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FIFTY-THIRD SESSION

**ESDP: The way ahead – Conclusions of the Berlin Conference
– reply to the annual report of the Council**

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee
by Lluís Maria de Puig, Rapporteur (Spain, Socialist Group)

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on ESDP: The way ahead – Conclusions of the Berlin Conference – reply to the annual report of the Council

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MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

¹ Adopted by the Committee on 15 May 2007.

RECOMMENDATION 795²

***on ESDP: the way ahead – Conclusions of the Berlin Conference
– reply to the annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the efforts of the German Presidency to take forward institutional reform of the European Union;
- (ii) Recalling that without the current text of the draft Constitutional Treaty, the 2003 Nice Treaty remains the basis for the ESDP activities of the European Union;
- (iii) Welcoming the operational successes of the ESDP, including the 17 missions launched to date, seven of which have been completed successfully;
- (iv) Noting recent progress made on ESDP capabilities, specifically as regards the operational launch of two battlegroups and finalisation of the Force Catalogue 06 (FC06) in the framework of the 2010 Headline Goal;
- (v) Aware that significant challenges remain in terms of capabilities and procurement, in particular the need to strengthen the European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB), overcome delays inherent in national decision-making procedures affecting the rapid deployment of battlegroups, counter the failure to invest in new technologies and eliminate the considerable overlap in existing national civilian and military technologies;
- (vi) Aware that new and diverse security challenges are presenting themselves for the ESDP, such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), human security, energy security and the use of the internet by terrorist groups and coordinated cyber attacks on the governmental e-systems of states, to name but a few;
- (vii) Aware that in a changing security environment traditional NATO-EU relations and the Berlin Plus agreements are not of themselves sufficient fully to encompass the expanding requirements of military and civilian crisis management;
- (viii) Concerned at the threat to European security presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; also that the EU has not so far engaged in a discussion about missile defence;
- (ix) Aware that recent US proposals to install a missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, designed to protect the United States and its allies from external attack, is viewed askance by Russia and may have repercussions in other areas where cooperation with Russia is needed, as well as creating divisions among EU member states;
- (x) Aware that the future of south-east Europe lies in the EU, thus implying a specific EU responsibility for stability, security and prosperity in the region;
- (xi) Welcoming the work of the EU Planning Team to prepare the establishment of an ESDP mission in Kosovo which will be the largest EU operation to date;
- (xii) Welcoming the efforts of Mr Ahtisaari, the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary General, to help determine the future status of Kosovo;
- (xiii) Concerned about the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board recently took a decision to extend the activities of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and EU Special Representative (EUSR) to 30 June 2008 because of continuing dissension between the governments of the entities over the reforms required by the EU;
- (xiv) Welcoming nevertheless the decision by the EU Council on 27 February 2007 to implement its Transition Plan for Operation Althea, leading to a reduction of EUFOR troops on the ground and preserving a stand-by force in the region;

² Adopted by the Assembly on 4 June 2007 at the 1st sitting.

- (xv) Welcoming progress achieved as regards Africa, particularly on the EU concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, and looking forward to the EU-Africa Summit due to be held, with a view to adopting an EU-Africa Strategy, under the Portuguese EU/WEU presidency in the second half of 2007;
- (xvi) Perturbed that despite extensive international efforts, the situation in Darfur is deteriorating;
- (xvii) Welcoming the international aid given to Afghanistan for reconstruction, security, rule of law and counter narcotics operations as well as the initiatives to transform the German police mission in Afghanistan into an ESDP mission and strengthen the EU's presence and influence in the country;
- (xviii) Aware that consecutive Eurobarometer surveys show public opinion is strongly in favour of ESDP but recalling people's unwillingness for their government to engage in military intervention,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE WEU NATIONS AS CURRENT OR PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO

1. Prepare and implement policies requiring strong political, operational and institutional investment, given the emergent new security challenges needing to be addressed in future under the ESDP;
2. Increase their investment in new and diverse technologies designed to tackle new security challenges;
3. Introduce legislation and conventions to ensure cyber security, taking account of EU Commission efforts in regard to critical infrastructure protection and information security;
4. Step up the dialogue with and implement more transparent policies towards national defence industries with a view to strengthening the EDTIB and move towards a greater transparency of national defence markets so as to avoid unnecessary duplication and costs;
5. Further deepen the existing NATO-EU dialogue with a view to exploiting more efficiently the synergies between the two organisations in military and civilian crisis management;
6. Continue offering their full support to and bringing their influence to bear on the search for a lasting resolution of Kosovo's future status;
7. Develop a European dialogue on the US missile defence shield, installations for which it is proposed to locate on EU territory, and take account of the views of all sides in order to avoid a new political crisis developing;
8. Formulate, with a view to the EU-Africa Summit, a strong EU-Africa strategy encompassing all the elements needed to bring about greater stability and peace in Africa and step up cooperation and dialogue with regional organisations on that continent, primarily the African Union, and with the United Nations;
9. Offer their support in ending the crisis in Darfur; call on the Government of Sudan to hand all indicted war criminals over to the International Criminal Court; exert pressure for all government-backed Janjaweed militias to cease military operations targeting the population of Darfur and prevail upon the Sudanese Government to agree to a large-scale UN peacekeeping deployment in the stricken regions;
10. Increase the information they each individually and the EU provide to the public about the need for civilian or military intervention;
11. Require EU members forthwith to devote their full attention to interparliamentary cooperation and parliamentary scrutiny of ESDP matters when it comes to drafting the new Constitutional Treaty and to include existing specialist bodies, such as the WEU Assembly, in the discussions, so as to secure greater participation by national parliaments in the democratic scrutiny of matters falling within the area of EU intergovernmental cooperation.

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Lluís Maria de Puig (Spain, Socialist Group)

I. Introduction

1. In this year, 2007, the year in which Europe celebrates its 50th anniversary, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), born of the Saint Malo Summit in December 1998, can still be described as being in its infancy. Nevertheless, over the past eight years, the fledgling ESDP has made strides and been extended to parts of the world that few would have thought possible. Under this policy Europe has, in a relatively short space of time, achieved new levels of operational and political progress and contributed to tackling the current challenges. At the same time, the ESDP offers new possibilities for guiding the EU's efforts and increasing its influence in the area of security and defence. The global security situation these past few years has undoubtedly provided fertile ground for the nurture of the ESDP and given the European Union the means of enhancing its security and defence capabilities both within and outside its borders. Following publication of the 2003 European Security Strategy, a more focused approach to security and defence issues was adopted consisting of defining the principal challenges and laying the foundations for Europe's security and defence architecture through specific goals.

2. Today, the EU is no longer a political or an operational "dwarf". Through cooperation with international and regional organisations and the creation of civil-military structures and capabilities, with 16 ESDP operations³ on three continents, it is gradually establishing itself as a world player in providing security and promoting global stability. However, it still faces significant challenges. In a dramatically changing international security environment, the ESDP needs to be constantly transformed to keep up with the fast pace of change. Drawing on the conclusions of the WEU Assembly's Conference on ESDP: the way ahead, held in Berlin on 6-7 February 2007, this report examines recent developments and the current situation of the ESDP on the world stage, with a particular focus on present challenges and possible ways forward in four distinct areas: political developments, operational developments, capabilities and procurement and the role of parliaments in ESDP development.

II. Political Developments

3. The credibility of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been strengthened by the success of the ESDP as the embodiment of a multilateral approach to decision-making and problem-solving backed up by action. After all, how can the EU be perceived as an effective global player if its decisions are not implemented on the ground? A major question raised during the Berlin Conference was whether the EU should act and look like a state and, if so, whether the ESDP could be perceived as a single-state policy. It was stressed that multilateral cooperation was the way forward and that although EU decision-making at 27 may be painful, as Mr Solana, the EU High Representative for CFSP and the WEU Secretary General, recently observed "this is just a fraction of the pain felt when a common position is not reached (...) Imagine a world where there were no unified positions of the EU: on Iran, on the Middle East, on Africa, on climate change and the Doha Round"⁴.

4. An underlying factor that is crucial to the ESDP's future is public opinion. Recent Eurobarometer surveys have shown overwhelming public support for the ESDP. According to the latest opinion survey published in February 2007⁵, "European public opinion remains very upbeat on issues relating to ESDP. On average, three out of four EU citizens are in favour of a common security and defence policy". 75% of citizens in the EU of 25 supported the ESDP, while 68% were in favour

³ EU missions and operations are detailed in the Appendix.

⁴ Address by Javier Solana, EUHR for the CFSP, at the ESDP Conference: "From Cologne to Berlin and beyond – Operations, institutions and capabilities", Berlin, 29 January 2007. <http://europa.eu>

⁵ "The role of the EU in justice, freedom and security policy areas" – fieldwork June-July 2006, publication February 2007. Special Eurobarometer 266/Wave 65.4. <http://ec.europa.eu>

of a common foreign policy. It is quite significant that these high figures have remained relatively stable (never falling below 60%) in all Eurobarometer surveys since 1999, showing not only that public opinion is keeping abreast of developments in the ESDP, but also that the ESDP is working and that the public is demanding more of it. On the other hand, this positive attitude cannot necessarily be relied on, as public support tends to fall away when issues pertaining to military intervention reach the point of decision, since an overwhelming majority tend to feel that such decisions should be taken by national governments⁶. In practical terms, however, if the individual European citizen was asked how much he or she were prepared to pay for the ESDP, the percentages theoretically in favour of “more ESDP” might be rather different.

5. The ESDP has also progressed in terms of the EU’s cooperation with other global players in the field. Overall, operational activities have been enhanced through combined efforts with the UN and NATO, as well as with third countries such as Canada and Turkey. However, as far as transatlantic relations are concerned, a major obstacle outstanding remains the defence spending gap which, if narrowed, would lead to a more sustainable relationship on an equal footing. Additionally, as the ESDP progressively gains in strength and influence it could be perceived by the US as a factor in alleviating its own commitments around the globe.

6. Regarding the development of NATO-EU relations, Zoltan Nagy, Head of the NATO Affairs and Multilateral Affairs Section, insists that “NATO views a stronger EU as further contributing to common security”. The process of developing NATO-EU relations has always been complex. Not only do the two organisations differ institutionally and politically, their differing memberships have often led to impasse. Berlin Plus has worked in terms of avoiding duplication, but it is not the solution for the future. Today’s rapidly evolving security environment demands a combination of both military and civil aspects in operations and only an effective EU-NATO partnership can achieve this by leaving behind the traditional tendency to compete and instead seeking synergies. A recent WEU Assembly Political Committee report⁷ notes “for the time being, the discussion on providing NATO with civil capabilities has not gone very far, so there is a need to concentrate on developing the framework in which NATO can dialogue with those who deal with the civil aspects of crisis management, reconstruction and state building. NATO needs to develop closer relationships with other international organisations and institutions, non-governmental organisations and contributing individual countries”. Inherent differences in attitudes and opinion will always exist and the perception that a closer relationship could lead to greater US influence in European affairs will always be a barrier. A “happy marriage”, as Mr Nagy points out, is therefore impossible, but “peaceful cohabitation” based on compromise is more likely to succeed and therefore lead to a strategic partnership.

(a) The Constitutional Treaty

7. Following the renewed calls by Chancellor Merkel in the framework of the German Presidency to press on with the European Constitution, Europe may be coming out of its period of reflection. Although the Treaty is not referred to in the Berlin 50th Anniversary Declaration by the Heads of State and Government, in her own address to mark the anniversary Chancellor Merkel urged member states to ratify the text and find a common basis before the European Parliament elections in 2009. “Not doing so” she added “would be an historic failure”⁸. Irrespective of whether the recent revival of interest leads to a Treaty, one thing is certain: Europe at 27 needs to advance politically and must continue focusing its efforts on the international security situation. Global events will not wait and member states should not let the ESDP’s success to date make them too confident and hence over-

⁶ Eurobarometer Survey 146. Public Opinion and European Defence July 2001. <http://ec.europa.eu>

⁷ See Assembly Document 1951 adopted on 18 December 2006: “NATO: Transformation and strategic partnership with the EU – reply to the annual report of the Council” submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Charles Goerens, Rapporteur (Luxembourg, Liberal Group). www.assembly-weu.eu

⁸ Address by Dr Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and President of the European Council, at the official ceremony to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome. 25.03.2007. www.eu2007.de

ambitious, creating unrealistic expectations. Europe must also be prepared for possible future enlargements with current candidate countries as well as with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

8. Calls from the various member states and their political leaders for different ways of tackling the Constitutional Treaty have added to the confusion of how this European political project should be taken forward. Though the German Presidency is pressing for renewed talks which focus on resurrecting the Treaty largely intact, the newly elected French President Nicolas Sarkozy is calling for a “mini-treaty” which could be ratified through parliament. Britain favours a text which would make modest amendments to earlier Treaties, bringing practical benefits to Europe’s citizens and therefore avoiding the public vote which a Constitution based on institutional reform would certainly entail. Poland and the Czech Republic have stated that they would be ready to renegotiate a new text, Denmark and Ireland are expected to hold referendums, whilst the new Dutch Government is awaiting a ruling by its State Council on whether a renewed referendum is necessary. Meanwhile, the 18 countries that have ratified the Treaty, either through referendums or parliamentary vote, are on standby. Germany’s task now is to explore ways of moving forward towards a consensus on the Treaty in June – a significant challenge, however, considering the variety of opinions expressed on the issue. An additional factor which seems to have had a negative impact on the Treaty is the long two-year ratification period for member states. This may have affected both political and public perceptions, particularly in view of the fact that long periods of inactivity tend to have the effect of diluting discussion and creating the impression that no progress is being made – an impression that may have been further exacerbated by the ensuing “period of reflection” following the French and Dutch “no” votes.

9. On security and defence issues the Nice Treaty which, since February 2003, has remained the basis of the EU’s ESDP activities does not allow enhanced cooperation on “matters having military or defence implications” (Article 27b). This means that the various forms of “permanent structured cooperation” and “enhanced cooperation” and the possibility of conferring an EU mission on a group of member states, as envisaged by the Constitutional Treaty, can currently only be implemented outside the Treaty on European Union (TEU). This could present WEU with a possible role if specific agreements were made, or if Article 17.4 of the Nice Treaty was invoked. This states: “the provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this title”⁹.

10. Regarding that part of the text of the draft Constitutional Treaty dealing with CFSP matters as currently proposed, the two principal amendments to the provisions of the TEU are the creation of an EU Minister for Foreign Affairs (Art. I-40 (4)) and of a European External Action Service (Art. III-296 (3)). Additionally, Article I-41(6) allows for structured cooperation in the area of defence and Article I-44 (2) on enhanced cooperation changes the minimum number of member states required for participation in such cooperation from eight to one third and it may be established in any area of the CFSP. Regarding decision-making, the draft Constitutional Treaty states that the Council of Ministers will continue to take decisions unanimously and member states to have the right of veto. However, the Treaty also provides for qualified majority voting – this does not apply to decisions with military implications or in the area of defence (Art. III-422). In specific cases where qualified majority voting applies, from now on a member state may decide to oppose a decision by citing “vital” rather than “important” reasons of national policy (Art. III-300 (2)).

11. Although the aforementioned amendments, if introduced, will be important steps forward in the CFSP framework, they nevertheless fall short of meeting the conditions required for transforming the EU’s defence identity. In particular, there is no provision for a binding mutual assistance clause such as Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty (or NATO Article 5, which does not, however, only include European countries) and none for the collective participation of national parliaments in the ESDP decision-making process.

⁹ WEU Assembly Fact Sheet No 5 – The Treaty of Nice.

(b) New and future challenges

12. As the ESDP expands to meet new challenges in today's evolving security environment it is exploring new domains of the security and defence sphere, some of which mark a break with traditional defence aspects and therefore call for new political approaches. Some of the most important such areas include:

- Security Sector Reform (SSR): SSR can be described, in short, as the efforts and activities involved in creating, reforming or improving a country's security sector (depending on the state of the latter). This encompasses the security oversight and governance bodies: the governments; the parliament; the defence, internal affairs and foreign affairs ministries and the national security advisory bodies. Although the EU approach to SSR/SSG¹⁰ to date has not been as well focused or as organised as that of other international organisations, such as the UN and the OSCE, the Union has not shied away from playing a stabilising role and developing the powers and means at its disposal to implement SSR-related activities effectively. In recent years, various EU studies have shown that the Union is now determined to throw its full weight behind SSR and become a global player in this area. The EU approach to SSR became more sharply defined following publication of the European Security Strategy in 2003. In 2005, the Council noted that although the EU had no concept for framing its activities in the field of SSR, it possessed a unique set of tools that could allow it to become a more effective actor. In addition, the EU should expect further requests for assistance from third countries and other international organisations and greater Union involvement in SSR would be welcomed by the international community¹¹.
- Human security: Often connected with SSR, "human security" equates security with people rather than regions, focusing on the individual, not the state. It was first highlighted in 1994 by the UN Development Programme to describe the changing aspects of security following the end of the cold war. The recent crises in the Balkans and Africa and the evolution of terrorism have shown that the traditional ways of tackling security threats need to evolve accordingly to take into account the protection of individuals or groups that can be targeted in conflict. The increasing importance of human security should also give rise to a political debate on the "right to intervene" in a crisis and the "responsibility to protect". This responsibility implies a duty to react to particular situations in which there is a compelling need for human protection. A "just cause" however does not automatically justify military intervention beyond one's own national borders and can lead to political complications and divisions, as was the case in the Security Council during NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo. An international debate on the issue would therefore lead to the elimination of inconsistencies within the international community as regards the level and scope of its intervention as well as helping produce improvements in decision-making.
- Energy security¹²: Perhaps not a new challenge but certainly one which is increasing in importance, energy security is very much linked to the economic development of a country. The creation of energy reserves, reducing dependence on single sources of energy, increasing supplier numbers and exploiting new energy sources are appropriate responses to the fragility of the sector particularly when monopolies are created leading to an increase in prices. The recent crises over price increases by Russian gas monopoly Gazprom and the subsequent closure of pipelines to that country's neighbours also affected a number of European countries, thus highlighting their vulnerability in investing in single energy sources. Needless to say, energy issues – particularly with regard to petroleum – have traditionally also served to highlight the divide between East and West, with the latter being increasingly dependent on Middle-Eastern resources and more often than not having very

¹⁰ Security Sector Governance.

¹¹ "Initial Elements for an EU Security Sector Reform (SSR) Concept." Doc. 11241/05. <http://europa.eu>

¹² See Assembly Document 1969: "Security in the High North", submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Pedro Agramunt Font de Mora, Rapporteur and Chairman (Spain, Federated Group) and Odd Einar Dørum (Norway). www.assembly-weu.eu

little control over rising oil prices. The recent energy crises have led to an intensification of the dialogue on energy and its future security implications¹³. Another key security asset is water; access to reliable and sufficient water sources is a fundamental human right, yet according to the World Bank approximately 40% of the world's population face water shortages, with one billion people in urgent need of access to water supplies. Regarding security issues, water shortages around the world have led to conflict or an escalation of existing conflicts, and increased migration. Many such conflicts are described in the Pacific Institute's latest report entitled "Environment and Security Water Conflict Chronology"¹⁴. Lastly, the Worldwatch Institute in its "State of the World 2005" report notes that whilst some 300 000 people were killed in armed conflict in 2000, as many people die each and every month because of contaminated water or lack of adequate sanitation¹⁵.

- Terrorism: The reality of terrorism, its threats and dangers are all too well known in our day. Highlighted in the European Security Strategy as the primary key threat, its importance has not only increased in the eyes of people in general but also in the way it is handled under the ESDP. The response to terrorism will require a combination of civilian and military means in which intelligence and cross-border cooperation play a very important role. Innovative steps are needed in combination with traditional means of tackling terrorism such as sharing DNA and fingerprint data through a Europe-wide network of DNA databanks, as suggested by the German Interior Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, earlier this year¹⁶.
- Internet security and terrorism: Rapid technological advances in recent years have made communication means much more accessible globally than ever before. Although the political, economic and social advantages of this are evident, tools like the internet are now being increasingly used by terrorist groups, helping them to communicate, spread propaganda and recruit and organise new cells. To date, this problem has been identified by the international community and the EU¹⁷ and initial steps are being taken by the German Presidency for the creation of a project called "Check the Web", to be run by EUROPOL, which will monitor terrorist activity on the world wide web¹⁸. Monitoring an issue like this will most likely involve greater political and cross-border cooperation in the future.

13. The recent debate surrounding the proposed installation by the United States of a missile defence shield, in Poland, and the Czech Republic, designed to protect the United States from an external attack, has been gaining momentum, with Javier Solana stating, on 29 March 2007, that despite the fact that the EU is not a defence organisation it should nevertheless discuss the matter in the framework of its external security policy. The US states that installing the shield in eastern Europe could help ward off missile attacks from a rogue state such as Iran but that the shield is too small to affect Russia's nuclear deterrent. Russia, on the other hand, views this as a move by the US to install military equipment in its former sphere of influence. The matter could have serious implications for Europe. To start off with, such a debate will only serve to show that Europe's foreign policy is too limited to allow it to engage in such a discussion and that it will not be able to come forward with a clear decision. Secondly, it will no doubt bring to the surface divisions between member states – those that support and those opposed to the idea – bringing back memories of the climate which existed just before the war in Iraq. Lastly, the go-ahead for such a shield, which at the moment seems quite a likely

¹³ *Idem.*

¹⁴ Environment and Security Water Conflict Chronology, update October 2006. www.worldwater.org

¹⁵ www.worldwatch.org

¹⁶ This proposal aims to extend the existing "Prüm Treaty" on police cooperation signed by Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The Prüm Treaty, signed in Prüm on 27 May 2005, allows the exchange of DNA and fingerprint records as well as car registration numbers. <http://europa.eu>

¹⁷ EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism. EU Council, 9 March 2007. 3.3.5: "Enhanced cooperation against terrorist use of the internet. On 28-29 March 2007, the Presidency and Europol organised a seminar on the use of the Internet by terrorists. The German project "Check the Web" has been taken forward. The German Presidency has held an expert meeting on 26-27 February 2007, a second expert meeting will follow on 22-23 May 2007". <http://europa.eu>

¹⁸ *Idem.*

proposition since the US is engaging in bilateral discussions with the two countries that have accepted to have the shield installed on their soil, could lead Russia to play its energy card and use its veto in the UN Security Council on other matters.

III. Operational developments

14. In 2006 the EU conducted 10 operations – ranging from military, police, rule of law, security sector reform to institution building – on three continents, involving around 10 000 men and women. The major operation in the second half of the year under the Finnish Presidency was the EUFOR RD Congo military operation launched in response to the UN's request for support to its Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC); its main task was to contribute to security and stability during the electoral process in the DRC. EUFOR RD Congo ended on 30 November 2006, having been largely successful in the sense that little violence and electoral irregularity took place. The road to peace and stability however remains rocky, with multiple challenges ahead for President Joseph Kabila. To begin with, the new government is weak, with institutions that barely function, there is almost no control over the opposition-dominated western part of the country and fighting continues between rebel forces and MONUC peacekeepers in the east. In addition, although disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) efforts are progressing in the right direction¹⁹, a number of rebel groups have yet to give up their arms. What is most needed now is greater input from the international community in key areas such as governance and institution building to help the new government and ensure it can proceed in transparency with setting up a politically stable system. This means renewed security efforts through the further extension and strengthening of MONUC's mandate²⁰ to work with local forces, and renewed aid efforts focusing on humanitarian assistance and reconstruction.

15. The EU is continuing to provide civil-military support in the form of financial, military and technical assistance as well as police training activities to the African Union's AMIS mission in Darfur. Coordination efforts are implemented with the UN and NATO. Despite the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006 and the efforts of the international and regional organisations in the country, the security and humanitarian situation remains very worrying. There has been a re-emergence of the Janjaweed militia and a number of rebel groups, forming the National Redemption Front (NRF), who have not signed the DPA. They continue their armed attacks against civilians, forcing the evacuation of international aid staff in a number of instances and prompting warnings by the UN Country Team that relief operations in Darfur are in danger of total collapse due to the deteriorating security situation. The international community has called for a more robust and effective "hybrid" AU-UN force which would increase the military and civilian presence and ultimately develop a "predominantly African character". Efforts have stopped short, however, as the government has continued to reject significant UN involvement. Additional efforts by the EU are sorely needed, not to mention its increasing its financial assistance. Recently, the President of the International Crisis Group, Gareth Evans, called for the EU to act on its own or in partnership with third countries to "hold the Government of Sudan accountable through targeted punitive measures. (...) Here, the EU can lead effectively in reversing the international apathy. The EU must move beyond its pattern of public condemnation for active government recruitment and support of armed militias, continuing bombing campaign, and double-talk on the deployment of a hybrid force, to more meaningful steps. These include setting benchmarks for the Sudanese Government to stop its military offensive in Darfur, support the deployment of a UN hybrid force, lift obstacles to humanitarian aid and work towards a peace process"²¹.

16. Still on the subject of Africa, in November 2006 the Council General Secretariat and the Commission jointly prepared an EU Concept on "Strengthening African Capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts" which focuses on strengthening the role of the ESDP in Africa. The Concept identifies three areas in particular in which work can be taken forward:

¹⁹ "DRC: Another rebel groups gives up its arms" (28 February 2007). <http://www.irinnews.org>

²⁰ MONUC's mandate was extended on 15 February 2007 until 15 April 2007. UNSC Resolution 1742 (2007).

²¹ "Darfur: What Next?" by Gareth Evans (22 January 2007). www.crisisgroup.org

- increasing coherence at EU level;
- establishing a strong relationship with the African Union and sub-regional organisations;
- developing policies for the reinforcement of African capabilities.

An EU-Africa summit is expected to take place in 2007, at the initiative of the incoming Portuguese Presidency, with a view to adopting an EU-Africa Strategy.

17. Regarding more recent developments, on 27 February 2007 the Council approved the “transition” of the Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, deeming that the “security situation had evolved sufficiently to permit the EU to reduce the size of EUFOR” while maintaining an appropriate robust military presence of approximately 2 500 troops from the current 7 000. The capacity to reverse that decision will be maintained for an initial period of six months. Although the reduction of international forces does reflect the progress and relative stability achieved in the country, it also raises questions, mainly regarding whether the transition is being implemented prematurely. Naturally, forces are needed in various crisis-stricken areas of the globe, but cutting back their strength in a region whose future and stability have not been fully secured – especially one like the Balkans, marked by ethnic strife over the past 100 years – aggravates the risk of disruption to all the work accomplished to date. The present situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains at a level where the international community should continue to increase its focus on and its presence in the country. Ethnic tensions persist and the unresolved Kosovo situation could considerably affect developments in BiH. Moreover, the recent announcement of the High Representative, Mr Schwarz-Schilling, that he is to leave his post by mid-2007, is also expected to further highlight the political and social problems in the country as well as raise further questions regarding the future of the OHR and the Bonn Powers²². Regarding the situation in BiH and its outlook, Mr Schwarz-Schilling wrote “the country is still able to take a clear step forward, but that transition process will take more time. The learning curve has been steep and the international community has to show patience”²³.

18. Following the deadlock in the latest round of talks on Kosovo’s future status, the situation in the region still remains worrying. The latest UN plan regarding Kosovo’s independence, presented by the Special Envoy and Chairman of the negotiations, Mr Ahtisaari, was rejected by the Serbian Government. The plan, which was broadly accepted by the Kosovo authorities, supports a form of conditional independence for Kosovo but not full independence. At the end of February, Mr Ahtisaari stated “I regret to say that at the end of the day, there was no will on the part of the parties to move away from their positions. [...] The parties’ respective statements on Kosovo’s status do not include any common ground”. A number of views have been expressed on the situation in Kosovo. It has been described as Europe’s approaching train wreck²⁴, where the momentum gained for an independent Kosovo is now irreversible and anything but that would be catastrophic for the wider region. On the other hand, there is also the risk of creating a heavily criminalised state in the heart of Europe²⁵, resulting in more powers for the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) which has been connected with violence, riots and organised crime. Furthermore, independence may create a “snowball” effect in the region, whereby other disputed territories and large minorities begin seeking independence. What happens then? Will Europe redraw the borders of the western Balkans? Will we see the creation of a handful of new states? Further complicating the situation is Russia’s recent stance on the issue. At the UN Security Council earlier this year Russia indicated that it would only accept a proposal that seemed fair to both parties. More recently, however, it has stated that the latest plan put forward would not be accepted. One thing that is certain is that the international community and the EU – the major international organisation neighbouring the region – remains the only option for the future of the Balkans. Without external political, economic and civilian-military assistance, the likelihood of the

²² The Bonn Conclusions (also known as Bonn Powers) of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) authorised the High Representative to remove from office public officials who violate legal commitments and the Dayton Peace Agreement, and to impose laws as he sees fit if Bosnia and Herzegovina’s legislative bodies fail to do so.

²³ Weekly column by Christian Schwarz-Schilling, 26 January 2007. www.ohr.int

²⁴ *International Herald Tribune*, 23 March 2007.

²⁵ *Idem*.

current tension in the area's hotspots spreading and the region descending into violence once again would be very great.

19. Looking ahead from an operational perspective in Kosovo, efforts with a view to a future civilian ESDP crisis-management mission have continued since the setting up of an EU Planning Team (EUPT) for Kosovo in April 2006. In December 2006, following initial contacts with third countries likely to contribute to an operation in the region, the Council approved a crisis-management concept for a future ESDP mission. Current efforts are focusing on the development of an operational concept and in February 2007 further details of a possible future ESDP mission in the region were made available. The EUPT's work so far has focused in particular on planning for a future ESDP mission²⁶ which will:

- support the Kosovo authorities by monitoring, mentoring and advising on all areas related to the rule of law, in particular the judiciary, police, customs and correctional services;
- ensure, in close cooperation with the Kosovo authorities or independently, that serious and sensitive crimes are properly investigated and prosecuted and that any outcome of these procedures is thereafter properly enforced;
- be given clearly defined executive powers in order to ensure implementation of the above. Those executive powers will, to begin with, be limited and vested in the EUSR; in the broader area of the rule of law they will be carried out on his or her behalf by the ESDP mission.

20. Additionally, in accordance with the Council Joint Action, EUPT Kosovo is working towards:

- initiating planning, including necessary procurement processes, to ensure a smooth transition between selected tasks of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and a possible EU crisis-management operation in the field of rule of law and other areas that might be identified by the Council in the context of the future status process;
- providing technical advice as necessary in order for the EU to contribute to supporting and maintaining the dialogue with UNMIK as regards its plans for downsizing and transferral of competencies to the local institutions.

21. The mission in Kosovo will be the largest civilian mission so far in the ESDP framework, with an estimated deployment of around 1 300-1 500 police, judges, prosecutors and customs officials from EU member states and third states. The Operational HQ will be situated in Pristina, with a planning office in Brussels. Political control and strategic guidance of the mission will be exercised by the PSC under the responsibility of the Council. The recent deadlock regarding the region's independence is indicative of the fact that Kosovo remains a region in which the international community should be investing at this time, especially since violence flared again in the months leading up to the negotiations. An ESDP mission makes a major contribution towards greater stability and better governance.

22. The possibility of a future ESDP civilian police mission in Afghanistan was explored during a fact-finding mission to the country. Reference was made to this in the Presidency conclusions of 11 December 2006, explaining its role in examining opportunities and conditions for a potential civilian ESDP mission in the field of policing with connections to the wider rule of law area. Furthermore, in the 12 February 2007 meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), it was stated that "the Council approved the Crisis-Management Concept (CMC) for an ESDP mission to Afghanistan. A concept of Operations is now to be developed on this basis. The mission will work towards an Afghan police force, in local ownership, that respects human rights and operates within the framework of the rule of law. (...) The mission should address issues of police reform at central, regional and provincial level. There should be close coordination between the partners, and the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) and its Secretariat should be a key mechanism for such cooperation. (...) The ESDP mission should comprise an element to assist with

²⁶ <http://www.eupt-kosovo.eu>

the coordination of contributions, both equipment and rehabilitation of police infrastructure”²⁷. The Assembly’s Defence Committee June 2006 report on “European forces in Afghanistan: learning lessons” states: “a synergy between the Union and NATO would appear to be a means of increasing the effectiveness of their action in the longer term. NATO could concentrate more on the missions falling within its sphere of responsibility, with the EU increasing its civilian capability involvement, including the training of police forces under the protection of the Alliance’s European soldiers”²⁸.

23. The EU (European Community and member states) in the period 2002-2006 donated 3.7 billion euros in aid to Afghanistan, which was used mainly for reconstruction, security, rule of law and counter narcotics operations, as well as humanitarian and relief aid. A civilian operation is the next logical step in further investing in the future of Afghanistan. The advantages of such a mission are evident. It would allow the EU to boost its training activities with the Afghan Police Force. More importantly, however, it would also allow the EU to further extend its influence and use and expand its experience in the region. Such a mission would help alleviate the strain on NATO forces²⁹. It would not only contribute to the efforts of the international community, but would also create prerequisites for greater stability in the future and governance through local ownership. However, the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan is a major factor to consider in the preparation of such an operation. The last thing European countries want is to send civilian forces into a security situation they cannot respond to. Not only would this jeopardise the operation, it could lead to complications for other current and future operations and undermine the credibility of the EU.

24. Regarding the future of ESDP operations, a number of issues were raised during the WEU Assembly’s Berlin Conference which underscore the pressing need for further reform in view of the increasingly complex nature of crises and conflicts. Specifically, the issue of improving rapid decision-making in the area of crisis management was highlighted, as well as the further work needed on the combination of military and civilian instruments that will greatly facilitate the evolution of ESDP. Opinion was also unanimous that effective multilateralism and greater cooperation between international and regional organisations would lead to better preparedness in responding to crises and help identify the nature of the response required in a particular situation and determine whether EU engagement was truly necessary.

IV. Capabilities and procurement

(a) Recent developments

25. Significant progress has been made in developing the EU’s civilian and military capabilities, although a number of pressing issues continue to head the list of priorities for countries holding the EU presidency. In the past year, the Force Catalogue 2006 (FC06) was finalised in the Headline Goal 2010 framework and a revised version including Bulgaria and Romania is expected in the first half of 2007. Work carried forward in the Civilian Headline Goal framework for 2008 was reviewed by the Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference in November. The training of experts in the Civilian Response Team (CRT) pool was completed and further work was done on rapidly deployable police elements (Integrated Police Units (IPU) and Formed Police Units (FPU)).

26. Work was also carried forward on the EU Battlegroups and on 1 January 2007 it was announced that two 1 500-strong battlegroups had reached full operational capability. The two units can be deployed for crisis-management operations anywhere in the world within 10 days of a decision by the EU member states. However, General Bentégeat, Chairman of the EU Military Committee, pointed out to the Berlin Conference that “in order for the battlegroups to fulfil their role as the cornerstone of

²⁷ GAERC meeting, Brussels 12 February 2007. <http://europa.eu>

²⁸ See Assembly Document 1930 adopted on 20 June 2006: “European forces in Afghanistan: learning lessons”, submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Jean-Pierre Kucheida, Rapporteur (France, Socialist Group) and Mehmet Tekelioglu, co-Rapporteur (Turkey), paragraph 92. www.assembly-weu.eu

²⁹ “A well-functioning Afghan police force and judiciary is essential for NATO success”. See Assembly Document 1962: “The role of European Forces in NATO missions in Afghanistan,” submitted by Ignacio Cosidó Gutiérrez, Rapporteur (Spain, Federated Group). www.assembly-weu.eu

EU rapid-reaction operations in emergency situations, the conditions for their deployment needed to be further clarified". This means that the political decision-making process leading to the deployment of battlegroups must be clarified and simplified in member states so as not to jeopardise response times and delay a whole battlegroup because one member state has not approved a decision to deploy. Moreover, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr, General Johann-Georg Dora, stressed that battlegroups should not continue to be the EU's only form of rapid military response. The scope of this should be explored further and its capabilities enhanced by drawing on all services.

27. It must be underlined that the European defence industry faces numerous problems and that the immediate priority should be the strengthening of the European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB). At a conference in Brussels organised by the European Defence Agency (EDA) on 1 February, Javier Solana, speaking as Head of the Agency, said "none of us can any longer afford to sustain healthy and comprehensive DTIB on a national basis. (...) The future health, maybe even survival of Europe's defence industry requires a European approach, and a European strategy"³⁰. The Commission's Vice-President, Günter Verheugen, added that current obstacles in the industry create costs amounting to 3 billion euros per year. A recent proposal for the creation of a Defence Procurement Directive will be directed towards complementing the EDA's own Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement and tackling those obstacles by opening up markets, introducing more transparency and increasing competition.

(b) Developing Capabilities: The major challenges

28. Today, the Comprehensive Capability Development Process (CCDP) in Europe is controlled by a number of actors that ultimately define what is needed and what should be developed. Heading the process are the member states' governments, represented in the European Council and the Political and Security Committee, steered principally by national defence and foreign policies. Discussions at this level focus on Europe's global contribution, geopolitical and geostrategic change, Europe's evolving military role, today and in the future, and what capabilities this is likely to require. Discussions are then referred to the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and Military Staff (EUMS) which provide guidance and recommendations on what capabilities Europe possesses and what it may need in the future based on the above conclusions. Once the priorities have been identified, the discussion then moves on to a level that mostly involves the EDA and the EUMC. These bodies identify which of the priorities in question are the most urgent or important to resolve, which realistically can be seen through to final development, what is required to deliver solutions and lastly which country or industry will take up a capabilities project.

29. The EDA, which was set up in 2004 to support the member states in their efforts to improve defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, primarily deals with capabilities development, the EDTIB, research and technology and armaments cooperation. Its main tasks include working for a more systematic approach in defining and meeting ESDP capability needs, promoting equipment collaboration across the European defence industry and encouraging European defence research and technology with a view to defining and satisfying future capability requirements. Furthermore, the EDA recently developed a "Long-Term Vision"³¹ through an analysis of global trends to 2025 and their likely effect on Europe's military response. However, progress in a number of fields now requires a set of clear approaches to create an environment within which European ESDP capabilities can thrive and develop in a timely manner in order to respond to the challenges of the future. When considering today's main problems, one must include defence spending. Collectively, European states are today spending approximately 193 billion euros annually (US spending exceeds 400 billion dollars), a considerable amount. However, only a fraction of this is used efficiently, as a large amount of the effort is lost because of duplication in national policies and programmes and insufficient focus on research and technology and procurement. Consider an example quoted by Mr Zandee, Head of the EDA Policy and Planning Unit, at the Assembly's Berlin Conference: "with over 1.8 million military, in 2005 Europe was just able to deploy some 74 000 troops for crisis-management operations, a mere

³⁰ EDA Conference, 1 February 2007. www.eda.europa.eu

³¹ EDA: An initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs. 3 October 2006. www.eda.europa.eu

4%”. This not only highlights an aspect that contributes to making the ESDP less than efficient. More importantly, it indicates what Europe might have if the development of its capabilities were to take place in a more efficient and transparent environment that did not necessarily sacrifice sovereignty or rule out market competition, but in fact created the prerequisites for a healthier market in the future.

30. Additional capability challenges to consider are:

- the persistent, traditional national tendencies which still dominate the demand side of the market. The September 2006 study on “the cost of non-Europe in the area of security and defence”³² highlights the “national factor” giving rise to different national regulations, export control lists, lack of information sharing and complex licensing procedures, all of which contribute to duplication and unnecessarily high prices. Rather than each defence ministry going its own way independently of others, there is a need to move towards a more European demand-based attitude with a common focus on what is needed to get the job done, thereby eliminating the strategy-capability gap;
- the considerable overlap in the existing military and civilian technologies, which is unreasonable. For example, capital and time are currently being spent on four different battle tanks and 23 national programmes for armoured fighting vehicles. The total number of weapons programmes in the EU stands at 89 compared to 27 in the United States³³;
- the lack of investment in new technologies, referred to time and again. To achieve a credible and efficient EDTIB, able to compete relatively closely with that of the US, new technologies need to be identified and developed. Additionally, medium and small-sized companies, whose focus is on new technologies, are not being closely enough involved in these programmes. This is an area that does not necessarily need pan-European attention but can be dealt with rather through clusters of countries and companies that have specialised in certain technologies.

31. The prime responsibility in tackling the capability challenges outlined above lies in the hands of governments as the principal promoters and administrators of national defence industries. If resources and aims are pooled, an efficient EDTIB can be created. However, opening up European defence markets is still an issue that is quite controversial, even taboo, and is therefore not something that can be achieved overnight. Nevertheless, it should be regarded as the long-term goal. Greater dialogue and commitment by Europe’s governments and legislative bodies in this area will undoubtedly lead to a reduction in unnecessary costs and greater economies of scale, giving more value for the money being spent.

V. The role of parliamentarians

32. Despite the efforts and progress made so far, there is insufficient parliamentary control over the ESDP, an aspect of direct concern when it comes to taking decisions under the ESDP, as defence budgets are voted and approved in national parliaments. Parliament is also the place where troop deployment is normally authorised. Discussions at parliamentary level take place in the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees of national parliaments, but there is insufficient communication at this level between the different EU member states. There is therefore a lack of substantial “European” dialogue. National parliaments are also not informed of precise operational details or the latest developments in ESDP matters – something Claude France Arnould (Director, Defence Aspects, Secretariat General, EU Council) pointed out at the Berlin Conference as requiring correction, as “parliamentarians need to be informed about the details of a planned operation as far upstream as possible”. Parliamentary debate at national level may suffice for national issues and provide adequate scrutiny of individual governments but when decisions are made about future operations under the flag of Europe, only pan-European scrutiny can and should guarantee absolute democratic legitimacy.

³² “The cost of non-Europe in the area of security and defence”, study for the European Parliament submitted by Dr Hartmut Kuechle, No. EP/ExPol/B/2005/13, September 2006. <http://europa.eu>

³³ EDA Conference, 1 February 2007. www.eda.europa.eu

33. As regards scrutiny at European level, the European Parliament, although in the advantageous position of being the first to receive information on ESDP developments, has no legal authority to exercise scrutiny in the matter. Even the discussions leading to the draft Constitutional Treaty touched only very lightly on the question of a greater role for national parliaments³⁴ in European legislative procedures. As a result, the “final” text made no provision for more involvement by national parliaments in security and defence issues.

34. If there is one lesson that has been learned to date, it is that history waits for no one. Clearly, the future of the ESDP is crucial for Europe’s success. This paper has outlined Europe’s successes to date and its shortcomings, as well as the future challenges that face it. To address these challenges, proper parliamentary scrutiny at a European level is needed to complement that being exercised by the national parliaments. Our own Assembly, as the Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly, through its annual sessions, conferences and committee work, provides a forum where those national parliamentarians who scrutinise ESDP at home can come together to exchange views and compare and contrast different national policies, with a view to offering constructive insight at the European level. Moreover, as Dr Wolfgang Wagner stated in a presentation to the Assembly’s Berlin Conference, the Assembly possesses unique advantages in this area. By bringing together members of parliament who continue to bear the major responsibility in ESDP, it becomes a tool for strengthening the national parliaments’ capacity to monitor and supervise the work of the national governments in the EU Council. Furthermore, the Assembly’s unique form of membership allows third countries, members of other international organisations, which aspire to become EU member states and are active in ESDP operations (associate members and affiliate associate members of the Assembly) to take part in the discussions, thereby providing an opportunity for additional input on security and defence issues and maintaining valuable interorganisational ties. Lastly, a further advantage the Assembly can offer is its institutional links with the WEU Permanent Council, the members of which are also members of the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC)³⁵. This direct link provides a basis for dialogue between the Assembly’s members and the government representatives responsible for ESDP issues and allows for a free flow of information on ESDP matters which national parliaments would otherwise find it difficult to obtain on a regular basis.

35. To improve further the workings of the Assembly as an advisory body on a European scale and strengthen its ties with key national legislators, a greater number of delegates from the 10 full member states’ national Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees should take an active part in the Assembly’s discussions. This is a suggestion that has resurfaced recently and would, in theory, be very much a step in the right direction as far as the Assembly is concerned, since the aim is to increase dialogue with the very legislators who scrutinise security and defence issues at home. It does however raise practical concerns about the composition of member states’ delegations which, under Article 9 of the Modified Brussels Treaty³⁶, must be the same as those of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

36. With regard to democratic legitimacy, the Assembly, issuing its Message to the Heads of State and Government³⁷ on 7 February 2007 in Berlin, made clear that democratic scrutiny of the ESDP by national parliamentarians must be strengthened by enhancing the existing interparliamentary forum as a vital link with citizens and public opinion. The United Kingdom Government³⁸, responding to the Message, reasserted the Assembly’s important role in bringing its experience and expertise in the analysis of security issues.

37. Several ideas have also surfaced about transforming the Assembly, a number of which were put forward during the Berlin Conference:

³⁴ Protocols annexed to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe: 1. Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the EU. Title II, Interparliamentary Cooperation, Articles 9 and 10.

³⁵ With the exceptions of Iceland, Norway and Turkey.

³⁶ Article IX of the Modified Brussels Treaty states: “The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.”

³⁷ www.assembly-weu.eu

³⁸ Mr Geoff Hoon responding in his capacity as British Minister for Europe, 14 March 2007.

- First: the Assembly cannot be updated or transformed. It is an irreplaceable body which can become a valuable additional advisory body for the EU. This might be an ideal outcome if there were guarantees that parliamentary scrutiny of European and transatlantic aspects of security and defence on a European level would in the future reside solely in the hands of the transnational WEU Assembly. As such a decision is unlikely to materialise, however, preserving the current *status quo* does not diminish the risk of political developments in Europe one day resulting in the disbanding of the modified Brussels Treaty.
- Second: a merger between the Assembly of WEU and CEAC³⁹ (Conference of European Affairs Committees) to form a body which will scrutinise European affairs, much like CEAC/COSAC does today, and include a European defence and security identity. In principle, this is an interesting idea since, because both bodies today base their activities on interparliamentary cooperation, a link with the European Parliament would also be created as CEAC/COSAC involves the cooperation of European affairs committees of national parliaments and representatives from the European Parliament. The two bodies, however, will also bring inherent and fundamental differences to the table, most notably their basic rules of procedure and founding Treaty, the different composition of their memberships and the nature of their work. A possible merger therefore would probably result in the creation of a new “interparliamentary forum”, an idea likely to be met with resistance in Europe, as well as the unavoidable “diluting” of one of the bodies in favour of the other.
- Third: Parliamentary control of ESDP can be increased by enhancing cooperation between the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament; such cooperation will bring the “best of both worlds” into the equation. The WEU Assembly, with its 50 years of experience in interparliamentary scrutiny of security and defence issues and its comparative advantages as described in this report, will complement the very competences in which the European Parliament lacks focus. The European Parliament, on the other hand, being a well established institution in the European Union and whose directly elected members focus on European politics, can provide the WEU Assembly with a much needed link with the EU’s institutions.

³⁹ Better known by its French acronym COSAC (Conférence des Organes Spécialisés dans les Affaires Communautaires).

APPENDIX

ESDP operations

Ongoing Operations

The Balkans

EUFOR Althea

This military peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was launched in 2004 to take over from NATO's SFOR operation and act as a deterrent to renewed fighting, ensure compliance by the parties to the Dayton Agreement (General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina) with their responsibilities under Annexes 1A and 2 of that Agreement and, in line with its mandate, to contribute a safe and secure environment in BiH by carrying out core tasks of the Office of the High Representative (OHR)'s Mission Implementation Plan and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)⁴⁰.

On 5 December 2006 there was a change of command, with General Chiarini being replaced by General Witthauer. Following a decision of 27 December 2006, the size of the force is to be scaled down, but a 2 500-strong military presence involving troops from 24 EU member states will be maintained. To these must be added contributions from various non-EU states.

Althea is one of the missions establishing a presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. EU assistance to this country totalled 51 million euros in 2006.

EUPM (EU Police Mission)

The EU Police Mission works under the authority of the EU High Representative in Bosnia. It is supported by a force of 170 policemen in all, made up from contributions from each of the 27 EU member states plus 28 civilian staff, giving a total staff complement of 198. The mission, launched on 1 January 2003, followed on from an identical UN-led mission.

The mission, under the command of General Vincenzo Coppola, aims to transform the police service in Bosnia and Herzegovina into one "operating in accordance with best European and international standards".

EUPT (EU Planning Team in Kosovo)

The objective of this project, launched on 12 April 2006, is to ensure a smooth transfer of authority from selected tasks of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to a future EU crisis-management operation. Following its December 2006 meeting, the EU Council decided to extend the EUPT's mandate until May 2007.

EU BAM (EU Border Assistance Mission) to Moldova and Ukraine

The EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine was launched on 30 November 2005 following a Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission and the Governments of Moldova and Ukraine (7 October 2005) and the Council Joint Action 2005/776/CFSP (7 November 2005). The Mission was initiated at the joint request of the Presidents of Moldova and Ukraine and is an advisory, technical body with no executive powers.

This Mission helps to prevent smuggling, trafficking, and customs fraud, by providing training and advice to Moldovan and Ukrainian officials, reinforcing their capacity to carry out effective border and customs controls and border surveillance. Through its work, the Mission also contributes to strengthening cross border cooperation and building confidence and works very closely with the office of the EUSR for Moldova, Mr Kálmán Mizsei.

The EU Border Assistance Mission has a two-year renewable mandate.

⁴⁰ EUFOR/Althea website. <http://www.euforbih.org>

Africa

EUPOL Kinshasa (EU Police Mission working with the Integrated Police Unit, IPU, in Kinshasa)

Launched on 12 April 2005 in close coordination with the United Nations, the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa is the first ESDP civilian crisis-management mission in Africa. Established under Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004, its aim is to mentor and guide the Integrated Police Unit under the Congolese chain of command. One thousand or so Congolese police officers are to be trained under the scheme. The IPU's task is to relieve the neutral force currently being made available by MONUC (Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo/United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) in order to guarantee the security of the government and the transitional institutions.

IPU equipment and training are funded from the European Development Fund managed by the European Commission and by a Joint Action covering contributions from the CFSP budget and the member states. The mission has a budget of some 4.3 million euros.

EUPOL Kinshasa's initial one-year mandate was extended by the EU Council on 8 December 2006 until 30 June 2007.

EUSEC RD Congo (EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo)

Following an official request by the DRC Government, the EU decided on 8 June 2005 (Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP) to establish an advisory and assistance mission for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The mission provides advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of security while ensuring the promotion of policies that are compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and observance of the rule of law.

General Pierre Joana (France) was appointed Head of Mission and mission experts have been assigned key posts in the Congolese Administration. An essential aspect of the mission is the "chain of payments" project designed to ensure the payment of soldiers' wages and EUSEC experts have been seconded to Congolese army brigades for that purpose. EUSEC also worked in close cooperation with EUFOR RD Congo, in particular sharing its in-depth knowledge of the Congolese army. The reference amount for the expenses relating to this mission is 1.6 million euros.

EU support to AMIS II (Darfur)

The aim of the EU's civil-military support action to the African Union's AMIS II mission is to stabilise the Sudanese region of Darfur. It was established by Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP of 18 July 2005. The military element of that support action involves the provision of planning and technical assistance to all AMIS II levels of command, including the logistic support coordination structure. It also entails the provision of military observers in the context of the AMIS II enhancement plan, the training of African soldiers and observers as necessary, as well as strategic and tactical transport, and air observation, if requested by the African Union. The civilian police element (CIVPOL) supports the AMIS II police chain of command by providing the African Union with highly experienced senior police advisory staff at all levels and by offering training support to CIVPOL personnel through a mission training capability provided by a group of EU trainers and support for setting up a police unit within the African Union Secretariat.

The Middle East

EU COPPS (European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support)

A European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support was set up in January 2005 under the authority of EU Special Representative Marc Otte, within the framework of the Action Plan for the Middle East Peace Process agreed by the EU Council. The Office advises and mentors the Palestinian Authority in drawing up its plan for the reform of the security services. On 14 November 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP establishing a Police Mission under the

ESDP. The operational phase began on 1 January 2006 for an initial three-year period. Mission HQ is in Ramallah and there is a presence on the ground in Gaza and on the West Bank. Mission staff have no executive powers.

The mission aims are to advise and closely mentor the Palestinian Civil Police and particularly senior officers at central HQ and district level in the implementation of the Palestinian Civil Police Development Programme 2005-2008 (PCPDP), to coordinate and facilitate EU member state and international assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police as necessary and to advise the Palestinian authorities on police-related aspects of the criminal justice system.

Common costs of 6.1 million euros were earmarked to cover mission expenses up to end 2006. Projects are funded separately by the member states and other international donors.

EU BAM Rafah (EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories)

On 15 November 2005, Israel and the Palestinian Authority concluded an Agreement on Movement and Access covering the principles agreed for the Rafah Crossing Point (Gaza). On 21 November 2005, the EU Council decided to provide the third party presence referred to in the agreement and to launch an assistance mission, EU BAM Rafah, to supervise operations at this border crossing point. Although the legal basis for the mission is Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP of 12 December 2005, the operational phase started on 30 November 2005 for a 12-month period. Its mandate has nevertheless been extended for a further six months. EU BAM Rafah consists of some 70 staff, basically seconded from member states. Major-General Pietro Pistolese (Italy) is the Head of Mission.

EU BAM Rafah's main functions are as follows: to monitor, verify and evaluate the performance of border police, security officers and customs services at the Rafah Terminal in accordance with the Agreed Principles for the Rafah Crossing, with authority to ensure compliance by the Military Police with those principles and all rules and regulations laid down for the Rafah Crossing; to contribute to the liaison between the Palestinian, Israeli and Egyptian authorities over all aspects of the Rafah Crossing. The Mission is not tasked to substitute for the Palestinian authorities which remain fully responsible for border and customs management, in line with the procedures laid down in the Framework Agreement.

Estimated mission costs to end 2006 are 11 475 200 euros (including contributions of 3 875 200 euros from member states).

EUJUST LEX (EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq)

On 21 February 2005 the Council decided to launch a support mission to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq through capability training designed to enable the Iraqi police force, judiciary and prison authorities to work together. The mission principles are based on Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP of 7 March 2005 and the mission itself consists of integrated training in the fields of management and criminal investigation for senior officials from the judiciary, the police and the penitentiary in order to promote an integrated criminal-justice system in Iraq.

The Council agreed that training at this point would take place either in the EU or within the region. The mission has a coordination office in Brussels and a liaison office in Baghdad. The arrangements, which are complementary to other international efforts being carried out concurrently, have been worked out in conjunction with the Iraqi authorities. On 12 June 2006, welcoming the progress of the mission, the Council agreed in response to Iraqi requests to extend EUJUST LEX for a further period of 18 months until 31 December 2007.

Since 1 July 2005, almost 800 senior officials from the Iraqi police service and the Interior and Justice Ministries have already participated in integrated training courses in 10 EU member states. The Union is thus seeking to contribute to rule-of-law training and awareness for Iraq's police and judiciary, to encourage ethnic and religious diversity among recruits and sensitise them to the role women can play within a democratic judiciary.

An amount of 11.3 million euros from the EU budget is intended to cover the common costs of the mission for this second phase. In addition, member states will continue to contribute training courses and trainers.

Completed Operations

The Balkans

EUPAT (EU Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)

The European Police Advisory Team, comprising some 30 police advisors, was designed to support the development of a police service based on European standards of policing. The mission was launched on 15 December 2005 for a period of six months.

Based in Skopje, the mission was led by Jürgen Scholtz and commanded a budget of 1.5 million euros.

Concordia

This operation for law and order maintenance in the western part of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia began on 18 March 2003, taking over from the NATO operation Allied Harmony. This 400-strong mission was not entirely European, since only 13 of the 26 contributor nations were EU countries. The mission objective was to guarantee the security needed for the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Planning and command of the operation involved the use of NATO joint assets and capabilities under the Berlin Plus agreements. France acted as framework nation for the Force HQ until September 2003, when it handed over to EUFOR. The mission ended on 15 December 2003.

EUPOL Proxima

The EUPOL Proxima police mission, which was launched in December 2003 (by Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 22 November 2004) and extended until December 2005, formed part of the consolidation measures surrounding the Ohrid Framework Agreement that laid down the basis for stabilisation of the political and security situation in the both member states and third states and operated out of the National Police Headquarters of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

It contributed to maintaining public order and consolidating the rule of law, securing civilian control over the countries' borders and strengthening regional police and security cooperation.

Africa

EUFOR RD Congo

EUFOR RD Congo (Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP of 26 April 2006) was based on an official United Nations request (UN Security Council Resolution 1671) to support The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the period encompassing the elections in that country. During those historic elections, EUFOR RD Congo provided backup to MONUC in making the region secure. This operation was conducted in parallel to the EUSEC RD Congo mission (for security sector reform) and the EUPOL KINSHASA mission (for assisting with setting up an integrated police unit and training it to international standards).

EUFOR RD Congo forces provided assistance with establishing security in various parts of the country.

The operation ended on 30 November 2006.

Artemis (EU military operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC)

A military operation code-named Artemis was deployed in the DRC in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003), following the adoption of Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP on 5 June 2003. That month the EU sent 2 000 peacekeeping soldiers to Ituri province in the north-east of the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is rich in mineral deposits. Artemis was the first European military deployment outside Europe involving no assistance from NATO. In deploying Artemis the EU was responding to an appeal from the UN Secretary-General asking it to take over the UN peacekeeping operation in Bunia (in Ituri) for a period of three months, until September 2003, after

which a larger UN force was to be set up under Bangladeshi command. A new wave of confrontation between ethnic militia had broken out a few months earlier, devastating a large part of the region and threatening the already fragile peace process in the area.

Six EU states, together with South Africa, Brazil and Canada, sent troops to the peacekeeping force under French command working in close cooperation with the EU Special Representative in the region. Their mission was to protect the refugee camps, make the airports secure and guarantee the security of UN personnel and humanitarian workers.

The EU military forces worked closely with the MONUC peacekeeping force in the DRC.

The mission ended on 1 September 2003.

Southern Caucasus

EUJUST THEMIS (EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia)

The European Union launched a rule of law support mission in Georgia on 16 July 2004 under Council Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP of 28 June 2004. EUJUST THEMIS was the EU's first such mission under the ESDP. It brought together high-level experts, mainly judges with sound professional experience in posts of responsibility in their own national judicial systems, to provide support and advice to ministers and to high-level civil servants and relevant institutions within central government.

EUJUST THEMIS was set up to support the Georgian authorities in addressing pressing problems in the country's criminal justice system by helping them to develop a coordinated approach to the reform process. The operation ended, its main objectives having been achieved, on 14 July 2005.

South-East Asia

AMM (Aceh Monitoring Mission)

This monitoring mission in Aceh, Indonesia, was launched by the European Union in cooperation with ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) contributor countries, Norway and Switzerland, in order to monitor the implementation of various articles of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the Indonesian Government and the Free Aceh Movement on 15 August 2005. The mission became operational on 15 September 2005 (Common Action 2005/643/CFSP of 9 September 2005) and reached a successful conclusion on 15 December 2006, following the local elections held in Aceh on 11 December 2006.

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

***on ESDP: The way ahead – Conclusions of the Berlin Conference
– reply to the annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the efforts of the German Presidency to take forward institutional reform of the European Union;
- (ii) Recalling that without the current text of the draft Constitutional Treaty, the 2003 Nice Treaty remains the basis for the ESDP activities of the European Union;
- (iii) Welcoming the operational successes of the ESDP, including the 17 missions launched to date, seven of which have been completed successfully;
- (iv) Noting recent progress made on ESDP capabilities, specifically as regards the operational launch of two battlegroups and finalisation of the Force Catalogue 06 (FC06) in the framework of the 2010 Headline Goal;
- (v) Aware that significant challenges remain in terms of capabilities and procurement, in particular the need to strengthen the European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB), overcome delays inherent in national decision-making procedures affecting the rapid deployment of battlegroups, counter the failure to invest in new technologies and eliminate the considerable overlap in existing national civilian and military technologies;
- (vi) Aware that new and diverse security challenges are presenting themselves for the ESDP, such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), human security, energy security and the use of the internet by terrorist groups, to name but a few;
- (vii) Aware that in a changing security environment traditional NATO-EU relations and the Berlin Plus agreements are not of themselves sufficient fully to encompass the expanding requirements of military and civilian crisis management;
- (viii) Concerned at the threat to European security presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; also that the EU has not so far engaged in a discussion about missile defence;
- (ix) Aware that recent US proposals to install a missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, designed to protect the United States and its allies from external attack, is viewed askance by Russia and may have repercussions in other areas where cooperation with Russia is needed, as well as creating divisions among EU member states;
- (x) Aware that the future of south-east Europe lies in the EU, thus implying a specific EU responsibility for stability, security and prosperity in the region;
- (xi) Welcoming the work of the EU Planning Team to prepare the establishment of an ESDP mission in Kosovo which will be the largest EU operation to date;
- (xii) Welcoming the efforts of Mr Ahtisaari, the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary General, to help determine the future status of Kosovo;
- (xiii) Concerned about the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board recently took a decision to extend the activities of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and EU Special Representative (EUSR) to 30 June 2008 because of continuing dissension between the governments of the entities over the reforms required by the EU;
- (xiv) Welcoming nevertheless the decision by the EU Council on 27 February 2007 to implement its Transition Plan for Operation Althea, leading to a reduction of EUFOR troops on the ground and preserving a stand-by force in the region;
- (xv) Welcoming progress achieved as regards Africa, particularly on the EU concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, and

looking forward to the EU-Africa summit due to be held, with a view to adopting an EU-Africa Strategy, under the EU/WEU presidency in the second half of 2007;

(xvi) Perturbed that despite extensive international efforts, the situation in Darfur is deteriorating;

(xvii) Welcoming the international aid given to Afghanistan for reconstruction, security, rule of law and counter narcotics operations as well as the initiatives to transform the German police mission in Afghanistan into an ESDP mission and strengthen the EU's presence and influence in the country;

(xviii) Aware that consecutive Eurobarometer surveys show public opinion is strongly in favour of ESDP but recalling people's unwillingness for their government to engage in military intervention,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE WEU NATIONS AS CURRENT OR PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO

1. Prepare and implement policies requiring strong political, operational and institutional investment, given the emergent new security challenges needing to be addressed in future under the ESDP;
2. Increase their investment in new and diverse technologies designed to tackle new security challenges;
3. Step up the dialogue with and implement more transparent policies towards national defence industries with a view to strengthening the EDTIB and move towards a greater transparency of national defence markets so as to avoid unnecessary duplication and costs;
4. Further deepen the existing NATO-EU dialogue with a view to exploiting more efficiently the synergies between the two organisations in military and civilian crisis management;
5. Continue offering their full support to and bringing their influence to bear on the search for a lasting resolution of Kosovo's future status;
6. Develop a European dialogue on the US missile defence shield, installations for which it is proposed to locate on EU territory, and take account of the views of all sides in order to avoid a new political crisis developing;
7. Formulate, with a view to the EU-Africa Summit, a strong EU-Africa strategy encompassing all the elements needed to bring about greater stability and peace in Africa and step up cooperation and dialogue with regional organisations on that continent, primarily the African Union, and with the United Nations;
8. Offer their support in ending the crisis in Darfur; call on the Government of Sudan to hand all indicted war criminals over to the International Criminal Court; exert pressure for all government-backed Janjaweed militias to cease military operations targeting the population of Darfur and prevail upon the Sudanese Government to agree to a large-scale UN peacekeeping deployment in the stricken regions;
9. Increase the information they each individually and the EU provide to the public about the need for civilian or military intervention;
10. Urge EU member states in any resumed talks on a new text for the draft Constitutional Treaty to focus more intensively on interparliamentary cooperation and scrutiny of ESDP matters, as parliaments provide a vital link with citizens, and to include existing specialist bodies, such as the WEU Assembly, in those talks as a means of increasing the effectiveness of interparliamentary dialogue in that area.

AMENDMENTS⁴¹

Amendments 1-2

tabled by Mr de Puig, Rapporteur, and Mr Kõuts, Estonia

1. In recital (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “groups” insert “and coordinated cyber attacks on the governmental e-systems of states.”
2. Following paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper insert a new paragraph as follows:
“Introduce legislation and conventions to ensure cyber security, taking account of EU Commission efforts in regard to critical infrastructure protection and information security;”.

Signed: de Puig, Kõuts

Amendments 3-4

tabled by Mr Mota Amaral (Portugal, Federated Group)

3. In recital (xv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation before “EU/WEU presidency” insert “Portuguese”.
4. Replace paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper with the following:
“Require EU members forthwith to devote their full attention to interparliamentary cooperation and parliamentary scrutiny of ESDP matters when it comes to drafting the new Constitutional Treaty and to include existing specialist bodies, such as the WEU Assembly, in the discussions, so as to secure greater participation by national parliaments in the democratic scrutiny of matters falling within the area of EU intergovernmental cooperation.”

Signed: Mota Amaral

⁴¹ See 1st sitting, 4 June 2007 (Amendments adopted).

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Chairman

Mr AGRAMUNT FONT DE MORA Pedro Spanish

Vice-Chairmen

Mr PANGALOS Theodoros Greek

Mr HANCOCK Mike British

Members of the Committee

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 Mrs BOCCIA Maria Luisa Italian
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 Mrs BOUSAKLA Mimount Belgian
 Mrs DÄUBLER GMELIN Herta German
 Mr DEES Dick Dutch
 Mrs DURRIEU Josette French
 MM FASSINO Piero Italian
 FRANCESCHINI Dario Italian
 GOERENS Charles Luxembourg
 GOUTRY Luc Belgian
 HANCOCK Mike British
 HAPPART Jean-Marie Belgian
 HÖFER Gerd German
 HÖRSTER Joachim German
 Baroness KNIGHT British
 MM LINTNER Eduard German
 MacSHANE Denis British
 MIGNON Jean-Claude French
 PANGALOS Theodoros Greek
 Mrs PAPADIMITRIOU Elsa Greek
 Mrs PORTEIRO Maria Josefa Spanish
 MM PUCHE RODRÍGUEZ Gabino Spanish
 DE PUIG Lluís Maria Spanish
 REISS Frédéric French
 ROCHEBLOINE François French
 RODRIGUES Ricardo Portuguese
 SKANDALAKIS Panagiotis Greek
 Van der LINDEN René Dutch
 Van THIJN Ed Dutch
 VERA JARDIM José Portuguese
 VIS Rudi British
 ... French
 ... German

To be nominated: Germany (1) France (1)

Affiliate members

MM BENTU Romanian
 CWIERZ Andrzej Polish
 EÖRSI Matyas Hungarian
 JELINČIČ Zmago Slovenian
 KAFKA David Czech
 KASAL Jan Czech
 KÕUTS Tarmo Estonian
 Ms KRUK Elzbieta Polish
 MM KUBOVIC Pavol Slovak
 MANNINGER Jenő Hungarian
 MERDJANOV Atanas Bulgarian
 Mrs MOGENIENĖ Laima Lithuanian
 MM NEAGU Nicolae Romanian
 OSMAN Remzi Bulgarian
 PERSON Andrzej Polish
 POPA Nicolae Romanian
 ROUBICEK Vaclav Czech
 STRAZDINS Janis Latvian
 SZABO Zoltan Hungarian
 WIERZEJSKI Wojciech Polish

Alternates

MM PUIG CORDÓN
 MOTA AMARAL
 CLAPPISON
 Mrs BONIVER
 MM KHALIL
 STUCCHI
 HENRY
 PFLÜG
 JONKER
 DREYFUS-SCHMIDT
 GALEAZZI
 FORMISANO
 GLESENER
 VAN OVERMEIRE
 LAXTON
 GORIS
 STRÄSSER
 GÖTZ
 WALTER
 SCHMITT
 Mrs WILLIAMS
 MM NACHBAR
 VRETTOS
 VARVITSIOTIS
 JAUREGUI ATONDO
 PADILLA CARBALLADA
 Mrs FERNÁNDEZ SORIANO
 MM LONCHE
 LE GRAND
 Mrs DE BELÉM ROSEIRA
 MM DENDIAS
 ...
 PLATVOET
 Mrs FERTUZINHOS
 Lord TOMLINSON
 ...
 Ms EYMER

Alternates

MM UNGUREANU
 KAWECKI
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ZELICHOWSKI
 BURIAN
 ...
 CHACHEV
 MATULEVICIUS
 LAMBRINO
 ATANASOV
 GALAZEWSKI
 GHEORGHE
 ...
 ...
 ...
 CEPIL

Associate members

MM	ATES Abdülkadir	Turkish
Ms	BILGEHAN Gülsün	Turkish
MM	ÇAVUSOGLU Mevlüt	Turkish
	CEBECI Aslan Erol	Turkish
	DØRUM Odd Einar	Norwegian
	LANGELAND Hallgeir H.	Norwegian

To be nominated: Iceland (1)

Permanent observer members

MM	JACOB Joe	Irish
	LAUKKANEN Markku	Finnish
	MURAUER Walter	Austria
	...	Swedish

To be nominated: Austria (1), Denmark (2), Finland (1), Sweden (2)

Affiliate permanent observer members

To be nominated: Cyprus (1), Malta (1)

Affiliate associate partners

MM	NIKOLOSKI Aleksander	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
	MARKOV Ante	Croatian

Secretary to the Committee: Mr Michael HILGER

Assistant Secretary to the Political Section : Mr Kostas PANAGIOTOPOULOS

Alternates

	...
MM	BATU
	KARSLI
	ÇERÇI
	...
	...

Alternates

MM	DURKAN
	...
	...
	FORSLUND

Alternates**Alternates**

MM	KONDARKO
	PUPOVAC

Committee assistant: Ms Isabel de TARAZONA

