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The European Union mission in Chad: EUFOR Tchad/RCA

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Document A/2007

4 June 2008

The European Union mission in Chad: EUFOR Tchad/RCA

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by René Rouquet, Rapporteur
(France, Socialist Group) and Ruhi Acikgöz, co-Rapporteur (Turkey)

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RECOMMENDATION 818²

1. Actively support the efforts being made in the framework of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission;
2. Pursue efforts at national, European and NATO level with a view to developing and strengthening European forces' intervention and support capabilities with regard to deployability, mobility, logistics, weapons systems, interoperability and multinationality;
3. Draw up proposals for the rapid reform of the Athena mechanism for the funding of EU military crisis-management operations, in order to secure at least a financial participation on the part of all states involved in the decision to launch an operation;
4. Re-examine the principles for the selection of lead nations and their role, in view of the major difficulties encountered during the force generation phase;
5. Take the necessary measures to provide the European Union with permanent responsive operational planning and command capacity;
6. Maintain close relations with the United Nations so that the European Union is able to respond swiftly once the launch of a peacekeeping operation has been agreed;
7. Ensure that from now on, the national parliaments are consulted before any decision to launch a military crisis-management operation is taken;
8. Keep the Assembly informed about the status of missions being conducted by the national forces of WEU states deployed for EU- or NATO-led military crisis-management operations.

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1. On 8 February 2008, the Official Journal of the European Union published Council Decision 2008/101/CFSP of 28 January 2008 on "the launching of the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA)". With this decision, taken in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) framework, the Council approved the operation plan and rules of engagement and set the date for the launch of the operation as 28 January 2008.
2. The decision was taken pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007) approving the establishment of a UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and authorising the EU to conduct an operation in those countries for a period of 12 months.
3. The EUFOR and MINURCAT missions express the resolve of the international community to contain the violence and instability in Darfur, Sudan, which the United Nations fears "might further negatively affect the rest of the Sudan as well as the region, in particular Chad and the Central African Republic".³
4. The instability and insecurity are fuelled, in particular, by the support that the Sudanese regime is providing to Chadian rebels. In early February 2008 the Chadian regime led by President Idriss Déby Itno was nearly overthrown by a rebel attack launched from the Sudanese border.⁴
5. The situation is exacerbated by the floods of refugees to the region: 241 000 Sudanese have taken refuge in eastern Chad, and a further 3 000 in the region of Birao in the north-east of the Central African Republic. There are a further 179 000 Chadian and 20 000 Central African internally displaced persons (IDPs).⁵
6. Poverty in Sudan and the Central African Republic - already disastrous - is further aggravated by the refugee crisis. Chad ranks 170^th and the Central African Republic 171^st among the 177 countries on the UNDP's Human Development Index and their populations have a life expectancy, respectively, of 50.4 and 43.7.⁶
7. According to UN estimates the violence in Darfur has caused the deaths of at least 200 000 people and the displacement of at least 2 000 000 refugees since the beginning of the clashes between the government troops (and their allies, in particular the Janjaweed militia groups, renowned for their violence) and armed regional movements.⁷
8. In order to protect civilians in danger, the United Nations and African Union have already launched the UN-AU hybrid mission to Darfur (UNAMID). This civil-military mission, which ultimately will consist of 20 000 soldiers and 6 000 police officers, has incorporated the African Union mission to Sudan (AMIS), launched in 2004, and taken over the command.
9. The situation between Sudan and Chad remains highly unstable, due to their failure to comply with their obligations under the 8 February 2006 Tripoli Agreement and the bilateral agreement signed on 26 July 2006 in N'Djamena.
10. EUFOR Tchad/RCA is the European Union's fifth ESDP military operation (following Concordia, Artemis, Althea and EUFOR RD Congo) and the largest in terms of the number of troops deployed. It is also the most multinational mission ever to have been deployed in Africa.
11. The stakes are high, for this mission aims to bring about the stabilisation of the region that will permit the rapid deployment of UNAMID and enable humanitarian aid to reach endangered civilians, key conditions for finding a lasting solution to the crisis in this region.
12. It will also be a test of the credibility of the EU and the European Security and Defence Policy. EUFOR Tchad/RCA will be conducted without recourse to NATO assets. The EU will need to prove that it is capable of supporting other international organisations on the spot and conducting swift and effective crisis management in a hostile and highly unstable environment, by deploying a force composed of troops from 14 member states.
13. What makes the situation particularly delicate is that EUFOR Tchad/RCA will have to demonstrate its neutrality vis-à-vis the French troops present on the ground and avoid getting drawn into and becoming a pawn in the inter-African political infighting.
14. EUFOR, UNAMID and MINURCAT will also need to coordinate with three other peacekeeping missions that are present in the region: the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the Central African Multinational Force (FOMUC) coordinated by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and the United Nations Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA).⁸

15. Darfur (literally, "house of the Fur people") is an extremely poor and arid region in the west of Sudan close to the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic. It has been unstable for many years due to a conflict between the Arab nomad population and the Fur, Massaleet and Zagawa farming communities.
16. The instability and insecurity worsened in 2003 following a spate of attacks against Sudanese Government installations by African rebel groups who reproached the Sudanese Government for its pro-Arab stance and policy of repression against the African population.⁹
17. This led to violent reprisals against the local African population, with the Sudanese Government openly supporting a number of "self-defence" militia groups. One of these in particular, the pro-Arab Janjaweed group, was involved, among other things, in the systematic massacre and rape of local African villagers, installing a climate of terror and causing nearly two million refugees and IDPs to flee. The Khartoum regime denies any links with the Janjaweed, but recently began incorporating members of that group into its army and security forces.
18. The Darfur conflict has generated a climate of insecurity that has spilled over into Chad and the Central African Republic, due in particular to the floods of refugees. Within Chad itself the situation is made even more volatile by a violent conflict between rebel and government troops and the presence of armed criminal militia groups, causing further movements of refugees.
19. The problems of this arid region are further compounded by the shortage of water and food. Access to it is difficult for geographic reasons and the situation must be stabilised for the UN-backed humanitarian organisations to be able to optimise their operations.
20. The main aim of the EUFOR mission is to support the multidimensional UN operations in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, with a view to improving security in the region in order to resolve the conflicts and guarantee the security of humanitarian operations.
21. On 31 August 2006 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1706 concerning the situation in Darfur, in which it reaffirms its concern about the effects of the ongoing violence in Darfur for the rest of Sudan and neighbouring areas, in particular Chad and the Central African Republic. It underlines the need to address the regional security aspects in order to achieve long-lasting peace in Darfur.
22. Then on 31 July 2007 it adopted Resolution 1769 launching the UNAMID hybrid mission.
23. On 25 September 2007 it unanimously adopted Resolution 1778 authorising the deployment of a multidimensional presence in the eastern part of Chad and north-eastern region of the Central African Republic, consisting of three components:

24. UN Security Council Resolutions 1778 (2007), 1706 (2006) and 1769 (2007) thus provide the legal basis for the EUFOR operation in Chad.
25. The objectives of EUFOR Tchad/RCA are to:

26. The launch of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation is part and parcel of the EU's efforts to strengthen support for refugees and displaced persons in Chad and the Central African Republic. On 16 October 2007, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and former Portuguese Prime Minister, Mr Antonio Guterres, welcomed the EU's decision, stating that the European force would make a very positive contribution in the region.¹⁰
27. It is with this aim in mind that the European Commission will be initiating a series of transition programmes for the recovery and rehabilitation of the region. These measures will be continued within the strategic framework of the 10^th EDF (European Development Fund), which will allocate 299 million euros to Chad and 137 million euros to the Central African Republic over a five-year period.¹¹
28. EUFOR Tchad/RCA has an initial one-year mandate, to be reviewed after six months.¹²

29. EUFOR Tchad/RCA will be deployed in a politically unstable and, from the military standpoint, potentially dangerous region. The political situation in Chad and the Central African Republic has the four following characteristics:¹³

30. The EUFOR force will also need to find a way of conducting a dialogue with the rebel forces and the Sudanese forces which are wary of European intervention. The EU's resolve to maintain a neutral stance with regard to the different parties to the conflict will be decisive for the success of this mission, which must avoid falling into the trap of taking sides in this region. This is particularly important vis-à-vis Sudan which has taken a radical stance with regard to the EUFOR presence.
31. The complexity of the mission is also evident from the area it covers. EUFOR Tchad/RCA will in practice be responsible for security and stability in a region 900 km long by almost 400 km wide.¹⁴ The Polish Chief of Staff, General Franciszek Gagor, observed in December 2007 that the region was also one of the least accessible in the world, the nearest sea port being roughly 2 000 kilometres away and the road system well nigh impassable.¹⁵

32. Large numbers of French personnel are already being deployed in Chad in connection with Operations Epervier and Boali being conducted under the technical/military cooperation agreements between the two countries. The French presence has been maintained since the launch of Operation Epervier in 1986.
33. Following the 1990 Franco-African Summit in La Baule and President Mitterand's declaration about rewarding African democratisation efforts, France expanded its presence in Chad in order to increase stability, assist the local population, support the Chadian national armed forces by providing training and material assistance to its various services and participating in the various peacekeeping operations.¹⁶
34. On 29 January 2008 the EUFOR Tchad/RCA Operation Commander, General Nash, declared that the EUFOR operation had sufficient capabilities to be independent, in particular of the troops already present under the French flag. Cooperation between EUFOR and the French forces on the spot was to be confined to: the use of French equipment in order to set up the EUFOR headquarters, the use of the N'Djamena field hospital in case of need, the provision of a reconnaissance capability (two Mirage F1 flights per day under French command) and deployment capabilities during the initial phase.¹⁷

35. The budget for the common costs of the military mission, to be funded through the Athena mechanism, amounts to 119.6 million euros, out of a total estimated budget of 400 million euros per year.¹⁸
36. The forces generation phase, completed on 11 January, provided sufficient capabilities in order to launch the operation. The first troops were deployed in early February, but EUFOR will only become fully operational towards mid-May.¹⁹
37. 14 member states are providing forces on the ground and 22 states are represented at Operation Headquarters (OHQ) in Mont Valérien, France. The operation involves the deployment of 3 700 people under a UN mandate (UN Security Council Resolution 1778) and pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorising the use of force. Initial operational capability (IOC) should be reached by mid-March.
38. The 14 member states contributing to the forces on the ground are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
39. Four other member states will be represented at the Force Headquarters: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom.
40. The 22 member states present at OHQ are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
41. Lieutenant-General Patrick Nash of Ireland is the Operation Commander at strategic level and his deputy is Major General Pacek Boguslaw from Poland. The Force Commander on the ground is Brigadier General Jean-Philippe Ganascia of France and his deputy General Fitzgerald Derry, also from Ireland. The operation consists of 3 700 military personnel, not including reservists.²⁰
42. General Nash is highly experienced when it comes to peacekeeping missions, having served with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL) and with the EU Monitoring Mission in Former Yugoslavia (EUMM).

43. France will be the biggest contributor of troops to the EUFOR operation. Although it initially announced a maximum participation of some 1 500 troops at the beginning of the force generation process, it was obliged to increase its participation by a further 500 soldiers, making a total of 2 000 soldiers, including 20 at OHQ. France will also be supplying two UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), nine Puma and Gazelle helicopters (one medical, two combat, four transport and two reconnaissance helicopters), one 40-strong support unit and one air surveillance radar manned by 20 military staff.
44. Poland will provide a 350 to 400-strong force composed of gendarmes, an infantry unit, an engineering unit, a support unit and an intelligence unit, as well as two Mi-17 multirole helicopters. Poland will also provide the Deputy Operation Commander.
45. The third major contributor is Ireland, with 400 soldiers. The Irish units will be equipped with Mowag Piranha III light armoured personnel carriers.
46. Sweden is supplying a 200-strong force and one "gender advisor". The Swedish contingent's presence, initially due to last until mid-July 2008, may now be extended. On 5 March 2008 Sweden's Defence Minister, Sten Tolgfors, announced that the Swedish troop deployment might continue until end August, at a cost of almost 5 million euros.²¹ The Netherlands is to provide a reconnaissance unit of some 60 troops, including five officers seconded to the headquarters. The Dutch deployment will be for a year from mid-April.²²
47. Swedish and Finnish troops will also be responsible for protecting the camps at Abéché and N'Djamena, as well as convoys.²³
48. The Austrian contribution will consist of 160 military personnel including field hospital medical staff, some special operations staff and logistics experts.
49. Belgium is to send 70 troops who will be responsible for logistic follow-up. 22 of these will be part of the intelligence and convoy protection forces. The task of this detachment will be to set up a transit capacity (housing and the transport of containers with the equipment) consisting of 12 Peace Support Operation tents to provide shelter for 150 people, and sanitation.²⁴
50. Romania will provide 120 soldiers, Spain 80, Finland 40 and Slovenia 15. Italy, Portugal and Luxembourg will also contribute military personnel, but at OHQ.
51. In addition Spain will be providing two CASA C-295 aircraft,²⁵ and Portugal²⁶ and Greece one C-130 aircraft²⁷ each.
52. Luxembourg has furthermore announced it will make a financial contribution of 400 000 euros.²⁸
53. During a telephone conversation on 7 February 2008 between the French Foreign Affairs Minister, Bernard Kouchner, and his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, Russia too announced its intention of participating in the operation.²⁹ Visiting Paris on 12 March 2008, Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdukov announced that Russia would make six to eight helicopters and 150 military support staff available. The helicopters may be deployed from mid-June onwards. This will be the first time Russia has taken part in an EU military operation.³⁰
54. On 29 February 2008 the Official Journal of the European Union published Political and Security Committee decision CHAD/1/2008 of 13 February 2008, accepting a contribution from Albania to the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission.
55. The EU has also contacted Norway regarding its possible participation in the force. If Norway does agree, its contribution will be minimal in any event.³¹
56. Negotiations with Ukraine are ongoing with a view to its providing a transport carrier.³²
57. Croatia, Turkey and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have also expressed the wish to participate in this mission.

58. A 200-strong European military unit which forms the EUFOR precursor force has the job of setting up the operation infrastructure. 150 men are deployed in the capital N'Djamena, where there is a logistics base, and the other 50 at Abéché in eastern Chad,³³ where the Force Headquarters (FHQ) is based.
59. The forces will be divided among three major operational zones: the north, centre and south, with a battalion in charge of each. A fourth zone in the Central African Republic comes under the responsibility of the central zone.

60. The northern zone will come under the responsibility of a 400-strong Polish battalion, whose main task will be to secure the region in preparation for the deployment of the UN police mission, MINURCAT. The Polish contingent will consist of two manoeuvre companies composed of military police and soldiers from the Zagan 11^th motorised infantry division, an engineering company and a national support element (NSE). It will have at its disposal, among other things, two Mi-17 helicopters, as well as Rosomak armoured troop transport vehicles, HMMV light armoured vehicles, Land Rovers and ZU23-2 air defence systems.
61. The contingent began to deploy towards the end of March 2008 but it will only achieve full operating capacity much later, due to the rainy season which will start in June. The Polish base is to be built by French engineers and private companies, in the framework of the assistance that France has guaranteed to provide to Poland.
62. The main aim of the northern zone mission will be to guarantee a EUFOR presence for security operations. The bulk of the refugees will be concentrated essentially in this zone.³⁴ The zone command post will be installed at Iriba.

63. The central zone lies around Abéché, home of the Force HQ, and extends as far as the area around Forchana near the Sudanese border where the zone command post is located. The central zone will be under the responsibility of a French battalion. There is a MINURCAT post close to Forchana.
64. The battalion in charge of the central zone completed deployment in March 2008. Part of its supplies, oil in particular, are to be supplied by private Cameroonian and Chadian companies.

65. The southern zone is located around Dar Sila in south-eastern Chad. It will be placed under the responsibility of an Irish battalion reinforced with troops from the French and other contingents, in particular from Sweden and Finland. Composed of two support companies and two motorised infantry companies, it will be commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Paddy McDaniels. In addition, a 60-strong Dutch detachment will conduct reconnaissance missions in the region.³⁵
66. The aim of this southern zone mission will be to guarantee a robust security presence in order to create a climate of stability in which displaced people will feel safe enough to start returning to their homes. It will focus on preventing conflicts among rebel groups and averting other destabilising factors.

67. The area covered by EUFOR Tchad/RCA also extends beyond the Chad/Central African Republic border towards Birao in north-east Central African Republic. The Birao region is allocated to the Multinational Detachment for Birao (MND-B) composed essentially of a 200-strong French contingent pre-positioned there since October 2007 and comprising an infantry and an engineering unit and a field hospital. The French troops will be reinforced with other European units.³⁶ This zone comes under the responsibility of the central zone which is commanded by a French regiment.
68. The northern and southern zones cover a region where there are already some 250 000 refugees. There are some 180 000 displaced persons in the southern zone.³⁷
69. The Force Headquarters, known as "Star Camp" and located at Abéché, should be operational by mid-May. It will house soldiers from the 18 countries represented at FHQ as well as the Italian field hospital.
70. Initial operational capability (IOC) will consist of four components: a command component, a multinational man_uvres component, a support component and a logistics unit.

71. It was at the 21 May 2007 meeting of the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) that the French Delegation proposed that the EU should intervene in the Darfur region.
72. France offered to be the lead nation and to activate the Mont Valérien Operation Headquarters (near Paris) for that purpose. For political reasons, however, it did not want the Operation Commander to be French.
73. A little later Sweden, which planned to send a sizeable contingent, said that it might send a Swedish general to command the operation.
74. In August, during the pre-planning phase, following a fact-finding mission on the spot in Chad, the Director of the EU Military Staff (EUMS), General Leakey, realised how small was the number of officers available to him for that pre-planning phase.
75. Shortly afterwards, Sweden also sent a fact-finding mission, following which the Swedish Government decided to reduce its participation in the operation and therefore not to provide the Operation Commander.
76. As of the beginning of September 2007, therefore, the Political and Security Committee began seeking a commander for the operation and proposed the job to Ireland, which had expressed the intention of sending a large (400-strong) contingent.
77. The Mont Valérien headquarters was declared Operation Headquarters on 4 September and the French Colonel in charge began making arrangements for the arrival of a core of French officers (40 people) and organising the planning process in cooperation with the EUMS in Brussels.
78. During that period the headquarters received a visit from a UN mission but it was not possible to provide any precise information as the Operation Commander had still not been designated.
79. The arrivals at OHQ of officers from the participant nations began from mid-September onwards and were spread over a number of weeks. General Nash from Ireland arrived at Mont Valérien in October and the headquarters was fully staffed by the end of that month.
80. It took numerous trips between Paris and Brussels (177 during October and November) to organise the operational planning process.
81. Due to all this it was only on 9 November, five months after the initial Political and Security Committee decision, that the first force generation conference could be held, in Paris.
82. The formal EU decision to launch the operation was taken on 28 January 2008.
83. Following this excessively slow build-up of the Operation Headquarters, the mission encountered various other difficulties during this phase.
84. The officers from the member states who had joined OHQ had been seconded on a mission abroad and were being put up in nearby hotels. Not only was this not a very economical approach for an operation of this kind of duration, but also it led to staff rotations that made it difficult to maintain continuity and the requisite level of expertise at OHQ. Officers were being relieved every two or three months and the new arrivals needed to be trained in EU working methods and procedures before being able even to familiarise themselves with the theatre of operations.

85. Deployment of EUFOR Tchad/RCA began in mid-January in unstable and uneasy conditions. The instability became so severe that deployment of the force had to be suspended following an anti-government rebel attack on 28 January 2008.
86. The situation was serious enough to call for the evacuation by French troops present on the ground of EU and other nationals, applying for the first time the concept of a pilot state for consular action adopted by the EU Council on 18 June 2007. More than 1 200 nationals of 60 different countries were evacuated in this fashion.³⁸
87. During the rebel attack, launched from Sudan, a column of some 300 vehicles³⁹ made its way from Sudan to the Chadian capital of N'Djamena. Violent clashes occurred on 2 and 3 February, before the Chadian Government gained the upper hand and was able to repel the rebels. Their defeat was due partly to the fact that they had had to cross some 700 km of semi-desert in order to reach N'Djamena and had not been able to organise a proper supply chain.
88. On 15 February, following these incidents, Chadian President Idriss Déby declared a state of emergency, enabling the Chadian authorities to search peoples' houses and censor the press.
89. France also admitted to having helped the Chadian Government to repel the rebel attack. A French Defence Ministry spokesman explained that France, in supplying munitions, was applying its technical cooperation agreement with Chad.⁴⁰
90. Deployment of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission resumed on 12 February, in spite of the climate of uncertainty in the country. The 27 EU Foreign Affairs Ministers, meeting in Brussels on 28 February, firmly condemned the renewed attacks of armed groups against the Government of Chad.⁴¹
91. EUFOR patrols, during which the force had its first contacts with the local population, began on 19 February. Their purpose was to communicate with the people in order to explain the reasons for the European presence and with local elected representatives in order to provide reassurance and gain the confidence of the towns and villages of the region. According to EUFOR representatives, they received a warm welcome from the villagers who showed interest in their explanations.⁴² The large majority of inhabitants have a positive attitude to EUFOR which they see not as an occupation force or risk factor but as a factor for stability and security.

92. The first real tensions to affect the mission were the result of a dramatic incident in which a French EUFOR soldier lost his life.
93. On Tuesday 4 March, a EUFOR patrol consisting of two special forces commandos (from the French 1^st Parachute Marine Infantry Regiment, based in Bayonne)⁴³ got lost in the Tissi region in the border area between Chad, Sudan and the Central African Republic and strayed into Sudanese territory. The Sudanese army opened fire, killing Sergeant Gilles Polin and wounding his companion, an adjutant, who was able to flee on foot. On 6 March 2008 the EU High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, expressed his condolences for the death of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA soldier.
94. The soldier's body was found by a group of nomads who were trying to retrieve it when a grenade accidently went off, killing four of them. The Sudanese Government is demanding compensation for the four nomads' families of some 10 000 dollars each.⁴⁴
95. This incident is likely to envenom the relations between EUFOR, Sudan and the Chadian rebel forces operating out of Sudan.

96. In spite of the difficulties encountered during deployment, the operation proceeded normally and initial operational capability was declared on 15 March 2008.
97. On 8 March 2008 EUFOR Tchad/RCA officially took over the command of the unit stationed at Birao, in the Central African Republic, in the presence of General Ouandé, Chief of Staff of the Central African Republic forces. This unit is reinforced by other European units.⁴⁵

98. The EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission is the EU's fifth military deployment in five years, following Artemis (2003), Concordia (2003), Althea (2004) and EUFOR RD Congo (2006). 3 700-strong, it is also the most ambitious operation in terms of the numbers of troops deployed. It is a crucial mission for the EU, in that it projects the image of a strong, united Union taking action in a humanitarian crisis that is in the media spotlight. It will also allow Europe to confirm the effectiveness of its intervention in Africa, following the success of EUFOR RD Congo.⁴⁶
99. The launch of the mission was applauded not only by the UN, but also the media and civil society, which see it as a sign of Europe's readiness to shoulder its responsibilities with regard to the violent conflicts in Darfur. This mission is in line with the general resolve to promote cooperation and mutual assistance among the regional organisations. EUFOR's presence is not only a factor for security for the civilian population, but also for all the states of the region and even the African Union, which sees itself as the EU's ally. The European presence helps lend credibility to the role of the AU in conducting its mission with UN assistance.
100. EUFOR Tchad/RCA having reached initial operational capability on 15 March 2008, we can already perform a first partial analysis. The initial political and military reactions on the ground and at Force Headquarters reflect general satisfaction with the way the mission is going, in spite of some delays in forces deployment. It should be noted that there was a major logistics gap before France took charge of this element on the ground.
101. The "lead nation" concept needs to be re-examined in the light of the difficulties encountered during the EUFOR Tchad/RCA preparation phase: Sweden withdrew its original offer to provide a general to command the operation and finally Ireland agreed to step in, sending General Nash as Operation Commander at Mont Valérien. This caused a major delay.
102. The difficulties and delays that arose during the EUFOR Tchad/RCA planning phase showed the limits of the lead nation concept.
103. Major difficulties were encountered during the force generation process. The refusal on the part of a number of countries to contribute to the operation led to major delays that held up the force generation process and the deployment on the ground. The need for faster deployment in order to stabilise the situation as rapidly as possible put the decision-making process to the test: it took more than six months to reach a decision on deployment (28 January). The lack of flexibility and the reluctance shown by certain countries during the political negotiations also brought home the difficulties inherent in unanimous decision-making.
104. It should be noted that at the end of April the contingents of the major European partners were still conspicuously absent on the ground. The delayed deployment process has not caused major logistic or strategic difficulties, since initial operational capability has been reached, but could pose more of a problem in the event of emergency. Fortunately the start of the rainy season should deter most attacks against civilians and check any acts of violence.
105. The abovementioned difficulties are exacerbated by the limits of the Athena mechanism, whereby the EU contribution covers only the common costs, while the main troop contributors must finance the participation of their contingents, which account for the biggest share of the mission costs. This is also an obstacle to participation by non-EU third countries willing to contribute troops to the operation but for financial reasons either unable to do so, or able to provide only a fraction of the troops that they could otherwise have supplied. Albania is a case in point.⁴⁷ ESDP decisions are taken unanimously and it is therefore regrettable that the lion's share of the costs should have to be borne by the countries present on the ground alone.
106. EUFOR Tchad/RCA is fully in line with the UN's efforts to find a solution to the Darfur crisis. Indeed, guaranteeing the security of the refugee camp areas and providing protection for humanitarian aid workers and UN personnel are key to any a solution to the crisis in the Darfur/Chad/Central African Republic region. But this operation has shown that there are major difficulties still within the Union. It is therefore necessary to take an overall approach and to clearly define the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy as it applies to Africa and the role the EU should play there in the light of its traditional responsibilities and the current threats of conflict.

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APPENDIX

0. (Source: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

0. 2 (Source: French Defence Staff)

REPUBLIC OF CHAD

1. PRESENTATION

Area: 1 284 000 km²

Population: approx. 9.8 million

Capital: N'Djamena, located in the western edge of the country on the border with Cameroon.

Major cities: Sarh, Moundou, Abéché

Two official languages: French and Arabic

Religions: Muslim (55%), Christian and Animist (45%)

French community in Chad: approx.1 500 registered inhabitants

2. GEOGRAPHY

Topography

Chad is in central Africa, bordered by Libya to the south, Niger to the east, Sudan to the west and the Central African Republic to the north. The centre and south of the country consist of plains, while the north and east are mountainous.

Chad is completely landlocked with no access to the sea. Its largest water resource is the Chari river basin in the south of the country. The Chari (1 200 km long) has its source in the central African mountains and is the only tributary to Lake Chad in the south-east of the country. The Chari runs through a large part of the country and forms the border between Chad and Cameroon. It provides 90% of the waters flowing into Lake Chad.

The majority of Chad's population live on the banks of the Chari and its tributaries. The Chari has a major economic role, as it provides water to over 20 million people in the four countries which surround it: Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria. However, it should be pointed out that the lake has shrunk considerably in the last four decades. In the 1960s, it had an area of over 26 000 km². In 2000, its area had fallen to less than 1 500 km².

Climate

The climate is influenced by two air masses:

The country consists of three distinct climate zones:

3. TRANSPORT

Road network

There is no official system for the classification of the public highways. There is no order of importance of roads and they do not have any regulatory identification number. It is estimated that there are approximately 40 000 km of roads (including both paved and unpaved roads), 650 km of which are surfaced. The Chadian road system comprises two networks: the permanent national network which covers 2 562 kilometres, and the national seasonal network which takes in another 3 600 kilometres. The remainder of the network is made up of regional roads and tracks. All the main roads are located in the south of the country and for the most part consist of relatively poorly maintained tracks and a few minor roads. The north of the country is far worse off and only has a few minor roads that link the different oases. Some roads become impassable in the rainy season, leaving large parts of the country isolated for up to 6 to 8 months. The very poor road network makes it difficult to travel between the towns and cities of Chad.

River network

The river network consists of the Logone, which is navigable for only two months of the year, and the Chari which is navigable all year round downstream of N'Djamena and for four months of the year from Sarh to N'Djamena.

Rail network

The rail network is non-existent. Extending the Transcameroon railway to Chad would improve services and help open the country up.

Air network

Officially, the air network comprises 43 runways, many of which are in poor condition. There are five main airports: in N'Djamena (the only international airport in the country), Abéché, Faya-Largeau, Moundou and Sarh, which are managed by the Agency for the Safety of Aerial Navigation in Africa (ASECNA), and smaller airports in Ati, Bilitine, Bokoro, etc. Only the airports in N'Djamena and Sarh are considered to be in good condition. The other airports are in a worrying state and lack facilities (fire engines, safety equipment, radio beacons, etc).

The exploitation of Chadian oil resources has encouraged work on the transport infrastructure, though the impact of this on national development is not yet apparent. Investment in this area could have a positive effect if the authorities are capable of anticipating what is necessary to rise to the challenges of national development.

4. POPULATION

The population of Chad is estimated at 9.8 million inhabitants. Average density is seven inhabitants per square kilometre, but varies widely (0.2 to 40) from region to region. The south of the country - known as "fertile Chad" because of its agricultural potential - is by far the most populous area.

Demographic data:

Age pyramids:

Ethnolinguistic groups

Chad is a real ethnic mosaic. Not counting various clans and subgroups, there are 174 distinct ethnic groups in Chad, which can be classified generically in six large categories:

There are many spoken languages in Chad (nearly 130), but only 18 are spoken by more than 50 000 people. The official languages are classical Arabic and French, which are used by the administration and in the legal system (especially French which is the de facto working language), though these are used relatively little by the population which continues to speak dialects such as Chadian Arabic and the Sara language.

5. ECONOMY

Economic figures

Chad remains a very poor country. The large majority of the population is rural, with agriculture and cattle breeding being the main activities. The cotton industry in Chad employs up to two million people. It is in a critical situation both for external reasons (fall in prices, distorted competition as a result of some producer countries subsidising their industry) and internal ones (difficulties managing the state-owned cotton company, government debt to the industry, process of privatisation poorly handled, funding problems made worse by the decision to raise the purchase price for producers without any financial guarantee).

In 2000, the discovery of oilfields in Doba, in the south of the country, had a major impact on the economy (the GDP has increased 40% since 2003). Oil production started on completion of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline which transports oil in the Gulf of Guinea for an international consortium. The pipeline was partly funded by the World Bank. The Chadian government undertook to spend 80% of royalties and 85% of dividends on fighting poverty. It is now a major challenge for Chad to put its oil revenue to good use.

In 2004 and 2005, the country went through serious financial difficulties which posed a constant threat to the implementation of public expenditure programmes. These financial difficulties were made worse when the IMF programme was interrupted at the end of 2003 and the planned budget support (20 million euro) from the EU was blocked. Several IMF missions have been to Chad to negotiate the prerequisites for access to a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) programme.

A law was passed in 1999 requiring 80% of Chad's oil revenues to be directed into funding social programmes and the fight against poverty - a unique case in Africa (the initiative for this mechanism came from President Déby with support from the World Bank). One of the challenges for this mechanism was to enhance the absorptive capacity for oil revenues by the priority sectors. However, faced with a dangerous security situation, President Déby had to take on the World Bank in an attempt to make the mechanism more flexible, in particular to be able to better equip the Chadian army so that it could resist repeated rebel attacks. The law on the distribution of oil revenues was amended, with the consent of the World Bank, though 65% of oil revenues still goes to priority social sectors in the area of sustainable development. (Source: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

6. POLITICS

General information

History overview

March 1976: Agreement on technical military cooperation signed with France (NB: this was not a "defence agreement").

December 1986: Beginning of Operation Epervier in Chad. Deployment of French forces in Chad after Libyan troops invaded Chadian territory. Between 800 and 1 100 troops were stationed permanently in Chad in the framework of Operation Epervier.

June 1990: 16^th Franco-African Summit (La Baule, 19-21 June 1990).

François Mitterrand strongly encourages African countries to take up democracy.

December 1990: General Idriss Déby takes power and overthrows President Habré.

France protects its citizens during clashes.

July 1996: Idriss Déby re-elected President of the Republic.

May 2001: Idriss Déby re-elected President of the Republic.

April 2006: Rebel troops attack N'Djamena. French fighter jets fire warning shots at rebel column.

May 2006: Idriss Déby re-elected President of the Republic.

November 2006: Rebel forces strike again, attacking Abéché.

September 2007: Resolution 1778 (2007) of 25 September 2007, the United Nations Security Council approves the establishment of a UN mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and authorises the European Union to deploy its forces for a period of one year from the date that it declares its initial operational capability.

For over three years, Chad has had to deal internally with the consequences of the Sudanese Darfur crisis which remains a major destabilising factor. In order to keep Khartoum happy, President Déby refused to support the Darfur rebellion and at the end of 2003 offered to mediate between the two parties. Although this aroused the hostility of part of his clan who were linked to some of the Darfur rebels, it led to the signing of the N'Djamena agreements the following year.

While President Déby relied for support for a long time on the Bideyat and Zaghawa ethnic groups (the latter of which he himself comes from), the defection of a large number of Zaghawa officers from the Chadian army in October 2005 seriously jeopardised the basis of this regime.

This situation revived political opposition which up until then had lacked any legitimacy and, in particular, triggered renewed activity by a number of dissident movements at the same time as increasing rebellions organised by external agents.

Since 18 December 2005, the Chadian army has repelled several rebel attacks, including one on N'Djamena on 13 April 2006, another on Abéché on 25 November 2006 and in particular the one on N'Djamena at the end of January, beginning of February 2008.

Chad has accused Khartoum of supporting the rebel movements and seeking to overthrow President Déby. Today, the situation in the east of Chad remains volatile and needs to be consolidated, despite President Déby's repeated successes against the rebel movements that have tried to overthrow his regime. The continuing tension on the Sudan-Chad border highlights the fact that the Darfur crisis is still having a destabilising effect on the region.

There are many other factors creating instability in the east of Chad, in particular the inter-ethnic violence between Arab and non-Arab groups and the many refugees from Darfur, the Central African Republic and displaced Chadians. (Source: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

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¹ Adopted by the Committee on 6 May 2008.

² Adopted by the Assembly on 4 June 2008 at the 2^nd sitting.

³ UN Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006).

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³⁷ Force HQ.

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⁴⁷ Information provided by French officers during talks at the French Ministry of Defence on 10 April 2008.