DOCUMENT A/1972

4 June 2007

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Parliamentary scrutiny of external operations

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Document A/1972

4 June 2007

Parliamentary scrutiny of external operations

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations
by Emelina Fernández Soriano, Vice-Chairwoman and Rapporteur (Spain, Socialist Group)

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RESOLUTION 131²

on parliamentary scrutiny of external operations

(i) Noting that the scrutiny of external operations by the national parliaments is penalised by a number of factors, in particular the time taken by parliamentary procedures and the technical complexity of military issues;

(ii) Regretting that the task of establishing public consensus is left to the media, when it should be built through dialogue between voters and their elected representatives on the one hand, and between the elected representatives and governments, on the other;

(iii) Taking the view, given the growing number of external operations involving a number of countries, that the time has come to give national parliamentarians the means to participate effectively in the framing of common decisions in the area of European Security and Defence Policy;

(iv) Aware that the message issued to public opinion at national level is inevitably subjected to national political constraints and that it is becoming difficult for parliamentarians to support defence spending without being accused of diverting needed resources from the economic and social sectors,

1. Review their internal deliberation procedures so that they are better geared to the pace of decision-making required at international or European level in order to set up and manage external operations;
2. Make available the administrative and financial resources needed to allow them to participate more effectively in decisions on security and defence policy in the European and international framework;
3. Demand that their governments inform them immediately about planned external operations, before events and decisions are made known to the media thereby reducing parliament's role to a passive one of giving its approval after the event;
4. Support the maintenance of existing interparliamentary forums, where applicable proposing that they be reformed and adapted to the current requirements, in order to provide a common basis for drawing up security and defence policy decisions involving several countries.

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Emelina Fernández Soriano, Vice-Chairwoman and Rapporteur
(Spain, Socialist Group)

1. The Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations has already considered the current position in law and the procedures available to parliamentarians for scrutiny of international military missions in the context of the report submitted by Mrs Troncho and adopted by the Assembly on 4 December 2001³. The problem was becoming acute as the increase in the number of international missions exposed the limits of constitutional systems. The use of armed forces for intervention in accordance with the new concepts of peacekeeping and peacemaking could not be foreseen at the time when most modern constitutions were adopted.
2. Traditional constitutions almost always refer to the eventuality of war, and the powers and role of parliaments were defined in the context of management of armed forces, a context that bears no relation to the scenarios with which we are now familiar. The military alliances, NATO and WEU, both responded to the concern for collective parliamentary scrutiny by establishing their own interparliamentary assemblies to perform that function by monitoring any policies and missions that might be decided. The national parliaments were represented in these assemblies, so they did not feel that there was any need to introduce special procedures to legitimise the use of their national armed forces in the context of these alliances. Moreover, there was rarely any occasion to do so until the 1990s.
3. When, in 1992, the European Union decided to assume an independent role in the area of foreign policy by approving the Petersberg missions, which enabled it to conduct peacekeeping missions of varying degrees of intensity, the missions in question were always conducted under the aegis of WEU, and the Assembly was able to play a full part as an interparliamentary forum for scrutiny. But the first flaws in the system soon became apparent, as national parliaments were called upon to approve increasingly substantial budgets that could not really be regarded as essential expenditure incurred in connection with the application of international treaties. Also, the operations did not always receive unanimous support, and their legality was called into question by sections of the electorate. Parliamentarians did not really have the means to oppose intergovernmental decisions and, above all, they suffered in their respective countries from a degree of isolation that gave members of the executive a certain advantage.
4. The final blow to this already shaky system was the approval of the Treaty of Nice, when the European Union decided to take the ESDP in hand by abandoning the WEU structure, which had provided a clearly defined legal framework and a suitable forum in which parliamentarians could put their views to governments. As a result, parliaments now seem to be resuming their national role in decisions on external operations taken within the framework of the ESDP but also, indeed especially, in the context of ad hoc coalitions, when each country expresses a willingness to participate independently of any pre-existing alliance.
5. In all countries, the media play a strong role in shaping public opinion, and this in turn influences members of parliament. It is not uncommon for the issue of external operations to be raised in election campaigns and may, if the government loses its majority, lead to troops being withdrawn and to changes in the form of participation in military operations that are already under way.
6. European countries are at present participating in several external operations, in different contexts: UN missions, intervention within NATO, ESDP missions, bilateral agreements. The content of the missions also varies; apart from military missions in the strict sense of the term, there are military operations other than war (MOoTW), in which armed forces provide a humanitarian presence, logistical support, help for refugees, assistance in the event of pandemics or natural disasters, nominal assistance to other armed forces, protection for civilians. It is very difficult to cover all these operations in a uniform system of national decision-making procedures, especially as the constitutions of European countries are not all based on the same principles. Parliamentary republics rub shoulders with presidential regimes, constitutional monarchies and mixed systems. All our countries have a parliament, but these parliaments have such a wide variety of powers and prerogatives that it is difficult to compare them.
7. The national parliaments are consequently not on an equal footing in respect of the role they are able to play in the ESDP. It would be desirable to restore a balance, in Europe, in the political weight carried by parliaments in decisions on the use of their armed forces in the international context. The respective governments are also handicapped when it comes to taking joint decisions, since some of them have to obtain parliamentary approval and this often takes some time. Above all, the national parliaments do not have a common reference point that is adapted to this new situation. The WEU Assembly remains the only interparliamentary forum enabling national parliamentarians to exchange information among themselves and debate with the representatives of executives, but the historical context in which it was created is so different from the current situation that an in-depth reform is needed in order to give back to parliamentarians the working instrument they need.

8. In reviewing parliamentary scrutiny as currently exercised in the various national parliaments, a résumé of the numerous external operations currently under way is useful in order to form a clearer idea of the burden this represents, or could represent, for the national parliaments. In listing them, a distinction will be drawn between ESDP operations and operations conducted within a multilateral framework. We shall see that national parliaments are not involved to the same extent in both cases. Similarly, it should be noted that civilian operations of a technical nature are never submitted specifically to the national parliaments, but rather figure on a general list of projects to be funded, or are mentioned for information purposes in lists which are reproduced from year to year.
9. In addition to the strictly military and police missions being conducted in the ESDP framework, there are a number of civilian monitoring and observation missions:

10. We must also mention the principal international missions being conducted under United Nations mandate:

11. Continuing the review undertaken in Mrs Troncho's report in 2001, the Committee proceeded to examine the work of parliamentarians in connection with the Althea mission on the basis of Mr Crema's report⁴, submitted to the Assembly on 7 December 2005. A survey was conducted in the form of a questionnaire addressed to all the national parliaments with delegations in the WEU Assembly, with a view to comparing the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny of the operation, which represented a substantial commitment by the European Union and its partners. The survey also covered the activities of the European Parliament in this connection, so as to give a full account of parliamentary scrutiny of the mission. The WEU Assembly, for its part, had arranged for members of its committees to visit Bosnia and Herzegovina, to give parliamentarians an opportunity to examine the military and civilian aspects of the situation in person.
12. The Althea military mission has undoubtedly been an ESDP success story, enabling the process of stabilisation to continue and the country's democratic structures to be restored. However, the general public in Europe remained largely unaware of it and the results did not receive the publicity they deserved, to enable people to appreciate the progress made on European defence. Our Committee also observed in the course of its visit a distinct difference between the Bosnians' expressions of confidence in NATO and their perception of Europe, which was seen largely as an economic and social force that might boost the process of reconstruction.
13. The final conclusion was equally unsatisfactory in respect of the national parliaments: many of them took note of the mission when it was launched but did not engage in any real debate on the subject once the budget for the operation had been adopted, and the political decisions were always taken in Brussels with a minimum of information. The budget was renewed annually but few parliaments took the opportunity to find out how the mission was going or discuss what further action should be taken after peace had been restored. The media reported on the management problems encountered by the EU Special Representative, his relations with civil society, and the results of his mandate, but no particular attention was paid to the political aspects. Parliamentarians, on being asked, expressed surprise at finding that the matter might be within their remit and some actually thought that they had no business to interfere, once a mission had been launched by the European Union. But the Althea budget was submitted to them for approval every year. Only the European Parliament reacted by calling for it to be changed into a community budget in accordance with the Athena mechanism, a legal situation that would have allowed it to assert its power of scrutiny with respect to the mission.
14. Ultimately, none of the parliamentary institutions had any say on the conduct of the mission, which was managed by the executives and the military authorities in Brussels. The police mission had an even lower profile and attracted no public attention. Regular communiqués were planned and arranged by the military authorities but the national parliaments were not involved and so lost an opportunity to increase public interest in the ESDP, a policy which enjoys public support and which could help to relaunch the European ideal, currently in abeyance.
15. In the case of the most recent ESDP mission, EUFOR DR Congo launched in 2006, the example of the German Parliament is significant, since Germany had agreed to act as lead nation in the conduct of the operations. The Law of March 2005 on the role of parliament in the deployment of armed forces rationalised the procedures for parliamentary participation in decisions to send troops abroad and members of the Bundestag made full use of their powers of scrutiny vis-à-vis the Federal Government during the debates on Bundeswehr participation in the Congo operation. Thus, they were informed at the outset of the precise geographical location of the operation, the terms of the mandate, the duration and cost of the operation, and the maximum number of troops taking part. They were then informed of the political objectives of this mission, which was being conducted far outside European territory but which was proving to be highly significant as an indication of Europe's determination to play a greater part in international affairs.
16. The government was obliged to assure some members of the opposition that the forces dispatched were under instructions to adopt a policy of strict neutrality, a point which may appear to be obvious but which is of fundamental importance when the purpose of the operation is to provide support and assistance during the election period. Other members were concerned about the coordination of EUFOR DR Congo with the MONUC mission already in the area. As relations with this mission were governed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1671 and by the conclusions of the EU Council, several members wanted to know why the operation could not be conducted under the auspices of NATO rather than the European Union, and whether the two organisations might possibly collaborate on this occasion. The parliamentary group, Die Linke (the Left), pointed out that when the EUFOR DR Congo mission was being planned, the ESDP had become such a strong policy that it might one day call into question the Bundestag's central role in the deployment of German armed forces abroad.
17. As to the funding of German participation in EUFOR DR Congo, the cost of the operation was set at €50 million. The opposition parties, the FDP and the Left tabled 168 amendments, which were all rejected. Members of the FDP (the Liberal party) were against the mission. In their view, it was not sufficiently well thought out and they could not see how 2 000 troops from the European Union, dispatched with a limited mandate for a period of only four months, could make any difference in a country the size of western Europe. The Left too voted against, on the ground that the budget for the mission (initially €50 million and ultimately €56 million) would be better used to support reconstruction projects.
18. So on 1 June 2006, the Bundestag approved, by 440 votes to 135, the motion to dispatch 780 members of the Bundeswehr to provide support and assistance during the first free elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This vote confirmed the Council of Ministers' decision of 17 May in favour of this commitment, already widely reported in the media which had once again anticipated the parliamentary decision and presented the public with all the arguments before parliament had had a chance to open the debate and state its position.

19. The European press and public appear to have realised that there actually was such a thing as a European security policy when a number of countries decided to send reinforcements to the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon in August 2006. Although the mission was still under the aegis of the United Nations, support during the crisis in the summer of 2006 was much stronger in European countries than in other countries, and the media projected an image of European solidarity, at least in political terms, which, strangely enough, helped to draw attention to the fact that there actually was an ESDP.
20. UNIFIL was originally created by the Security Council in 1978 to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area. UNIFIL stayed on after the Israeli withdrawal to monitor the Blue Line between the two states. Hostilities broke out again in July 2006 following the capture of two Israeli soldiers, and on 11 August 2006 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1701 increasing the troop strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15 000 and deciding that in addition to the original mandate the force should, among other things, monitor the cessation of hostilities, accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deployed throughout the south, and extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons.
21. The European Union reacted with remarkable coherence in view of the scale of the crisis, producing a unanimous response at international level. On 23 August, the ambassadors of the 25 member states met to discuss the availability of troops, the terms on which they could be dispatched to reinforce UNIFIL, and ways of ensuring the success of the operation. This meeting paved the way for the extraordinary meeting of EU foreign ministers on 25 August, which was attended by the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan. The European Union also took the lead in arranging the international conference convened in Stockholm on 30 August to obtain the funds urgently needed for the reconstruction of Lebanon, which had suffered massive damage during the war. The European Commission subsequently provided funds to assist victims of the conflict.
22. This diplomatic frenzy, in support of reinforcement of a UN mission that was already exhausted as a result of its efforts, was not altogether welcome in military circles. They would have preferred to have nothing to do with UN operations in which military efficiency is undermined by the cumbersome nature of the administration at headquarters, the heterogeneous nature of the troops, and the ambiguous nature of the mandates. But it would have taken too much discussion to reach agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc multinational force, so the first solution that came to hand was universally adopted. On the political side too, there were complaints that there was no real role for the High Representative for the CFSP, Mr Solana. President Chirac was highly critical, expressing the view that Europe had been conspicuous by its absence during the Lebanese crisis, and although Mr Solana had recommended the deployment of a EUFOR, i.e. a force under direct European command, the idea had not been taken up by any of the member states, several of them on the grounds that this was an emergency.
23. So, in response to the UN appeal and in accordance with the intergovernmental agreements at Union level, the European countries decided to act independently. The media attributed their differences and demands respectively to determination to play their part and caution in the face of a changing situation. France, which held the rotating command of UNIFIL at the time, announced that troops would not be dispatched until it had received the necessary assurances with regard to the mandate. Italy offered to send 2 500 men, but only after the ceasefire was confirmed. The Scandinavian countries, Spain, Poland and Belgium followed suit. Germany sent 2 400 seamen to monitor the coastal areas, to avoid the spectacle of Bundeswehr troops on Israeli territory. And lastly Britain, already heavily committed in Afghanistan and Iraq, provided some logistical support.
24. This instance of international intervention clearly illustrates the new face of external operations, resulting from a mixture of community decisions and intergovernmental decisions, in which civil and military aspects are closely intertwined. The political and administrative responsibilities follow the same pattern. The problem is therefore to find a common parliamentary thread capable of meeting, at any time, the necessary requirements in respect of information, knowledge and scrutiny, to support the decisions to be taken.
25. The decisions on the launch of the mission were, of course, taken in accordance with the constitutional systems of the participating countries: these cover the full range of approval procedures, from purely parliamentary procedures in the case of Italy and Germany to procedures of a markedly more governmental nature in the case of France. There was also extensive media coverage. People were moved by pictures of the conflict and supported national commitments, which were often attributed to European decisions. The ESDP finally played its "virtual" role in a UN legal context.

Germany

26. Politically, Germany's position in the Middle East is still delicate and its relations with the region are still affected by its Nazi past. Although the State of Israel and Lebanon both asked for German military support, the solution adopted for participation in UNIFIL II was to send a naval force to ensure that the ban on supplying "arms and related materiel" to Hezbollah was respected.
27. The expanded UNIFIL went into action on 1 October 2006. German participation in this United Nations force, in the form of a contingent of 2 400 men at a cost of €46 million in 2006, was scheduled to last for three months. Its mandate was to be extended for a further eight months in 2007, at a cost of €147 million, and this decision will again be submitted to the Bundestag for approval (approval of "Einzelplan 14").
28. The Federal Government decided on 13 September 2006 to send German armed forces to the Middle East to participate in the expanded UNIFIL. When Chancellor Angela Merkel submitted the government proposal to parliament, she told members of the Bundestag that the UN mandate to the expanded UNIFIL was "robust" and that the German naval contingent could take all necessary means, including coercive measures against suspect vessels.
29. The Bundestag approved the proposal on 20 September 2006 by 442 votes to 152, with 5 abstentions. The debate provided an opportunity to review German policy on the conflict in the Middle East: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/the Greens) suggested that Syria should be brought into the diplomatic negotiations in the Middle East and stressed the importance of humanitarian aid. The group also drew attention to the use of cluster bombs. It wanted the Quartet (UN, US, EU and Russia) to relaunch the "Roadmap" and suggested that it be extended to include Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The CDU/CSU (Christian Democrats) and the SPD (Socialists) also pressed for Syria to be brought into the diplomatic negotiations.
30. The FDP (Liberals), on the other hand, considered that the deployment of German troops in the expanded UNIFIL was a real trap because of the link between Germany and the Jewish State, in the sense that a German force deployed in the region could not be "neutral" vis-à-vis Israel. The Liberals pointed out that there were still some crucial points that had not been settled: the disarmament of Hezbollah, the precise powers of Lebanese liaison officers on Bundeswehr vessels, and the monitoring of the border between Lebanon and Syria. The FDP had already raised the problem of defining the area to be covered by the German naval patrols off the Lebanese coast. It had been proposed that the German naval contingent should cover an Area of Maritime Operations (AMO) extending from Lebanese territorial waters (6 to 12 nautical miles from the base line between the area and the coastal waters) to 50 nautical miles to the west. For the purpose of controls within its territorial waters, the Lebanese Government preferred to have a liaison officer on every German vessel as a formal token of respect for its sovereignty.
31. Die Linke (the Left) was against participation in UNIFIL. In its view, a political, not a military, solution was still the proper solution to the Middle East conflict, and it recommended a number of ways of assisting the peoples and states affected by the conflict: send German doctors and psychologists, help with mine clearance operations, help with operations to clean up after the deadly black tide caused by the shelling, and help with rebuilding infrastructure and houses. It also suggested that aid should continue to be given to the Palestinian Authority, without restrictions, and called on the Palestinian Government and the Prime Minister (all members of Hamas) to recognise the State of Israel. It wanted a project to be set up for meetings between young people, to foster mutual understanding between Israelis and Palestinians, and an organisation for cooperation on the Middle East to be established, on the lines of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), possibly with its headquarters in Berlin.
32. Parliamentarians from all political groups in the Bundestag were also painfully aware of the incidents that had occurred between the German navy and the Israeli air force, in which German vessels and Israeli aircraft had exchanged fire off the Lebanese coast three times in a single week. Christian Schmidt, Parliamentary State Secretary at the Federal Ministry of Defence, reported to the Bundestag Defence Committee on 25 October 2006 that two Israeli F-16 fighters had opened fire on a German vessel while at the same time releasing infrared anti-missile decoy flares. The incident was confirmed by a German Defence Ministry spokesman but denied by Israel, the Israeli Prime Minister having discussed the matter with Chancellor Merkel during a telephone conversation which was reported to members of the Bundestag.

Belgium

33. The Belgian Parliament called a joint meeting of the Chamber and Senate External Relations and National Defence Committees on 28 August 2006 for a question and answer session on the Belgian Government's decision to provide troops for the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon. The decision to hold a joint meeting to save time, in view of the impending summer recess inter alia, was contrary to parliamentary rules and each chamber could, if necessary, have sat separately and subsequently voted on a recommendation to the government. The Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt, explained the terms of Belgian participation in the operations planned within the framework of UNIFIL II, stressing that, although the country supported the EU's determination to play a role in the world, it felt that it was essential to react to the crisis in the Middle East. The increase in the Belgian force was very small (from 300 to 400 men) but the force was responsible for highly specialised tasks in mine clearance and medical services. Members had nevertheless learned lessons from the earlier Belgian mission in Rwanda, which had been the subject of an ad hoc parliamentary commission of inquiry, and they insisted that the rules of engagement must be stricter and clearer, the available assets must be quantified, and an exit strategy must be defined. The Defence Minister, André Flahaut, and the Foreign Minister, Karel De Gucht, answered questions in their respective fields, undertook to pass any information that became available to the Senate special committee responsible for monitoring military operations, and hoped that members of the chamber would also be informed.
34. The vote on the motions that had been tabled took place on 12 October 2006 in plenary session of the Chamber of Representatives only.

France

35. The French Constitution assigns parliament a subordinate role in the definition of national foreign policy, since this is the task of the President of the Republic and the government. Nevertheless, the French Parliament did important committee work throughout the process which led to the creation of and France's participation in the expanded UNIFIL. On 27 July, the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee invited Foreign Affairs Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy to a debate on the situation in the Middle East and the Israeli-Lebanese conflict. A political consensus emerged on the need to implement a diplomatic solution that could be supported by both governments, in order to restore the full sovereignty of the Lebanese state and secure its border with Israel. It was also agreed that no solution involving military assistance could be envisaged outside the UN framework. On 24 August, as the situation on the ground degenerated, with serious clashes, Mr Douste-Blazy replied to questions from members of the Senate Committees convened during the parliamentary recess. On 30 August, the Senate Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees were briefed by the Defence Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, about the guarantees required by France for expanding its deployment on the ground. Indeed, with the UNIFIL force at that moment under French command, France had additional responsibilities to live up to. The same day Mr Douste-Blazy, speaking to the National Assembly, expressed regret at the lack of a clear European Union stance, although cooperation was under way with the United Kingdom, and Germany too had offered support. With a view to hearing all sides of the question, the Lebanese Ambassador, Mrs Sylvie Fadlallah, was invited to brief the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee on 3 October. The situation in Lebanon was also the subject of another parliamentary session on 21 November, following the assassination of the Lebanese Industry Minister, Pierre Gemayel. On 5 December members of parliament were briefed during a question and answer session on the military situation, the limits of the UNIFIL mandate and the functioning of the chain of command under UN auspices.
36. During the debate on the 2007 Financial Law, and the defence budget in particular, the funding of UNIFIL was again on the agenda, with hearings given by representatives of the military authorities. There was a debate on all the external operations and the current status of their deployment, and there were a number of calls for a stronger engagement at European level, on the grounds that France all too often found itself alone in its diplomatic and military efforts at international level.

Greece

37. Law 2292/1995, Article 3.10, gives the government the responsibility for taking decisions on participation in international military missions. More specifically, it is the government Foreign Affairs and Defence Council (KYSEA) that is competent for the deployment of Greek troops in the framework of international commitments. However, ministerial decisions only enter into force once the legislative mandate is voted by parliament. On 21 September 2006, the parliament retroactively approved the participation by Greek navy units in strengthening the UN mission in Lebanon as of 8 September, the date set by the KYSEA. On 12 September, Foreign Affairs Minister Dora Bakoyanni faced a barrage of criticism on the management of the crisis from Socialist Party (PASOK) and Communist party (KKE) members who complained about the lack of information on government action and of a coherent political line adopted in agreement with parliament. The latter point compounded earlier criticism about the inherent contradictions in the UN decision-making process, the lack of clarity surrounding the military action and the absence of an overall plan for resolving the Middle East conflict. The government was forced to justify the peacekeeping role being played by this mission and undertook to consult parliament about the future management of the crisis and the role to be played by the Greek armed forces.

Spain

38. Since the changes introduced by Law no. 5/2005 on national defence, parliament has the prerogative to give the government prior authorisation to send troops to serve on military missions abroad. Accordingly, on 7 September 2006, the Congress of Deputies opened a debate, attended by the Minister of Defence and the President of the Council of Ministers, with a view to giving its authorisation in this connection. As the Minister of Defence, Alonso Suarez, said in his introduction, "the Government is asking Parliament for authorisation to send our troops on a mission, a procedure designed to obtain the support of Spanish society through its lawful representatives in the institution in which the sovereign power of the people is vested, an institution to which we must also give a full account of the conduct of the operations".
39. The debate was very detailed, as the government representative explained the terms of the UN Resolution, the objectives of the mission, the limits of the mandate, the composition of the battalions to be deployed in two phases, the tasks of the navy, the strength of the forces to be deployed and the nature of the logistical equipment. He then passed on to the civil aspects of the assignment, the activities in connection with humanitarian assistance and aid to sections of the population that had suffered in the conflict. The opposition nevertheless complained that the government communications did not add anything to what was already known from press reports and did not address the real questions that were still unresolved: namely the estimated cost of the operation, how long it would last, the degree of risk involved, and the chances that this mission, which was an extension of the earlier one, would be successful. However, it is worth mentioning that all political parties represented in parliament, including the nationalist parties, overwhelmingly supported the involvement of the Spanish armed forces in Lebanon. For the first time in history, the mission was approved unanimously - without any abstentions. A day later, on 8 September 2006, the Council of Ministers specified what Spain's military contribution to UNIFIL and its financial contribution to this new deployment would be. In this sense, parliament's active participation and support for the government's decision as regards the involvement of Spain's armed forces in Lebanon has also contributed to generating public support for the new mission, as various opinion polls⁵ show. To sum up, the Spanish Government strongly backs up the idea that Spanish troop deployment abroad should not only take place within a legal international framework but that there should also be the strongest possible political and public support for new engagements abroad.

Italy

40. On 13 July 2006, the day after hostilities broke out in Lebanon, the Italian Senate Foreign Affairs Committee asked the government to take a position in parliament but, pending further developments in the situation and in view of the forthcoming international conference, the Foreign Minister did not brief the relevant Chamber and Senate committees until 27 July. On 18 August, after the UN Security Council had approved the Resolution, the four competent Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees of the two chambers invited the Foreign Minister to discuss the situation and the decisions to be taken. It should be noted that the regulations do not provide for joint meetings of committees of both chambers and the arrangement was made to save time. So the Chamber of Deputies had to convene meetings of its own committees, the same day, to vote on a resolution calling on the government to take concrete steps to give appropriate effect to the UN proposals and to keep parliament informed. The Senate, which has different procedures, was unable to vote on a specific text. On its return from the European summit, the Italian Government accordingly submitted a proposal for a measure (Decree-Law no. 253 of 28 August 2006) on the necessary provisions for Italian participation in the mission in Lebanon and for strengthening the Italian military contingent in the new UNIFIL mission. Parliament approved the proposal and the measure subsequently became Law no. 270/2006 in October. As the title indicates, the measure covers both the civil and the military aspects of the mission. It contains an estimate of the cost of the mission in terms of troops and materiel, together with the administrative rules for staff on mission. It also refers to the provisions of the peacetime military penal code and the courts' jurisdiction with respect to disputes and offences. The civil provisions cover the cost of work to repair damage to the infrastructure and training courses in Arabic culture and language for troops on mission.
41. The Italian Government regards the mission as a peacekeeping operation combined with a strong commitment to the civilian population. It was obliged to take this position in order to overcome the internal opposition that emerged during discussion of the draft law on the annual funding of all current international military missions, covered in the next section.
42. It should be noted that, in the case of the UNIFIL II mission, the Italian Parliament was fully involved in the decision-making phase and the government complied with the rules in respect of substance, form and timetable. The first parliamentary scrutiny was conducted on 22 November 2006 following the assassination of Pierre Gemayel: the committees, meeting in the Senate, were briefed on the situation by the two Deputy Foreign Ministers, with due attention to the event and to the start of the Italian military mission. While some doubts still remained, the Italian mission could certainly be described as a complex and difficult one, in view of the gravity of the situation on the ground. The government did not conceal the fact that the mission was likely to last for some time but the international community was committed to it and the Italian Parliament once again supported it.

Turkey

43. It is interesting to mention Turkey here, as an example of a country outside the European Union with a real attachment to the values of parliamentary democracy in that, despite the dominant position of the army in the country's institutions, parliament is required to authorise and monitor international military missions.
44. After a heated debate with a number of enforced breaks, members of the Turkish Parliament meeting in extraordinary session on 5 September 2006 approved the proposal to send troops to reinforce the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon by a majority of 340 to 192. It should be noted that in 2003, in similar circumstances, parliament had rejected the government proposal to allow the US army to use Turkey as a base to open a northern front in Iraq: so the government majority was by no means a foregone conclusion. The motion that was tabled did not specify the number of troops that were to participate in the mission, and the Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gul, gave an assurance that Turkish troops would not be engaged in combat but in humanitarian and logistical tasks, for a period of one year. The Turks were also to be responsible for training Lebanese troops and helping to monitor the coastal areas. The Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, also assured members that there would be no question of disarming Hezbollah and that the Turkish troops would be withdrawn if any such order was given.
45. Demonstrators surrounded the parliament building during the session, protesting against the proposal to send blue helmets to Lebanon; the results of various opinion polls published in the Turkish press suggested that 70% to 80% of the people were against participation in the UNIFIL mission. However, the government explained to the parliamentarians that its strategic aim was that Turkey should become an essential link in the Middle East peace process, by exploiting its position as a member of NATO, an ally of Israel, and a pillar of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC): the arguments against the isolationist tendency won the day, thanks to the fact that the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, happened to be in Ankara.

46. The international military missions that have attracted most political and public attention and have been most widely reported in the media in recent years are the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Parliamentarians played an important role in the decisions in this connection and there were even substantial changes in majorities that brought the government down in some cases. Despite the fact that these are multilateral missions, the approach has been governed largely by the domestic policy of the participating countries and the public has lost sight of the original difference and the reason for undertaking the mission in each case: with those who are against military intervention per se and those who complain that the UN Resolutions are unclear, the prolongation of the operations has gradually turned people against them and the whole subject has become an election issue.
47. In Italy, the question of the military commitment in Iraq was specifically raised during the election campaign in the spring of 2006, and the Left coalition was emphatic that it wanted to withdraw, a view often expressed by members of the public in repeated demonstrations ever since the start of the mission. Following its victory in the elections, the new government announced its decision to that effect in the programme presented to parliament, under which the troops were to return or to be allocated to civilian and logistical tasks. The section on Iraq in the law on the annual funding of international military missions (Law no. 247, of 4 August 2006) was drafted in the light of the new political position but the parliamentarians called for separate draft measures for each operation because the number of foreign commitments made it difficult to monitor each particular one. The government finally accepted an agenda designed "to enable military missions to be constantly monitored by a parliamentary committee that could also count on contributions from players in civil society and NGO representatives on the ground" (Senate session, 27/07/2006).
48. One year on, that parliamentary committee has still not come into being, which illustrates how difficult it is to add a further layer to the parliamentary scrutiny already being exercised at national level by the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees. Parliamentarians would do better to direct their criticism at the lack of links with the other national parliaments involved in scrutinising the same operations. Indeed, each national parliament is clearly isolated in its efforts to wage the same combat, which then becomes bogged down in domestic policy issues and the collective dimension is lost sight of.
49. In Italy this is a recurring theme, because a new law on the funding of international missions has to be approved each year, a process which keeps both chambers of parliament busy for about two months. The government's submission of the relevant draft legislation to parliament on 31 January 2007 immediately sparked off a heated debate, with the left wing of the majority opposed to strengthening the Italian contingent in Afghanistan. Tensions reached a high when an Italian journalist was kidnapped by the Taliban. The government was able to get the authorisation thanks to support from an opposition party which gave it a slim majority in favour.
50. The parliamentary debate in Italy has evolved from one mission to the next. Increasingly it has come to focus on the actual content of the mandates given to the Italian armed forces. Parliamentarians use their budgetary powers in order to analyse the political objectives of operations and particularly in order to define the country's role in operations initially intended to be peacekeeping missions, but which have gradually moved higher up the scale of intensity, moving beyond the limits formerly agreed. Indeed, government question time is often used to put questions about the way military operations are evolving, and this has become a recurring theme in the national political debate. However, with a single funding law to cover all the external operations, most operations clearly fail to hit the headlines and indeed are scarcely mentioned in the national and international political debate. The missions in the Balkans and Africa, for example, attract little attention.
51. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that although the Italian Parliament plays a full role vis-à-vis the executive, it sometimes comes up against unexpected obstacles in the form of problems of technical interpretation. In Italy, as indeed in other countries, a consultative body - the Supreme Defence Council, chaired by the President of the Republic and composed of government members and high-level officials - acts as an adviser on the practical implementation of decisions, which sometimes leads to a revision of their content, in the form, for example, of changes as regards the choice of equipment and troop numbers. This is but one example of the type of problem besetting parliamentary scrutiny.
52. The political climate in the United Kingdom has also changed, prompting the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to inform parliament of his intentions concerning the British forces deployed in Iraq. On 21 February, a House of Commons sitting was taken up with government statements about its intentions, most of which had already been published in the press: the Prime Minister announced a first partial withdrawal of the armed forces that had been fighting alongside United States troops for four years, adding that the United Kingdom military presence would continue in 2008 in the form of support and training missions. The opposition protested because the newspapers had already published extensive extracts from the speech the day before it was made. The Speaker complained that it was impossible for parliament to prevent ministers from going to television studios and insisted that the government report its decisions to the House at the earliest possible moment.
53. Despite the successful British operations specifically listed by the Prime Minister, the opposition continued to maintain that the situation in Iraq was impossible and the public, which had initially supported the mission, now distanced itself. In poll after poll, it appears that the great majority of the British people now consider that the war cannot be won and that the troops should come home. The distrust of Downing Street has spread to the Labour Party, which is likely to lose votes as a result. So the debate in parliament held no surprises: Tony Blair's exit strategy, opposed by all political parties, is raising many questions among parliamentarians.
54. Following calls for the states participating in the mission in Afghanistan to step up their efforts, the German Government decided to send Tornado reconnaissance aircraft to strengthen its contribution. The strong reactions in Germany indicated that Bundeswehr involvement in missions is not perceived as a minor matter. Neocommunist members of the Linkspartei announced their intention to contest before the Constitutional Court the validity of the decision voted by the Bundestag on 9 March 2007. In the German system, the Constitutional Court can annul a parliamentary decision it deems to be in conflict with constitutional principles. The majority is also obliged to take account of changes in public opinion. A survey published by Der Spiegel in March showed 57% of Germans to be in favour of a Bundeswehr withdrawal from Afghanistan, where 3 000 German servicemen are currently deployed. 36% were in favour of continuing the mission without increasing troops and only 4% wanted to strengthen the German contingent with Tornado aircraft and the 500 servicemen needed to accompany them. Doubts have been expressed within the SPD (Social Democratic Party). During a vote in the Bundestag, 69 of its 222 members voted against sending the Tornados. This was not enough to call the result into question, but does give the party leadership food for thought, with a grass roots protest calling attention to the fact that pacifism was one of the party's founding values. Things are likely to become even more complicated, as the Coalition's Foreign Affairs Minister, Frank Walter Steiner, is a social democrat. Parliamentarians do not have an easy task of it, in that they must reconcile this public consensus with the operations made necessary by globalisation and the fight against terrorism. The development of external operations into increasingly more dangerous, offensive missions has not been fully accepted by the public at large, which maintains its image of a virtually demilitarised army engaged in reconstruction or buffer force activities in a peacekeeping framework.

55. On 27 July 2006 the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution published a report on "Waging War: Parliament's Role and Responsibility" which considered the different options for increasing parliament's role in the deployment of armed forces. The report concluded that "the exercise of the Royal Prerogative by the Government to deploy armed force overseas is outdated and should not be allowed to continue as the basis for legitimate war-making in our 21st century democracy. Parliament's ability to challenge the executive must be protected and strengthened". It further recommended that there should be a parliamentary convention determining the role parliament should play in making decisions "to deploy force or forces outside the United Kingdom to war, intervention in an existing conflict or to environments where there is a risk that the forces will be engaged in conflict".
56. More specifically, the report recommended that the convention should encompass the following characteristics:

57. In a follow-up report published in February 2007, the Select Committee pointed out that the government's response had been published (as a Command Paper - Cm 6923) only on 7 November 2006 (more than three months after the initial report) in spite of assurances that a reply would be given by the time the House returned from the summer recess on 9 October. It complained that this was against the spirit of the commitment given by the Leader of the House, in a letter to the Chairman of the Science and Technology Committee, that "the Government will aim, from now on, to respond to all (...) House of Lords Select Committee reports within two months". It accepted the point made in the letter that "where a report is complex or technical in its nature, the response may on occasion require a little longer" and agreed that the issue of war-making powers was indeed a complex one. Nevertheless it considered that the "brevity and paucity of the Government's response" rendered such an excuse "unconvincing".
58. The government's response did indeed appear to be inadequate. Given the seriousness of the subject matter and the scope of their findings, the authors of the report had been surprised that it consisted of a mere one and a half pages of comment, in contrast to previous government responses to major reports, which had been much longer. They felt that whilst such a cursory response might have been acceptable if it had genuinely engaged with their arguments and recommendations, this document failed to address the majority of points made by the Committee and by 46 witnesses and organisations in 243 pages of evidence. They pointed out that the response largely pointed back to comments and assertions already made by the government (not least in evidence during the inquiry) and the Prime Minister, and that it failed to provide a comprehensive or stand-alone outline of the government's position in reply to their final carefully deliberated report.
59. In its reply, the government had stated that it was "not presently persuaded of the case for (...) establishing a new convention determining the role of parliament in the deployment of the armed forces", arguing that "it must be the Government which takes the decision" because "that is one of the key responsibilities for which it has been elected". The Select Committee felt that this underplayed the fact that parliament was also elected - indeed the executive drew its strength and legitimacy from a democratic parliament - and did not address its conclusion that "Parliament's ability to challenge the executive must be protected and strengthened". It claimed that it was not sufficient simply to assert, as the government did, that "adequate mechanisms for intense parliamentary scrutiny of executive actions are already in place". It noted that when members of the Committee had voiced their discontent about the response during an oral evidence session with the Lord Chancellor on 22 November 2006, he had declined to throw any further light on the government's position and told them: "I am not sure that there is much more that we can do".
60. The authors of the report observed furthermore, that the government did not seem convinced of its own position when it had said that "the matter needs to be kept under review" and that it was keeping its policies "under review". They voiced the suspicion that disagreement on this matter at the highest levels of government was responsible for what was essentially a "fudged" response to the report. They noted that the comments by the Prime Minister and the Lord Chancellor on this matter seemed at odds with the Chancellor of the Exchequer's comment in January 2006 that "a case now exists for a further restriction of executive power and a detailed consideration of the role of Parliament in the declaration of peace and war" and pointed out that the Leader of the House of Commons had taken a similar position to that of the Chancellor, when he had noted that "the parliamentary votes on military action against Iraq not only showed Parliament at its best, but also set a clear precedent for the future".
61. These sentiments, they said, appeared to be shared across the political divide. Indeed the Leader of the Opposition, David Cameron, had said that "giving Parliament a greater role in the exercise of these [prerogative] powers would be an important and tangible way of making government more accountable", asking "shouldn't there be a formal process for Parliamentary approval?". Similarly, the Liberal Democrat leader Sir Menzies Campbell had argued for "a war powers act to require parliamentary approval for a declaration of war".
62. Irrespective of the response it had received, the Committee noted an emerging cross-party political consensus on the fact that the current arrangements were unsustainable and was optimistic that its recommendations would be revisited in the very near future. It expressed the hope that this vitally important constitutional issue would be addressed in a more satisfactory manner and said it looked forward to playing its part in that debate.

63. This report has endeavoured to put together sufficient an overview of the involvement of the national parliaments in monitoring international peacekeeping missions. Such missions have become so numerous and complex that they now play a leading role in political debate. The increase in the size of the foreign affairs and defence services of certain national parliaments since the end of the cold war speaks for itself. The emergence of numerous conflicts scattered across the globe requires an investment in time and resources which weighs heavily on the political decisions that need to be taken. Public opinion has also woken up to foreign and defence policy issues and plays an often vociferous part in influencing national decision-making. Parliamentarians find themselves right in the middle of this debate, but have no more resources than they did in the past in order to play their role: parliamentary structures, procedures and mode of organisation remain the same in most cases. On the other hand, information is flowing at a much faster pace via the media, putting pressure on governments to take decisions fast. The obvious disparity in terms of working tools puts parliaments at a disadvantage from several points of view.
64. First of all, the time factor is detrimental to the efficiency of the parliamentary decision-making process, whether the parliament is required to give its approval or simply take note of a decision. External operations are launched in response to emergency situations, in response to a crisis, and government decision-making takes place at intergovernmental level at meetings in which the ministers must come to an almost immediate decision on behalf of their country. Only a few constitutional systems (in Sweden and Denmark, for example) make it compulsory for the government to obtain prior parliamentary approval. While systems that make provision for parliamentary approval are preferable to ones in which the government is under no obligation at all to parliament, if that approval is given a posteriori, then the decision is a foregone conclusion based on the premise that the government will always have the support of its parliamentary majority which will not disown a decision already taken. Thus by the time parliament is debating the deployment, the first military components are already under way!
65. Secondly, the technical nature of the military sector is an obvious handicap for politicians. It takes an expert to have an in-depth understanding of the issues at stake. The documentation put together for the members of defence committees is either an overview, hence superficial, or extremely detailed, hence likely to be difficult to understand. Administrative staff are not necessarily experts in the field and the committees call in military experts, if the parliamentary administration gives them the means to do so. But in most cases parliamentarians rely on documentation prepared by the ministerial services, hence it is once again the governments that are in control of the situation.
66. As regards external operations, the tasks that parliaments should be able to perform the most effectively are budgetary scrutiny and the monitoring of an operation, since they are not carried out under pressure of events and can be organised in advance. But once again, budgetary issues are highly technical and it is difficult for non-experts to make proposals or amend the figures. This being said, the budgetary exercise provides an excellent opportunity to express a political opinion with regard to the conduct of a particular mission. An additional complicating factor as far as the budgetary aspects are concerned is that public opinion, already inclined to be changeable during the course of a military intervention, is likely to turn against it once it knows the costs involved, on the grounds that it is diverting much needed resources from the social and economic sectors.
67. Finally, as regards the international framework, there is a major flaw that hampers the work of parliamentarians. This is the fact that each national parliament is alone with its decision, which quite naturally is likely to be influenced by domestic policy constraints. At European and international summits, government decision-making is freer and more efficient. It is up to parliaments to call for their own supranational forum of the kind represented by our Assembly, which it is high time to reform in order to adapt it to the current political context.

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MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

President
Lord	RUSSELL-JOHNSTON	British
Vice-Presidents
Mrs	FERNÁNDEZ SORIANO Emelina	Spanish
Mr	ZACCHERA Marco	Italian
Members of the Committee			Alternates
MM	ADAM Ulrich	German		...
	AGRAMUNT FONT DE MORA Pedro	Spanish	MM	FERNÁNDEZ AGUILAR
Mrs	BECERRIL Soledad	Spanish		BLANCO GARCÍA
Mr	BOCKEL Jean Marie	French		POZZO DI BORGO
Mrs	BOUSAKLA Mimount	Belgian		LAMBERT
Mrs	BRASSEUR Anne	Luxembourg	Mrs	ERR
Lord	BURLISON	British	MM	GREENWAY
Mr	DELL'UTRI Marcello	Italian		CANTONI
Mrs	EYMER Anke	German		ULRICH
Mrs	FERNANDEZ SORIANO Emelina	Spanish	Mrs	CORTAJARENA ITURRIOZ
MM	FREIRE AUTUNES José	Portuguese	MM	FERTUZINHOS
Mr	GEVEAUX Jean-Marie	French	MM	JACQUAT
Mrs	GRAF Angelika	German		SCHEER
Mrs	HOMBURGER Birgit	German		LEICHBRECHT
Mrs	JONKER Corien	Dutch		KOX
Mrs	KANNELLOPOULOU Kriniou	Greek		BOUGAS
Mrs	KATSELI Eleonora	Greek		DRAGASAKIS
MM	LEGENDRE Jacques	French		NACHBAR
	LONCLE François	French		EVIN
	MALINS Humfrey	British		PRENTICE
	MARTINS Alberto	Portuguese	Mrs	MENDONÇA
Lord	RUSSELL-JOHNSTON	British	Mr	MacSHANE
Mr	SILVESTRI Gianpaolo	Italian	Mrs	PELLEGATTA
Mrs	SMITH Geraldine	British	Mrs	McCAFFERTY
Mrs	SOLIANI Albertina	Italian	MM	MOSELLA
MM	WAALKENS Harm-Evert	Dutch		DEES
	WILLE Paul	Belgian		VAN DEN BRANDE
	ZACCHERA Marco	Italian		CESA
Affiliated members			Alternates
Mrs	ALEKNAITE-ABRAMIKIENE Vilija	Lithuanian	MM	MONKEVICIUS
MM	ALMASSY Kornél	Hungarian		...
	ANDERLIĆ Anton	Slovenian		...
	ATANASOV Ivo	Bulgarian	MM	BALGARINOV
	CZINEGE Imre	Hungarian		...
	DIMITROV Dimitar	Bulgarian		MERDJANOV
	KALLO Kalev	Estonian		...
	KIKUSTE Sarmite	Latvian		...
	KLIM Josef	Polish		ARNDT
Mme	KRUK Elzbieta	Polish	Mrs	BUBULA
Mme	PETRESCU Anca	Romanian	MM	PURCELD
MM	PISKORSKI Mateusz	Polish		CHMIELEWSKI
	PRODAN Tiberiu Aurelian	Romanian		SEMCU
	SIMKO Josef	Slovakian		...
To be nominated: Czech Republic (2)
Associate members			Alternates
Mr	GÜLÇIÇEK Ali Riza	Turkish	MM	KEPENEK
Mrs	HOLMBERG Kari Lise	Norwegian		...
Mr	ILICALI Mustafa	Turkish		GÜLYESIL
Mrs	INCEKARA Halide	Turkish		BASTOPÇU
To be nominated: Iceland (1), Norway (1)
Permanent observer members :			Alternates
MM	DURKAN Bernard	Irish	...
	LAAKSO Jaaklo	Finnish	...
To be nominated: Finland (1), Austria (2), Denmark (2), Sweden (2)
Affiliate permanent observer members			Alternates
To be nominated: Cyprus (1), Malta (1)
Affiliate associate partners			Alternates
MM	ALITI Rafiz	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	MM	SEKULOVSKA
	PLESA Velimir	Croatian		JURJEVIC
Secretary to the Committee : Mrs Marisa NUDDA		Committee assistant: Mrs Martine AUGER

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¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 15 May 2007.

² Adopted by the Assembly on 4 June 2007 at the 1^st sitting.

³ See Assembly document 1762 adopted on 4 December 2001: "National parliamentary scrutiny of intervention abroad by armed forces engaged in international missions: the current position in law", submitted on behalf of the Parliamentary and Public Relations Committee by Mrs Troncho, Rapporteur.

⁴ See Assembly Document 1911 adopted on 7 December 2005: "Parliaments and the Althea mission", submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations by Giovanni Crema, Rapporteur (Italy Socialist Group) and Ali Riza Gülçiçek, co-Rapporteur, Turkey.

⁵ Juan Díez Nicolás: "La opinión pública española y la política exterior y de seguridad", INCIPE 2006, p.173.