



European Security and Defence Assembly
Assembly of Western European Union

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15 June 2010

FIFTY-EIGHTH SESSION

European defence and the Lisbon Treaty
- reply to the annual report of the Council

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee
by Paul Wille, Rapporteur (Belgium, Liberal Group)

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Report transmitted to: the President of the Council of WEU; the Secretary-General of the WEU; the President of the Council of the European Union; the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; the President of the European Commission; the EU Commissioner for institutional relations and communication strategy; the Presidents/Speakers and the Chairmen of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and European Affairs Committees of the 39 national parliaments represented in the Assembly; the Presidents of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Baltic Assembly, the Nordic Council, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the CIS Parliamentary Assembly; the President of the European Parliament; the Secretaries General of the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe, NATO and the OSCE.

*European defence and the Lisbon Treaty
- reply to the annual report of the Council*

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¹ Adopted by the Committee on 18 May 2010.

RECOMMENDATION 852²
on European defence and the Lisbon Treaty

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the progress made by the EU member states in developing the ESDP/CSDP into one of the Union's most dynamic and innovative policy fields;
- (ii) Taking the view, however, that there is a risk of stagnation and that an energetic effort is needed, making the most of the opportunities offered by the Lisbon Treaty, in order to bring the Union closer to its goal of becoming a strategic international player;
- (iii) Noting that the civilian and military capabilities of EU member states are increasingly overstretched;
- (iv) Convinced that courageous steps are required if the ESDP/CSDP is to develop beyond its current status, confined essentially to crisis intervention, whereby it lacks the strategic perspective and tools for conflict prevention, management and resolution;
- (v) Recalling that ESDP/CSDP is not about mutual defence and has not led to the creation of a European army and that the EU member states, which lack a common strategic culture, are still a long way from achieving the joint perspective on security and defence issues needed to frame a common European defence;
- (vi) Stressing that a genuine common foreign and security policy can only exist if all EU member states are prepared to give up their sovereign right to act when they deem their national interests to be at stake;
- (vii) Noting that the Lisbon Treaty and the government declarations appended to it insist on the intergovernmental character of CFSP and CSDP;
- (viii) Recalling that the wording of the Lisbon Treaty's mutual assistance clause is the result of a compromise between those EU member states that wanted a mutual defence commitment, those wanting to protect their traditional neutral or militarily non-aligned status and those anxious to ensure that NATO was not undermined and that, as a consequence, it contains such major qualifications and restrictions that, despite bearing some similarity to Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, it does not at all have the same meaning;
- (ix) Regretting, therefore, that the 10 EU member states that are full members of WEU nonetheless announced on 31 March 2010 their intention to put an end to WEU and to denounce its founding treaty, the 1954 modified Brussels Treaty, a development likely to result in the winding down of WEU, together with its Assembly, by the end of June 2011;
- (x) Underlining that the WEU member states also declared on 31 March 2010 that they "remain strongly committed to the principle of mutual defence under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty";
- (xi) Welcoming also the WEU member states' statement in favour of "the enhancement of interparliamentary dialogue in this field";
- (xii) Considering the resolution adopted on 11 April 2010 by the French Senate stating that "the disappearance of the WEU Assembly should be made subject to the creation of a structure that would bring together parliamentarians from the 27 member states" and proposing a structure based on COSAC;
- (xiii) Taking the view that national parliaments would fare better if they opted for a more elaborate system of parliamentary scrutiny than a mechanism based on a conference model;

² Adopted by the Assembly on 15 June 2010 at the 1st sitting.

(xiv) Convinced that it is in the EU's interest to involve the European NATO states not members of the EU and other strategic partners relevant for European security, such as Russia, in its security and defence dialogue, including at the interparliamentary level,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES, AS MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, TO:

1. Launch a process of reflection on the implications for member states of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty's mutual assistance and solidarity clauses;
2. Develop closer security relations with the United States and the European non-EU NATO member states in accordance with the role attributed by the Lisbon Treaty to NATO;
3. Supplement the European Security Strategy with a chapter on mutual assistance and solidarity;
4. Launch a European-wide debate on the objectives of CSDP and the tasks for which the limited resources available should be used as a priority;
5. Continue to develop the battlegroups so that they can become a laboratory for testing innovative measures, such as the pooling and sharing of responsibilities, with a view to a possible future evolution towards the establishment in the EU of common European military capabilities;
6. Provide the European Defence Agency with a financial framework commensurate with its tasks and with the requirements of longer-term planning of crisis-management capabilities;
7. Reform the Athena funding mechanism for military CSDP operations so as to enable a larger share of the costs to be borne by all member states, with a view to encouraging individual member states to provide capabilities for crisis-management missions;
8. Endeavour further to overcome the "culture of distinctiveness" between the civilian and military components of the CSDP and strive to establish fully comprehensive crisis-management structures;
9. Create new incentives for European citizens to register as potential civilian staff for CSDP operations;
10. Support the establishment within the EU of a follow-up mechanism for interparliamentary scrutiny of European security and defence policies by offering to engage in regular dialogue with parliamentarians and to provide them with regular written reports about the development of CFSP and CSDP, the activities of the European Defence Agency, the efforts to establish permanent structured cooperation, and any activity relevant to achieving a common European defence,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL:

1. Continue to fulfil its duties emanating from the modified Brussels Treaty for the remaining time of that treaty's validity;
2. Consult closely with the Assembly to ensure that WEU is properly wound down with respect to its General Secretariat and Assembly and in order to make optimum use of its experience, staff and other assets.

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Paul Wille, Rapporteur (Belgium, Liberal Group)

I. Introduction

1. The aim of this report is to encourage EU member states to pursue the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and in particular the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) despite a difficult political and financial context. The initial difficulties with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty should not discourage member states from working towards a more coherent, capable and active EU. Although CSDP is one of the Union's most dynamic and innovative policy areas, its development has now reached a plateau and there is a risk of stagnation unless courageous steps are taken. With its rather eclectic list of deployments, the EU is certainly an actor in international politics, but not yet a strategic one.

2. Why such a plea at this stage? Because the EU has entered a crucial new phase with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the beginning, unfortunately, is rather disappointing. Core elements of the new structural set-up designed to strengthen foreign, security and defence policy have either yet to be established (European External Action Service) or to get to grips with their positions and tasks (High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission; President of the European Council), or else they are already in dire straits (permanent structured cooperation).

3. Other structural building blocks have been established but have either not yet been used (battlegroups), or have exhausted their possibilities (Berlin Plus), or their potential has not yet been fully tapped (European Defence Agency).

4. One reason is the lack of political cohesion within the EU: it is difficult for the European Union's 27 member states to formulate common interests that easily translate into efficient common institutions, agreed procedures and joint action. The real question is: what needs to be done to make security and defence policy at 27 work well?

II. Playing with words?

1. Common European defence

5. So far the EU has only been an autonomous player in the area of crisis management. We are a long way from reaching what even the Lisbon Treaty only foresees as a (distant) possibility: a common European defence. Calling CSDP a European defence is not only playing with words but is quite simply misleading. The EU remains a very heterogeneous group of countries with a wide spectrum of military cultures and security concerns and it will be some time before a common European defence can be established.

6. Because the EU is a group of countries and not a nation state, it is more difficult for the EU member states than for other powers to formulate strategic interests and for European citizens and policymakers to understand and subscribe to European as opposed to national interests. National interests vary because the member states themselves differ in size, economic power and geographic location. For centuries, European governments directed their foreign policy against the interests of the others. All too often, the result was an "I win, you lose" approach.

7. The development of a genuine European defence depends not only on the capacity of Europeans to agree on what their common strategic interests are but also on how to pursue them. A real common foreign and security policy can only exist if all EU member states – including the larger ones – are prepared to give up their sovereign right to act when they deem their national interests to be at stake.

8. Reading the text of the Lisbon Treaty one might gain the impression that it takes CSDP forward; however, the careful phrasing of the articles and appended declarations and the insistence on the intergovernmental character of that policy leave plenty of escape hatches open to those who wish to use them. It is very likely that with the Lisbon Treaty we have reached the limits for some considerable time to come of what is feasible and acceptable for the member states.

2. European army

9. The same juggling with words is applied with respect to the creation of a “European army”.

10. When asked in April 2010 how to reinforce the “common European identity”, Italian Foreign Affairs Minister Franco Frattini replied: by “building a European defence, i.e. a European army”.³ In this way, he explained, the EU could improve its capabilities for intervention in international theatres. If it wished to be credible with regard to the fight against terrorism, the stabilisation of crisis and conflict zones and enhancing nuclear security, he said, it must deliver its own security instead of relying on the United States.

11. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle declared during the Munich Security Conference in February 2010, in a speech on “Europe and the World – Securing the Future” that the “long-term goal is the establishment of a European army under full parliamentary control”.⁴ This lofty statement stood somewhat in contrast to his later remark (in response to the criticism that the Lisbon Treaty had got off to a slow start), that it would in all likelihood take about two years before the new structures provided for by the Treaty could work properly.

12. One can of course assume that both ministers are aware that the soldiers deployed for EU operations are provided by individual member states and that there is no standing EU army. Crisis management is not the same thing as European defence and they should not deliberately confuse the two.

3. The European Security Strategy

13. The EU launched the ESDP on the basis of Council declarations and decisions. At the time there was no doctrinal document setting out the EU’s strategic interests that would have made the EU’s activities in the field of security and defence understandable and predictable for others. The European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted in 2003 and complemented in 2008 changed all that, as it outlines what EU members consider to be their strategic objectives, namely to:

- prevent regional crisis, state failure and organised crime anywhere in the world from spilling over and threatening the security of Europe;
- establish functioning multinational forums that can deal effectively with global threats such as climate change, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- stabilise Europe’s neighbourhood, including the Middle East;
- contribute to better governance and improve the lives of people in the developing world.

14. The 2008 update of the ESS further underlines:

- the importance of secure energy supplies, and
- the role of strategic partners such as Russia, India and China.

15. However, all this is still only a start and one could imagine a more ambitious approach: agreement could be reached not only on the strategic objectives and interests, but also on the capabilities needed to achieve the first and to defend the second.⁵ However, at the time of the 2008 update there was, and indeed there still is, no taste among member states for complementing the ESS with a European White Paper. An amendment presented at the European Parliament calling for the Council to launch a systematic examination of each EU member state’s capabilities was refused.⁶ Member states usually do not like being compared.

³ “Il faut créer une armée européenne”, Le Figaro, 9 April 2010. www.lefigaro.fr

⁴ Munich Security Conference, 6 February 2010. www.securityconference.de

⁵ The Assembly has published two reports suggesting a wider revision of the European Security Strategy, Document 2000 (3 June 2008) and Document 2028 (2 December 2008) available at <http://assembly-weu.eu>

⁶ “Parliament calls for enhanced European defence...”, Bulletin Quotidien Europe, 12 March 2010. www.agenceurope.com

16. Given the particular circumstances at the time of its drafting (the Iraq crisis), the ESS is a quite remarkable document and has lost none of its relevance, even though its implementation has been quite selective.

4. European security culture

17. While there is a strategy in theory, putting it into practice is quite a different story. Building a security and defence policy that functions at 27, in both fair weather and foul, is another matter altogether. That requires a common security and defence culture, something which is still only in an early stage of development. At present, only a (small) minority of the member states take defence seriously and believe in (military) intervention to solve security problems.

III. The end of WEU

I. Mutual assistance, solidarity or collective defence?

18. Notwithstanding the EU's structural problems, the difficulties in implementing the Lisbon Treaty and the abovementioned contradictions, the 10 EU member states that are full members of WEU announced on 31 March 2010 their intention to put forward a date for putting an end to that organisation and to denounce its founding treaty, the 1954 modified Brussels Treaty (MBT). This will result in a winding down of WEU together with its Assembly by June 2011 (taking into account the 12-month notice period foreseen by Article XII of the MBT).⁷

19. What governments present as a step forwards following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty is in fact a *double* step backwards: in the first place, a strong and cohesive alliance of 10 countries (plus 18 associate states) is being replaced by a weaker one of 27 countries, and, secondly, the European Security and Defence Assembly (WEU Assembly) – a fully fledged structure for interparliamentary scrutiny – is being abandoned without there being an alternative structure up and running.

20. Does this mean that Europe is moving away from a collective defence concept of security?

21. One has to ask whether EU member states still consider a *European* collective defence commitment to be necessary, given that the Lisbon Treaty (Article 42.7) effectively identifies NATO as the ultimate provider of security for those countries that are members of it (which is the case for 21 of the 27, while a further four belong to NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme and two NATO countries are EU accession candidates). This is certainly one reason why the United Kingdom Government had no qualms about abandoning WEU as the sole *European* organisation with a binding mutual defence commitment. The unique *European* value of its commitment was not considered to be valuable any more. At least one member state had suggested keeping Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty so as to maintain a choice and keep open the option of transferring it to the EU at a more appropriate moment.

22. The wording of the Lisbon Treaty's *mutual assistance clause* is the result of a compromise. It had to satisfy three groups of states: those who wanted a mutual defence commitment, those who wanted to protect their traditional neutral status and those who wanted to ensure that the clause would not undermine NATO. As a result, although the text bears similarities to Article V of the MBT it does not have the same meaning and contains major qualifications and restrictions.

23. The Lisbon Treaty's *mutual assistance clause*, which (in contrast to the *solidarity clause* in Article 222 of the Lisbon Treaty) is not identified as such in the treaty but is hidden away in Article 42.7, calls on EU member states to offer "aid and assistance" to any of their number falling victim to "armed aggression on its territory". While they are called upon to use "all the means in their power", assistance by military means is not specifically mentioned. Indeed, there is a difference between a mutual assistance clause (EU) and a mutual defence clause (NATO, WEU) containing an explicit reference to military means. The *solidarity clause* for its part does explicitly mention military means, but only with reference to managing the consequences of a natural disaster or an act of terrorism (e.g. a chemical, radiological or nuclear attack) requiring drastic quarantine measures. However, the

⁷ "Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of WEU", Brussels, 31 March 2010. www.weu.int

solidarity clause is not intended to enable the collective deployment of military capabilities against a terrorist group; neither does it perform any deterrent function: indeed, how could one deter a natural disaster?

24. The Lisbon Treaty's *mutual assistance clause* is immediately qualified and restricted in scope by the sentence that follows it and by the second paragraph of Article 42.7. The first stipulates that this clause "shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states", making it clear that no change is implied for EU countries with a neutral or non-aligned tradition, while the second reaffirms NATO's role, for those EU member states that are members of it, as "the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation".

25. For Nicole Gnesotto, Vice-President of Notre Europe and former Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), the fact that NATO remains the "relevant framework" for mutual defence is the main reason why the clause "remains largely theoretical" and is no more than an "empty shell in terms of Europe's existential solidarity".⁸ However, she believes that the EU has made progress and points out that only a few years ago the idea of shared responsibility for security and defence matters could never even have been mooted.

26. If it was really the case that Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty could replace Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, why do the WEU member states, including, by the way, the United Kingdom, declare in their solemn statement of 31 March 2010 that "we remain strongly committed to the principle of mutual defence of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty". They cannot have their cake and eat it. They either keep the treaty or they do not.

27. The leading role given to NATO in defence raises the question of EU-NATO relations: if NATO is indeed the ultimate guarantor of security, why has no suggestion been made on the ways and means of involving European NATO member states that are not members of the EU (Albania, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, and Turkey) in this commitment? Most of those countries are also contributors to EDSP/CSDP missions. They and other essential strategic partner countries like Russia and Ukraine enjoyed a special status within WEU (and its Assembly).

28. Despite recent improvements, EU-NATO relations – which have even been described as a "frozen conflict" in the past – are certainly an area where there is a need and the potential for progress. Europeans need to be able to fight alongside NATO forces and the necessary political coordination needs to be established. Since NATO is in many ways synonymous with the United States, the EU also needs to make sure that it has functioning relations with Washington. The recent cacophony over the EU-US summit in Madrid, cancelled because US President Obama had announced he would not participate, left observers with the impression that "summitry" was more important to certain EU leaders than dialogue with the United States.

29. Finally, the current discussion about the withdrawal of forward-deployed US nuclear weapons from a number of European countries is taking place without the EU holding any kind of discussion about the role of nuclear weapons in Europe's security. Despite the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty with its mutual assistance clause, even those EU member states falling into the category of supporters of a future common European defence have not engaged in any consultations about such a move within the EU framework. These are questions (including that of the role of two EU member states' nuclear deterrent for European security) that in the past had their rightful place within WEU.

2. Interparliamentary scrutiny of CSDP

30. With the Lisbon Treaty the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) has now become the CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy). Despite the use of the term *common*, however, that policy is *not supranational*. It remains *intergovernmental*. This has two consequences.

31. First: the usual supranational instruments available to the Council (majority decision-making, judicial control possibilities, primacy of EU law) are deliberately set aside; second, in the intergovernmental sphere, the European Parliament, a supranational body, does not have the same

⁸ "Vers une armée commune", La Croix, 9 April 2010.

powers as in other areas of European policy. In particular, there is no co-decision procedure for security and defence. The European Parliament is only kept informed and can only issue non-binding resolutions.

32. Security and defence policy is one of the last bastions of national sovereignty in what, in other areas, has become an increasingly integrated EU. To reinforce their position, in Lisbon Declaration No. 14 concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the governments, in stating that they do not want the European Commission or the European Parliament to acquire any new responsibilities in that sphere, have drawn a red line: “The provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy do not give new powers to the Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the European Parliament”.

33. National governments are anxious to retain control and are unwilling to cede their sovereignty in these areas. At the same time, they refuse to grant the European Parliament any additional parliamentary rights. National parliaments therefore have every reason to remain vigilant with regard to a possible lack of scrutiny at EU level.

34. In their 31 March 2010 declaration the WEU governments called for “the enhancement of interparliamentary dialogue in this field”, referring to Lisbon Treaty Protocol No. 1 on the role of national parliaments as a possible basis for such dialogue. This could lead to the assembly model for interparliamentary scrutiny being replaced by a conference model based on COSAC. The protocol foresees the possibility of COSAC convening interparliamentary conferences on CFSP and CSDP. What can be established under the protocol depends on whether it is interpreted cautiously or ambitiously.

35. A simple conference would be the cautious interpretation. Such a conference may allow for exchanges of views between parliamentarians but it would not cater for a structured dialogue with the EU executive. Neither does it provide the essential structural elements for parliamentary oversight. Parliamentarians deserve a better tool to help them fulfil their constitutional role of scrutinising intergovernmental activities: they should therefore call for a more ambitious interpretation of the protocol. In particular, they should be allowed to draft and adopt analytical reports, cross-examine EU executives and government representatives and exchange views without the taboos that come with structures in which the political representation closely mirrors that of the governments. Parliamentarians should also form political groups in order to transcend national boundaries and interests.

36. Given that the Lisbon Treaty clearly seeks greater involvement of the national parliaments in the European Union, it would be in accordance with the treaty to establish a more permanent mechanism for interparliamentary dialogue and scrutiny. Article 12f states that “National Parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union”. In its preamble, the protocol on the role of national parliaments expresses the desire to encourage “greater involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the European Union” and to “enhance their ability to express their views (...) on (...) matters which may be of particular interest to them.” A mere conference that takes place only every six months is not compatible with those objectives.

37. What is needed is something more than COSAC, a structure exercising real scrutiny that is not confined to a small number of parliamentarians and in which a record is kept of proceedings. Given the concerns expressed by speakers and parliamentary whips about parliamentarians’ absences and travel expenses, the new mechanism also needs to be less elaborate than a fully-fledged interparliamentary assembly.

38. A more modest interparliamentary structure – one, however, that could create committees and would have the support of a small secretariat and adequate financial resources – should be sufficient to continue a systematic, structured and informed dialogue between national and European parliamentarians and between them and the EU on CFSP and CSDP. Or instead of committees, another possibility would be to establish working groups to deepen discussions where necessary.

39. Particular attention should be paid to the composition of delegations. Ideally, parliaments would select members with competence in their home parliaments for European affairs, security, defence and

foreign policy as well as development issues and interior affairs, in order to reflect the growing interdependence between internal and external security, on the one hand, and between crisis management and development, on the other.

40. It would also be preferable for interparliamentary dialogue not to be limited to the 27 EU member states. Europe is bigger than the EU and strategic issues such as the overall European security architecture and the future of the energy trade, as well as questions relating to non-proliferation, climate change and migration, call for the involvement of a wider audience than one composed of EU members only. We would be depriving ourselves of important information and goodwill if we were to create yet another “EU only” forum with little to differentiate from all the others.

IV. ESDP – the first 10 years

41. The so-called 10th “anniversary” of what was called European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at its inception in 1999 and is now the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) led to the publication of a number of analytical studies and reviews of the EU’s achievements as a security and defence player and the challenges it faces.⁹

42. In reality, there have not yet been 10 years of experience, at least as far as operations are concerned. While the ESDP was officially launched in 1999, actual operations only started in 2003 (Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). This was a takeover mission from NATO and made use of the Berlin Plus arrangements allowing the use of NATO capabilities. The operation was the result of earlier efforts by EU High Representative Javier Solana who had taken the lead in negotiating the so-called Ohrid Agreement in 2001. The prevention of hostilities and the ensuing political settlement can be considered as the true beginning of CFSP/ESDP and its first achievement.

43. The first “autonomous” EU military operation was Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, which lasted only three months. Although this operation was presented as being *independent* from NATO (not making use of NATO’s planning capabilities under the Berlin Plus agreement), it was not entirely *autonomous*: the lack of strategic lift among EU member states made it necessary to rely on commercial Antonov airplanes for the transfer of equipment.

44. It was a whole year before the EU launched another Berlin Plus-type military operation – EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004) which took over from NATO’s SFOR operation – and three years before the EU deployed its next “autonomous” operation, again in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2006) and again at the request of the UN. Since then, the situation in the east of the country has remained fragile and stories about civilians caught up in the geopolitical struggle over this resource-rich region continue to hit the headlines. The population remains at the mercy of dubious militias and warlords engaged in criminal rather than military activities. When in 2008 another crisis was unfolding in the eastern part of the DRC, the EU decided to turn down a similar UN request. This raises the question as to whether the EU is really pursuing long-term objectives, both with respect to the DRC and as regards its relations with the UN (set out as a prime objective in the European Security Strategy, ESS).

45. Critics even go so far as to question whether crisis management can contribute to solving conflicts at all. After looking at the examples of Sudan and Chad, Richard Gowan from the European Council on Foreign Relations concludes that the international community “can no longer solve foreign crises, only manage their effects”.¹⁰ The numerous half-hearted interventions in those two countries risk resulting in no more than the permanent funding of international refugee camps, while cooperation with the governments that are responsible for the crisis in the first place has become the

⁹ For example, Giovanni Grevi, Damien Hirst and Daniel Keohane (editors), “European Security and Defence Policy - The first 10 Years”, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009, www.iss.europa.eu; Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (editors), “The EU as a strategic actor in the realm of security and defence?”, SWP Research Paper 14, December 2009, www.swp-berlin.org; and Anand Menon, “Empowering paradise? The ESDP at ten”, *International Affairs* 85, 2/2009, www.chathamhouse.org.uk

¹⁰ Richard Gowan, “The making of a strategic shambles”, *European Voice*, 15 April 2010, www.europeanvoice.com

rule. A seminar organised by the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) on EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2008) concluded that the mission was an “operational success” but had left many with a feeling of “political frustration”.¹¹ It was neither able to help resolve the Darfur conflict nor to improve in any lasting way the situation of refugees in Chad. After the EU’s withdrawal the UN was left to deal with the conflict and, as it now turns out, is seemingly unable to achieve progress.

46. According to a Brussels commentator, the EU’s approach to the situation in Guinea Bissau, a small country that suffers from recurring political violence where the EU has deployed a small security sector reform mission can be characterised as representing only the “minimum effort”.¹² Others consider many EU civilian missions, the smaller ones in particular, as mere “political gestures”.

1. Crisis intervention or management?

47. According to the official records, all ESDP operations have been a success. In reality, however, one has to recognise that it has not always been easy to assemble the troops, other personnel and the necessary equipment (EUFOR Tchad/RCA, 2008). The EU monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) is hailed as an example, with the EU proving to be the only international actor capable of deploying a mission; but although the mandate extends to the whole of the country, including the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EU monitors have been refused entry to those two regions. In practice therefore, they only monitor a part of the territory in dispute and the mission is therefore actually contributing to consolidating the new borders.

48. In total more than 20 missions have been completed or are ongoing¹³ which in itself is a remarkable achievement that puts ESDP/CSDP at the forefront of those areas where the EU is progressing and producing tangible results.

49. A thorough assessment of those missions by the SWP institute in Berlin¹⁴ resulted in the following observations:

- the record is mixed for both civil and military missions and it is often unclear to what extent the missions have served European policy objectives;
- no particular type of successful mission can be identified;
- the EU is mostly reacting to crises that have erupted rather than anticipating and preventing them;
- reaction speed is not the EU’s strength. Only five out of 23 missions covered by the SWP study were on the ground in less than four weeks;
- missions have often been initiated at the insistence of one particular member state which is why the authors of the study speak about “instrumentalisation” of the EU by former colonial powers (EUFOR Tchad/RCA, 2008). As a consequence, mandates were defined very narrowly which meant that the mission had only limited potential (e.g. the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation, whose geographic scope and length of mandate were insufficient) or the mission was terminated according to a predefined withdrawal plan when major developments should have led the mandate to be extended (EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, when the agreed withdrawal date was maintained despite the fact that the election process – the main reason for the operation in the first place – had not been completed);
- the EU has difficulties with adapting mandates where necessary. The worsening of the security situation in Afghanistan further reduced the already limited potential of the EU police mission there. EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL-COPPS Palestine suffered when Hamas won the

¹¹ EDD, 23 March 2010. www.agenceurope.com

¹² Olivier Jehin, EDD, 15 April 2010. www.agenceurope.com

¹³ For a chart of ongoing and completed missions see www.isis-europe.org and www.csdpmap.org which provide regular updates.

¹⁴ Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (editors), “The EU as a strategic actor in the realm of security and defence?”, SWP Research Paper 14, December 2009. www.swp-berlin.org

2006 elections. When mandates are extended they do not generally undergo any significant changes and are not subjected to a thorough revision;

- missions are sometimes understaffed, underequipped or lack the necessary political framework, putting mission objectives and staff at risk (EUPOL Afghanistan, where insufficient staff and the absence of security agreements with NATO seriously limit the EU's impact; EULEX Kosovo, which started without the full legal framework having been established; EU NAVFOR Somalia, which started without participating states having secured arrangements for bringing captured pirates to trial);
- communication among EU personnel in the theatres of operation, including heads of mission, EU special representatives, EU delegations, and member states' embassies is considered to have been inadequate (EUPOL Afghanistan);
- cooperation between the EU Commission and the EU Council can be difficult;
- staff turnover both on the ground and in the Brussels structures is high, the lessons learned process is inadequate, and the European institutional memory is weak;
- missions are not systematically scrutinised by the national parliaments or by the European Parliament;
- deployments, in particular those limited in scope and time and not backed up by a majority of member states lack public support;
- missions lack financial resources of their own;
- cooperation with the regional organisations responsible for the theatres of operation is limited.

50. The finding that the EU tends to react rather than take preventive action is surprising considering that the EU's main doctrinal document, the 2003 European Security Strategy, clearly places the focus on conflict prevention.

51. The EU is often regarded as a civilian power. However, ESDP/CSDP is not only about civil operations and even a mission bearing the civilian label is not necessarily staffed with civilian personnel only. The EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh/Indonesia (EUMM Aceh) in 2005, particularly at the beginning, was more than anything an "unarmed military mission". This was in response to the mission tasks, which included destroying weapons handed over by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

52. The civilian missions to date have in many cases not been able to transform in any lasting fashion the police and judicial systems of the host country, let alone significantly improve human rights standards or establish the rule of law. EULEX Kosovo may be the exception, but the size and mandate of the mission provide it with particularly helpful conditions.

53. The EU is so far engaged in ad hoc short-term crisis *intervention*. It is not yet pursuing long-term crisis *management*. In particular, EU member states need to better support deployments by taking political action aimed at *conflict management* and *resolution*.

54. The overall impression one gets is that ESDP/CSDP has probably often been more useful to the EU itself (in order to create certain structures and test common procedures or to divert attention away from the fact that there is no coherent European political approach to solving a given conflict) than to the countries of deployment.

55. The EU has certainly demonstrated global engagement and "channelled and fostered cooperation between EU member states in the sensitive domains of security and defence".¹⁵ It is also true that the EU has developed an innovative set of instruments, with its initially military approach to crisis management very soon becoming a comprehensive civil-military one. In the meantime, the EU has made use of practically all combinations of instruments and mission components at its disposal, including the various set-ups for operational planning and command (with the notable exception of the battlegroups). But the period of testing its tools and procedures should now be followed up by a more

¹⁵ Grevi, Hirst, Keohane (editors), 2009, page 403.

coherent path of action geared to a clear set of priorities. The EUISS puts it this way: “in some cases the gap between the discourse and practice of ESDP has been significant”.

56. EU representatives claim that over 70 000 people have participated in EU missions, a number that seems to comfortably exceed the 1999 Headline Goal of 60 000 deployable soldiers. However, the Headline Goal was about deploying 60 000 soldiers *at one and the same time* and not during 23 missions spanned over several years, and the target did not include civilian staff. The figure reflects the high turnover of EU missions, which are often no more than 100 strong. In only a few cases have more than 1 000 personnel been deployed.

57. Nick Witney, the former Director of the European Defence Agency, in an analysis of ESDP which he terms “the triumph of improvisation”,¹⁶ calculates that the forces deployed in EU operations represent less than 0.33 % of the total military manpower of EU member states (in 2005). One should add that less than 0.1% of the total staff employed by the EU is composed of military personnel. He concludes that Europeans are falling “far short of their ambition to make a major contribution to global security”. He criticises not only the EU’s lack of ambition but also, as regards ESDP, the strategic vacuum, the participation deficit, the perverse financial (dis)incentives, the fragmented command structures and the lack of systematic assessment and lessons learned procedures (leading to what he calls “corporate amnesia”).

58. In the light of all those points of criticism one might argue that the EU has often left little more than a small footprint, that it has failed to mobilise more than token resources (RD Congo, Sudan), that it has shied away from the real crises and conflicts (Afghanistan, Iraq) and accepted humiliating conditions for its missions (Georgia, Rafah), and that its few significant deployments have concentrated on benign follow-up operations inherited from NATO (for example, in the Balkans).

59. To be fair, the large majority of missions have brought positive results; in Chad and Sudan, for example, although hundreds of thousands of refugees are still in camps, there is much less violence. Also, while size matters for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations, the fact that the EU often suggests deploying small missions with a consultative rather than peacekeeping character is exactly what makes them acceptable to host governments: after all, the EU has no agenda for regime change, but only for improved governance and transformation. Moreover, limiting the duration of missions from the outset reduces the risk of “mission creep”. The operations that were given limited objectives and a pre-defined timeframe achieved what they were launched for: examples are Artemis (2003), EUFOR RD Congo (2006), EUMM Aceh (2005) and EUFOR Althea.

60. But are these relative successes enough to make the EU a strategic player? Its operations in the DRC indicate a lack of strategic perspective. A total of five missions have been deployed there. But all have been conducted in reaction to a crisis or at the request of third parties (UN) and did not arise as a result of an in-depth debate within the EU on what action it should take in the DRC, let alone Africa as a whole. At the same time, an equally serious crisis unfolded in the Darfur region of neighbouring Sudan, but the EU responded only with a small direct deployment. Ultimately, as the conflict went on and threatened stability in neighbouring Chad and the Central African Republic, the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission was deployed in the region in 2008. But it dealt more with the symptoms of the Darfur conflict than with the conflict itself. The authors of the SWP study call such operations “surrogate” missions.

61. Operations that directly address the vested interests of a majority of member states seem to be particularly successful. The anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia (EU NAVFOR Somalia) is a striking example. Not only was it possible to rapidly launch the mission, it was also very innovative with respect to securing arrangements with Kenya and other countries for the prosecution of pirates captured by EU forces. Recently, however, there seem to have been problems with this system and EU countries are envisaging bringing pirates before their own national courts. Moreover, there is growing support for the creation of an international tribunal for piracy. A further positive element is that EU NAVFOR Somalia involves many third countries and was soon complemented by additional measures

¹⁶ Nick Witney, “Re-energising Europe’s Security and Defence policy”, European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2006. www.ecfr.eu

(EU TM Somalia) to tackle the root problem behind piracy in the region, namely, the lack of functioning state structures in Somalia.

62. This is an area in which the EU can display and use its unique panoply of instruments (composed, in addition to military capabilities, of civilian capabilities – diplomacy, financial aid, technical assistance) that no other international organisation can provide. The problem is that 10 years after its launch, the ESDP has yet to prove that it can significantly increase member states' capabilities.

2. ESDP – good for European capabilities?

63. One of the initial expectations of ESDP was that it would help enhance EU member states' military and civilian capabilities. Striking equipment gaps had been exposed when European forces operated alongside US forces during the Kosovo war (1999). Transport, communications, intelligence: the list of shortfalls was endless. The number of initiatives launched in this area since that time is impressive, the results, unfortunately, are less so.

64. A study by the EUISS concludes that the experience gained from ESDP operations has helped to identify priorities for capability development and acknowledges the progress that has been made. In the authors' view, however, ESDP continues to "endure shortcomings in both the quantity and quality of available resources".¹⁷

65. Between 1999 and 2008 defence expenditure rose nominally from 160 billion to 210 billion euros. However, in GDP terms, it fell from 2.1% in 1997 to 1.7% in 2007 (-19 %). Two countries (France, United Kingdom) account for 43% of EU defence spending, and the biggest four (including Germany and Italy) for around 70%. Although the cost of defence equipment is rising, EU defence spending is shrinking. This has consequences for the procurement of new equipment that is more suited to crisis intervention.

66. The EUISS concludes that member states have made progress towards reducing military personnel and the amount of outdated equipment. Between 1999 and 2009 EU member states reduced their forces from 2.5 million (including 1.1 million conscripts) to 2 million (including only 200 000 conscripts). While this is good news for budgets, it did not lead to an increase in deployable forces.

67. Regarding equipment, the period between 1999 and 2009 brought some progress with respect to procuring the right equipment for crisis intervention operations. The number of transport helicopters doubled in that period. However, many of those helicopters are not usable under the adverse climate conditions that prevail in many crisis zones without being adapted (armour, filters, etc.). Moreover the cost of maintaining helicopters in crisis areas is very high. As a result, only a few of the 3 500 helicopters that are currently in service in EU countries are offered for deployment. The number of transport planes has increased, but there is still a shortage of heavy-lift aircraft. At the same time, large numbers of tanks, planes, and other systems and equipment designed for the battles of the past are still in place and weighing heavily on our budgets today.

68. There are a number of reasons why CSDP resources are limited. First, as mentioned above, the EU has no army. Neither does it have its own defence budget. Each member state retains sovereign control over its armed forces. Even when member states agree to make soldiers and assets (e.g. battlegroups) available to the EU, they retain a full right of veto as regards their actual use.

69. A consequence of the sovereignty issue is the continued fragmentation of defence spending, with national equipment plans that more often than not are geared to the interests of the national defence equipment industry. Within the EU, there are 23 armoured vehicles programmes, five ground-to-air missile programmes, four tank models and three fighter planes, to give but a few examples. A dozen European companies are working to develop the same technologies in parallel. Attempts to open up the EU's highly protectionist national defence markets have brought some improvement. However, the voluntary code of conduct on defence procurement agreed within the European Defence Agency has so far had only a limited impact on cross-border purchases of defence equipment. The

¹⁷ Grevi, Hirst, Keohane (editors), 2009, pages 69-114.

Commission's so-called Defence Package, aimed at a progressive opening of the defence market, has not yet been implemented. Concerns of national sovereignty lead to duplication, wastage of resources and rising prices. They are not conducive to cooperation and to the joint procurement efforts that are necessary in order to increase CSDP resources at a time of stagnating or decreasing budgets.

70. A further reason is the rule of "the costs lie where they fall", whereby the member states that contribute soldiers and other assets to military missions must bear the costs themselves. This principle offers little by way of positive incentives and indeed penalises the contributing countries. It actually encourages countries *not* to pledge forces by establishing a budgetary disincentive. The cost of civilian missions can be covered by the EU budget. For military operations the so-called Athena mechanism allowing certain common costs to be funded by all the member states on a GDP basis has been established. However such "common costs" (headquarters in the host country, troop transport) rarely account for more than 10% of the total cost of an operation.

71. The next reason is structural: EU member states' forces are to a large extent static forces that are not suitable for deployment to external theatres. Although 20 years after the end of the cold war most member states have made considerable progress in transforming and modernising their armed forces, only about 100 000 (5%) of all available troops can actually be deployed. Moreover, most EU countries also contribute troops to NATO and UN operations and often few are left over for ESDP. The same applies to equipment. A helicopter cannot be deployed for more than one operation at a time.

72. Another structural reason pertaining to civilian staff is the difference between deploying them and deploying military personnel. The latter can in principle simply be ordered to go, while for the former, the recruitment process is much more complex. Indeed, member states have difficulty finding staff for the EU's civilian missions (EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL Afghanistan). Even where there are staff willing to work for a mission, there are often problems with finding a position to match their qualifications. It has therefore been proposed to establish a European civilian reserve¹⁸ composed of volunteers who would be recruited, trained and certified according to common standards.

73. The EUISS comes to the conclusion that "ESDP is approaching the limits of what can be done within the scope of the resources made available so far".

V. What next? Suggestions

74. The numerous abovementioned ESDP studies have come up with a wealth of recommendations and suggestions on how to improve ESDP and how to provide its successor, the CSDP, with better and more efficient tools and procedures in the future. These can be grouped together under four headings: strategic perspective, resources (funding and capabilities), comprehensiveness (institutional and political support, civil-military cooperation), and lessons learned.

1. Strategic perspective

75. If the EU wants to become more of a strategic and less of an ad-hoc player with respect to conflict management and resolution, it should move towards long-term strategic planning of CSDP operations. There will always be a need to respond to unforeseen crises, which is why the work on improving rapid reaction capabilities should continue. But the essence of a strategic player is to clearly define its long-term interests and to put in place a list of policies for achieving them. The fact that two of the EU's members are permanent members of the UN Security Council will make it easier to solicit UN support for the EU's objectives, particularly in the field of conflict prevention.

76. The EU should therefore review its relations with the UN as well as regional organisations such as the African Union because they are of strategic relevance. As regards the former, this means reversing the current trend whereby EU countries are pledging increasingly fewer forces for UN missions in order to avoid placing their troops under UN command. With respect to the latter it means

¹⁸ Daniel Korski in Nick Witney, "Re-energising Europe's Security and Defence policy", European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2006, page 45. www.ecfr.eu

giving thought to better ways of helping the African Union to build effective crisis-management capabilities.

77. The EU member states should also deepen their strategic dialogue and identify those areas in which they wish to have a long-term impact. There is little to gain from continuing piecemeal deployments that do not follow a broader plan, but spring primarily from initiatives by the country holding the EU presidency or from outside requests.

2. Resources

(a) Funding

78. The current system of funding CSDP operations leads to perverse incentives and is in need of revision. If, in future, CSDP operations follow a long-term plan based on agreed common priorities, it should be possible to agree on increasing the share of the mission that is funded by all member states. The creation of a “CSDP operational fund”¹⁹ could increase the part of the shared cost of operations.

79. The SWP Institute in Berlin²⁰ suggests providing CSDP operations with their own financial resources so that they can fund “quick impact projects” more easily. Such financial means would give missions more flexibility and offer them the possibility of backing up their training and advisory efforts with equipment aid.

80. Funding for the European Defence Agency needs to be improved. In particular, the Agency needs resources commensurate with its role in supporting the development of capabilities for CSDP operations and a financial framework that allows for more strategic planning than is the case with the current annual budgetary procedure.

(b) Capabilities

81. Assets and capabilities for common use, in particular those required on a regular basis for EU operations, for example force headquarters, logistics, communications and transport assets, could be procured by the EU in order to create a set of joint capabilities.

82. A warehouse system, including pre-positioned equipment, could be established to speed up deployment.

83. Certain civilian and military capability requirements overlap, for example in the field of communications, information, protection, transport, and logistics. These could be addressed jointly. The European Defence Agency could assist with formulating common requirements. This would be relevant for many dual-use technologies.

3. Comprehensiveness

(a) Institutional and political support

84. A truly comprehensive approach implies respecting certain principles from the outset. For instance, rule-of-law, police and judicial training missions should aim for lasting transformation of the situation in the host country. It also implies establishing local ownership of the reform and transformation process as soon as possible.

85. A comprehensive approach also involves reducing rivalry between missions and EU delegations in the host countries.

86. Missions also need much more political support from the EU in Brussels and from the member states.

¹⁹ Margriet Drent and Dick Zandee, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, “Breaking Pillars. Towards a civil-military security approach for the European Union”, January 2010, page 81. www.clingendael.nl

²⁰ Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (editors), “The EU as a strategic actor in the realm of security and defence?”, SWP Research Paper 14, December 2009, page 155. www.swp-berlin.org

(b) Civil-military coordination

87. Its combined use of civilian and military means is one of the EU's unique contributions to crisis management. In their study called "Breaking pillars",²¹ Margriet Dent (Clingendael Institute) and Dick Zandee (Head of the Planning Unit at the European Defence Agency) focus on overcoming the historic dichotomy within the EU between the civilian and military spheres. They conclude that despite many efforts, civilian and military crisis management structures remain separate worlds that are divided, first of all between the supranational and the intergovernmental pillars, and second, within the intergovernmental pillar itself. Among many other things the authors suggest introducing training measures to overcome this "culture of distinctiveness".

88. As far as new developments under the Lisbon Treaty are concerned, the authors believe that the civilian-military approach "will not be carried through sufficiently" and they therefore recommend "full integration of civilian and military planning and conduct structures". However, some of their proposals are nothing less than revolutionary: for instance, they suggest merging the existing separate units to form a European Union Civil-Military Staff. Coordination of the strategic planning of missions, including the division of tasks and responsibilities and the synchronisation of deployments would then become easier. The authors also reopen the question of a single EU operational headquarters, which in the past has been a very divisive issue. Finally, they call for the creation of a "well resourced and integrated CFSP Fund" for all EU external action (ranging from short-term crisis intervention to long-term development policies) within the EU budget and subject to the scrutiny of the European Parliament. There is likely to be strong opposition to any proposal involving a merging of development and crisis intervention funds. However, safeguards could be established to ensure that development money does not end up being put to military use.

4. Lessons learned

89. Past operations have shown that the different EU countries' personnel use different standards for recording lessons learned. The proposal has therefore been made to establish a common methodology for the assessment of operations.²² So far, the EU has adopted guidelines for the "identification and implementation of lessons and best practices" for civilian missions only.

90. In response to the high turnover of staff in missions and in the Brussels Secretariat, a "binding handover procedure" and a systematic archiving system have been suggested.²³

91. A more critical attitude with regard to previous operations would be helpful so that mandates, rules of engagement and diplomatic efforts can be adapted quickly and accordingly. All too often during the meetings between the members of the Assembly and the Ambassadors of the EU's Political and Security Committee, the government and EU representatives have gone into great detail about the success of operations, the improvements in internal EU coordination and the good functioning of funding mechanisms, but said little about the real impact of missions on the ground.

VI. Conclusions

92. This report has highlighted some of the illusions and rhetoric surrounding the question of what has really been achieved during the first years of ESDP/CSDP and how far along we really are on the long path towards establishing a common European defence.

93. However, it is important not to become cynical. ESDP/CSDP has been one of the EU's most dynamic policy areas and the large majority of its crisis interventions have had a positive impact, at least in the short term. It has been worth the effort, but we can do better.

²¹ Margriet Dent and Dick Zandee, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, "Breaking Pillars. Towards a civil-military security approach for the European Union", January 2010. www.clingendael.nl

²² Margriet Dent and Dick Zandee, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, "Breaking Pillars. Towards a civil-military security approach for the European Union", January 2010, page 13. www.clingendael.nl

²³ Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (editors), "The EU as a strategic actor in the realm of security and defence?", SWP Research Paper 14, December 2009, page 159, www.swp-berlin.org

94. A long-term crisis-management policy geared to conflict prevention and resolution instead of intervention only calls for a more strategic approach, which includes building sustainable and deployable military capabilities. There can be no comprehensive civil-military approach without sound military means.
95. More work is also needed in order to formulate common positions and strategies and define our priorities, given that our limited resources do not allow us to deal with every crisis.
96. We also need to develop common strategies with our closest partners, in particular the United States and fellow NATO members, so that we pursue compatible objectives within the existing and emerging forums for global governance. This will be one response to the West's loss of relative weight in international institutions. In order to achieve the effective multilateralism called for by the European Security Strategy we need first to take a close look at the realities outside the cocoon of certain offices in Brussels and EU member states' capitals.
97. At a time when NATO is developing its new Strategic Concept and given the dual membership of the majority of its members, the EU countries must decide whether they really wish to assume a greater share of the responsibility for their security and defence, which also means shouldering a larger share of the financial burden.
98. Finally, a common security culture favouring more autonomy in security and defence – a prerequisite for establishing a common European defence – can only emerge if there is room for joint discussion. EU members have not given the EU the same status as a nation state. European citizens have not been able to develop a distinct European identity. Consequently, instead of a joint political debate at European level there are national debates which tend to be mostly about each country's role in the EU and not about the role of the EU as a whole.
99. The European Parliament and the national parliaments can contribute to generating such a debate. The Lisbon Treaty gives national parliaments a distinct role in the oversight of CSDP. The interpretation of how the interparliamentary dialogue should be implemented is likely to be very different from one member state to another. The European Parliament has its own interests and will act accordingly.
100. National parliaments would do better to opt for a forward-looking interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty implying a more structured system of parliamentary scrutiny than that which a mere conference could provide.
101. This would provide much better support for the further development of the CFSP, and of the CSDP in particular, because it would be based on the full participation of all national parliaments.
102. Why is this point so important? Because, for the foreseeable future, it is national assets and capabilities that will be used for CSDP operations and the national parliaments will be the ones to decide on the financial resources and national capabilities to be allocated to the CSDP.
103. This is particularly relevant in light of the growing pressure on defence budgets. Only national parliaments can reverse the current trend of declining budgets and only national parliaments can convince governments to forge ahead with the integration of European security and defence policy, which involves sensitive issues such as the pooling of resources and sharing of responsibilities.
104. It will be up to the next EU/WEU Presidency (Belgium) to inject an extra dose of enthusiasm and dynamism in order to proceed with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, speed up the process of finding a follow-up mechanism for interparliamentary scrutiny and sort out how to properly wind down WEU and its Assembly while ensuring that optimum use is made of its experience, staff and other assets.

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