TEXTS ADOPTED

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Texts adopted (June 2000)

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Texts adopted
(June 2000)

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RECOMMENDATION 665

(i) Aware of the crucial importance of the WEU associate member countries to peace and security in Europe;

(ii) Taking account of the central role of the associate members in all WEU institutions since the creation of associate member status;

(iii) Welcoming the stated readiness of the six countries concerned to continue to contribute to European defence through its new institutions;

(iv) Noting with concern, however, that neither the Cologne nor the Helsinki European Councils gave a clear response to the matter of an appropriate form of participation for associate members in the new Common European Security and Defence Policy;

(v) Recalling Decision 23 adopted at the special session of the Assembly in Lisbon;

(vi) Noting with concern that the level of participation of the associate members in the ESDP may not match up to that currently offered them in WEU, given that the Helsinki European Council reaffirmed that such participation will be "without prejudice to the Union's decision-making autonomy";

(vii) Noting with concern therefore that the associate members may be consulted only in the event of NATO assets being used or where their own national forces are involved in peace operations, while their current participation in WEU is analogous to that of the full members;

(viii) Noting with concern that contrary to the spirit of Amsterdam, the European Council no longer plans to absorb WEU acquis in its entirety, including associate member participation, and envisages taking only WEU's operational aspects into the ESDP;

(ix) Expressing its disquiet that, to the extent that all WEU structures are not to be taken into the European Union in the immediate future and that the associate members are not represented in the ESDP interim bodies, their ability to play a continuing part in European defence may be compromised,

1. Endeavour to secure for the associate members participation rights in the new security and defence architecture that are at least equivalent to those they at present enjoy in WEU;
2. Encourage a global agreement with the group of six countries concerned such that their rights and obligations are laid down in a clear and uniform way;
3. Ensure that when certain WEU structures are transferred to the EU, associate member participation remains at present levels;
4. Support the Assembly's intention to offer the associate members participation rights that are at least equivalent to the present arrangements once it is transformed into an interim security and defence assembly, in accordance with the decision taken in Lisbon;
5. Support the transfer of an equivalent of the present parliamentary dimension of WEU to the European security and defence framework in accordance with Assembly Decision 23 adopted in Lisbon;
6. Secure participation for the associate members in the work of the interim bodies set up in the ESDP framework.

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RECOMMENDATION 666

(i) Thanking the Council for rapidly conveying the second part of its forty-fifth annual report and the detailed information contained therein;

(ii) Noting that the Council's informal reflection process on Security and Defence Europe deals with the preparation of WEU's legacy and problems connected with the inclusion of those WEU functions that the European Union regards as necessary to fulfil its responsibilities in the area of crisis management, but that the parliamentary dimension is not part of that process;

(iii) Aware that the Council and the Assembly will continue to exist for as long as the modified Brussels Treaty remains in force and that they both bear the prime responsibility for application of the Treaty;

(iv) Reminding the Council nevertheless that the modified Brussels Treaty assigns it responsibilities with a view to promoting the progressive integration of Europe and cooperation with other European organisations and that the Treaty on European Union, which states that WEU is an integral part of its development, confers upon it additional tasks in respect of the European Union;

(v) Recalling that the parliamentary dimension of European security and defence forms part of WEU's legacy and that the Council must exercise its responsibility with a view to guaranteeing the continuity of such dimension;

(vi) Stressing the fundamental importance of WEU's responsibility to ensure that the establishment of direct cooperation between the European Union and NATO can be successfully achieved once WEU ceases to play its pivotal role between the European Union and NATO;

(vii) Stressing also the need for the Council urgently to clarify what is to become of those WEU responsibilities that are not transferred to the European Union and the resultant consequences for WEU as an Organisation;

(viii) Strongly desirous that WEU, whose major achievements since its reactivation laid the foundations for the initiatives that led to the Cologne and Helsinki decisions, should do its utmost to further the success of projects to be finalised between now and the end of 2000;

(ix) Welcoming with satisfaction the Declaration issued at the Helsinki Summit which confirms that the European Union recognises that primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security lies with the United Nations Security Council,

1. Take the measures necessary for WEU to ensure that the collective defence commitment provided for in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty is effectively maintained, taking account of the recent decisions concerning the European Security and Defence Policy;
2. Pursue its process of informal reflection on Security and Defence Europe and include the parliamentary dimension within it on the basis of the proposals contained in Assembly Recommendation 664;
3. Propose to the European Union that, on the basis of the work undertaken by the Portuguese presidency and joint proposals put forward by Britain and France, it establish a Consultative Council for the CESDP bringing together European Union member states, EU applicant countries and non-EU European members of NATO, which would meet at least twice a year at ministerial level;
4. Ensure, while respecting the European Union's decision-making autonomy, that the delegations of the non-EU European members of NATO and of the EU applicant countries have participation rights in the Consultative Council for the CESDP at least equivalent to those they have acquired in the WEU Council as associate members and associate partners;
5. Propose to the European Council that the European Union sign a protocol to be appended to the Treaty on European Union, stipulating that the Consultative Council for the CESDP - without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 4 and 21 - shall make an annual report on those of its activities under the CFSP which have defence implications, to the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA) composed of representatives of the fifteen parliaments of the signatory states of the Treaty on European Union, representatives of the fifteen parliaments of the EU applicant countries and the non-EU European members of NATO, and representatives of the European Parliament;
6. Ensure that the delegations of the non-EU European members of NATO and of the EU applicant countries have participation rights in the European Security and Defence Assembly that are at least equivalent to those they have acquired in the WEU Assembly as associate members and associate partners;
7. Do what is necessary to ensure that during the transitional period WEU is in a position to respond more effectively to any requests from the European Union to develop and implement actions of the Union, anticipating them in so far as is possible;
8. Assist the European Union in framing its "headline goal" of deploying and sustaining a European force capable of carrying out the full range of Petersberg missions, on the basis of the work done by WEU, in relation especially to the illustrative Petersberg mission profiles;
9. Make public opinion and the political authorities in the member states aware of the need for additional funding to achieve the "headline goal", in particular to guarantee that the said European force is militarily self-sufficient and has the necessary capability to carry out the proposed missions;
10. Ensure that the function WEU currently fulfils as an essential element of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Atlantic Alliance is in future fulfilled by the European Union's CESDP;
11. Support efforts to set up flexible forms of closer cooperation in the framework of the CFSP and CESDP that are not strictly limited to European Union member states;
12. Support proposals for the WEU Secretary-General and CFSP High Representative to preside over the PSC and civilian crisis-management machinery and give him powers to convene the Council of the European Union in the event of an emergency;
13. Propose to the European Union that it base its relationship with NATO on a provision of the Treaty on European Union comparable with that of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty;
14. Prepare and transmit to the European Union an in-depth assessment of its experience in the field of crisis management and propose to the Union that it base its new responsibilities in this area on a new provision of the Treaty on European Union drawing on Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty;
15. Assist the European Union in coordinating civilian and military crisis management using the CIMIC concept as a basis and inform the Assembly about this concept;
16. Carry out an audit of those areas of the modified Brussels Treaty not transferred to the European Union and a study of the resultant consequences for WEU as an Organisation;
17. Give the Assembly an indication of the repercussions the transfer of certain WEU functions to the EU will have for the annual report the Council has to make to the Assembly, pursuant to Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty;
18. Strengthen and extend the activities of the Torrejón Satellite Centre, taking into account all the implications of its transfer to the European Union, including the fact that it works in a configuration of 16 countries, and inform the Assembly of its findings before taking any decision on such a transfer;
19. Ensure that the WEU Institute for Security Studies can continue its activities in the service of WEU and the European Union;
20. From now on, give the National Armaments Directors, and WEAG and WEAO which the Council has decided should for the time being remain WEU's responsibility, more specific guidance and a more positive political impetus, so as to strengthen European cooperation in this connection, and consult the Assembly before taking any decision on the future tasks and institutional position of such organisations;
21. Take a decision on the future of the Transatlantic Forum, ensuring that the European Union is able to take advantage of the Forum's acquis to help it organise security cooperation with the transatlantic allies:
22. Ensure that all WEU bodies for a time continue their dialogue with Russia and Ukraine and consider how the acquis represented by that dialogue can be preserved if transferred to the European Union, taking account in particular of the need for continuity of the formal relations the WEU Assembly has established with both chambers of the Russian Parliament;
23. Continue its dialogue with the southern Mediterranean countries and consult the Assembly before taking any decision as to the future of that dialogue;
24. Oppose any solution worked out within the European Union framework that seeks to reduce associate member and associate partner participation rights in missions whose implementation is to be transferred to the European Union;
25. Encourage the observer countries to commit themselves fully and without reservation to all aspects of the European Security and Defence Policy and invite their parliaments to send full delegations to the Assembly's meetings and sessions as the Assembly invites them so to do in Order 112;
26. Propose to the European Union General Affairs Council that it hold a meeting with the Assembly's Presidential Committee as soon as possible.

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OPINION 36

Considering that the Council has conveyed its decision on the draft budget of the Assembly for the year 2000,

COMMENDS the Council on having conveyed its opinion on the draft budget of the Assembly for the year 2000 before the end of 1999;

STRONGLY REGRETS that the Council did not agree to the Assembly's requests as regards permanent staff, namely the creation of two analyst posts (grade A2) in the Defence and Political Sections, and the staff incentive scheme.

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RECOMMENDATION 667

(i) that the Council has transmitted to the Assembly the budgets of the ministerial organs for the financial year 2000, which were approved in December 1999;

(ii) that the operating budgets approved consist, on the one hand, of those for the Secretariat-General, the Military Staff, the WEU Special Operations Fund, the Institute for Security Studies and the Satellite Centre and, on the other, of those for Eurocom, WEAG/WEAO and the Transatlantic Forum;

(iii) that the approved budgets also include the pensions budgets for retired WEU staff;

(iv) that the total amount of the budgets of the ministerial organs for 2000 comes to some 28 million euros, an increase of 1.2% compared with 1999;

(v) that, with this increase, the overall volume of the budgets of the ministerial organs remains unchanged;

(vi) that there is no change to the establishment tables as a whole;

(vii) that the budget year for MAPE operations runs from 12 April 1999 to 11 April 2000, and that there is no indication as to the budget beyond that period;

(viii) that the approved budgets give no indication as to funding for the mine-clearance assistance mission in Croatia that is normally funded by the EU;

(ix) that the approved budgets give no indication as to the budget implications of the decisions taken at the EU Cologne and Helsinki Summits concerning the transfer of certain WEU functions to the European Union;

(x) that the budgets do not, in particular, give any indication about the future of members of staff of the WEU ministerial organs or the possible reintegration elsewhere of those concerned by a restructuring of WEU;

(xi) that, notwithstanding insistent and repeated requests from the Assembly, WEU Paris-based staff are still affiliated to the French social security health insurance scheme pending a reply from the French authorities to a request for disaffiliation agreed by the Council and transmitted to them by the WEU Secretary-General,

1. Inform the Assembly at the earliest possible opportunity of decisions taken in respect of funding WEU operations under way and particularly those of MAPE;
2. Make representations to the French authorities in order to secure rapidly a favourable reply to WEU's request for its Paris-based staff to be disaffiliated from the French social security health insurance scheme;
3. Inform the Assembly as soon as possible of any proposals to give effect in budgetary terms to decisions concerning the profound transformation of WEU: timetable, arrangements for the staff of the ministerial organs, resources for WEU's residual functions, funding for pensions, etc.;
4. Ensure that, in view of the high level of expertise of WEU staff, the transfer of certain functions of WEU to the European Union is accompanied by a corresponding transfer of the staff of the ministerial organs concerned and the continued employment of other staff.

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RECOMMENDATION 668

(i) Noting that the changes which have occurred in the geostrategic situation in Europe since the end of the cold war, in particular the break-up of former Yugoslavia and the crises in Bosnia, Albania and, more recently, in Kosovo, raise the question of the adequacy of Europe's assets for dealing with new crisis scenarios that might conceivably arise in the shorter and medium term;

(ii) Noting that missions of European forces are necessarily evolving in the direction of carrying out the tasks defined in Petersberg in June 1992;

(iii) Noting furthermore that these new missions require that states undertake operations in multinational frameworks, such as the United Nations, NATO, WEU and the European Union, or in varying forms of coalition;

(iv) Mindful of the European Union member states' commitment to democratic values, human rights and the implementation of the Stability Pact for the Balkans, and of their shared resolve to become involved in managing crises arising on the continent of Europe or at its boundaries;

(v) Welcoming the resolve shown by European Union heads of state and government in both Cologne and Helsinki to make the Union capable of autonomous and credible action in the face of international crises, in line with the Plan for Action adopted by the WEU Assembly on 16 March 1999;

(vi) Endorsing the EU member states' decision to handle the matter in the intergovernmental framework of the European Union's second pillar, which deals with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP);

(vii) Attaching great importance to the audit of assets and capabilities available for European-led crisis-management operations adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers in Luxembourg, on 23 November 1999;

(viii) Emphasising that the point of the Fifteen's decision in Helsinki to undertake crisis-management operations supported or otherwise by NATO assets and capabilities is not to compete with NATO but, as a partner, to shoulder the burden of crisis management "where NATO as a whole is not engaged";

(ix) Welcoming the progress achieved in framing a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) within the European Union and on deployment by 2003 of a European force to army corps level capable of undertaking the entire range of Petersberg missions;

(x) Stressing the importance of the decision reached at the Helsinki European Council held on 10 and 11 December 1999 to place crisis-management operations under the political control and strategic direction of the European Union, by creating collective politico-military bodies to that end, in the form of a Political and Security Committee (PSC), a Military Committee and an EU Military Staff;

(xi) Noting the establishment within the European Union from 1 March 2000 of a number of interim bodies responsible for preparatory work on decisions in respect of the future operation of the CESDP;

(xii) Aware of the importance of intelligence in the context of crisis prevention, strategic assessment and situation monitoring and of the fact that, owing to numerous psychological and political obstacles and deeply ingrained suspicions, cooperation in this area is a sensitive matter;

(xiii) Welcoming the information supplied in the annual report of the Council on progress in the operational field particularly in relation to the following:

(xiv) Stressing the supreme importance of the fifteen European Union member governments concluding an appropriate multilateral agreement with non-EU European members of NATO and applicants for accession to the European Union to allow them such collective participation rights as may be necessary in a wider European security and defence framework;

(xv) Endorsing the transfer to the European Union of certain of WEU's functions,

1. Seek to ensure that the 28 WEU member, associate member and associate partner and observer countries are fully associated with crisis-management operations in the framework of EU-led actions;
2. Seek to secure a rapid handover from the interim bodies established in the European Union on 1 March 2000 to the collective bodies envisaged in Helsinki: the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and Military Staff;
3. Conclude within a reasonable timeframe such agreements as are necessary for reorganising the relationship between the European Union, Western European Union and the Atlantic Alliance;
4. Urge European Union member governments to:

5. Improve ties between WEU, the European Union and NATO by creating a link between the European Union Military Staff and NATO and the Torrejón Satellite Centre;
6. Implement appropriate measures for shortening the Torrejón Satellite Centre's image processing times, in particular by increasing the number of image interpreters, create a proper military division in the Centre and take such steps as are necessary for its transfer to the European Union;
7. Transfer the present WEU Institute for Security Studies to the European Union so that a "think-tank" devoted to long-term European strategic defence matters exists within the EU framework.

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RECOMMENDATION 669

(i) Considering that the resolve expressed by the European Union at its Helsinki Summit to acquire a rapid reaction force suitable for conducting the missions defined in Petersberg, commanded by a common military staff and under the EU's political responsibility, calls for a transformation of Europe's intelligence assets;

(ii) Noting that the WEU Satellite Centre, which is due to be transferred to the European Union in the coming months, will be called upon in that new framework to perform new tasks;

(iii) Aware that the Cologne Declaration refers explicitly to the need for "a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning" which "may require in particular (...) a satellite centre (...)";

(iv) Considering that the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) will be implemented within the General Affairs Council by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which will assume the political and strategic direction of any operations with the assistance of the Military Committee (MC);

(v) Aware that the execution of decisions will be the task of the Military Staff (MS), which will also be responsible for generating the forces necessary for implementing the CESDP, and that in this overall framework the Satellite Centre will be called upon to participate, in conjunction with the MS, in genuine intelligence work for the purpose of applying the space-related aspects of the CESDP on the basis of arrangements which remain to be defined;

(vi) Considering that, in a context of limited defence budgets, the Centre must clearly be tailored to Europe's actual capabilities, so that the necessary financial and technological investments can be adapted accordingly;

(vii) Considering that it would make sense to give the Satellite Centre capabilities in the fields of communications, navigation, real-time data transmission and, in the longer term, early warning and electronic surveillance;

(viii) Recalling, nevertheless, that the dual nature of the Centre's tasks should be maintained and that it should maintain a capacity for civilian services;

(ix) Noting that the question of the new tasks to be assigned to the Centre raises the question of its specific nature, given that the establishment of centralised European military assets may mean either creating a military satellite-management structure, or maintaining a civilian/military structure, or else the existence of an essentially civilian structure which is placed under military authority in specific cases;

(x) Considering that the Centre's militarisation would raise a number of questions of a financial, political, technological and industrial nature;

(xi) Noting, furthermore, that a large part of military requirements could be covered by commercial sources, in particular as regards network services, transmissions and intelligence gathering, as is the case in the United States;

(xii) Considering, nevertheless, that whatever the future nature of the Centre (civilian, military or both), it would be totally inconsistent to rely solely on the commercial sector for carrying out strategic missions, and that Europe should therefore encourage the development of military programmes or of dual-capacity civilian programmes;

(xiii) Emphasising that the Centre's current status of service provider is compatible with the future tasks that Europe may give it in connection with the Petersberg missions and that, from a strictly financial point of view, it would be desirable for the Centre to be capable of supplying telecommunications, meteorological or navigation services, while continuing its remote-sensing activities;

(xiv) Deeming it necessary, furthermore, to develop a European military satellite system which is of national interest to each country, while being of global interest to Europe;

(xv) Considering that the European Union could assist with the funding of such a project in the same way as it is encouraging the development of a navigation system;

(xvi) Noting that neither WEU nor the EU has the legal competence to requisition member states' satellite assets during a crisis;

(xvii) Taking the view that whatever status is decided for the Centre, relations must be established between it and the various institutions and bodies dealing with satellite issues;

(xviii) Considering that it would be essential to involve industry in the Satellite Centre's development, to ensure that the strategic requirements expressed by Europe are in line with the expertise available in Europe;

(xix) Recalling in that regard that it is vital to draw up cooperation arrangements with ESA given the need, on the one hand, for the requisite structures to be defined in cooperation with a space agency, and on the other hand, for the European Space Agency's potential for technical analysis to be tapped, particularly in a wider security framework;

(xx) Stressing also the importance for the Satellite Centre of developing cooperation with the European Commission's Joint Research Centre;

(xxi) Noting, furthermore, that the transfer of the Satellite Centre to the European Union may give rise to problems in connection with the current status of the associate member countries and the future situation of those countries which are currently observers;

(xxii) Considering also the need to define possible relations between the Centre and NATO and the various possibilities for cooperation between them, as well as between the Centre and other organisations such as the OSCE;

(xxiii) Noting also the need to give closer consideration to the possibility of creating a European NIMA based on the proposal from Eucosat, but also taking account of other factors;

(xxiv) Emphasising that the Satellite Centre's future will depend essentially on the means that Europe is prepared to devote to it and on the realistic nature of the tasks assigned to it;

(xxv) Considering that a European defence identity cannot do without a space dimension;

(xxvi) Recalling, finally, Recommendations 646 and 660,

1. Urge WEU member countries and observer states, as members of the European Union, to ensure that the Centre is able to evolve in order to adapt its tasks to Europe's requirements, with a view to:

2. Envisage extending the tasks of the Centre in order to initiate the development of a battlefield management capability, which calls for:

3. Examine and give guidance for the Centre's status, first of all by confirming the dual nature of its tasks and the important role of the civilian market in European space strategy, and secondly, by allowing a military cell to be set up within the Centre, since intelligence and battlefield management tasks require specialised personnel and equipment;
4. Define who, apart from WEU and the EU, will be entitled to use the Centre's services, by studying the possibility of making available some of its capacity to the OSCE and NATO and envisaging coded access to the Centre's data for non-member governments and non-government customers;
5. Ensure that as far as the Centre's relations with the European authorities (PSC, EU Military Staff, WEU) are concerned, WEU will also provide for satisfactory solutions taking into account the wish of the associate members to participate in its activities and will not stand in the way of its offering its services to other governments or organisations and that it takes account of the role of the associate partners;
6. Take account of the fact that any extension of the Centre's tasks will have to take place in a limited financial framework, which means that:

7. Request the EU to co-finance with member states the satellite systems it deems necessary for the Centre and to acquire the legal and financial means to requisition member states' satellites where necessary;
8. Inform the Assembly about WEU's participation in the definition of a European space strategy.

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RECOMMENDATION 670

(i) Observing that parliamentary democracy has to develop in step with changes in society and technological advances so that the wishes of the electorate are better understood and given more effective expression;

(ii) Persuaded of the need to provide parliamentarians with increased opportunities to discuss their ideas with a view to solving problems common to the same geopolitical region;

(iii) Convinced that the WEU Assembly's many years of experience of debate on European security and defence issues has helped create a legacy of parliamentary cooperation and diplomacy that should not be fragmented,

1. Recognise, in the context of reform of the European institutions, the indispensable need for a parliamentary dimension to the debate on the Common European Security and Defence Policy and the importance of parliamentarians being able to exchange ideas at a multilateral European level;
2. Work to promote institutional assemblies providing a framework for the development of common policies, in which members of parliament of the countries concerned could contribute to the search for solutions by engaging in discussion and dialogue with other national representatives.

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RESOLUTION 102

(i) Aware that modern society is increasingly having to contend with the phenomenon of globalisation and that new challenges have to be met in framing individual national policies;

(ii) Convinced that if parliamentarians are to be able to fulfil their remit more effectively, they must have increased opportunities to meet on a more structured basis - such as in international assemblies - and exchange information on problems that are prevalent in a wider geographic context;

(iii) Persuaded that the democratic dialogue, in which parliaments are the interface between the electorate and government, cannot focus solely on national interests since these tie in with and depend on broader geopolitical interests,

1. To support the development of parliamentary cooperation networks with the assemblies of other countries and with the inter-regional and international assemblies of which they are members;
2. To join initiatives designed to promote exchanges between parliamentarians interested in the same subjects and to support endeavours in "parliamentary diplomacy" that are developing under joint programmes, particularly as regards collective security and crisis resolution;
3. To strengthen the administrative procedures and support services necessary for the efficient organisation of a permanent system of contacts and exchanges between national, inter-regional and international parliamentary assemblies.

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RECOMMENDATION 671

(i) Noting that there is an acute awareness in the WEU associate member countries of the problems arising in connection with their future cooperation with western institutions, which constitutes one of the priorities of governments;

(ii) Aware that questions pertaining to the future of Europe's common security and defence must be perceived and understood by the public at large;

(iii) Convinced that, in addition to conveying a political message, the dissemination of studies and the organisation of debates by institutions specialised in the field of security and defence can contribute to that public awareness;

(iv) Welcoming the fact that several institutions in the associate member countries are actively engaged in studies and research on foreign policy and international affairs;

(v) Conscious that the associate member countries contribute considerable sums to WEU's overall budget and that, de facto, they co-finance the WEU Institute for Security Studies, giving them certain rights, therefore, notably regarding the possible transfer of the Institute to the European Union;

(vi) Desirous that the WEU Institute for Security Studies should be able to establish a more productive network of contacts with its counterparts elsewhere, which would be conducive to transmitting and disseminating the ideas being developed within the WEU institutions,

Support, with the assistance of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, the establishment of more effective channels of communication with the institutions in the associate member countries specialising in international policy, with a view to the wider dissemination to the public at large of information about WEU's thinking on the future of Europe's security and defence.

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RESOLUTION 103

(i) Noting that the United States National Missile Defence initiative raises serious questions in the context of the global strategic balance and, consequently, European defence;

(ii) Fearing, in addition, that Russia's opposition to any revision of the ABM Treaty will give rise to a serious crisis with the United States in the event of deployment of American NMD and will thus upset the delicate global strategic balance,

the governments of the WEU members of the North Atlantic Alliance to present a joint position which is to be defined by all the countries belonging to WEU (28) and the European Union before seeking agreement with the United States in the framework of the Alliance.

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DECISION 24

Pursuant to Decision 23 of the Assembly on "European security and defence: the parliamentary dimension" adopted at the Special Session held in Lisbon on 21 March 2000,

Forthwith to use as its title and ordinary appellation:

"ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

THE INTERIM EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE ASSEMBLY".

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MANDATE FOR THE STEERING COMMITTEE FOR THE
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE ASSEMBLY

1. Pursuant to Decision 23 of the Assembly on "European security and defence: the parliamentary dimension", adopted at the Special Session held in Lisbon on 21 March 2000 and in accordance with Article VII (d) of the Charter and Rules 40.4 and 40.5 of the Rules of Procedure, it is decided to set up a special committee which shall be called:

"The Steering Committee for the
European Security and Defence Assembly"

2. The Steering Committee shall be composed of the President of the Assembly of WEU, ex officio, the Leaders of the 28 national delegations to the present Assembly of WEU (or their representatives) and the Chairmen of Political Groups (or their representatives).
3. The President of the European Parliament is invited to appoint one representative (and one substitute) to take part in the work of the Steering Committee as observers.
4. The Steering Committee for the ESDA will hold its first meeting on the morning of Thursday 8 June 2000 to elect its Chairman, three Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur and to decide its programme of work. The Steering Committee's first task will be to define its internal procedures within the parameters laid down in Decision 23.
5. Reflecting as closely as possible the intergovernmental structures (at "15 + 15") being established by the European Union for a European Security and Defence Framework, the Steering Committee will elaborate proposals on:

a.	a draft Charter for the ESDA;
b.	the remit and a legal foundation for the ESDA;
c.	the size and composition of the ESDA;
d.	the status of countries participating in the ESDA: EU member states and states which are either candidates for accession to the EU or non-EU European NATO states;
e.	the modalities for the European Parliament's participation in the ESDA;
f.	voting rights for countries participating in the ESDA and for the European Parliament;
g.	the committee structure for the ESDA;
h.	draft rules of procedure for the ESDA;
i.	administrative and other matters concerning the setting up of the ESDA;
j.	financial and budgetary arrangements for the ESDA.

6. The Steering Committee will report its proposals during the Plenary Session of the WEU Assembly in December 2000 with a view to establishing the ESDA with effect from 1 July 2001.

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RECOMMENDATION 672

(i) Acknowledging that peace, prosperity and stability in south-eastern Europe are a strategic priority for the European Union, WEU and their member states and that the EU's overall objective is the fullest possible integration of the countries of the region into the political and economic mainstream of Europe;

(ii) Recognising that with a total of 9 billion euros, the EU and its member states are by far the most important donors of aid and assistance to south-eastern Europe;

(iii) Considering that in order to ensure the substantial sums made available by donors are used to best effect, there needs to be an improvement in the way the administrative bodies responsible for the use of those funds operate and the creation of genuine transparency in financial management;

(iv) Taking the view moreover, that action is necessary against organised crime, whose influence has come to pervade the whole of the Balkans;

(v) Welcoming the positive changes taking place in Croatia following the recent legislative and presidential elections which have opened perspectives for a closer relationship between Croatia and the EU, progress on Croatia's obligations under the Dayton Peace Agreement and its unreserved commitment to regional cooperation;

(vi) Welcoming the economic reforms and political stability in FYROM which allowed it to start negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement in March 2000, while recognising that a considerable effort is still needed to carry out all the reforms that are required;

(vii) Convinced that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will continue to present the biggest threat to peace and stability in the region of south-eastern Europe as a whole for as long as President Milosevic and his regime are in power;

(viii) Acknowledging that selective sanctions aimed at that regime will remain a necessary part of the policy the EU is pursuing in its endeavours to bring about democratic change in Serbia, but considering at the same time that a serious effort must be made to develop a comprehensive dialogue with Serbian civil society at all possible levels and to support the democratic opposition;

(ix) Considering that there are doubts about the effectiveness of the sanctions policy against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which was intended first to make the FRY change its policy towards the newly independent republics of former Yugoslavia and Kosovo and then to force President Milosevic and his regime to step down, but whose sole effect so far appears to be the further isolation of the government and population of a country which is one of the essential keys to peace and prosperity in south-eastern Europe, and which has not attained the objective of bringing down the present regime;

(x) Aware of the mounting tension between the government of Montenegro and the regime in Belgrade over a more equal and democratic relationship between the two republics of the FRY that is being sought by the government of Montenegro;

(xi) Aware that President Milosevic will try to exploit the stand-off between the two republics to his own advantage, even by using force or provoking civil strife, but convinced that any dispute between the two republics has to be settled by peaceful means;

(xii) Welcoming the EU's determination to take the decisions necessary to meet Montenegro's immediate financial needs and to provide it with macro-economic assistance to help it carry out democratic reforms and achieve economic prosperity;

(xiii) Aware that Albania is still facing serious problems in terms of institutional instability, governance, basic administrative procedures and the rule of law which need to be addressed before negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement can be opened;

(xiv) Considering that the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) is playing an important role in supporting the Albanian Government's fight against crime and corruption, but convinced that it needs an extended mandate in order to allow WEU police officers to take on active police duties, while care should also be taken to ensure that its original advice and training programmes continue to be implemented;

(xv) Aware that Albania needs international support and assistance to develop its economy and society, but considering that the key to success lies in the country itself and in the hands of the political parties which should stop their feuding and join forces to deal with the country's priorities;

(xvi) Noting that the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina is making only slow progress, in particular as regards the return of refugees and displaced persons;

(xvii) Considering that in the years following the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Agreement the delicate military balance between the two entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina may have shifted to the disadvantage of the armed forces of Republika Srpska, as a result of reduced military support from the FRY stemming from sanctions and the operation in Kosovo and of qualitative and quantitative improvements of the Federation Army through the Train and Equip programme and other bilateral military support programmes;

(xviii) Regretting that the nationalist parties in power are still trying to obstruct the country's development towards a modern democratic market economy by fuelling ethnic hatred and blocking or slowing down the process of political and economic reform, as a result of which the country continues to be dependent on donors;

(xix) Considering that there is no conclusive explanation for the fact that almost five years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, SFOR has not yet detained either Radovan Karadzic or Ratko Mladic who are among the most sought-after war criminals of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(xx) Noting that insecurity, anarchy and violence are still widespread in Kosovo, notwithstanding a massive presence of foreign troops to keep the peace and guarantee security, and of international organisations to help govern and reconstruct the province;

(xxi) Recognising that UNMIK does not receive the equipment or financial support it needs to establish an effective administration, police and judiciary in Kosovo, these being essential for peace, security and stability in the country;

(xxii) Noting that uncertainty over Kosovo's future status is understandable in view of the fact that negotiations on this issue with the present regime in Belgrade are out of the question, but considering that decisions on a "political settlement" for Kosovo cannot be postponed for ever given that such a settlement will have a vital impact on such important issues as the legal system and, as a consequence, the means to be employed to fight crime, put an end to violence, develop the economy and attract foreign investment;

(xxiii) Considering that the international aid effort for the reconstruction of Kosovo is too dispersed for it to be coherent and effective and that it would be better for a number of the big donors to concentrate their efforts on rapid reconstruction of the province's basic infrastructure, establishing the basic conditions for healthy economic development;

(xxiv) Considering that the international community appears to be giving too much support to nationalist and extremist Kosovar Albanian leaders, most of whom are former members of the KLA, who do not give the impression that they are prepared to accept the principles of democratic government and who wish to keep the province under their control using whatever means are necessary;

(xxv) Emphasising the vital importance of Stability Pact projects for promoting inter-regional cooperation and improving the inter-regional infrastructure which is considered to be the backbone of economic development of the region as a whole and its integration into Europe;

(xxvi) Welcoming the results of the Stability Pact Regional Funding Conference of 29-30 March 2000 in Brussels which led to a breakthrough, with pledges of more than 2.4 billion euros for quick-start and other projects, including projects for both Kosovo and Montenegro;

(xxvii) Welcoming the progress made in the stabilisation and association process for countries in south-eastern Europe which has enabled the EU to start negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with FYROM, while other countries are to receive assistance to prepare them for the start of negotiations on such an agreement,

1. Extend MAPE's mandate in order to allow WEU police officers to take on active police duties, while making sure that MAPE's original advice and training programmes continue to be implemented;
2. Ask the European Union to make every effort to further pacify the situation in Kosovo by:

3. Ask the European Union to urge SFOR and the OSCE to see to it that the delicate balance between the armed forces of the entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina as stipulated in Annex 1B to the Dayton Peace Agreement is not being upset as a result of developments in the region since 1995, and to take the appropriate measures if such changes have taken place;
4. Ask the EU Council to give more support to a new generation of political leaders in Albania who are forward-looking;
5. Ask the EU Council to provide an evaluation of the results of economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, especially as regards the objective of bringing down President Milosevic and his regime;
6. Ask the European Union to make clear to the recipient partners in the Stability Pact that continuation of the transfer of assets depends on progress in the field of democratisation, respect for human rights and the rights of minorities, and the establishment of the rule of law and the fight against crime;
7. Ask the European Union to give support only to those political leaders in Kosovo, both Serb and Albanian, who are willing to refrain from using undemocratic means to influence the population and from fuelling ethnic hatred and intolerance openly or through illegal activities;
8. Present a six-monthly report on the implementation of the Stability Pact to the WEU Assembly, taking into account the fact that the Pact is a vital element of the peace process in south-eastern Europe.

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RECOMMENDATION 673

(i) Recalling Recommendations 651 and 663 on the situation in Kosovo where the Council was requested to:

(ii) Noting with satisfaction that the European Corps which forms part of FAWEU took command of KFOR operations as from April 2000;

(iii) Considering the efforts made by the European Corps HQ to organise and train for its role as parent HQ to KFOR from April 2000;

(iv) Preoccupied by persistent instability and insecurity in Kosovo a year after the end of Operation Allied Force;

(v) Concerned about the existence of flash-points of intercommunal tension and armed conflict, particularly in Mitrovica and along the demilitarised zone;

(vi) Considering the scope of KFOR missions, in particular for "establishing a safe environment and guaranteeing security and public order";

(vii) Considering the discussions in progress among a number of European countries with a view to setting up a multinational force for maintaining public security and law and order;

(viii) Considering the importance in the context of KFOR missions of the support role of UNMIK and provision of backup for the international humanitarian effort in liaison with governmental and non-governmental organisations and local civilian community leaders;

(ix) Expressing support for KFOR staff in carrying out their mission to make the territory secure, rebuild its infrastructure and restore law and order under the difficult conditions prevailing in Kosovo,

1. Urge European governments to support the European Corps Headquarters in its role of KFOR command in Kosovo;
2. Ask the governments of those WEU nations engaged in Kosovo to strengthen KFOR by providing military police forces trained and equipped for missions involving the maintenance of public order;
3. Support the formation in the 28 WEU nations of military units to company level for missions involving the maintenance of public order;
4. Encourage the formation of European multinational units for the purpose of providing backup to police forces or substituting for them in the context of missions involving the maintenance of public order;
5. Promote development of civilian-military cooperation and in particular support the endeavours of KFOR's CIMIC office.

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