TEXTS ADOPTED

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Texts adopted (December 2000)

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Texts adopted
(December 2000)

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RECOMMENDATION 674

(i) Recalling European Union member states' attachment to democratic values and human rights and their shared determination to become involved in the management of crises occurring on the continent of Europe or on its borders;

(ii) Welcoming the resolve shown by European heads of state and government in Cologne, Helsinki and Feira that the Union should be capable of reacting to international crises in autonomous and credible fashion;

(iii) Stressing that the purpose of the decision taken by the Fifteen in Helsinki to undertake crisis-management operations with or without the support of NATO assets and capabilities is not to compete with NATO but to take on, in partnership with it, the burden of crisis management where NATO as such is not involved;

(iv) Welcoming the ongoing relationship, now established between the European Union and NATO, through the machinery of the four ad hoc groups set up at the Feira European Council and their respective organisations' determination to cooperate;

(v) Stressing the importance of the headline goal agreed at Helsinki to set up an autonomous European rapid reaction capability whereby some 60 000 troops can be deployed over two months;

(vi) Stressing the importance of the decision taken at the European Summit held in Helsinki on 10 and 11 December 1999, to place crisis-management operations under the political control and strategic direction of the European Union by creating collective politico-military bodies to that end: namely a Political and Security Committee (PSC) an EU Military Committee (EMC) and a European Military Staff (EMS);

(vii) Conscious of the effort being made by the countries involved in the headline goal, reflected in the fact that the goal set for forces in volume terms will be achieved;

(viii) Stressing the need to make good the deficiencies evident in areas such as command and control, intelligence and strategic transport and welcoming the priority being given, in negotiations currently in progress, to intelligence, which is the key to strategic autonomy;

(ix) Applauding the fact that the countries of the European Union have made provision for civilian aspects of crisis management, thus enabling them to deal with the full range of Petersberg missions;

(x) Approving the transfer of certain WEU functions to the European Union;

(xi) Emphasising that it is vital that the European Union conclude a multilateral agreement with the non-EU European NATO members and the EU applicant countries, allowing them to participate to their satisfaction in crisis management in a wider European security and defence framework,

1. Ensure that the 28 WEU member, associate member, associate partner and observer states are fully involved at the governmental and parliamentary level in EU-led crisis-management operations;
2. Ensure that the permanent bodies provided for in Helsinki: PSC, EMC and EMS, should, following the Nice European Council (December 2000), rapidly succeed the interim bodies set up on 1 March 2000 within the EU framework;
3. Urge EU governments to:

4. Improve the operation of the Torrejón Satellite Centre by increasing the number of image interpreters, thus enabling it to process images rapidly in times of crisis, before its transfer to the EU;
5. Take the necessary steps with a view to transferring the WEU Institute for Security Studies to the EU, thus providing the latter with a strategic think-tank on long-term European defence-related issues.

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RECOMMENDATION 675

(i) Recognising that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a major threat to international security and stability;

(ii) Recalling that the implementation of political and legal instruments continues to be fundamental to the fight against nuclear armaments proliferation;

(iii) Stressing the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed on 1 July 1968 and extended indefinitely in April 1995 as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the regular review conferences for which are the means of progressing the debate in a constructive way;

(iv) Supporting unreservedly the signature, ratification, rapid entry into force and full application of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996;

(v) Reaffirming the need to conclude a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty without which efforts to counter nuclear proliferation would be in vain;

(vi) Noting that the increase in the number of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) can but strengthen the non-proliferation regime;

(vii) Recalling that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty has been one of the pillars on which the world strategic balance rests;

(viii) Welcoming ratification on the part of the Duma in April 2000 of the Russian-American Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II as a further indication of the importance of reducing the number of ballistic missiles able to carry weapons of mass destruction;

(ix) Concerned by the risks posed to international security by the exponential development of China, India and Pakistan's nuclear forces and by the difficulties of eradicating the covert North Korean Nuclear Programme notwithstanding the assurances given in the framework of the international Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) programme and also concerned about the recent agreements between Russia and India on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, while India still remains opposed to inspection by the IAEA;

(x) Perturbed also by Iran and Iraq's current armament programmes and the difficulties of reaching an agreement with Baghdad to enable the new United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to carry out inspections;

(xi) Conscious of the potentially harmful consequences the unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on the part of the United States, because of the potential deployment of a National Missile Defense system (NMD), could have on international stability and the Russian-American dialogue on nuclear weapons control;

(xii) Fearing that European troops engaged in external operations (OPEX) could, in the near future, be threatened by the use of tactical nuclear weapons acquired by a state of concern;

(xiii) Noting the recurrent difficulties encountered by European states in taking a common position on this issue because of the intrinsic difference dividing them, namely whether or not they possess nuclear weapons,

1. Reach a European common position on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament issues and defend it in international negotiations;
2. Seek to convince states not parties to the NPT to accede to it so that the Treaty becomes fully comprehensive;
3. Work for ratification and implementation of the CTBT by all nuclear powers;
4. Make every effort at the Geneva Disarmament Conference to revive negotiations on the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty;
5. Encourage appropriate creation of NWFZs;
6. Seek to convince the United States and Russian Governments of the need to retain the ABM Treaty and to come to an agreement on deployment or non-deployment of NMD;
7. Invite all states participating in WEU to embark upon a joint Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD) development programme, taking into account the possibility of cooperation with other partners outside WEU;
8. Invite Washington and Moscow to speed up the entry into force of the START II Treaty and enter into serious negotiation of a START III Treaty;
9. Provide financial support, if possible in conjunction with the US Administration, for international programmes for dismantling obsolete nuclear weapons belonging to the Russian Federation;
10. Act, together with their partners, to improve the powers and resources of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so as to strengthen guarantees under the regime for monitoring the NPT;
11. Seek to ensure that all states introduce measures to control the export of any materials, equipment and technology relevant to the development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

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RECOMMENDATION 676

(i) Noting the trend in the armed forces of the WEU nations towards a professional system with a large number of volunteers, which has resulted in a reduction in the size of the armed forces;

(ii) Stressing the importance of preserving reserve capabilities which can, where necessary, reinforce the national defence potential and provide support for forces engaged in operations abroad, including Petersberg missions;

(iii) Considering that it is necessary for that purpose to arrive at an appropriate level of interoperability, in terms of training and equipment, between regular and reserve forces;

(iv) Taking the view that in future it will be necessary to promote reservist exchanges and exercises in a multinational framework;

(v) Considering that it is important to ensure that, in those countries which already have or are in the process of drawing up voluntary reserve forces, the social, family and financial status of reservists allows them to carry out their duties without suffering any major disadvantage;

(vi) Expressing the wish that the WEU member countries should be able to harmonise the status of their reserve forces with a view to making more effective use of their reserve capabilities in the framework of multinational operations in the service of the United Nations, NATO or the European Union;

(vii) Stressing the role of reserve forces as a link between armed forces and civil society and the way in which they help civilians to acquaint themselves with and gain an understanding of defence matters and the role of the military;

(viii) Expressing its support for the activities of national reserve associations and for the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR) in view of the work they do to make the political and military authorities aware of problems encountered by reservists;

(ix) Noting with satisfaction that NATO is keeping a careful watch on reserve forces, as shown by its adoption of document MC-441;

(x) Expressing the wish that the future Military Staff of the European Union, which is henceforth responsible for implementing Petersberg missions, also give thought to this matter;

(xi) Recalling Recommendations 534 on "European security - reserve forces and national service" and 656 on "The move towards professional armed forces in Europe",

1. Commission a study on the situation of reserve forces in the WEU member countries, in the context of its obligations under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, and in all WEU countries in the context of the possible deployment of such forces for Petersberg missions;
2. Urge the WEU countries to enhance the status of reservists, in particular as regards employer support and social welfare;
3. Recommend the WEU nations to promote reservist exchanges and exercises with reserve units at a bilateral or multilateral level;
4. Recommend the WEU nations to set up a system for identifying reservists according to their specific abilities and expertise with a view to improving their assignment;
5. Develop contacts and pursue the dialogue with national reservist associations, the Atlantic Alliance National Reserve Forces Committee (NRFC) and the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR);
6. Keep the Assembly informed of action taken in this area by the Council or the appropriate ministerial organs.

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RECOMMENDATION 677

(i) Having taken note of the Foreign Policy Concept, National Security Concept and Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation;

(ii) Noting that Russia's National Security Concept clearly shows that the government is fully aware of the many internal threats to the country's security which are still causing political instability and economic disintegration;

(iii) Aware that Russia has made a remarkable macro-economic improvement since the financial collapse of 1998, but noting that this is almost entirely due to the devaluation of the rouble and soaring oil prices, while most of Russia's industrial equipment and infrastructure needs to be renewed and the country is currently attracting less than 1% of worldwide foreign direct investment;

(iv) Noting that, despite a number of spectacular measures taken against business empires which were striking for their lack of transparency, the Russian Government has yet to deliver on its promises of economic reform, improvements in corporate governance, bankruptcy legislation and transparency in the application of commercial law;

(v) Agreeing with the Russian view that the process of strengthening regional stability should be further promoted by reducing the number of conventional armed forces and by adopting confidence-building measures in the military sphere;

(vi) Disturbed by recent reports that Russia has maintained a biological warfare capability and that biological weapons research installations, for the most part under military control, are still engaged in the development of an offensive capability in violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC);

(vii) Recognising the urgent need for the Russian Federation to adapt the size and structure of its armed forces to the requirements resulting from the internal and external security threats and risks as assessed in its National Security Concept and Military Doctrine, taking due account of the funding available in its federal defence budget;

(viii) Considering that it is also in Europe's interest for the Russian Federation to have a viable defence structure with adequate troops and equipment so that it can protect its borders with Asia against any threat;

(ix) Considering that Russia lacks the financial resources and practical means to dismantle defunct military nuclear installations and nuclear warheads stockpiled as a result of the implementation of START and other arms limitation agreements and that Western aid programmes are essential to help Russia perform the task of dismantling;

(x) Stressing that there is no reason for further NATO enlargement to be seen as a threat to Russia's security;

(xi) Emphasising that in cultural, political and economic respects the Russian Federation is part of Europe and expressing the opinion that Russia, whose future lies in Europe, should accordingly cooperate with the European Union and other European countries in order to establish peace, stability and security on the continent as a whole;

(xii) Welcoming the fact that, according to Russia's Foreign Policy Concept, there are good prospects for the development of the Russian Federation's relations with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and noting that Russia wishes to establish neighbourly relations and mutual cooperation with those states provided they respect Russian interests;

(xiii) Aware that the three Baltic states are in the process of adapting their legislation to EU standards in the framework of their applications for EU membership and that they wish to establish neighbourly relations with Russia based on mutual respect for each other's national interests;

(xiv) Aware of the alarming situation in Belarus - a partner in a confederation with Russia - where President Lukashenko's authoritarian regime continues to hold the country in its grip, hampering the development of a democratic society and a market economy;

(xv) Aware that peace and stability in the Balkans requires the involvement of Russia;

(xvi) Concerned about the lack of progress in the process of withdrawing Russian arms and ammunition from the territory of the Republic of Moldova and convinced that immediate action is needed to speed up this process to which Russia committed itself at the November 1999 Istanbul Summit of the OSCE;

(xvii) Emphasising that the problem of the status of the Russian-speaking Transdniestrian region cannot be solved without full respect for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova;

(xviii) Looking forward to implementation of the 17 November 1999 agreement between Georgia and Russia regarding the reduction of Russian troops and military equipment on the territory of Georgia;

(xix) Recognising Russia's right to preserve its territorial integrity and the need to combat terrorism;

(xx) Regretting that after signing an agreement on the future status of Chechnya as a separate entity, the Russian Federation has used disproportionate means and methods in Chechnya without any guarantee of achieving the objective of restoring law and order and respect for human rights;

(xxi) Recognising that a faction of the Wahhabite and other radical Islamic movements are using the conflict in Chechnya to actively pursue the creation of a strictly Islamic unified state in the North Caucasus and are not only a threat to the integrity of the territory of the Russian Federation but also jeopardise the development of a democratic society, given that their ideology contradicts UN principles of human rights and civil society;

(xxii) Emphasising that the radical Islamic factor is bound to become increasingly important and dangerous for the whole region of the Central Asian republics and the North Caucasus unless there is a tangible improvement in the socio-economic situation, and unless existing ethnic grievances are properly addressed and resolved,

1. Continue, despite paragraph 4 of the Marseilles Declaration, its dialogue with Russia on Russian involvement in European strategic security issues, in particular in the context of the maintenance of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, as an important step towards further convergence of European thinking on security, while taking account of the common concept of the 27 WEU countries adopted in Madrid on 14 November 1995;
2. Examine, in cooperation with the national armaments directors and WEAG/WEAO, the scope for comparing western European and Russian requirements for the next generation of defence equipment and the opportunities for technological and industrial cooperation between western Europe and Russia in the development and production of new defence equipment;
3. Asks WEU member states to provide more financial and technical assistance for the dismantling of Russia's defunct military nuclear installations and stockpiles of nuclear warheads resulting from the implementation of START and other arms limitations agreements;
4. In the light of Recommendation 621 (1997) urging the Council to examine the possibility of cooperation with Russia on anti-missile defence, pursue this with greater urgency than has been demonstrated to date, and report back to the Assembly.

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ORDER 113

(i) Recalling the regular meetings of its committees with members of both Chambers of the Parliament of the Russian Federation;

(ii) Convinced of the importance of continuing the existing dialogue between the Parliament of the Russian Federation and the WEU Assembly;

(iii) Considering that this dialogue should be complemented by regular reports of the Assembly's committees reviewing developments in Russia in their respective areas of interest,

1. INSTRUCTS its Political Committee to review the development of the political process in Russia, including Russia's involvement within, or with regard to, different international institutions;
2. INSTRUCTS its Defence Committee to carry out analyses of the structure, needs and capabilities of Russia's armed forces;
3. INSTRUCTS its Technological and Aerospace Committee to examine the conversion of the Russian defence industry, the development of new defence equipment programmes and the possibility of cooperative armaments and space programmes.

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OPINION 37

(i) Welcoming the fact of Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Poland and Sweden's having become WEAG full members at the Group's meeting in Marseilles on 13 November last;

(ii) Noting that the main purpose of the Ministerial Council meeting in Marseilles was to agree the cessation of most WEU Council activities, ahead of the decisions the European Council is to take in Nice;

(iii) Regretting that the Council did not see fit in the Marseilles Declaration to point to the importance of the Assembly's continuing, in the new context, to discharge its responsibilities under the modified Brussels Treaty pending the development and ratification of new arrangements covering the ESDP parliamentary dimension;

(iv) Recalling the crucial role played by WEU since its reactivation and its important contribution to the development of the European security and defence architecture, as the Council rightly acknowledges in its Marseilles Declaration;

(v) Recalling that WEU's contribution covers the range of European security and defence issues and is not confined only to the Petersberg missions whose implementation is to be transferred to the European Union;

(vi) Noting that the elimination of WEU as a political factor and the ending of its former pivotal role as defence component of the European Union and essential element of the development of the European security and defence identity within the Atlantic Alliance, confirmed in Marseilles, represents a major turning point in the construction of Europe, the implications of which, particularly in terms of the purpose and geographic boundaries of that construction, have not yet been fully determined;

(vii) Welcoming the Council's reaffirmation of WEU member states' resolve to fulfil the commitments of the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly those arising out of Articles V and IX;

(viii) Drawing attention to the degree of significance to be attached to the fact that, since the end of the cold war, WEU has drawn together all the European Union member states, European members of the Atlantic Alliance and central and eastern European countries which are EU or Alliance applicant states, thus leading to its acceptance as a true framework for dialogue and cooperation between Europeans on security and defence-related matters, broadly defined;

(ix) Stressing the importance that should be attached to the fact that all of the 28 WEU countries have been involved up to now in the dialogue and cooperation WEU has established with Russia, Ukraine, the European Mediterranean countries and others;

(x) Noting with regret that the Marseilles Declaration fails to give weight to the need to ensure that the rights and interests of WEU non-EU nations are safeguarded in full once the Petersberg missions and activities of the Satellite Centre and Institute for Security Studies are transferred to the European Union,

1. WELCOMES progress in the EU towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy, but nevertheless CONSIDERS that the decision to eliminate WEU entirely as a political factor in a European security and defence architecture which is still incomplete is at the present time premature and unfortunate;
2. Consequently IS YET TO BE CONVINCED by the decision reached in Marseilles to end the dialogue and cooperation established between the WEU countries and third countries, in the knowledge that if these take place in the European Union, WEU non-EU member countries will be excluded from them;
3. Likewise IS YET TO BE CONVINCED by the decision reached in Marseilles to suspend all consultation between WEU on the one hand and the European Union and NATO on the other, which would lead to those WEU Council functions that remain being cut off from the development of other aspects of the European security and defence dimension;
4. CONSIDERS highly regrettable the decision reached in Marseilles to terminate the work in WEU of the Open Skies experts' group given that:

5. URGES the Council at 28 to continue its regular dialogue with the Assembly at 28 as the parliamentary forum for debate on security and defence policy encompassing all interested European countries as advocated by the French Presidency;
6. PROPOSES that this intergovernmental and interparliamentary forum for debate should include Cyprus and Malta;
7. URGENTLY REQUESTS a joint meeting with the Council to evaluate the impact of the decisions taken in Marseilles and Nice on the future work of the Council and the Assembly and on their relationship with one another;
8. REQUESTS its Presidential Committee to proceed as necessary to carry out an in-depth examination of the implications of the decisions taken in Marseilles and Nice for the Assembly's future work.

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RECOMMENDATION 678

(i) Welcoming the substantial progress being made by European Union member countries towards developing a decision-making capability and a rapid reaction force to enable the Union to assume the full range of Petersberg tasks in response to international crises;

(ii) Mindful of other outstanding matters such as the financial implications of achieving European Union ambitions, the modalities of EU/NATO cooperation, involvement of non-EU allied and EU-applicant countries in the CESDP, the decision-making process and harmonisation of civilian and military crisis management, the role of the High Representative and whether Treaty amendments are necessary;

(iii) Regretting the fact that the European Council was unable to agree WEU's full integration into the EU, thus giving a full defence dimension to the Union, as implied in the Amsterdam Treaty, with the result that responsibilities for crisis management and collective defence are now exercised separately, by different organisations, on the basis of different treaties;

(iv) Welcoming the Council's confirmation that the collective defence commitment provided for under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty will remain valid and that there is no thought of denouncing that Treaty on the part of its signatories;

(v) Welcoming WEU members' resolve that the Organisation should have the structures necessary to fulfil its commitments under the modified Brussels Treaty;

(vi) Stressing the importance of the Council examining carefully all areas in which WEU should continue to exercise the functions arising from the modified Brussels Treaty;

(vii) Stressing the utmost importance of continued involvement on the part of the associate member, associate partner and observer countries in the Council's future activities;

(viii) Convinced that any decision to suspend or cease certain WEU activities, such as dialogue and cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and the non-WEU Mediterranean countries, would be counterproductive, as such activities continue to be in the interest of the relevant interlocutors and cover areas that cannot properly be taken over by the European Union;

(ix) Paying tribute to the important contribution the Transatlantic Forum is making to raising awareness in the United States of efforts being made to give Europe a security and defence dimension;

(x) Underlining the importance of continuing regular consultation between WEU and NATO in the areas both of ESDI and collective defence, bearing in mind that NATO has military responsibility for guaranteeing Europe's defence not only on the basis of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty but also of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, whose stricter commitments are binding on only 10 out of 19 alliance member countries;

(xi) Recalling that ESDI is not the same project as ESDP and deploring that neither the annual report nor the Marseilles Declaration make any reference to the future of ESDI even though there is uncertainty as to whether the European Union is able and willing to take over WEU's role in this context;

(xii) Reiterating its conviction that if enhanced cooperation is extended to the second pillar of the European Union, the form of such cooperation should not be restricted exclusively to the EU institutional framework;

(xiii) Recalling Recommendation 626 advocating that interested associate member and associate partner countries should have the opportunity of participating fully in the CFSP without waiting until they have completed European Union accession procedures;

(xiv) Noting the European Union's decision to take over the WEU Satellite Centre and the Institute for Security Studies;

(xv) Recalling that it is unclear how long a transitional period may be required before the European Union becomes fully operational and that WEU must remain so in the meantime - particularly its military staff and all bodies involved in preparing WEU/NATO exercises, as well as these concerned with the implementation of tasks carried out at the request of the European Union;

(xvi) Noting that EU governments have no intention of settling the matter of parliamentary scrutiny over the CESDP at the Nice Summit and that this is consequently an area likely to suffer from a lack of accountability (democratic deficit);

(xvii) Welcoming nevertheless the confirmation from the French Presidency of the Assembly's unique position as a wider forum, bringing together 28 countries, for consultation, reflection and exchanges of views on security and defence issues and for promoting a European defence culture among the public at large - an apposite description of its new role as the interim European Security and Defence Assembly;

(xviii) Finding it extremely disappointing that the Council did not feel able to give an adequate account of the Assembly's work in the Marseilles Declaration;

(xix) Noting with interest the renewed debate on the possibility of a second parliamentary chamber of the European Union in order to complete its democratic dimension;

(xx) Noting also recent proposals from the European Parliament designed to offer representatives of national parliaments a limited opportunity for involvement in parliamentary scrutiny over the CESDP;

(xxi) Stressing that any discussion leading to a decision about future parliamentary scrutiny over the CESDP at European level must involve the WEU Assembly and may form a part of the agenda of a further intergovernmental conference dealing with the wholesale reshaping of the EU parliamentary dimension;

(xxii) Stressing the absolute necessity of the Assembly being kept fully informed about the way the European Union is to discharge the Petersberg responsibilities, particularly if EU governments decide that the new arrangements do not require changes to the Treaty on European Union,

1. Continue to fulfil all its obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty, the exercise of which WEU has not legally transferred to other organisations, and in particular those arising from Articles IV, V, VIII, IX and XI, and the relevant Protocols and resolutions, especially those concerning the forces of WEU countries placed under NATO command;
2. Maintain regular consultation with NATO with a view to maintaining scrutiny over the latter's responsibility for the discharge, militarily, of the mutual assistance clause under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty;
3. Inform the Assembly as to what remains of the concept of ESDI and how and by whom this concept is to be implemented in future;
4. In the light of Mr Solana's admission that the "EU cannot simply replicate the arrangements of WEU" but must "craft something much more sophisticated", inform the Assembly as to which elements of the WEU/NATO framework agreement on the release, monitoring and return or recall of NATO assets and capabilities and of the NATO/WEU consultation arrangements must be replaced by relevant EU/NATO arrangements and which can remain unchanged;
5. Inform the Assembly as to how it plans to implement the WEU exercise programme prepared for the period 2001-2005;
6. Continue to meet regularly at ambassadorial and ministerial level with full participation on the part of all associate member, associate partner and observer countries, making full use of WEU as an enlarged forum for general strategic reflection on European security and defence matters and possibly as a framework for enhanced cooperation, in accordance with Article 17.4 of the TEU;
7. At 28, develop a comprehensive assessment of future risks and threats to Europe's security, with particular emphasis on the territorial integrity of its member countries, and transform it into a new common security concept of all 28 WEU nations drawing, among other reports, on the reports drafted by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations dealing with the position of institutions engaged in security and defence research in WEU associate member and associate partner countries;
8. Make dynamic use of Article V provisions by allowing interested European NATO countries that are EU-applicant states to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty in conformity with Article XI, thus paving the way for the European Union assuming common defence responsibilities at a later stage;
9. Fully support the request of certain associate member EU-applicant countries to become CFSP and CESDP full members without waiting until the EU accession procedure has been completed;
10. Comply to the full with its obligations under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and in particular paragraph 3 thereof which deals both with crisis management and collective defence;
11. Continue to transmit an annual report to the Assembly covering all the relevant Treaty areas, including military and civilian crisis-management aspects, and support the Assembly's function as a wider forum for discussion on security and defence;
12. Ensure that the Presidency of the Council continues to brief the Assembly on a regular basis;
13. Strongly support requests from the Assembly to hold briefing sessions with the PSC and/or the Chairmanship of the EU General Affairs Council on CESDP matters;
14. Harmonise its activities with those of the forthcoming Presidency of the European Union and ensure that any initiative envisaged by the EU Presidency concerning discussion of the parliamentary dimension of the CESDP is taken in cooperation with and with the involvement of WEU and its Assembly;
15. Ensure that transfer of the Satellite Centre to the European Union is achieved in such a way as to guarantee that WEU associate member country involvement in the Centre's activities is not reduced or affected in any way and that the Satellite Centre continues to be available to WEU;
16. Ensure that transfer of the WEU Institute for Security Studies to the European Union does not affect its close working relations with WEU and its Assembly;
17. Ensure that, when a decision is taken on the future of the Transatlantic Forum, any successor body continues fully to involve the Assembly in its activities to strengthen transatlantic understanding and cooperation;
18. Examine carefully those elements of its dialogue and cooperation with third countries such as Russia, Ukraine and the non-WEU Mediterranean countries that should preferably continue to be exercised in WEU, before reaching any decision to turn the whole over to the European Union;
19. Continue to exercise oversight of the cooperation between WEU member countries which are parties to the Open Skies Treaty;
20. Continue to monitor closely UN and OSCE activities;
21. Give WEAG and WEAO the political impetus they need and respond more positively to the interest of associate partner countries such as Bulgaria in joining both bodies;
22. Ensure that the WEU Secretariat-General remains sufficiently strong to service, as necessary, WEU's future tasks and those of WEAG and WEAO;
23. Continue and redouble the effort to find appropriate solutions for those staff members of the Secretariat-General and of WEU's subsidiary bodies who cannot be retained by the Organisation, and ensure that they take account of the professional expertise and legitimate expectations of such staff.

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RECOMMENDATION 679

(i) Taking account of the different European armaments cooperation structures whose purpose is to resolve the problems posed by operational convergence, company law, exports, legal and taxation systems and the coordination of research and development and procurements;

(ii) Welcoming the work done in this area by those bodies within WEU, the EU and NATO, as well as the efforts undertaken by a number of countries outside those institutions, for example in the framework of OCCAR and the LoI;

(iii) Taking the view, nevertheless, that the abundance of such bodies is evidence of the persistence of a number of fundamental problems linked with the harmonisation of the policies of countries with different and, in some cases, divergent cultures and interests;

(iv) Noting that the most sensitive issues concern operational convergence, synchronising procurements and budgetary harmonisation and that those issues have been under study for some considerable time, in particular within WEAG and POLARM, without a satisfactory solution having been reached;

(v) Considering that operational convergence and procurement policy are determined by a country's military culture, international spheres of interest and defence budget, and in many cases also by strictly industrial considerations;

(vi) Stressing that true operational convergence and harmonisation of procurements will become a reality when all countries agree on the need for a common defence policy geared to common goals;

(vii) Taking the view that even if the abovementioned questions can be gradually resolved, structural problems will remain in connection with the industrial return on collaborative projects and the harmonisation of export legislation;

(viii) Considering that abandoning the juste retour principle, as recommended by the LoI, should go hand in hand with the growing specialisation of the different companies that are party to a merger - as is already the case within Airbus - and that individual tasks should not be divided up;

(ix) Considering that this type of structure concerning the industries of all European countries should play a decisive role in favour of the European preference, since each country will have a vested interest in developing the trans-European group;

(x) Noting furthermore that WEAO and OCCAR constitute a major step forward, as compared with previous bodies, given that they have a legal personality allowing them to place and manage contracts, to harmonise the procurement policies of the participating states and to coordinate their R&D, as well as, in the case of OCCAR, to organise its own procurement policy;

(xi) Taking the view that some progress has also been achieved as a result of the LoI, given that it is geared towards an integration of defence industries - its aim being to standardise procedures for mergers among transnational companies - and hence advocates a number of rules governing access to research data, the standardisation of technology transfers, the harmonisation of export rules and the interdependence of European companies for the supply of defence equipment;

(xii) Aware that while the achievements of OCCAR and the LoI are unquestionable, governments are still not prepared to give up certain prerogatives;

(xiii) Considering furthermore that the greatest caution is called for with regard to armaments exports, particularly to areas of actual or potential conflict;

(xiv) Noting that, as regards mergers in its defence industry, Europe was confronted with companies of different nationalities, governed by different rules, whose ties with the state varied in strength from one country to another, and that market forces were therefore not enough to bring about consolidation, making government involvement necessary;

(xv) Stressing that for mergers to be a real success, two essential conditions must be met: first of all, companies must have the legal possibility to engage in mergers among themselves. Secondly, their various governments must create the conditions in which such mergers are feasible, inter alia by harmonising standards, export legislation and the possibilities for technology transfers;

(xvi) Welcoming the creation of EADS which, by merging the aeronautical activities of Aerospatiale Matra, CASA and DaimlerChrysler Aerospace, represents a decisive step towards the development of a Common European Security and Defence Policy;

(xvii) Acknowledging that the complex structure of the new company is imposed by the difficulty inherent in creating a transnational group from companies deemed by their respective states to be of strategic importance;

(xviii) Considering that, pending the introduction of a fully practicable European procedure for harmonising the policies of the different defence companies in the group, EADS may in the short term be confronted with a number of problems pertaining to technology transfers and export duties, not to mention the day-to-day legal difficulties inherent in the merger of companies of different nationalities;

(xix) Noting that while there is no immediate cause for concern about the company's profitability and operations, one may nevertheless wonder about the longer-term rationale of the merger, as long as defence budgets remain limited and there is not a more satisfactory solution to the problems of operational convergence, juste retour and harmonisation of defence budgets;

(xx) Taking the view, furthermore, that the creation of EADS should not have repercussions for the maintenance of production sites and related jobs;

(xxi) Considering that in Europe the role of the state is perceived more in terms of controlling industry than of supporting it by means of a dynamic approach like that taken in the United States, where the state keeps up the level of R&D investments even when military budgets are shrinking,

1. Grant increased support to the activities of WEAG and WEAO and give them the necessary political impetus;
2. Promote the participation of associate partner countries interested in armaments cooperation within WEAG and WEAO;
3. Encourage the arms-producing countries to speed up the efforts they are making to facilitate and support the setting-up of transnational defence companies;
4. Ensure that:

(a) the juste retour principle is geared to specialisation based on existing capacities in certain countries, rather than dividing up individual tasks;

(b) the European Code of Conduct is amended in order to rule out different interpretations, in particular as regards exports to crisis zones in which human rights are at risk or to areas on the brink of a conflict;

(c) the provisions of the LoI concerning on the one hand, the possibility for governments to force transnational defence companies to maintain certain national industrial capacities, even when economic arguments speak against it, and on the other hand, the system for transmitting classified information, are revised in order to avoid hampering the internal operations of those companies;

(d) as states disengage from their defence industries, the European Union gradually assumes responsibility for defining common criteria and standards, in particular in order to regulate public defence procurements;

(e) the policy of state control over the defence industry is replaced by a policy of supporting that industry by means of the necessary investments in R&D;

(f) further efforts are made in order to settle questions pertaining to operational convergence, synchronising procurements, company law, legal and taxation systems and technology transfers;

(g) the POLARM and COARM groups are strengthened in order to encourage the application of the LoI agreement;

(h) industry is encouraged to continue the process of restructuring at the level of both systems companies and suppliers, with a view to the medium-term aim of opening up the defence markets in the United States and European Union, among other things by promoting multilateral free trade and avoiding bilateral preferential treatment;

5. Set about establishing the European Armaments Agency, providing a broad framework for all WEAG members, to whom a set of general rules would apply, as well as a narrower framework for any countries wishing to reach agreement among themselves on specific rules. The task of that Agency would be a common European procurement based on harmonised requirements, procurement rules and timetables.

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RECOMMENDATION 680

(i) Conscious that the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction represents a growing threat to international security;

(ii) Welcoming the efforts being undertaken to combat the proliferation of missiles, in particular in the framework of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement;

(iii) Considering nevertheless that those efforts are still not sufficient to effectively curb proliferation and the risks it entails for international security;

(iv) Recalling in that regard the recent joint statement by Presidents Putin and Clinton in which they affirmed their resolve to strengthen the international legal instruments for the control of armaments, in particular the MTCR, to draw up a code of conduct on missiles and to establish a global control system for the non-proliferation of missiles and related technologies;

(v) Considering that the 1972 ABM Treaty between the United States and Russia is the cornerstone of the arms control process, in particular as regards weapons of mass destruction;

(vi) Noting that deployment of the National Missile Defense (NMD) system could entail the risk of violating the ABM Treaty;

(vii) Considering the advantages that transatlantic cooperation at all levels and on the basis of an equal partnership could offer to the cooperating parties in the field of anti-missile defence;

(viii) Welcoming the recent commencement of institutionalised discussions within NATO on the National Missile Defense system;

(ix) Noting the collective discussions within NATO on theatre missile defence as well as the cooperation among the United States, Germany and Italy within the MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defence System) programme;

(x) Considering the interest Russia has expressed in participating in a European anti-missile defence system and WEU's policy of encouraging deeper cooperation with Russia;

(xi) Aware of the serious consequences that the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty could have for international stability, and for the relations between the United States and Russia in particular;

(xii) Taking the view that it is urgent for Europe to adopt a common position on anti-missile defence before seeking agreement with the United States in the Alliance framework;

(xiii) Considering that President Clinton's decision to leave the NMD deployment decision to his successor provides Europe with the opportunity to give careful thought to this matter;

(xiv) Recalling in that regard Assembly Resolution 103 of June 2000, calling on the governments of the WEU member states that are also members of NATO to present a common position defined by all 28 WEU nations and all EU member states;

(xv) Regretting the negative reply to that Resolution of the WEU Council which, although it recognised the importance of this question, stated that the matter was not on the agenda of any of its forthcoming meetings;

(xvi) Recalling in this connection that all anti-missile defence issues fall within the scope of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty;

(xvii) Considering that several years are required to develop and deploy an anti-missile defence system,

1. Express concern about the risk of a new arms race provoked by a unilateral programme of such magnitude and with such far-reaching implications as NMD;
2. Task the Special Working Group to resume immediately the process of reflection on anti-missile defence and to that end:

3. Urge the United States, whilst acknowledging its right to take such defence measures regarding conventional weapons as it deems necessary, to recognise its commitment to NATO allies, to consult fully with them on any decision to proceed with an NMD programme and to invite them to share in the burden of such a programme;
4. Keep the Assembly informed of progress on studies on the development of a European space-based observation system;
5. Inform the Assembly whether, in accordance with paragraph 38 of the Noordwijk Declaration, an independent early-warning capability has been studied and, if so, what conclusions have been reached.

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RECOMMENDATION 681

(i) Recognising the fundamental importance for European security of the transatlantic partnership, based on shared values, and stressing that the interoperability of European means with those of the United States is imperative for inter-allied operations;

(ii) Taking account nonetheless of the uncertainty surrounding American policy as regards engagement in outside theatres;

(iii) Welcoming the European Union's political resolve to acquire a capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, in order to respond to international crises where NATO as a whole is not engaged;

(iv) Aware that autonomous European crisis-management operations are feasible only if Europeans succeed in narrowing the technological gap that exists between Europe and the United States;

(v) Considering that this gap now makes it urgent for European countries to coordinate their defence research priorities more closely;

(vi) Noting that the technological gap between Europe and the United States affects the development and production of military equipment far more than technological capabilities;

(vii) Noting the correlation between technological innovation and general economic growth;

(viii) Stressing the crucial importance for Europe of establishing a strong and competitive defence industrial and technological base, which is an essential corollary to development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP);

(ix) Recalling that the Declaration adopted by the WEU countries on the occasion of the Maastricht Summit on 10 December 1991 already referred to "enhanced cooperation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency";

(x) Conscious that Europe has not yet succeeded in acquiring the instruments necessary for a common armaments policy despite the efforts it has made to this end;

(xi) Recalling also that WEAO was created as a forerunner of a future European armaments agency and that the WEAO Charter specifies that when WEAG Ministers decide that the conditions to move to a full European armaments agency are met, it is the intention that this agency will become the WEAO Executive Body and will absorb the Research Cell;

(xii) Noting that, notwithstanding the different strategies and interests of European countries and the inequality of their technological standing, it is important that all of them should have a fair share and that they should reconcile their differences in view of the need to cooperate with the United States;

(xiii) Considering that defence research is essential for developing the technological expertise of the future, so that Europe can take effective action to promote peacekeeping in its immediate environment and safeguard its security in the face of any threats it might face;

(xiv) Observing that a Europe-wide technological drive needs to be based on a shared perception of new risks and operational military requirements;

(xv) Stressing the substantial budget gap that separates American defence research activities from those in Europe, and the inadequate synergy among European countries, whose budgets are fragmented;

(xvi) Noting that, in view of recent efforts to restructure European defence industries, it is now indispensable to create the institutional conditions in Europe which will allow European companies to enjoy the same conditions as their main competitors, in particular those in the United States;

(xvii) Emphasising the essential role the European Union must play in order to bring about the legal and fiscal reforms that are necessary to create a single European market for defence equipment;

(xviii) Noting that even though Europeans do not have the same power or capacity for design and development that exist in the United States in the field of space, the efforts some European countries have made over thirty years have nonetheless enabled them to master the most advanced space technologies for civil and military applications;

(xix) Considering the importance of information technologies in meeting military requirements, the possibilities they offer for civilian-military synergy and the energy being put into them by both Europeans and Americans,

1. Give greater prominence in its annual report to the Assembly to the activities of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) and the Research Cell of the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO);
2. Prepare a report on the future risks Europe is likely to face and a discussion paper on a common operational doctrine;
3. Ensure that European countries keep the long-term operational requirements of European armed forces under constant review for the purpose of ensuring the convergence of their armaments policies, drawing in particular on the framework of Eurolongterm, whose structures should be strengthened even further;
4. Seek to define a European joint vision of the way forward in defence research;
5. Establish common technology goals to that end by updating the SCITEC Study on Science and Technology Strategy carried out under WEAG auspices in 1998, and by clearly identifying those technological areas in which Europe is lagging behind the United States;
6. Strengthen the structures of WEAG and WEAO and step up their activities;
7. Specify what the role of the future European armaments agency should be and report on current thinking in this connection, with a view to the agency becoming the WEAO Executive Body and absorbing the Research Cell;
8. Increase the research budgets of European countries and coordinate their use more effectively;
9. Decide to create, in the appropriate framework, a common European fund for defence research;
10. Initiate, also in the appropriate framework, a discussion among the ministers concerned with a view to launching dual-technology research programmes, giving priority to areas considered strategic;
11. Use the successful experience of the Franco-German Saint Louis Research Institute as a model for ensuring that the various European countries organise defence research in a more satisfactory manner;
12. Create a body with responsibility for ensuring that the military sector benefits fully from the rapid progress the civil sector has made in information technologies, and for conducting a strategic review of the most crucial technological areas;
13. Have more systematic recourse to the joint development of technological demonstrator facilities;
14. Ensure that all European countries have a fair share in multilateral European armaments cooperation bodies, with this to apply in particular to the WEU associate partners within WEAG and WEAO and that the "smaller countries" participate on an equitable basis in the development and production of defence equipment, and encourage industrial restructuring in Europe;
15. Actively pursue the dialogue with the American authorities in order to forge between defence research institutes in the United States and those in the European Union countries working together as centres of excellence, an extensive, permanent and balanced transatlantic link going beyond a mere exchange of information so as to result in joint projects;
16. Ask the United States to come down clearly in favour of fair cooperation on both sides of the Atlantic and to take practical steps to remove the political, legal and administrative obstacles which stand in the way;
17. Urge the EU member states to update the conclusions of the WEU audit of assets and capabilities for European crisis-management operations and, in the CESDP framework, make a more detailed assessment of the requirements Europeans still need to meet in terms of capabilities if they are to be able to take autonomous action where necessary and achieve a level of optimum interoperability with the Americans in the event of a joint operation;
18. Encourage the WEU nations to develop, as a cooperative venture, space observation, surveillance and communications systems whose use could be shared in military operations conducted by European countries;
19. Urge the EU member states to work towards creating a European company status, and to proceed with the harmonisation of export rules and guarantees, procurement regulations and legal standards for defence equipment with a view to creating a single European market in this field.

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RECOMMENDATION 682

(i) Recalling Recommendation 671 adopted on 6 June 2000, in which it calls for the Council to "support, with the assistance of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, the establishment of more effective channels of communication with the institutions in the associate member countries specialising in international policy, with a view to the wider dissemination to the public at large of information about WEU 's thinking on the future of Europe's security and defence";

(ii) Considering that the Council's reply to that Recommendation confirms the resolve of the WEU Institute for Security Studies to involve the institutions of the 28 WEU nations, but that some of those institutions remain isolated and their approach somewhat outmoded;

(iii) Noting that the Marseilles decisions on the transfer to the European Union of the WEU Institute for Security Studies create a new situation in which it is the Assembly's wish that the Institute will continue to disseminate information on security and defence issues pertaining to the wider Europe;

(iv) Noting, once again, the growing public interest in European security and defence issues;

(v) Convinced of the need to create a common European security culture and to establish training programmes for the public at large as well as political authorities of those countries which, once they have completed the process of political, economic and social transformation, will join European institutions,

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RESOLUTION 104

(i) Highlighting the major current expansion in sub-regional cooperation between countries with common interests or a shared history or geography;

(ii) Noting that in central and southern Europe and the parts of the region located around the Mediterranean and the Black Sea and the Balkan Peninsula, where a number of conflicts have erupted between various countries, peace is still unstable and economic development very uneven;

(iii) Drawing attention to the fact that forms of sub-regional cooperation provide a framework for dialogue whereby the risk of new conflicts emerging in Europe can be reduced, and that they make an important contribution to the stability of central and southern Europe;

(iv) Welcoming with satisfaction the outcome of the Barcelona Conference in 1995 - of major significance in contributing to resolving the problems of the countries bordering on the Mediterranean - the setting up of a Mediterranean parliamentary forum, major developments in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and its Assembly and the advance of democracy in Yugoslavia and the Balkans;

(v) Aware of the difficulties these organisations are encountering in finding quick, practical solutions;

(vi) Convinced of the importance of the role parliamentary diplomacy can play in creating an awareness among national parliaments of the usefulness of interparliamentary dialogue in settling common problems,

1. To deepen interparliamentary cooperation on matters of common interest and, as a priority, in the more sensitive regions of central and southern Europe;
2. To encourage existing organisations and assemblies to pay an active part;
3. To request all governments concerned to engage in mutual information drives and cooperation efforts with a view to working together more effectively for economic development and consolidation of peace and national security in the regions concerned;
4. To encourage national parliaments to mount a campaign to inform and educate the public more widely about sub-regional cooperation issues;
5. To support the creation of parliamentary cooperation networks, to include national parliamentary, sub-regional and international assemblies;
6. To encourage representatives of national assemblies to attend the meetings of sub-regional organisations;
7. To take part in meetings directed towards promoting exchanges between parliamentarians from the countries of those regions of Europe involved in joint projects;
8. To make available the necessary resources for regular, effective exchange between national and sub-regional parliamentary assemblies;
9. To foster exchanges between parliamentary committees and contacts between parliamentarians on social, economic and cultural matters and issues relating to immigration, security, women, health, employment, the environment, human rights, etc.;
10. To promote exchanges between their committees for foreign affairs, defence, cooperation and the economy, and between the latter and their counterparts in international assemblies, and in particular with the Assembly of WEU, so as to contribute to solving problems relating to security, peacekeeping, defence and economic development.

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RECOMMENDATION 683

(i) Recognising the crucial importance of the Balkan Peninsula for the stability and security of Europe as a whole;

(ii) Aware of the proven value of the MAPEXT mission in Albania;

(iii) Welcoming the recent success in the presidential elections in Yugoslavia, which could influence favourably the whole political climate of the region;

(iv) Satisfied with the progress of democratisation in Croatia, which has also had a positive influence on Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(v) Welcoming the successful organisation of local government elections in Kosovo, though deeply regretting the fact that the Serb community did not take part;

(vi) Gratified by the successful organisation of local government elections in Albania, but concerned by instances of electoral improprieties in those parts of the country inhabited by a Greek ethnic minority, in particular the region of Himara;

(vii) Regretting nevertheless that the Council of the European Union has had to withdraw its financial contribution towards the collection and destruction of weapons in Albania, abrogating in consequence the Decision of 10 May 1999;

(viii) Deploring the fact that, especially in Republika Srpska, war criminals continue to go unpunished, in many cases occupying important positions, thus hampering the entire normalisation process and stabilisation of the region;

(ix) Recognising that in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania, international forces still face persistent difficulties over policing, due both to the present ethnic tensions and criminal activities;

(x) Aware that a complete return to normal in the Balkans will require time and systematic effort on the part of local forces and the international community,

1. Maintain and strengthen the MAPEXT mission in Albania, which is to be taken over by the European Union;
2. Examine the possible widening of MAPEXT's mandate to allow it to contribute to law enforcement;
3. Continue closely to monitor developments in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina and be ready to cooperate to the full in establishing the rule of law, possibly through involvement in international policing there;
4. Take the necessary steps, in line with the spirit of the Presidency conclusions to the Feira Summit, towards establishing a permanent European police force, in particular through the designation of sufficient numbers of police officers to be available at short notice;
5. Organise for such police contingents from various countries stardardised training on a systematic basis;
6. Cooperate closely with the EU over the above tasks.

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