremists (with the support of part of the population, who were either manipulated or consenting). Tribal or ethnic civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone further tarnished Africa's image in the eyes of the European countries.
12. Admittedly Europe at the time was in the grips of its own "tribal", ethnic and "religious" war on the territory of former Yugoslavia − a "rich man's war" in the words of former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali of Egypt − which was mobilising the attention and resources of the European states, the EU, WEU and NATO, as well a large part of those of the United Nations.
13. During that period, especially from 1991 to 1994, the continent of Africa gradually dropped lower down the list of European and American strategic priorities (the only exception being the intervention in Somalia from 1991 to 1993). The democratic change that would sweep through Africa once freed of its cold war constraints would, it was believed, help solve the problems of Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, West Africa was ravaged by ten years of extreme violence, leading to the disappearance of a state which had played a pivotal role in the Africa strategies of the cold war − Zaire − and the birth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

1. The DRC in 2006: the role of the United Nations and electoral issues

14. The DRC is a collateral effect of the serious crisis in Rwanda in 1994. France took action along the border between Zaire and Rwanda with a view to establishing a "humanitarian" zone to shelter Tutsi and above all, Hutu refugees fleeing the killing and fighting between the Rwandan army (composed for the majority of Hutus) and extremist Hutu militia (the Interahamwe) on the one hand, and, on the other, the forces of the Rwandan Patriotic Front backed by Uganda and other African states.
15. Operation Turquoise (June to August 1994), which France would have liked to become an EU mission³, was typical of a trend, beginning in the nineties, involving the endorsement by the UN Security Council of military intervention not being conducted under the political control and strategic direction of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).
16. While the operation had a positive effect in terms of protecting the population, it also had major strategic consequences, albeit not those expected by France and the other European states concerned, Belgium in particular. Turquoise was an emergency operation launched pending the reinforcement of the new UN force in Rwanda, UNAMIR II⁴. In the meantime, Rwandan army remnants and Hutu extremist groups had regrouped on the border between Zaire and Rwanda. This concentration of some one million combatants and civilians, for the most part Hutus, represented a clear threat to the existence of the new, mainly Tutsi government.
17. The situation in the Hutu border camps, including those on Zairian territory, deteriorated soon after the departure of the French troops and there were violent clashes between the Rwandan refugees and the Zairian population. In parallel, Zaire's political, economic and security situation continued to worsen. 1996 saw the re-emergence of armed groups that opposed the Mobutu regime; some of them, like the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, were supported by neighbouring states such as Uganda, Rwanda (since 1994) and Tanzania, where they had their bases.
18. The weakening and collapse of the Mobutu regime and ongoing ethnic tensions on the borders with Rwanda and Burundi prompted the new Rwandan government to take direct action (September-October 1996) to eliminate the remains of the former Hutu army and Interahamwe militia in Zaire. The Rwandan forces, however, were not the only ones to operate on the territory of Zaire, where armed Zairian opposition groups were also active.
19. On 25 October a number of those groups joined forces within the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL) coordinated by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. At the end of October, Ugandan forces also entered the territory of Zaire in order to attack Ugandan armed rebel bases there. Although the foreign forces were primarily following their own national agendas, their action supported the anti-Mobutu opposition groups.
20. Abandoned by its protectors from the cold war era, with the notable exception of France, which attempted on several occasions to mediate in the conflict or to get the UN to intervene in order to stabilise the situation on the ground, the Zairian Government collapsed after a conflict which claimed hundreds of thousands, or more than one and half million lives, for the most part civilians. On 17 May 1997, the AFDL forces entered Kinshasa and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of the Congo. President Mobutu went into exile and died in Rabat, Morocco, on 7 September 1997.
21. Laurent-Désiré Kabila became the first President of the DRC. However, in another outbreak of conflict he found himself pitted against his former supporters from Rwanda and Uganda. The biggest African conflict of the 20^th century involving states and armed rebel factions began to rage in the eastern and southern part of the country. DRC allies Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia as well as Uganda, Rwanda and armed groups that opposed the new government in Kinshasa were all involved. For more than two and a half years, the eastern, south-eastern and northern parts of the DRC were transformed by violent fighting into an immense battlefield in which alliances often fell apart and new hostilities were declared. Once again, the dead, wounded and displaced were counted in millions.
22. On 10 July 1999, an initial ceasefire agreement was signed in the Zambian capital Lusaka by the DRC and its three African allies Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, as well as by Uganda and Rwanda. On 1 August the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), a rebel group opposing President Kabila's regime, also signed the agreement. The text, which had the active backing of the United Nations, gave the Organisation for African Unity (the OAU, superseded in July 2002 by the African Union, AU) the role of mediator. Nevertheless, the fighting continued throughout 1999, 2000 and 2001, including between the Rwandan and Ugandan forces operating on the territory of the DRC.
23. On 16 January 2001, Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated. His son, Joseph Kabila Kabange, who had been appointed supreme military commander the previous week, became the new President. He engaged in a step-by-step peace process which lasted until the end of 2002 and led to the signing of a number of ceasefire and peace agreements: on 20 July 2002 in Pretoria, South Africa, between the DRC and Rwanda; on 6 September 2002, in Luanda, Angola, between the DRC and Uganda; and on 17 December 2002, in Pretoria, a global peace agreement designed to settle the conflict in the DRC. Those agreements paved the way for the stabilisation of the DRC, with the active support of the United Nations.

0. The United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)

24. MONUC is a key component of the UN involvement in the DRC. This force, which in 2006 is composed of 16 192 soldiers and officers, 770 observers and 1 132 policemen, is based for the most part in the east of the country, where the situation is the most volatile. It was set up in 1999 in support of the peace process launched by the Lusaka Agreement of 10 July 1999. MONUC has constantly monitored the situation in the DRC, illustrating the importance of that country for the United Nations.
25. The UN presence is very strong in the DRC; in addition to MONUC there are also a whole host of other agencies involved in humanitarian assistance, economic and social development and the health sector, as well as in state, security sector and armed forces reform. On the spot the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador William Lacy Swing (United States) is responsible for civilian matters, while the responsibility for military affairs lies with MONUC Commander General Babacar Gaye (Senegal).
26. This operation, the most costly UN mission to date, has become a matter of credibility for the Organisation:

0. (b) The internal situation in the DRC: the electoral process

27. Having established its military presence, the UN also engaged in a process of actively supporting the 1999 and 2002 peace agreements and the reorganisation of the Congolese state. Since the large-scale war in Africa (1997-2002), the DRC has, de facto, been divided into large regions under the control of local political or military leaders, whose populations also include refugees from other regions or neighbouring states. The country's geography, its lack of roads, waterways and air transport, the dilapidated state of its infrastructure and its security problems are real, though not insurmountable obstacles to the country's reconstruction. Indeed, it has a wealth of natural resources such as diamonds, copper, gold, uranium and a whole range of other minerals in great demand on the international market, such as coal and oil, not to mention its hydraulic resources and timber.
28. Agriculture, forestry and mining account for about half of the DRC's gross domestic product, according to the International Monetary Fund. The mining industry, in spite of its lack of transparency, remains one of the DRC's major strategic assets. Nevertheless, the country is heavily indebted and the majority of the population − although town-dwellers are relatively better off − is not feeling the benefits of the modest degree of economic stabilisation that has been achieved. Wars and massacres have led to a breakdown of social structures in rural communities and displaced thousands of people. In the Katanga province alone, where even this year there was still fighting between government forces and armed Mai Mai groups, 100 000 people have returned to find their villages in ruins and depend to a large extent for their survival on international assistance.
29. In reality, the Congolese Government is unable to rebuild the country. Yet time is a strategic resource and the success of the international (UN and EU) efforts in the DRC depends on achieving swift results. This is why it is so important to establish more legitimate government structures and to achieve broad agreement among the major political (and also armed) players in the DRC. The challenge of the ongoing electoral process is to give genuine nation-wide legitimacy to the government in Kinshasa, as well as to the authorities in Lubumbashi, Bukavu, Bunia, Goma, Kisangani and other conglomerations, and to abolish the system of rule by factions.
30. The 2006 elections are therefore crucial, with the first phase − presidential and parliamentary elections − to be followed by regional and local ones. The timetable has been changed several times in order to reconcile the demands of the main candidates and political movements, and also to avoid opening the door to lengthy quibbling which could spiral into violence.
31. However, while that danger still exists, another major war does not seem likely under the present circumstances. The main personalities and factions involved in the previous conflict have to a large extent been given satisfaction in terms of their local objectives (but not that of controlling the DRC as a whole). The foreign troops have withdrawn and the UN embargoes and inspections for controlling weapons and goods trafficking are in place, while the strong MONUC presence in the east is a considerable deterrent to any large-scale resumption of hostilities.
32. The violence is for the most part the doing of fairly small armed groups (a few hundred to one or two thousand men) which also engage in acts of banditry. Political violence is being contained, in spite of the events of August 2006, when the forces of the incumbent President and candidate Joseph Kabila attacked the headquarters of Vice-President and candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba (Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, MLC).
33. Those clashes⁸, which took place in Kinshasa from 20 to 22 August 2006, left more than thirty dead and dozens of people, many of them civilians, wounded. At least one battle tank together with heavy weaponry was used against Jean-Pierre Bemba's encampment (which at the time of the attack was receiving a visit from a delegation of diplomats representing the International Committee for the Support of the Transition, known as CIAT⁹).
34. However, those events did not jeopardise the electoral process itself. Following the publication of the results of the first round of the election, Mr Kabila and Mr Bemba were the two candidates left in the running for the second round. This took place on 29 October 2006, with a few minor incidents and a lower turnout than for the first round (65%, compared to over 75% for the first round).
35. After the votes had been counted the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) declared Joseph Kabila the winner with 58.01% of votes cast. However, there was a huge split between the east of the country, where Mr Kabila got 90% of the votes, and the west, where 76% voted for Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba¹⁰. The latter contested the election result but opted to follow the legal procedures by lodging an appeal with the DRC Supreme Court.
36. This upset the plans of the EU and other international organisations and also led to violent incidents on 11 and 21 November 2006 in Kinshasa. On the latter date a section of the Supreme Court was set on fire, allegedly by Jean-Pierre Bemba's supporters, during clashes with the police¹¹, and a car belonging to the IPU (the Integrated Police Unit set up with assistance of EUPOL Kinshasa) was burned.
37. The same day, one of the main lawyers representing Mr Bemba, Marie-Thérèse N'Landu Néné, herself a candidate during the first round of the presidential elections, was "conveniently" arrested by the police on charges relating to weapons that had been transported by soldiers loyal to Mr Bemba in a car belonging to her.
38. Following the incidents at the Supreme Court the newly-elected President, Joseph Kabila, speaking through the intermediary of UN and EU representatives in the DRC, demanded the withdrawal of Jean-Pierre Bemba's forces from Kinshasa and their return to their encampment in Maluku. Within three days some 200 soldiers¹² and their families had left Kinshasa.
39. On 24 November 2006 there were false reports in Kinshasa that the Supreme Court had granted Mr Bemba's appeal, which would have reversed the election result. There were spontaneous demonstrations of joy in some parts of the capital with its majority of Bemba supporters. Some main streets were blocked¹³ and the MONUC, EUFOR RD Congo and Congolese police forces were placed on higher alert.
40. On 27 November 2006, the Supreme Court rejected Mr Bemba's appeal, making Joseph Kabila the first democratically elected President of the DRC. The final announcement was made on 29 November and the President is to be officially inaugurated on 10 December 2006.
41. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the legislative elections led to the formation of a "presidential" bloc within the parliament which, despite the "advisory" efforts of the UN, EU and various national representatives, is loathe to share posts of responsibility with members of the opposition. During the vote on the rules of procedure of the Congolese National Assembly, some members of Jean-Pierre Bemba's bloc, the Union Nationale, left the chamber in protest.
42. Negotiations involving representatives of the UN, EU and various other countries (the CIAT group) together with members of the presidential majority and representatives of the MLC and other pro-Bemba groups are currently under way with a view to finding a political solution to the crisis between President Joseph Kabila and former Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba. It may be possible to meet the latter's concerns during the next phases of the electoral process.
43. Indeed, elections to the Senate are scheduled for 29 December 2006 and the provincial governors and vice-governors are to be elected on 16 January 2007. Jean-Pierre Bemba could take his seat in the Senate and have the support of newly elected governors belonging to his political bloc. This local power is important for maintaining political control over the western part of the DRC, for it could act as a counterweight to possible authoritarian or dictatorial leanings on the part of President Kabila and his "presidential majority" in parliament.
44. The investment by the United Nations, the European Union, international donors and non-governmental organisations working to stabilise the country, estimated at more than half a billion dollars, is considerable. Thousands of civilian observers from the Congo and other states, in particular EU countries (including Commission representatives) have been deployed on the ground.

45. To those efforts must be added those of MONUC and EUFOR RD Congo, the support missions to the Congolese police, the various economic and social reconstruction experts and economic actors from both the public and private sectors. The DRC has become a showcase, a "technology demonstrator" of the capacity of the United Nations and European Union to manage the process of national reconstruction (the famous concept of "nation building") from start to finish.

2. The European Union and the DRC

46. The European Union's relationship with the DRC is determined by developments in the relations between the DRC and those EU member states that have traditional ties with Africa. The rise to power of Laurent Désiré Kabila, partly with the support of Rwandan Tutsi forces, was met with suspicion by one such European power strongly engaged in Africa. It was only when Mr Kabila changed his stance towards his Rwandan allies that more constructive relations could develop between the DRC and the EU.

47. The 1997-2002 war in Africa did not give rise to any EU engagement other than political and humanitarian assistance. At the time the Union's focus was more on internal EU matters (entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, introduction of the single currency, for example) and, in the CFSP framework, on managing the civilian aspects of the post-conflict situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania¹⁴ and, as of 1999, also in Kosovo.

48. Moreover, up until 2001 the Union did not have political-military crisis-management structures: following the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties the execution of EU decisions with security and defence implications was the responsibility of WEU (with the agreement of the WEU Council). That year the EU began giving new impetus to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), moving from an initial phase of setting up the requisite structures towards small-scale but practical engagements with the potential for further development.

49. In parallel with the Balkans operations and Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM, March to December 2003), Africa became a new theatre in which to demonstrate those capabilities. When peace returned in 2002 the Union made a remarkable comeback, particularly in the DRC, where the task of Operation Artemis (end of May 2002 to September 2003) was to provide security for the town of Bunia (Ituri province) and the surrounding area¹⁵.

50. It is now the hallmark of EU crisis-management operations that military intervention is but one of a range of instruments at the service of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Union action is designed to be inclusive and comprehensive and from the outset to incorporate civil, security and military components. This coordination of the instruments now available to the EU for its external policy is a process that is constantly being developed, adapted and improved upon.

51. This is true both for the Balkans and Africa, although this does not mean that the priorities are the same. South-eastern Europe, recent and future EU enlargement, the crisis in Lebanon and the more complex crisis in Iran are issues that are currently mobilising more diplomatic, economic, security and defence resources than the DRC (and indeed the rest of Africa).

52. In line with the principle of effective multilateralism set out in the December 2003 European Security Strategy, the Union has established a strategic partnership with Sub-Saharan Africa (represented by the African Union and other regional cooperation bodies). The relevant text, adopted by the Brussels European Council on 19 December 2005, is very general in scope; more than anything it is a list of good intentions that is very limited in terms of actual commitments: peace and security, human rights and governance, development assistance, sustainable economic growth, regional integration and trade and investing in people are listed as the five major areas for that partnership during the initial period until 2015.

53. That document will be followed up in 2007 by the adoption of a common EU strategy for Africa, probably under the Portuguese Presidency, during the EU-Africa Summit to be held in Lisbon during the second half of the year. The 2005 partnership text concludes that "Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa. Our strategy is intended to help Africa achieve this". That statement is best illustrated, precisely, by the intervention in the DRC, where the EU's peace action has both a political and economic, as well as a security and defence dimension.

54. Its political role is embodied by the Special Representative for the African Great Lakes Region (currently the Italian former journalist, deputy and senator turned diplomat, Aldo Ajello¹⁶). Economic aid and the assistance provided during the electoral process fall under the responsibility of the Commission, but aid is also provided by certain EU member states on a bilateral basis. Security is provided through EUPOL Kinshasa, while defence functions are performed by EUSEC RD Congo (and up until the end of November 2006 also by EUFOR RD Congo). Individual member states have also organised training and exercises for the DRC armed forces on a bilateral basis.

55. EUPOL Kinshasa was set up by an EU Council Joint Action on 9 December 2004. The "European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (...) [and] the Integrated Police Unit (EUPOL Kinshasa)" are the practical implementation of the measures defined in Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004 "concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa (...)" and in Council Joint Action 2004/494/CFSP of 17 May 2004 "on European Union support to the establishment of the Integrated Police Unit in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)". Common Position 2004/85/CFSP has an interesting political dimension in that it gives a ranking and division of tasks in the area of crisis management in Africa.

56. The text stipulates that "(1) The primary responsibility for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African continent lies with Africans themselves. (2) The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations". Hence the Union, in accordance with the logic of effective multilateralism, sees itself as a provider of security and defence playing a complementary role to that of the "international community". The Union provides capabilities and expertise but cannot replace those who are directly concerned (in this case the Africans themselves) or the United Nations. In order to ensure that its action has maximum impact, the Union endeavours "to (...) promote coordination between the many actors that may be involved, including a closer coordination of the measures taken by the Community and its Member States (...)" (Article 1).

57. It goes on in Article 2 to define four fields of action:

58. Article 10 of the Common Position sets out a series of measures in the areas of promoting sustainable peace and reconstruction, including two to be implemented in the DRC through the EUPOL Kinshasa police mission and EUSEC RD Congo. It proposes to:

59. Joint Action 2004/494/CFSP of 17 May 2004 is the EU's response to the request submitted by the DRC Government to the EU Special Representative in October 2003 for "European Union assistance in setting up the IPU [Integrated Police Unit], which should contribute to ensuring the protection of the State institutions and reinforce the internal security apparatus".

60. Much of the funding for this project is provided by the European Commission through the European Development Fund. There are also contributions from the CFSP budget (intergovernmental) and individual member states. Only the Council is able, in the CFSP/ESDP framework, to provide weapons and anti-riot equipment. In addition, the Commission's action is supplemented by a "European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) component for monitoring, mentoring and advising".

61. The Commission is responsible for "technical assistance, rehabilitation of the [IPU] training centre¹⁷ and the provision of equipment for the IPU (with the exception of arms and anti-riot equipment), as well as adequate training". Union financial assistance is set at 585 000 euros (the national contributions come on top of this). It takes the form of non-reimbursable aid subject to strict conditions of "auditing, accountability and traceability" and is destined essentially for the purchase and supply of "law enforcement equipment, arms and ammunition".

62. Once the regulatory and financial framework had been established for the EU's support to the IPU, implementation of the project was endorsed by Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004. Prior to that, on 16 November 2004, the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) had approved "the concept of an ESDP mission to follow the [Commission's] EDF project" (paragraph 12). That Joint Action marked the launch of the first EU police mission in Africa. EUPOL Kinshasa thus appears to be a mission for monitoring the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) project.

63. The IPU, established by a DRC decree in December 2003, is a multi-purpose unit capable of conducting various missions ranging from a conventional type of presence and order-keeping activity to riot-control tasks, the protection of state officials and certain key buildings and infrastructure, to special intervention.

64. With its staff of 1 008 (of which 20% women), the IPU is a "police technology demonstrator" which could provide the model for the creation of a genuine DRC national police force (the current police force was set up in 2002 but lacks equipment and training). However, the majority of staff come from the east of the country where support for President Joseph Kabila is the strongest.

65. The IPU became operational in June 2005, with the active support of the EU (Council and Commission) and the EUPOL Kinshasa police mission, with two training courses (basic and specialised) finalised on 30 April 2005 and 25 June 2005 respectively. The EUPOL Kinshasa mission launched in April 2005 has the following mandate:

66. The 2004 Joint Action was amended by Council Joint Action 2005/822/CFSP of 21 November 2005 extending the advisory activities of EUPOL Kinshasa to "other issues complementary to the effective conduct of policing in DRC" and furthermore it "shall enhance liaison with EUSEC RD CONGO in the field of security sector reform".

67. Council Joint Action 2006/300/CFSP of 21 April 2006 extends EUPOL's mandate until December 2006 and announces a temporary strengthening of the mission during the electoral process. It also broadens the mandate to take account of circumstances:

68. EUPOL Kinshasa is also a crisis-management force in the ESDP framework. The PSC provides the political control and strategic direction of the operation and keeps the Council informed of developments. On the spot, Special Representative Aldo Ajello is in charge of providing political guidance to the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner. The latter manages the operation on a day-to-day basis. He submits reports to the PSC and may be invited to attend certain of its meetings. The Special Representative communicates with the Council and receives guidance from it through the intermediary of the Secretary-General/High Representative SG/HR, Javier Solana.

69. Since January 2006, in recognition of its active and constructive role, EUPOL Kinshasa has been a member of the joint working group on the reform and reorganisation of the Congolese national police (French acronym GMRR). On 19 March 2006, in the presence of the EU's SG/HR, EUPOL Kinshasa and MONUC signed a technical arrangement aimed at better cooperation between the two missions. On 23 March 2006 the Council of the Union, following a PSC recommendation, decided to strengthen the EUPOL Kinshasa mission for the duration of the electoral process.

70. EUPOL Kinshasa also accepts contributions from third countries. It currently has a staff of 45 police officers and civilians from seven EU member states (2 Belgians, 1 Dane, 11 French, 4 Italians, 2 Dutch, 6 Portuguese and 1 Briton), two accession candidates (1 Romanian and 1 Turk) and Canada (1 person), as well as from two African countries (13 from Angola and 2 from Mali)¹⁹.

71. EUPOL Kinshasa is directed by Superintendent Adílio Ruivo Custódio from Portugal. Its initial budget of 4.3 million euros was maintained at the same level for the first quarter of 2006 (December 2005 to April 2006). From May to December 2006 EUPOL received funds of 3.5 million euros.

72. This operation has had positive results, at least as regards the Integrated Police Unit and other specialised units²⁰, such as the Rapid Intervention Police (French acronym PIR), set up in the framework of bilateral cooperation projects (in this instance between Angola and France). These units work in a professional fashion and perform a deterrent function on the ground. This is owed in part to the supervision and training provided by EUPOL and to the bilateral cooperation projects, as well as to the extra payment provided in conjunction with the ongoing training being organised for the Congolese police.

73. Pay is a recurring theme in connection with management of security and defence issues in the DRC and the current solutions are not satisfactory for the medium and long term. Without the assistance currently being provided by Europe and the international community, there is a very real risk of these police units (the best ones) disintegrating or becoming divided among the different political factions and ethnic groups. Another problem is the harmonisation of training methods and equipment, because rather than being channelled through a central body they depend on each of the countries participating in the DRC police reform process.

74. The mission is to be extended until March 2007 with a view to achieving the broader objective of reforming the Congolese police forces. The IPU and other specialised units represent the first step in that process. Currently the priority is Kinshasa, the state of the police force in the interior of the country being assessed as very poor. EUPOL's mandate may be adapted and extended until June 2007, depending on results and on developments in the country following the elections.

75. EUSEC RD Congo was launched in parallel to EUPOL Kinshasa in order "to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)". The practical purpose of that mission is to assist the Congolese authorities in setting up a Congolese national army that brings together the different armed factions that fought for the control of the regions during the internal and external strife from 1996 to 2002.

76. That integration process is necessary in order to do away with the armed groups, bring about political, regional and ethnic reconciliation and ensure that the armed forces, rather than being in thrall to one individual or region, adopt the classic principles of loyalty to the democratic institutions and defence of the country's territorial integrity and of national interests.

77. This is a huge undertaking involving individual countries (Belgium and France in particular), the United Nations, MONUC and the European Union. EUSEC RD Congo is the Union's contribution to that project. Its objectives are set out in Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP adopted by the EU Council on 2 May 2005:

78. EUSEC RD Congo, which is directed by General Pierre-Michel Joana²¹ from France, is currently composed of 32 military and civilian experts appointed by the participating member states²². They are present in the various departments of the Congolese Government involved in armed forces reform: "the private office of the Minister of Defence, general military staff, including the Integrated Military Structure (IMS), the staff of the land forces, the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-assignment (CONADER), and the Joint Operational Committee".

79. EUSEC RD Congo's first mandate lasted one year, from May 2005 to May 2006. It was extended until June 2007 by Joint Action 2006/303/CFSP of 25 April 2006. Its initial operating budget was set at 1.6 million euros for the first year, then increased to 4 750 000 euros for the period until 2007. It has the same chain of command as EUPOL Kinshasa, with the PSC providing the political control and strategic direction, the Special Representative providing guidance to the Head of Mission and communicating with the Council through the EU SG/HR. The two operations work in coordination with each other and with the European Commission delegation, and cooperate with MONUC as well as with third states involved in the DRC. The Head of Mission reports to the PSC and may be invited to its meetings.

80. EUSEC RD Congo and the efforts made by the UN and third countries to reform the Congolese armed forces have had fairly mixed results. The 2002 global agreement that was confirmed by an agreement signed in Sun City (South Africa) on 2 April 2003 made provision for a two-step process: the demobilisation of armed groups and then the incorporation of the combatants in mixed, or integrated, units. Reassignment programmes were planned for combatants for whom there was no place or who wished to return to civilian life, the aim being to establish at least 18 integrated brigades by the time of the 2006 elections. At present there are 14 such brigades, and generally speaking they are under-equipped and under-staffed. They have little or no transport and communications capabilities, making it difficult to deploy them to the different provinces.

81. In September 2005, six months after its launch, EUSEC submitted a report on armed forces reform to the DRC authorities. General Pierre-Michel Joana underlined two particularly important aspects:

The issue of strength is important, in view of the hundreds of thousands of combatants involved in the conflicts.

82. An estimated 70 000 combatants have not yet been through the armed forces reorganisation process, according to the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-assignment (CONADER). In the capital Kinshasa the estimates range from 15 000 to 20 000 combatants (or even 30 000, according to some sources). The current strength of the DRC armed forces is estimated by General Joanna at 100 000. To these must be added the 50 000 police officers trained by MONUC. The pace of reorganisation has slowed during the electoral period due to the desire of the main Congolese players to maintain control over their militias pending the new distribution of power that will result from the elections.

83. Armed forces reform also depends for its success on international donors. Although the Congolese Government is theoretically liable for the costs of reform, the various demobilisation and reassignment programmes are in fact being funded through UN and EU aid. As long as the political stabilisation process is delayed, the two organisations will have to keep up the financial effort in order to avoid the failure of the defence sector reform process.

84. Thanks to that assistance it has also been possible to raise the wages of the Congolese soldiers to 25 dollars per month, which is non-negligible but still barely sufficient to feed a family. The integration process involving the deployment of soldiers outside their home regions (in order to create the sense of a Congolese national identity) has meant moving thousands of people (soldiers and their families, with some five to eight people per family unit) and installing them elsewhere in disastrous conditions.

85. In the areas in which the brigades are stationed, the infrastructure, where it exists at all, is too dilapidated to cope with thousands of extra people. There is a shortage of farmland (the basis of subsistence for families) and there are not enough jobs and schools. The local population has to put up with these newcomers who do not speak the same language and who, in some cases, do not share the same beliefs, customs and traditions.

86. However, in the DRC, like in Afghanistan and Iraq, the security sector is the only field which offers hopes of regular pay. This has the perverse effect of increasing the numbers of personnel beyond a level that is really affordable for the state without international assistance.

87. Already, due to a shortage of funds, demobilisation centres have had to be closed, embezzlement and corruption are widespread and there have been cases of soldiers racketeering civilians, while Congolese military units (not militias) have been involved in fighting for the control of an area or of the local population. At the end of November 2006, "dissident" soldiers from the 81^st and 83^rd brigades clashed with troops from the 11^th brigade in the north-east of the country.

88. The soldiers are commanded by self-proclaimed general Laurent Nkunda, a Congolese of Tutsi origin, for whom an arrest warrant has been issued on charges of war crimes. The incidents took place on 25 November 2006, following the killing of a Congolese Tutsi by a policeman. MONUC was obliged to intervene during the clashes, using helicopters against the insurgents' positions. More than 15 000 civilians fled the combat zone. The 11^th brigade, backed by MONUC, regained control of the area on 28 November 2006²⁴.

89. To offset financial shortages EUSEC RD Congo has worked, together with MONUC, on setting up a "technical assistance project on improving the chain of payments of the Ministry of Defence in the DRC" (Joint Action 2005/868/CFSP, 1 December 2005). The idea is to have an administrative chain of payments that is separate from the chain of command. The Congolese paymasters in the different units are assisted (although a more accurate term would be "supervised") by MONUC observers to ensure that "treasurers receive the salaries and pay them out to the different battalions and brigades in conformity with the established norms. MONUC accompanies this process both technically and administratively to ensure that the soldiers are paid in accordance with accepted standards"²⁵.

90. As far as EU action is concerned, however, there are institutional obstacles to more direct intervention on the ground. EUSEC RD Congo, whose budget is funded partly by the European Commission, does not have direct executive authority over programme expenditure, while the Commission does not have a mandate to manage programmes under the ESDP. In order to fund a programme on the spot, EUSEC RD Congo has to work through UN agencies such as the UNPD (UN Programme for Development).

91. The members of the Defence Committee's subcommittee learned in Kinshasa; during their fact-finding visit on EU operations in the DRC, that the costs of working through a UN agency can represent up to 14% of the budget (240 000 euros out of a total of 2 million euros for one specific project involving the creation of a database for the DRC armed forces).

92. EUSEC RD Congo has also engaged in the process of developing a defence culture in the DRC. The DRC armed forces are currently ineffective (for dealing with external aggression). They are ill-equipped and plagued by social and disciplinary problems and low morale. EUSEC RD Congo is participating in an audit of the DRC defence sector which could provide the basis for a white paper on national defence setting out, in traditional fashion, the country's vital interests, the threats it faces and its capabilities.

93. This short and medium-term project also covers air and naval forces, customs and the respective roles of the armed forces and security forces. For the moment, due to the legacy of the past wars, the priority is to successfully reform the land forces, which are the largest.

94. The success of the security sector reform operation in the DRC will also depend on what happens after the elections. If the stabilisation and peacemaking process continues, the problem will be essentially a financial one²⁶, and hence not insurmountable either for the United Nations or the European Union. But if the sharing of power between the new majority and opposition is not to the satisfaction of the main parties concerned, there is a risk of the 14 integrated brigades disintegrating into armed groups and militias, whose action will be all the more lethal for them having had the benefit of better training and new equipment.

95. This possibility of conflict perhaps explains why, in the two Joint Actions on EUSEC RD Congo adopted in 2005, the Council of the European Union expresses the view that:

96. That analysis also led to the decision to strengthen the EU mission in the DRC with a small, but compact and robust military force: EUFOR RD Congo.

97. EUFOR RD Congo is the EU's second military intervention in the DRC. Operation Artemis in 2003 was a test of the EU's capacity for autonomous military crisis-management intervention. "Autonomous" means choosing not to exercise the option of having recourse to the NATO assets and capabilities (including the chain of command) available to the EU for its military missions, the arrangements for which are set out in the "Berlin plus" agreements between the EU and NATO (2002-2003)²⁸. Operation Artemis was conducted in a different framework, whereas the Berlin plus agreements provided the basis for Operations Concordia (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2003) and Althea (launched in 2004 in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

98. From 2003 to 2005, drawing on its experience of Operation Artemis, the EU launched a process of reflection on developing a military rapid reaction capability within the Union. That capability is a core element of the "Headline Goal 2010": the so-called battlegroups.

99. These units composed of some 1 500 men must be rapidly deployable (available within 5 to 10 days from the decision to intervene, deployment within a few hours or up to two days in the case of battlegroups forming the initial phase of larger interventions, by special forces, for example). Their task is to occupy the field for up to 30 days (which can be extended to up to 120 days) pending the arrival of a larger substitution force. The EU so far has 15 national, bi-national and multinational declared battlegroups, but not all of them are operational for the moment.

100. Operation Artemis was the first demonstration of what a battlegroup could do, before such groups officially existed. EUFOR RD Congo could have been the first practical application of the concept: what was actually done resembles the battlegroup concept and could be described as a kind of ad hoc battlegroup, due to the different approaches taken by the EU member states to the UN's request for the EU to provide military assistance to MONUC during the electoral period. Domestic policy and financial considerations also come into play.

101. The letter sent to the EU Presidency on 27 December 2005 by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guehenno, did not come as a surprise. Following EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo, it was logical to deploy a military force to support the EU's engagement in the DRC. It was a matter not only of political coherence, but also of demonstrating the Union's ability to deploy its full range of civil and military crisis-management tools, whether political (the Special Representative) or economic and social (the Commission), pertaining to security (EUPOL Kinshasa) or to armed forces reform (EUSEC), or of a military nature (EUFOR RD Congo).

102. The UN's request to the EU happened to coincide exactly with the change of standby duty rota among the two battlegroups which had already been set up: a French one and a German-French one. However, the latter was bi-national solely to the extent that it comprised a small number of French officers, which meant that had the Council wished to deploy a complete battlegroup, Germany would have had to bear the responsibility (and the costs) on its own.

103. There is no automatic procedure for such decisions within the EU decision-making structures: in the field of security and defence, unanimity and consensus are the rule (although positive abstention is accepted). In order to avoid placing the responsibility for this mission on the shoulders of a single country (which to boot was already highly involved in the Balkans and Afghanistan), a call for contributions was launched among the EU member states. Third countries, accession candidates and partners were also invited to contribute.

104. This search for volunteers and forces in order to form a robust but compact "ad hoc" battlegroup partly explains the time that elapsed between the UN request on the one hand, and the start of the EUFOR RD Congo planning process (23 March 2006) and positive reply to the UN (28 March 2006), on the other. Once those matters had been dealt with the UN was able to formalise the EU's military engagement during the election period in the DRC alongside MONUC, by adopting Security Council Resolution 1671 on 25 April 2006, authorising "for a period ending four months after the date of the first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections, the deployment of EUFOR RD Congo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo". On 27 April 2006, Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP on EUFOR RD Congo was published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

105. The document is a fairly succinct one for an operation of such huge political importance. As for all EU operations under the ESDP, the political control and strategic direction of the operation was exercised by the PSC. It worked under the authority of the Council of the European Union but had considerable powers delegated to it:

106. The military command of the operation was shared between Germany and France. The Operation Commander was a German, General Karlheinz Viereck, while the Force Commander, General Christian Damay²⁹, was French. The EUFOR RD Congo mission was to support MONUC in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1671. The Operation Headquarters was in Potsdam, Germany³⁰, the lead nation. The Force Headquarters was based at N'Dolo airport in Kinshasa.

107. EUFOR RD Congo, involving 21 EU member states and candidate countries, was composed of three pillars: an advance element deployed in Kinshasa, an on-call force stationed in Libreville, Gabon, and a "strategic" reserve in Europe (in France and Germany). A total of some 2 300 soldiers and officers were deployed in the DRC and Gabon. At the end of the mission and mandate on 30 November 2006, just over 1 400 troops were deployed in Kinshasa (there had been 1 200 at the start of the operation). More than two thirds of the force came from France and Germany.

108. The rapid reaction force within EUFOR was composed of the Spanish Legion's Grupo Táctico Valenzuela (130 soldiers and officers, of which 90 combatants), while a Polish military police company was in charge of protecting the EUFOR headquarters and base at N'Dolo airport. The French and German forces had more conventional duties (patrols, contacts with the civilian population) and support tasks. Special forces provided by France (two companies), Sweden (1 company) and Portugal (25 people) considerably strengthened EUFOR's deterrent, reaction and intervention capabilities.

109. The size of the force, viewed against the Congolese environment (the size of the country, the presence of numerous militias and armed groups) and the size of MONUC (more than 16 000 soldiers and officers) was modest in relation to the strategic importance for the Union of stabilising the DRC. The mandate − set to last four months starting from 30 July 2006 − was short in view of the time needed for the electoral process (dogged by delays, problems, crises and violence) and managing its aftermath.

110. However, as stressed by the commanding officers in Potsdam during the visit of the Defence Committee subcommittee on 25 July 2006, what really made the difference was the quality of the force: in terms of its composition, with a large number of special forces and combat troops (of some 800 soldiers, almost 300 were special forces); in terms too of its equipment, logistics chain, transport capabilities and communications. Essentially its role was to provide a deterrent, since it is clear that a force of this nature, even if deployed to its full capacity (with more than a third involved in support activities) could not deal with a large-scale resumption of internal hostilities in the DRC.

111. Generally speaking EUFOR was a good quality force, but it was limited by having to work with different rules of engagement (the problem of caveats). Each unit had its national doctrines, practices and instructions which were more or less adapted to the local requirements. This issue is becoming increasingly important with the growing number of multinational engagements and could lead to friction among the countries involved, with some being more exposed (and having to bear greater responsibilities) than others.

112. EUFOR RD Congo must be seen in a wider context, which includes MONUC, as well as the Integrated Police Unit in Kinshasa supervised by EUPOL Kinshasa. The acquiescence of the most powerful Congolese faction led by President Joseph Kabila, whose Presidential Guard is large (estimated at about 10 000 soldiers) and well-equipped, also facilitated EUFOR RD Congo's task. Furthermore, the other opposition groups and various armed factions refrained from expressing their hostility through acts of violence. The DRC is not like Iraq, Afghanistan or Lebanon, which explains how a small force like EUFOR RD Congo could play such a major role.

113. The force was compact and robust, as any battlegroup should be. It had a relatively clear mandate and − unlike most of the European, transatlantic and coalition operations since 1995 (the NATO intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina) − it had a clear exit strategy, linked partly with the smooth running of the electoral process and the reactions of the main political and military forces in Kinshasa. The conditions for its withdrawal were as follows:

114. The question of maintaining the force, even on a smaller scale, was raised several times by the members of the Defence Committee subcommittee during their fact-finding visit to Kinshasa from 23 to 25 November 2006. The question was particularly relevant, given the outbreaks of violence in the capital during the month of November and the growing tensions between the newly elected President Joseph Kabila and his main rival Jean-Pierre Bemba.

115. Obviously a smaller force would be much less effective, with a role confined to self-defence and possible protection of personalities, but not of the population in general. That task, should the need arise, would fall to MONUC, which is in the process of redeploying part of its forces to Kinshasa to offset the withdrawal of the EUFOR RD forces. The latter's departure also deprives MONUC³¹ of certain capabilities, in particular in the area of intelligence.

116. However, although the European authorities on the spot (national Ambassadors, Special Representative, EUFOR, EUPOL, EUSEC and the European Commission) agree that the timing of the withdrawal process is unfortunate, the military personnel are eagerly awaiting their departure after five months in Kinshasa. Each unit will withdraw under its own steam and at its own pace. The last to leave will be the French (end of December 2006, beginning of January 2007). The only way to maintain the mission would be to relieve the current forces, but no member states have offered to provide fresh forces.

117. EUFOR RD Congo was also open to participation by third countries. Turkey for example contributed a staff officer in Potsdam and a C-130 H transport plane (based in Europe). On 10 August, the Council of the European Union announced that it had reached an agreement with Switzerland on that country's participation (liaison officers).

118. The Achilles heel of the operation was its funding, for which it relied essentially on the member states, with part being financed through the ATHENA Mechanism. The baseline for the common costs of this EU military operation − the part funded through ATHENA − was set at 16 700 000 euros for a period of four months. They related to the headquarters deployment and infrastructure, in particular command, control and communications systems.

119. For airlift between Europe, Gabon (operational reserve in Libreville) and the DRC (Kinshasa), the Union used the SALIS Agreement (Strategic Airlift Interim Solution), which was set up by a memorandum of understanding signed in Istanbul on 28 June 2004 by 15 European NATO member states. The resulting mechanism has been operational since March 2006 and is based at Leipzig airport in Germany. Flights between Europe and Africa were coordinated by the Strategic Airlift Coordination Centre in Eindhoven, the Netherlands, in liaison with the EUFOR RD Congo headquarters in Potsdam. Logistic support and the transport of troops from Gabon to the DRC and within the DRC, were provided where necessary on the spot by tactical airlift capabilities based in Libreville and Kinshasa.

120. On-the-spot airlift capabilities consisted of eight transport aircraft and three transport helicopters in all, which seemed adequate in view of the small number of forces involved (120-130 soldiers at company level). Ground-based air support was provided by French Mirage aircraft stationed in Gabon. The German CH-53 and French Gazelle helicopters based at N'Dolo and N'Djili (Kinshasa international airport) were also equipped with offensive weapons.

121. The officers who briefed the Assembly subcommittee in Potsdam stressed that they were two aircraft short of the air capabilities requested during the planning phase. The limited air capabilities would only have been a problem if EUFOR RD Congo had had to deploy to other parts of the DRC. It was agreed during the planning process, in order to take account of those restrictions, that in the case of MONUC making such a request, there could only be one deployment outside Kinshasa at any given time.

122. EUFOR did in fact deploy certain specific elements outside Kinshasa, to Kananga, Lumumbashi, Gbadolite and Boma. The latter mission was conducted in preparation for withdrawing troops and equipment by sea.

123. The success of EUFOR RD Congo was due above all to making effective use of available resources. The force had air support, special forces and rapid reaction forces at its disposal, as well as electronic observation and intelligence-gathering capabilities, including four B-Hunter drones. These Israeli drones were operated by a 49-strong Belgian unit. However, they were vulnerable, as demonstrated by the fact that one of them was shot down by light weapons during their first flights³². As a result their flight altitude had to be increased, with consequences for the quality of the data gathered. Since they are relatively large (6.9 metres long with a wing-span of 8.9 metres) they are easily detected and, moreover, they are unarmed.

124. A deterrent force more than an intervention force, EUFOR RD Congo also carried out an information campaign to reassure the inhabitants of Kinshasa about its stabilising role and impartiality. The more or less open support that some European countries and by inference therefore the EU, had shown for President Joseph Kabila, prompted various opposition groups to accuse Europe of interfering in favour of that presidential candidate.

125. In order to offset that impression EUFOR RD Congo launched various initiatives for the benefit of the citizens of Kinshasa and published a newspaper called La Paillote giving information about its stabilisation activities during the electoral period. The people of Kinshasa had given the European forces a lukewarm, and in some cases hostile, reception. The European forces' response to the incidents in August considerably improved their image, although the acts of defiance continued.

126. The 20 November 2006 issue published an appeal from EUFOR asking people not to attack its vehicles. The article reported a resurgence of threats against EUFOR military personnel in previous weeks and attacks against their vehicles using stones. It underlined the dangers for peace and for the victims of such acts of violence and warned that EUFOR personnel might be obliged to act in self defence if its military vehicles continued to be blocked or attacked.

127. It is interesting to note the newspaper's answer, in a different register, to a letter from a reader asking whether there might be major problems in the DRC following EUFOR's withdrawal. "No", was the answer, "the recent events [the article was written before the incidents at the Supreme Court] have demonstrated that the Congolese are quite capable of taking action by themselves [this probably refers to the police forces, IPU and other specialised units under EUPOL supervision]. Moreover, MONUC remains in the DRC and can intervene in case of need"³³.

128. In moments of crisis EUFOR RD Congo demonstrated its ability to transform itself very rapidly into a military deterrent force. The events of 20 to 22 August provided the opportunity to demonstrate the rapid deployment of a European force, including the reinforcements that were swiftly brought in from Libreville, Gabon. Together with the MONUC troops the EUFOR RD Congo units engaged in the protection and evacuation of the visiting CIAT diplomats (International Committee for the Support of the Transition) who were blocked at the headquarters of the Vice-President and candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba when it came under attack from Presidential Guard elements (who had already disrupted the announcement of the results of the first round of the presidential election: Joseph Kabila 44.81%, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 20.03%, with a turnout of 17 931 238 out of the 25 420 199 registered voters). The intervention by EUFOR RD Congo alongside the MONUC forces was decisive for containing the violence.

129. It is too soon to take final stock of the results of this mission. Its presence strengthened not only MONUC, but also and above all the EU's global action in the DRC. The United Nations still plays a leading role in preparing and actively supporting the transition in this country. Nevertheless, the authorities in place following the elections also know that the EU's support, its economic assistance in particular, is crucial for their country. Even if the Union has fewer available resources to offer for economic aid, due to enlargement and its internal priorities, and on top of that makes any assistance contingent upon good governance, it is nevertheless a vital economic partner for many African states, including the DRC.

130. EUFOR RD Congo was but one aspect of that relationship. It was a political operation, designed to show the EU flag in the DRC. It was also a demonstration of European know-how and capabilities in the field of civil and military crisis management and a "technology demonstrator" for the battlegroups. Notwithstanding initial reservations about the capacity of this force to influence events and the overall situation in the DRC, it has contributed to the ongoing development of EU military capabilities. It was the EU's second largest military operation (involving a total of almost 3 000 soldiers and officers) after Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (6 200 soldiers and officers). Moreover the lessons learned during this operation will be useful for enhancing European military capabilities and developing ideas about new forms of intervention in international crises.

131. Artemis (2003), EUPOL Kinshasa (2005-2006) and EUFOR RD Congo (2006) constitute the Union's visiting-card in the DRC in matters of ESDP. But above and beyond their public relations impact, these operations, although limited in terms of duration, number and quality, have made a real difference on the ground. What is lacking is their integration in a coherent, proactive and global European policy for Africa with realistic and feasible short, medium and long-term objectives.

132. The assistance provided to the African Union for the deployment of its peacekeeping force in the Darfur region of Sudan in 2004 and throughout 2005 (NATO was also involved in that effort, but in a separate capacity³⁴) represents another facet of EU intervention in African crises, in this case for the benefit of a regional organisation. The EU's economic and humanitarian assistance to Africa, although this is more the responsibility of the European Commission, also lends greater coherence to its action there.

133. However, there are clearly limits to its action, particularly in the field of ESDP. Three factors are decisive for the effectiveness of the EU's current and future crisis-management action in Africa and elsewhere: the political and military decision-making processes, military capabilities and funding. Other political, strategic, security and economic aspects must also be taken on board, as well as issues of civil-military coordination/cooperation.

134. These different aspects are present at various levels in the conception, preparation and conduct of EU crisis-management operations in the DRC. Whatever their final outcome, which depends above all on the Congolese themselves, these operations are a real measure of the EU's capacity to be an effective provider of security outside Europe's geopolitical borders.

1. Political and military decision-making in the European Union

135. In presentations of the European Union (and indeed of other international organisations) the decision-making processes always look straightforward: a Council composed of the representatives of the heads of state and government (in charge of strategy, meeting twice a year), a Council of Ministers (in particular the foreign affairs and/or defence ministers in the case of the ESDP and NATO) with strategic/operational responsibilities, and specialised councils meeting at ambassadorial level to deal with day-to-day or week-to-week management.

136. This pyramidal structure is supported at the base by a secretariat (or secretariat-general) which, in some cases, comprises a large number of national civil servants seconded by their respective ministries of foreign affairs, defence, international cooperation, the interior or other areas, as appropriate. Direct contacts with the national administrations guarantee (at least in theory) the overall harmony of this intergovernmental architecture.

137. The relevant EU structures are the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the General Secretariat of the Council/High Representative for the CFSP. In the field of ESDP there are three main bodies: the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and, since more recently, the European Defence Agency (EDA).

138. The Council of the European Union meets in different formats according to the sector concerned (CFSP/ESDP, agriculture, market issues, economy/finance, research, education or culture, for example). For the ESDP the relevant body is the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) composed of both foreign affairs and defence ministers³⁵.

139. GAERC decisions are implemented and followed up by the PSC and Military Committee and executed at "tactical" level by the General Secretariat/High Representative for the CFSP, assisted by the EU Military Staff and calling where necessary on the services and capabilities of the EDA, the EU Satellite Centre and the EU Institute for Security Studies (the two latter structures being former WEU bodies that were transferred to the EU between 1999 and 2001).

140. This then, in simplified terms, is the superstructure in charge of crisis-management operations decided (at European Council level or on the proposal of the Council of the Union) at the request of one or several member states. Indeed this is a collective undertaking, in that Union action incorporates community instruments (the Commission with its various Directorates, agencies and dependent bodies) as well as mixed structures (such as those set up for cooperation in the area of justice and internal security).

141. Finally, an increasingly important player which should not be forgotten is the European Parliament. Although under the current treaties it does not have explicit competence for CFSP/ESDP, it regularly monitors EU action and operations in that area. Through its reports, resolutions, hearings and, also, presence in the field (the EP has a large budget enabling it for example, to fund aid and assistance programmes or to subsidise European or local non-governmental organisations), the EP carries out regular monitoring³⁶, if not an embryonic form of parliamentary scrutiny.

142. There are two main aspects to bear in mind as far as the ESDP is concerned: it is an intergovernmental policy and all decisions are taken unanimously. Dissenting states may use their veto (in which case the decision is blocked) or use the method of constructive abstention. For Denmark the latter has become standard policy at national level, since this EU member state does not participate in any of the Council's ESDP activities.

143. The current EU treaties make no provision for qualified majority voting or for so-called structured or enhanced cooperation in the area of defence. This does not stand in the way of developing military and civil-military crisis-management capabilities within the Union, as long as there is no conflict with the national strategic interests of a member state. The consensus requirement is not a real obstacle, but rather a factor for delay or a motive for abstention.

144. This is one of the reasons why the EU does not have a permanent operations headquarters: the United Kingdom and other member states oppose the idea on the grounds that this would be duplication with NATO's SHAPE. This also explains why the Union was unable to define a common position on the United States' and United Kingdom's invasion of Iraq. These instances of a decision being blocked by a country or group of countries are extreme cases. In other cases certain countries may be reticent about a consensus reached on the basis of the lowest common denominator, for which, while it may be acceptable to all, they do not wish to assume the full responsibility.

145. All the member states (with the exception of Denmark for the ESDP) have subscribed to the 2003 and 2010 headline goals, the battlegroups and to the strategies for Africa, the fight against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and for the stabilisation of Afghanistan, Iraq, the DRC, Darfur and Lebanon. However, when it comes to actual military deployment the positions adopted tend to be à la carte (the same is true for NATO, as regards Afghanistan, for example). Some states participate while others do not, or if they do, they prefer to offer material and financial support rather than sending troops.

146. This is the reality of the ESDP in the EU's current political and legal framework; moreover, in the current context of wholesale enlargement there are no simple solutions. The rule for the ESDP is one country one vote, regardless of the military capabilities that the country is able to make available to the Union. The difference among countries is on the ground, when it comes to choosing the operations headquarters, the operations commander and the force commander.

147. Operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo illustrate that point. In both cases it was one or two countries with African "ties" that took the initiative, supported by a coalition of the willing. This is acceptable for a small operation of short duration, but there are major limitations as far as bigger and longer-duration operations are concerned.

148. This situation is due to the obvious fact that although the ESDP is a genuinely European (common) policy, it relies on exclusively national forces and equipment which in practice are placed under the dual responsibility of both the EU and the national authorities for the duration of operations. This is true of the 2003 and 2010 headline goals, as well as for the battlegroups.

2. Military capabilities: objectives and realities

149. The European Security and Defence Policy has a military component: the European national armed forces. But there is no common or integrated collective defence at European level. There is no European army, any more than there a transatlantic army in the NATO context. When WEU was at its height the European member states and partner countries made available military units, often the result of bi- or multilateral cooperation projects, known as FAWEU, forces answerable to WEU. The most well-known example is the Eurocorps.

150. From 2001 onwards, the EU inherited this system when WEU's political and military crisis-management functions were transferred to it. This strengthened the EU's resolve to set up a 60 000-strong force that could be deployed all over the world within 60 days for a period of at least one year, together with the necessary equipment and logistics. This was the 2003 Headline Goal defined in the Helsinki Declaration issued by the European Council in December 1999.

151. In 2003 the European Council meeting in Thessaloniki, Greece, announced that this project had been realised, but with a number of shortfalls, in particular in the areas of strategic and specialised transport capabilities. Since 1999 the Union has been working to make good all identified shortfalls and has kept a catalogue of forces and a catalogue of requirements. This effort gave rise to the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), and in 2004-2005 to the European Defence Agency.

152. Having met the general requirements of the 2003 Headline Goal, the Union has drawn up and is currently working to meet a headline goal for 2010, geared more to quality than quantity, with a view to creating an optimum rapid reaction capability. The events of 11 September 2001, the operations conducted by a coalition of the willing in Afghanistan and the American and British invasion of Iraq (and the subsequent participation of other European states in the securitisation, stabilisation and reconstruction of Iraq) have made this project more relevant than ever.

153. Since the crises in former Yugoslavia there have been new crises for which the Union is still not prepared, at least not in terms of an autonomous capacity for military intervention, in other words outside of a US-led coalition or without recourse to NATO assets under the Berlin plus arrangements. Operation Artemis was an exception, but since it took place in very specific circumstances it does not set an example for the future³⁷.

154. Nevertheless, Operation Artemis demonstrated that the capacity to deploy a small but robust force can have an impact on the local situation that exceeds the physical scale of the operation. Artemis made a real difference in one part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo by neutralising or intimidating the militia who were attacking the local population and obstructing the work of humanitarian organisations. It did this with two thousand soldiers deployed for two months pending the arrival of a larger force under MONUC auspices.

155. This operation, for which France held the operational command, provided useful input to the process of reflection on improving the EU's rapid reaction capabilities. This was the underlying idea of the battlegroup 1500 concept put forward by Germany, France and the United Kingdom and endorsed by the Council of the Union. 15 such battlegroups are currently being established some of which will become operational from 2007 onwards.

156. However, this concept, geared to high-intensity conflicts, offers only a temporary solution as far as low-intensity operations are concerned. As demonstrated by the recent intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there is no mechanism for overcoming the possible political problems which may be raised by a member state or the state in charge of a battlegroup, for example for reasons of cost or expediency or due to national priorities (other external engagements, for instance).

157. Part of the problem is due to the currently popular concept of using the same set of national resources for both EU and NATO-led crisis-management missions, including combat missions. There is no dedicated European army, any more than there is a transatlantic one. As long as engagements are limited in terms of their duration and troop/equipment requirements, there is sufficient room for manoeuvre to allow crises to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

158. However, the limits are already being reached: Afghanistan (NATO), Kosovo (NATO), Iraq (coalition), Bosnia and Herzegovina (EU), Ivory Coast (France), Lebanon (United Nations) and the DRC (EUFOR RD Congo) are permanently mobilising close to 70 000 European officers and soldiers (or more than 150 000 if one takes into account the fact that with the system of rotation, for each deployed unit there is another one engaged in preparations for its tour of duty). Moreover, generally speaking more than half of these troops are provided by some half a dozen countries from among the 24 NATO member states and 25 EU member states. Also, for structural and social reasons, European military reserves remain under-used or are not taken into account at all in operational planning.

159. It is true that the countries concerned can in this way assume a leading role in keeping with their national ambitions, but if one country fails to deliver and no other country is able to replace it, this will lead to situations in which the Union may be unable to honour a request for intervention, for example from the United Nations, other international or regional organisations or individual governments. The hesitation on the part of NATO and the EU with regard to deploying a force in Sudan or Lebanon is due in part to the large number of requests for intervention and the resulting over-stretch of limited resources. Moreover, for more and more countries, particularly the small and medium-sized ones, the cost of operations makes it impossible to effectively fill the gap left by the larger ones.

3.The funding of the ESDP and of European military operations

160. Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States has increased its defence budget from year to year in order to fund its global war on terrorism. In the period from 2001 to 2006 that effort has cost a total of 432 billion dollars³⁸, in particular for the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Looking at the defence budget on its own (in other words excluding the additional expenditure for the global war on terrorism), requested allocations have gone from 292 billion dollars in 2001 to 421 billion³⁹ in 2006 and 441 billion⁴⁰ for 2007.

161. The actual sums approved by Congress in its budgetary legislation for 2006 and 2007 were, respectively, 453.28 and 453.48 billion dollars. According to a report published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Affairs, a non-governmental think-tank, total defence spending in 2006 amounts to 538 billion dollars (not including the expenditure linked with nuclear weapons) and could come close to 600 billion in 2007, if the so-called "exceptional" spending for the global war on terrorism remains at the same level (some 120 billion dollars per year)⁴¹.

162. It is interesting by way of comparison to note that there has been little change in the defence budgets of Spain and the United Kingdom, two countries involved alongside the United States in the invasion and occupation of Iraq and which have also been targeted by terrorist attacks on their own territory:

Spain (billions of euros)	2003 200442 2005 2006 2007 (estimate)
	6.479 6.746 6.990 7.416 7.696
United Kingdom (billions of £)	03/04 04/05 05/0643 06/07 07/08 (estimate)
	29.242 29.710 30.888 32.067 33.447

163. Given the economic disparities between the three countries, the only point in comparing these figures is to illustrate the difference between American and European perceptions and priorities in the field of security and defence in the context of the global war on terrorism. For the United States the latter is used as an argument in favour of increasing defence spending in general, and not just the budget for combating terrorism, whereas the European countries are concerned to do more and better with the same resources.

164. This approach is no longer tenable in the medium and long term and the European states will need to step up their cooperation in order to optimise their security and defence spending. External operations, whether in the EU or NATO framework, are becoming more costly and weighing more heavily on the national budgets, and they mean that less can be invested in the future. And, unlike the United States, the European states cannot use the argument of being at war in order to justify additional spending.

165. An interim solution for the funding of external operations, the ATHENA mechanism, has been set up within the European Union. On 23 February 2004 the Council of the European Union adopted Decision 2004/197/CFSP "establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of the European Union operations having military or defence implications" ⁴⁴. This mechanism is complementary to the principle of "costs lie where they fall", which means that individual countries pay for their forces and only "common" investments are funded by the Union.

166. In a reply to a question from a member of the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Geoff Hoon, explained how the ESDP was funded in 2005:

167. That reply provides us with a wealth of information: the costs of the civilian elements of the Union's ESDP operations are covered by the CFSP budget, part of which is funded by the Community budget and is subjected to the scrutiny of the European Parliament. The ATHENA mechanism makes provision for the countries' contribution to the common costs to be calculated on the basis of a classic distribution key based on GDP and not on the number of troops engaged⁴⁶. The common costs are those pertaining to headquarters and to command, control, communications and information (C4) systems. In the EU, as in NATO, the bulk of the funding for military operations decided in the ESDP framework comes from the national defence budgets.

168. This system does, it is true, enable countries to keep control over the use of the forces they deploy. However, the lack of a common funding system which could be extended or supplemented in order to cover logistics and transport or to fund pay bonuses for deployed soldiers is felt particularly strongly when troops find themselves engaged for extended periods in a large number of operations outside Europe. Although EUFOR RD Congo's mandate was clearly limited in time, the Union could not just abandon the DRC should there be a fresh outbreak of internal conflict.

169. The same is true of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Lebanon and, in more extreme circumstances, also Iraq. All European states have signed up to these various missions in the NATO, EU or UN frameworks or as part of a coalition of the willing without being prepared to assume the consequences, in particular in financial terms, through to the end. The longer an operation lasts the more it is necessary to rotate forces and to replace or repair damaged or destroyed equipment. The big countries can pay those costs, albeit with difficulties, but for the others they represent a permanent constraint and are an obstacle to the deployment of sufficient numbers of high-quality forces.

170. This is the problem facing NATO in Afghanistan (in addition to the dangerous nature of its mission in the southern and eastern parts of the country). The EU is now confronted with the same problem as it increases its involvement in the various international crises in accordance with the principle of effective multilateralism. The ATHENA mechanism is no longer sufficient, unless the EU restricts itself to missions that are limited in terms both of troop numbers and duration, which means they will have less political impact in the long term.

171. EUFOR RD Congo is the European Union's fourth military deployment in three years. Artemis (2003), Concordia (2003), Althea (2004) and EUFOR RD Congo (2006) have directly mobilised more than 10 000 soldiers and officers. This in itself is a feat, given that it was only in 2001 that the Union acquired proper political-military command and control structures for crisis-management operations. Each year since 2003 the Union has planned and conducted at least one military operation, while setting up, in parallel, police, advisory and monitoring missions in the CFSP/ESDP framework.

172. The EU has not been able to extend its active approach to Lebanon, although it is not impossible that the European forces engaged in the UN interim force in Lebanon will be able to "emancipate" themselves and regroup under the Union flag. Kosovo (police or gendarmes) or, further afield, Darfur in Sudan, are also potential theatres for future missions. These are sensitive political decisions, but the Union cannot afford to be absent from international crises if it wishes to be credible in the area of security and defence.

173. In order to be consistent with the options adopted in the European Security Strategy (2003)⁴⁷ and, more recently, with the initial long-term vision of European defence capability and capacity needs drawn up by the European Defence Agency and adopted by the Defence Ministers on 3 October 2006 in Levi (Finland), the EU needs to continue its efforts to develop and strengthen the ESDP structures and capabilities.

174. Drawing on the experience of past or ongoing operations, a number of possible avenues suggest themselves:

175. It is up to the member states to decide the direction which the EU's CFSP and ESDP should take in the coming years. The Union has already gone too far with those policies to be able at this stage to contemplate any backtracking. Europe as a global player is a reality. It may still be looking for its marks in this changing world, but it exists and must take action using the civil and military tools that it currently has at its disposal. Inaction is no longer an option; engagement is the only course of action if Europe is to be a credible player in its own right.

176. The EUFOR RD Congo mission is one step in the long march towards a powerful Europe at the service of the world and its peoples. Although its approach is essentially "Euro-centric", it has nothing to do with a desire for domination or imperialism. Europe is just one corner of the modern-day global village, although perhaps by virtue of its political and economic position in the community of nations and its history, influence and civilisation, it has a slightly greater responsibility, a "manifest destiny" to fulfil, in order to create "a secure Europe in a better world"⁴⁸.

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APPENDIX

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): Geography, population and economic indicators

1. Geography

Surface area: 2 345 000 km²; 4 times the size of France or two thirds the size of Western Europe.

Population: 60 764 000 habitants

Capital: Kinshasa, located in the extreme west of the country: between 6 and 7 million inhabitants

Natural resources: Copper, tin cobalt and uranium deposits are reputedly to be found along the many faults running through the plateau of the Lualaba (the name given to the Congo River near its source). It is also rumoured that gold and diamond reserves abound there.

Virtually entirely landlocked except for a few kilometres of Atlantic coast the RDC is bounded on the west by the Angolan enclave of Cabinda and the People's Republic of Congo, to the north by the Central African Republic and Sudan and to the east by Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania and to the south by Zambia and Angola.

The country is largely covered by the Congo basin. This river, which rises in the south-east of the country, follows a 4 320-km course to the coast where it flows into the Atlantic through an estuary bordered on either side by Congo-Brazzaville and Angola. The Congo and its tributaries, the main one being the Kasai, make up Central Africa's largest waterway system with 14 166 km of navigable river. The river plays an essential part in the movement of people and goods. It is the longest water course in Africa after the Nile and the second largest in the world after the Amazon in Latin America in terms of drainage volume (40 000 m³/s). A flow of this magnitude represents one of the greatest hydroelectric potentials in the world, estimated at 774 000 GWh, or 8% of world potential.

To the south-east, Lake Tanganyika, the deepest in the world after Lake Baikal, extends over a distance of 677 km along the borders of Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi and Zambia. The lake is famous for its exceptionally clear water whose visibility extends to a depth of 25 metres. The waters of Lake Tanganyika have a high mineral content and its 20 000 km³ volume constitutes one world's greatest natural supplies of fresh water.

2. Transport

The DRC has a network of roads of a total length of some 145 000 km, only 2 430 km of which are surfaced. The two main arteries are the Kinshasa-Matadi-Banana and Kinshasa-Lubumbashi highways.

There are some 5 000 km of railways. The greater part of the network (3 600 km) is in the south-east of the country around the mining area of Katanga (Lubumbashi) and is in a very poor state of repair. Minerals are transported by rail to the river ports of Ilebo and Kindu, or to the Zambian, Tanzanian or Angolan rail systems. It takes nearly two weeks to get from Lubumbashi in the extreme south of the country to Katanga in the centre. The line between Matadi and Kinshasa (360 km) works better, transporting goods between the coast and the capital.

The Congo and Kasai rivers, with their 14 166 km of navigable waterways, are the country's two main transport links. There are has also approximately 1 300 km of shipping routes on the Great Lakes. An essential part in the country's transport system is played by the two navigable stretches:

It normally takes 15 days to cover the 1 000 km distance between Kinshasa and Kisangani in the north-east of the country and the journey time is further lengthened because of the numerous river control points the army has set up. Shipping on the Congo River is also threatened by gangs of armed bandits. However, it is still the most frequently used route for bringing emergency food aid to people displaced as a result of the conflict or transporting MONUC soldiers and equipment.

The DRC has some 24 airports with asphalt runways, two of them, N'Dolo and N'Dili (the international airport) in Kinshasa, and 205 makeshift airfields. There are some 20 or so airlines operating in the DRC. Following an agreement signed in November 2005 between Lignes Aériennes Congolaises (LAC) and the Spanish private sector company Bravo Airlines, LAC are now flying again on both internal and international routes with two Boeing 737 and 767 aircraft. The first flight, between Kinshasa and Kisangani, took place on 19 August 2006.

3. Population

Age structure:

0-4 years: 18.5%

Under 15: 47.5%

(Children under 15 in the workforce: 24%)

15-30: 27.3%.

30-50: 16.7%

50-80 and over: 8.3%

Mortality rate: 14 %

Infant mortality rate: 126 per 1000

75% of the population suffers from malnutrition. (38 million according to the Congolese press from international sources).

Only 7% of the population has access to electricity; 25% has access to drinking water in urban areas and 7% in the rural areas, although the country has an enormous reservoir and highly abundant rainfall.

The number of tribes or ethnic peoples making up the population of Congo is estimated at around 250. Many languages and cultures of small ethnic groups are tending to die out, while the dominant ethnic groups flourish. Bantu peoples account for 80% of the population, the main Bantu tribes being the Luba (18%), Mongo (17%), Kongo (12%) and Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi (10%) and in North Kivu a people distinguished by their language, Kinyarwanda, numbering between 600 000 and 1 000 000.

The other Bantu peoples: Lunda, Tchokwé, Tetela, Bangala, Shi, Nande, Hunde, Nyanga, Tembo, Téké and Bembe, Babindi, Hema, Nande, Budja, Bowa, Wakuti, Bemba, Yaka.

Religions: Catholics 50%, Protestants 20%, Kimbanguistes 10% (independent prophetic African church), Muslims 10%, other 10%.

Languages: French (official), Lingala (most common), Kinyarwanda, Swahili, Kikongo, Tshiluba, others.

The impact of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)

The first cases of AIDS were detected in the DRC in 1983. 4.2% of the population between the ages of 15 and 49 are infected with the HIV (human immunodeficiency) virus. In some provinces the rate is as high as 10.3%. Estimates of the number of people suffering from AIDS vary from 1-2.5 million.

4. The economy

Currency: Congolese francs

1 EUR = 515 CF (December 2005)

1 USD = 435 CF (December 2005)

Total GDP: 7.2 billion USD

GDP per head: 125 USD

GDP by sector:

Population living below the poverty line (2 dollars per day): 75%. In fact, most people live on less than 1 dollar per day.

Annual rate of inflation: 12.78%

2006 budget: 2.17 billion USD, national resources: 43%, international aid: 57%

Budget: proportion of budget allocated to:

Education 0.4%

Health 0.2%

Agriculture: resources are underexploited, yields have been falling for 20 years or so and there is no well-developed irrigation system in spite of the availability of substantial supplies of fresh water.

The DRC contains almost half of the forest area of the continent of Africa. Half of the land area of the country, more than 1 million km², is under forest. This represents potential tropical wood production areas of the order of 6 million m³/per annum. It is underexploited, partly because of its distance from coastal outlets.

Mining: Diamond production in 2003 was valued at 27.1 million carats, or 642 million dollars. Ranked in production terms below Botswana and Australia and alongside Russia, the DRC accounts for some 20-25% of the world's annual diamond production. However, the figures may be inaccurate given the very large proportion of diamond smuggling that goes on.

The DRC is also part of the Kimberley Process Diamond Certification Scheme set up in 2000 with the support of the United Nations and, in particular, Canada, following an initiative by the diamond producing states of southern Africa. This production control and certification scheme has been gradually extended to include other producer states. The European Union is represented on the Kimberley Process by the European Commission, which has held the vice-chairmanship since 1 January 2006. Botswana holds the chair and Russia chairs the membership committee.

Exports: 2.049 billion dollars.

Export goods: mining products, agricultural produce of low added value.

Exports to: Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany.

Imports: 2.5 billion dollars.

Import goods: manufactured products

Imports from: South Africa, Belgium, France, the United States, Germany, Japan.

The DRC belongs to four regional economic communities:

5. Politics and Administration

Independence granted: 30 June 1960

Zaire proclaimed: October 1971

Democratic Republic of Congo proclaimed: 17 May 1997

The Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, signed in Pretoria (South Africa) on 16 December 2002, was endorsed and ratified by the power sharing-agreement of April 2003. The agreement set out the parties making up the government of the RDC: consisting of the majority party, President Joseph Kabila's Party for Reconstruction and Development, the principal rebel factions (RDC-Goma, MLC, RCD-ML, RCD-N, Mai Mai), the main opposition parties and community organisations. The transitional government took power on 30 June 2003.

The agreement made provision for an equitable distribution of government offices in the interim institutions: the Presidency, the Government, the National Assembly, the Senate and the Judiciary. In order to satisfy all the parties involved in the negotiations, large numbers of posts had to be created. The result was a power-sharing administration guaranteed by a collegial Presidency consisting of the President and five Vice-Presidents (according to a 1+4 arrangement).

A new DRC Constitution was promulgated on 18 February 2006 following the confirmation by the Supreme Court of the constitutional referendum held on 18 December 2005. The 2006 Constitution repeals the Transitional Constitution of 2003. Pending the close of the elections and the announcement of the final results, the institutions set up in 2003 remain in place.

One institution is particularly important in this connection: the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) established under Article 154 of the 2003 Constitution. This is an autonomous and impartial body with legal personality and which is administratively and financially independent. It is funded by the Congolese authorities with contributions from the United Nations, the European Union and other concerned states.

Administrative organisation: the DRC is divided into 11 regions (provinces). These include Kinshasa, which has regional status. The regions are subdivided into sub-regions which are in turn divided into zones, then into communities. Each community is made up of a number of groupings consisting of several villages.

The elections

The presidential and parliamentary elections took place on 31 July 2006. They were organised by the IEC with assistance and funding from the United Nations, the European Union and individual states.

More than 50 000 polling stations were set up for just over 25 million registered voters (out of a total population of 60 million).

267 parties and movements, with 9 707 candidates, registered with the IEC for the 2006 parliamentary elections; 33 candidates stood for the presidential elections.

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were revealed on 20 August 2006: Joseph Kabila Kabange led the poll with 44.81% of the votes cast (7 590 485 votes), followed by Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo with 20.03% (3 392 592). The second round was scheduled for 28 October 2006. The announcement of the results of the first round was followed by violent clashes in Kinshasa between armed supporters of the two main rivals.

The results of the second round, made public on 15 November by the IEC and confirmed by the Supreme Court (after the appeals made by Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba who was standing for election as President were considered and rejected on 26 November) and confirmed by the IEC on 29 November 2006, made Joseph Kabila Kabange the winner with 58.01% of the vote. However, there was a huge split between the west of the country - largely supportive of Mr Bemba), particularly in the capital, Kinshasa - and the east, where the majority had voted for Mr Kabila.

The IEC announced the provisional results of the parliamentary elections on 7 September: out of the 500 seats, 111 go to the party of the incumbent President, the PPRD (Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie), 64 to Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC (Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MCL). The RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie), also supported by armed groups, won only 15 seats. A majority "presidential" bloc has since been formed, monopolising important Assembly positions despite protests from the MLC/Union Nationale opposition.

6. The Congolese armed forces, armed groups and child soldiers

(a) The DRC armed forces (Forces Armées de la RDC, or FARDC)

In 2003, President Joseph Kabila pledged that he would set up a national army incorporating the different armed groups. Article 180 of the Transitional Constitution drawn up the same year stipulates that the armed forces must be "national, republican and apolitical". Their composition at all levels must reflect fair and balanced participation by all the provinces.

As long as the Congolese armed forces are not fully operational, MONUC is supplying land and air transport and radio communications and dealing with the evacuation of wounded Congolese soldiers. The Congolese military for their part provide knowledge of the terrain, the people and the local languages, as well as the capacity to adapt to a sometimes difficult environment.

The armed forces are currently involved in a process of reform known as DDR (demobilisation, disarmament and reassignment). It was launched in 1999 by the DRC authorities with the assistance of international donors and with the advice of the EU's EUSEC mission, with the aim of giving the different militias the choice between being demobilised (in exchange for a bonus plus annual payments for one year for a total of 400 dollars) or reassigned to the armed forces.

In the latter case, once their identity, age and state of health have been checked, they are put through a lengthy process taking them far from their region of origin to one of six integration centres, where they are mixed with other militia members from other regions. There they receive 45 days of weapons training and civic instruction, before being assigned to an integrated brigade which is then deployed elsewhere. Some 60% opt for demobilisation and 40 % want to rejoin the army.

The initial aim of setting up 18 brigades by 30 June 2006 could not be met. The main problem encountered with this process has been the integration of soldiers of different origins and political allegiances. Some of them are former belligerents from one of the DRC's 250 ethnic groups, ex-militiamen or rebels, who in some cases previously fought each other. The men who have not yet been through the integration process are from the RCD-Goma in North and South Kivu, or else they are government soldiers, members of the Republican Guard or of the Mai Mai militia.

The integrated brigades are also at risk of acts of indiscipline and occasionally mutiny or inter-brigade rivalry. There were clashes in the north of the DRC in November between dissident elements from the 81^st and 83^rd brigades and the 11^th brigade (supported by MONUC units). There were few deaths but over 100 000 civilians fled the combat zone; this created tensions in other parts of the country due to an influx of refugees.

The 25 dollars wages, a considerable amount in terms of the local standard of living, are now being paid on a regular basis, which according to the MONUC spokesman is in itself a big step forward in as much as it is the only way of beginning to deter these men from racketing the population. Nevertheless the people living close to these centres are still at risk from violence, for many of the integration centres lack basic sanitary facilities, medical equipment and water and the needs of soldiers' families are only very rarely taken into account.

(b) Militias and armed groups

Militia action is concentrated in the east of the country and more particularly in the province of Kivu at the border with Rwanda and Burundi and the province of Ituri near the border with Uganda. Four years after the end of the second war in the Congo (1997-2002), an estimated 10 000 Hutu combatants from Rwanda are still residing in the east of the country. The main armed opposition groups are:

(c) Child soldiers

In 1996, shortly before Laurent Désiré Kabila came to power, the recruitment of child soldiers became systematic in Bukavu, South Kivu, in the east of the country. Some children signed up voluntarily, seduced by propaganda and the initial prospect of getting 100 dollars a month (much more than the average wage, which in some eastern regions is 0.18 dollars a day, or about 5,50 dollars a month). But many children were taken by force from their families.

Most of them were recruited before the age of 12. Child welfare groups think there may be as many as 30 000 child soldiers. Some 18 000 of them are receiving help through special projects and through the national programme for the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life. However, several thousands of boys and girls have still not been demobilised.

Arms proliferation

Weapons proliferation is a recurring problem: the leaders of armed groups and political factions in the east of the DRC have negotiated access to the local market for foreign companies, some of which collude with them for the supply of weapons. In order to control the situation and avoid a massive influx of light and heavy weapons into the DRC, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1493 on 28 July 2003:

The Security Council decided to set up a committee to monitor compliance with that embargo, the UN Group of Experts on arms trafficking. Following the publication of their report of 18 April 2005, the UN Security Council extended the embargo to all destinations in the DRC, with the exception of the weapons being used by MONUC for its humanitarian operations.

All future deliveries of arms or related equipment in compliance with those exemptions were to be made to sites specially designated by the interim Government of National Unity in coordination with MONUC. Six sites were designated for that purpose.

Containers of small and light weapons, which generally arrive at night, are taken in charge by military personnel. They are transported by aircraft chartered from foreign airlines from countries all over the world: Belgium, United Arab Emirates, Swaziland, Liberia, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan, and others.

According to the UN Register of Conventional Arms and Comtrade database of commodity trade statistics, the DRC Government has signed agreements with arms suppliers in Europe, including EU member states and candidate countries, Georgia and Ukraine. The Peoples Republic of China is another supplier to the DRC, as well as the state-owned company Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI), which manufactures munitions and light arms.

Between May 2004 and May 2005, Belgium, Germany and Hungary donated light weapons and police equipment to the new DRC police unit, but those donations do not seem to constitute an infringement of the embargo. Weapons and related equipment supplied to the DRC armed forces and law-enforcement services can, however, be used to commit human rights violations and the embargo is in some cases very laxly applied.

MONUC military observers (the MILOBS) in charge of monitoring compliance with the embargo have several times been refused authorisation to inspect the cargos of flights involving the former ALC (the Armée de libération du Congo, which is the armed branch of the MLC). Among the embargo facilitators are international freight companies, international brokers' associations and private transport companies, many of them registered in Europe.

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on European Union operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

(i) Fully supporting the international input to the process of transition, stabilisation and reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC);

(ii) Fully supporting the pursuit of the process of political transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(iii) Stressing the crucial importance of the presidential, parliamentary, provincial and local election process for putting in place a legitimate, democratic Congolese government, representative of the will of the people as a whole;

(iv) Considering the electoral process to be but one step in rebuilding the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(v) Stressing, in the light of other experience of national reconstruction, in south-eastern Europe and other parts of the world, that priority must be given to rebuilding economic and social structures;

(vi) Considering that given the present state of the country's economic networks and national infrastructure, this cannot be done without an effective political and economic commitment on the part of the major international organisations;

(vii) Stressing that the key responsibility for that assistance lies with the United Nations and the European Union which have already given their support to the peace and electoral processes;

(viii) Considering therefore that the Democratic Republic of the Congo should serve as a test for the implementation by the EU of a policy of Euro-African partnership based on common interests, mutual respect and consideration for the specific political and social characteristics of Congolese society as a whole;

(ix) Considering that security is a prerequisite for launching sustainable economic reconstruction leading in the medium term to a full assumption of responsibilities by the legitimate authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(x) Stressing the importance in this connection of providing assistance, advice and training in the fields of internal and external security, in particular through the EUPOL Kinshasa (police) and EUSEC DRC (armed forces) missions;

(xi) Recognising that without the significant presence of MONUC forces on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo it would not have been possible to implement the 2002 Pretoria regional peace agreements;

(xii) Taking the view that those forces should be kept in place until the democratic Congolese Government can extend its authority to the territory as a whole, thereby guaranteeing the security and justice to which its peoples aspire;

(xiii) Considering that on completion of the electoral process, the inauguration of the new President and the formation by due parliamentary process of a government representative of all the peoples of the DRC, the various militias and armed groups supporting candidates or private interest groups should be disbanded and their members integrated in the DRC armed forces, under the dual supervision of MONUC and EUSEC DRC;

(xiv) Considering that the United Nations and European Union have the means to carry out that process with the political, economic and military machinery available to them;

(xv) Considering, in that case, that the European Union, with the agreement of the new legitimate DRC authorities and in coordination with the United Nations, could envisage strengthening the EUFOR RD Congo mission and extending it for at least one year;

(xvi) Considering that in addition to such action on security the EU has a particular responsibility for economic assistance and the wherewithal to impose greater transparency on the exploitation and management of the country's natural resources, and of its mineral wealth in particular, and to ensure that they are used for the purpose of economic reconstruction in the interests of the Congolese people;

(xvii) Stressing that it is unacceptable for European firms or international companies that have ties with Europe to be involved in economic activities in the DRC that encourage corruption and the creation of armed security groups that fall outside the control of the state;

(xviii) Taking the view that when giving thought to the implementation of a strategic partnership with Africa, the Union should evolve coherent medium and long-term visions for the simultaneous use of economic, legal, civil and military crisis-management instruments;

(xix) Considering, in the light of the experience acquired through EUFOR RD Congo, that it is urgent to review the principles, structures and machinery involved in operational planning, forces generation and the funding of civil-military crisis-management operations;

(xx) Considering that the ATHENA funding mechanism is no longer satisfactory, particularly for missions in which thousands of soldiers are engaged for indeterminate periods;

(xxi) Underlining the need to confer better visibility on EU-led military crisis-management missions by keeping local and above all European public opinion better informed;

(xxii) Considering that there should be closer coordination between the governments of the member states and the national parliaments before the decision to launch a military crisis-management operation in the EU or NATO frameworks is taken, in order to better define the objectives of the operation and the conditions in which the forces are to be deployed (rules of engagement), taking into account the different national interests and priorities involved,

1. Propose the preparation of a new EU military stabilisation assistance mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
2. Actively support the EUPOL and EUSEC missions, increase their resources and extend their mandates to include training of the DRC police and armed forces;
3. Ensure where possible that in future the national parliaments are consulted before the decision to launch a military crisis-management mission is taken;
4. Draw up proposals for the rapid reform of the ATHENA mechanism for the funding of European Union military crisis-management operations;
5. Pursue efforts at national, European and NATO level with a view to developing and strengthening the intervention capabilities of European forces and the capacity to support them in the areas of deployability, mobility, logistics, armaments systems and interoperability in a multinational framework;
6. Keep to the deadlines for declaring the EU Battlegroups 1500 and the NATO Response Force operational;
7. Keep the Assembly informed of the state of play as regards the missions of the national forces of the WEU member states deployed on EU or NATO-led military crisis-management operations.

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AMENDMENTS 1-5⁴⁹

tabled by Mr Ignacio Cosidó Gutiérrez, Rapporteur (Spain, Federated Group)

1. Add, at the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, the following text:

2. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph:

3. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph:

4. Merge paragraphs 3 and 7 of the draft recommendation proper, and insert the text at the end of the draft recommendation.
5. Move paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper so that it follows paragraph 6.

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AMENDMENTS 6-9⁵⁰

tabled by Mrs Doris Barnett, Rapporteur (Germany, Socialist Group)
and revised on 20 December 2006

6. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, delete "military".
7. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, delete recital (xii).
8. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after recital (iii), add the following new recital:

9. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after recital (xxi) add the following recital:

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¹ Adopted by the Committee on 22 November 2006.

² Adopted by the Assembly on 20 December 2006 at the 8^th sitting.

³ In fact there was no discussion, either within the WEU or ESDP frameworks, of turning Operation Turquoise into an EU mission.

⁴ UNAMIR I had lost all its credibility and capabilities during the period of violence preceding and during the Rwandan genocide. The withdrawal of the Belgian contingent following the killing of the Belgian paratroopers tasked with protecting the Rwandan Prime Minister (Mrs Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a Hutu moderate who was also assassinated) put an end to UNAMIR I.

⁵ MONUC's mandate has since been extended on a regular basis, each time in connection with a UNSC Resolution on the situation in the DRC.

0. ⁶ Chapter 7 of the UN Charter - "action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression"; Article 51: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security".

⁷ The Ituri province (capital Bunia) was the scene of violent clashes between armed groups fighting to control the local population and international humanitarian aid.

⁸ MONUC forces were deployed in the city, supported during their first sortie by EUFOR RD Congo units. Reinforcements for the European force were dispatched to Kinshasa from the operational reserve stationed in Libreville, Gabon.

⁹ CIAT was set up following the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement in Pretoria in December 2002. It is composed of representatives of the UN Security Council's permanent members, plus representatives of Angola, Belgium, Canada, Mozambique, South Africa and MONUC.

¹⁰ Jean-Pierre Bemba won a majority of the votes in all the constituencies in the Kinshasa area: Independent Electoral Committee (IEC), www.cei-rdc.cd

¹¹ According to a pro-Bemba television station, the fire was the result of police intervention: CCTV, 23 November 2006.

¹² Out of an estimated one thousand.

¹³ WEU Assembly Defence Committee Chairman Robert Walter (UK, Federated Group), who was chairing the Assembly subcommittee that visited the DRC from 23 to 25 November 2006, directly witnessed these events on the evening of 24 November 2006.

¹⁴ WEU conducted a security assistance mission in Albania − the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) − from 1997 to 2001.

¹⁵ Operation Artemis was presented in detail in an Assembly report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee and adopted in plenary on 1 December 2004: "The European Union and peacekeeping in Africa", Assembly Document A/1880 (containing Assembly Recommendation 756), Rapporteur Stef Goris (Belgium, Liberal Group). http://www.assemblee-ueo.org

¹⁶ Aldo Ajello was a member of the WEU Assembly from 1979 to 1983, when he was an Italian deputy. Appointed Special Representative in 2000, his mandate was renewed in 2004 and again in 2006. The Defence Committee subcommittee on EU missions in the DRC met him during a visit to Kinshasa on 24 November 2006.

¹⁷ This refers to the Kasangulu training centre. The IPU has its operational base at Limete, in the DRC.

¹⁸ Thanks to this flexibility it was possible to equip the IPU and other specialised police units (the PIR, or Rapid Intervention Police, for example) with vehicles, tear gas grenades and other equipment for maintaining order. These items were supplied by Finland and France in particular.

¹⁹ South Africa was invited to participate in EUPOL activities but opted to continue working with the DRC authorities on a bilateral basis. South African technical advisers cooperate with EUPOL Kinshasa, however.

²⁰ With some nuances, for example as regards the incidents of 21 November 2006 at the DRC Supreme Court.

²¹ General Joana was also one of the commanders of France's Operation Licorne (June 2003 to June 2004, Côte d'Ivoire).

²² Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. EUSEC is also open to contributions from third countries. The small number of member states present (8 out of 25) is due to the fact that the other countries do not have diplomatic representations, as well as to the fact that the working language in the DRC is French.

²³ MONUC news, "FARDC troops estimated at 100,000, says EUSEC", interview by Oscar Mercado and Michel Smitall. www.monuc.org

²⁴ www.monuc.org

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ However, constraints imposed by the International Monetary Fund have a negative impact on these security sector reform efforts, without which there can be no social and economic reconstruction.

²⁷ This refers to the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union published in the Official Journal of the European Communities on 24 December 2002. Article 11 (Title V, on the arrangements for a Common Foreign and Security Policy) defines the objectives of the CFSP. http://eur-lex.europa.eu

²⁸ For a detailed analysis of the operational relations between the EU and NATO and the Berlin plus agreements, see Assembly document A/1918 "Cooperation in the operational area between the EU and NATO - reply to the annual report of the Council" together with Assembly Recommendation 774, submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Jean-Pierre Kucheida (France, Socialist Group), 7 December 2005. http://www.assemblee-ueo.org

²⁹ Although the EUFOR RD Congo mandate expired on 30 November 2006, some troops have stayed behind in Kinshasa pending the complete dismantling of the force scheduled for the end of 2006 or beginning of 2007.

³⁰ On the premises of Germany's Armed Forces Staff, the Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr (EinsFüdo Bw). On 25 July 2006, the WEU Assembly Defence Committee subcommittee on EUFOR RD Congo, led by the Defence Committee Chairman, Robert Walter, and including the Rapporteur, Ignacio Cosidó, met there with the Operation Commander, General Karlheinz Viereck, and the EUFOR RD Congo Military Staff, for a briefing and discussion on this operation and its means of implementation.

³¹ And also EUPOL, which used the images and films produced in real time by the Belgian B-Hunter drones.

³² A second drone was lost due to a technical failure during operations. On 29 November 2006, on the day of the drone's last flight over Kinshasa, two aircraft were in service. The Belgian military had also reported local acts of sabotage of the optical cables needed for the launch and recovery operations. During its fact-finding mission in Kinshasa, the Defence Committee subcommittee witnessed the recovery of a drone on its return from a mission. Imagery from the drones was also available to EUPOL HQ in real time.

³³ La Paillote, EUFOR RD Congo, 20 November 2006.

³⁴ See "Cooperation in the operational area between the EU and NATO - reply to the annual report of the Council", Assembly Document A/1918, Recommendation 744, Rapporteur Jean-Pierre Kucheida (France, Socialist Group), 7 December 2005. http://www.assemblee-ueo.org

³⁵ The WEU Assembly has regularly proposed setting up an EU Council of defence ministers only in order to manage the ESDP. The European Defence Agency is the only "subsidiary body" of the Council of the Union (to use WEU terminology) to be answerable to a Council composed exclusively of the defence ministers of the participating states.

³⁶ Although the EP is not part of the CFSP/ESDP decision-making process, it does have a say in the community budgets used to fund the EU's external action, and its political support (or bringing pressure to bear in order to obtain more financial resources) is sought by political decision-makers and the EU agencies in the field of the ESDP.

³⁷ See the report on "The European Union and Peacekeeping in Africa" submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee and adopted by the Assembly on 1 December 2004: Assembly Document A/1880, Recommendation 756, Rapporteur Stef Goris (Belgium, Liberal Group). http://www.assemblee-ueo.org

³⁸ "GWOT (Global War on Terrorism) tables 2006", Congressional Budget Office, 2006 ; www.cbo.gov.

³⁹ These are the figures set out in the "National Defense Estimates" that the DoD published for the fiscal year. Congress has the power to revise the figures upwards or downwards and to change the way in which the funds are allocated.

⁴⁰ These are the sums that the President of the United States submitted for approval to Congress. If the spending relating to nuclear weapons is included, the figures increase to 441 and 463 billion dollars respectively.

⁴¹ "Analysis of the FY 2007 Defense Budget Request", Steven M. Kosiak, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 2006. www.csbaonline.org

⁴² Terrorist attacks in Madrid, 11 March 2004. The same year the new Spanish Government headed by the Socialist Prime Minister José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero began withdrawing the Spanish troops from Iraq.

⁴³ Terrorist attacks in London, 7 July 2005.

⁴⁴ The process of reflection on arrangements for financing the common costs of the European Union operations having military or defence implications began in 1999 with the launch of the 2003 Headline Goal announced by the European Council at its meeting in Helsinki on 10 and 11 December 1999. Preparatory decisions for the Athena mechanism were taken in 2002 (17 June) and 2003 (22 September).

⁴⁵ "European Security and Defence Policy" House of Commons, United Kingdom, written replies to questions, 5 June 2006. http://www.publications.parliament.uk

⁴⁶ This does not involve Denmark, which does not participate in the ESDP or contribute to the Athena mechanism.

⁴⁷ For a detailed analysis of the ESS see "Implementation of the European Security Strategy − reply to the annual report of the Council" Document A/1896 and Recommendation 759 submitted by Gerd Höfer (Germany, Socialist Group), 13 June 2005. http://www.assemblee-ueo.org

⁴⁸ European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council meeting in Brussels on 12 December 2005 chaired by Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi representing the Italian Presidency. http://europa.eu

⁴⁹ See 8th sitting, 20 December 2006 (Amendments adopted).

⁵⁰ See 8th sitting, 20 December 2006 (Amendments 6,8 and 9 adopted, Amendment 7 withdrawn).